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BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1862.

ART I.—*Étude de la Doctrine Catholique dans le Concile de Trente, proposée comme Moyen de Réunion de toutes les Communions Chrétiennes. Conférences prêchées à Genève, pendant le Jubilé de 1851, sur le Texte nouvellement traduit du Concile de Trente.* Par le R. P. NAMPON, de la Compagnie de Jésus. Paris: Mme. Vve. Poussielgue-Rusand. 1852. 12mo., pp. 720.

WE have heard Father Nampon's work spoken of as a work of rare merit, and we regret that it did not fall into our hands when we could have enjoyed the pleasure of reading it. The few pages that we have ventured to look over have satisfied us that it is an able and learned work, and perhaps the best work of its class that has recently been published. We introduce it to our readers, however, not for the purpose of analyzing its contents, or pronouncing a judgment on its merits. We do it simply to acknowledge its reception, and to thank the unknown friend who has been so kind as to send us a copy. Hereafter, should we recover the full use of our eyes, we may speak of it more at length.

Though we have no intention of reviewing Father Nampon's work, we may be permitted, we trust, to make use of its title, as a text for some general and independent remarks of our own on the method or methods of effecting the purpose for which the excellent Father has written it: namely, the Reunion of all Christian communions. It may be that he has anticipated our remarks, or that his views

and our own on the subject, perfectly coincide; and it may be that he and we differ widely as to the best method of gaining the end we both alike seek to effect. However this may be, we shall present our own views, without seeking to shelter ourselves under his authority, and without meaning to imply that there is any antagonism between him and us.

Father Nampon's title indicates that he seeks in the Definitions and Doctrinal Decrees of the Council of Trent the means of bringing about "the reunion of all Christian communions," and in this he may judge not unwisely. The Council of Trent is justly regarded as one of the greatest and most venerable of all the Councils of the Church, and its doctrinal decrees are and must be accepted by every Catholic as infallible truth. But, after all, these decrees do not cover the whole of Catholic faith. They were all framed with the view of pointing out errors to be avoided, rather than indicating truth to be believed. The most profound and diligent study of them could never, of itself alone, give us a full and adequate conception of the Catholic religion. They are negative, rather than positive, and, even when positive, fail to present us truth as a whole, or the several truths they define as integrated in the life or informing principle of the Church herself. This is no objection to the Council, and detracts nothing from the veneration due it; for it was not its purpose to draw up a *credo*, or to give an explicit statement of Catholic *credenda*. Its purpose was to condemn the errors and heresies of the Innovators and Reformers of the sixteenth century, and therefore to present Catholic truth only so far as those errors and heresies impugned it. It gives us the truth not in its entirety, but only so far as it stands opposed to certain errors and heresies, or only so far as necessary to preserve the purity and integrity of Catholic faith against them. The simple statement and exposition of its Acts may be very useful, and, indeed, very necessary to enlighten the faithful, and to guard them against the propositions condemned; but they can hardly be sufficient to bring back those who have gone astray to the unity of faith. For that it is necessary to go farther, and to integrate the definitions of the Holy Synod in the living body of Catholic truth. The heterodox have either never had, or have lost, the conception of unity, and, though not destitute of all truth, they embrace it only in its variety and multiplicity. To bring them back into the Church, to make them real and not

merely formal Catholics—Catholics from internal conviction, not merely through blind submission—it is necessary to restore in their minds that conception, and to present them truth not in detail or in fragments, but in its generative principle, in its unity and universality, as an organic whole, so that they may see that to hold the errors condemned by the Council of Trent, or by any other Council, would be not merely to deny particular definitions made on the authority of the Church, but the principle, and indeed, the whole *schema* of the Gospel, and therefore to deny Christ himself.

The question of the reunion of all Christian communions is the great question with all sincere and earnest Catholics; and no inquiry can be more important, and none should have a deeper or more absorbing interest for us, than the inquiry as to the best and surest method of effecting it. The Christian world—embracing under the term both the orthodox and the heterodox—presents to-day a sad spectacle; and nothing is more certain than that both religion and civilization suffer materially from its divisions. All honest and earnest-minded men, of whatever communion, deplore these divisions, and seek to heal them, and to re-establish unity and peace. All clear-sighted men see and understand that this unity and peace must be real, not factitious, and rest for its basis not on compromise or mutual concessions, but on the unity of truth and conviction. Truth is one, and cannot be divided. It is independent of us, above us, and ours only as it lives in our convictions, and informs our life. It has authority over us, but we have none over it. We have, therefore, no right to restrict it, to confine it, to give it away, or make any pact or compromise with error. Certain it is, then, that the reunion so ardently desired can be effected only on the basis of truth; and that unity, to be real and permanent, must be the unity of truth itself, living and operating in the convictions of all Christians. We, as Catholics, can yield, in order to effect it, nothing of truth or of Catholic faith; and the heterodox, or those separated from us, can just as little yield any thing of the truth contained in their doctrines and convictions. They are as much bound to stand fast by the truth they have, as we are to stand fast by the truth we have. Any attempt, therefore, at reunion by way of compromise, by mutual concession, would be wrong in principle, and necessarily fail in practice. The reunion is

possible only by means of a doctrine that at once embraces all truth in its unity and universality—presented to the understanding of all the parties concerned, so as to accept and integrate in dialectic harmony the several elements of truth which they may respectively hold, and which, by not being held in that harmony, now produce the divisions to be healed.

We, as Catholics, profess to have truth in its unity and universality; and, if truly Catholic, we certainly so have it. But do we, in our ordinary methods of dealing with the heterodox, actually present it to their understandings in its unity and universality? Do we present the truth we have in such a manner that it is seen to embrace in dialectic harmony the truth, or portions of truth, which it must be conceded they also have? Do we enable them to see clearly that what they are required to accept from us is only truth, and that what they are required to give up to us is only error? These questions are both pertinent and important; and questions from which we should not recoil. Let us take the ordinary method of our controversialists in dealing with those who are separated from us, what we call the METHOD OF AUTHORITY, and see if there is not something lacking in the truth we present, or at least in our mode of presenting it.

This method begins by establishing the dominion of God over his creatures, and his right to govern them as he judges proper. From his right of dominion it proceeds to infer his right to delegate his authority to angels or to men, and to govern through them or by them, as his ministers or vicars. It then, by what it calls "motives of credibility," proves the fact that he has so delegated his authority, and delegated it to the Catholic Church, which it identifies with the Church in communion with the See of Rome, and presided over by the Pope, the visible head of Christ's kingdom on earth. Having established this much, it concludes, with an invincible logic, that what the Church teaches is and must be true; since, teaching by divine authority, she must be infallible, for God is truth, and can in no sense authorize the teaching of error. After having established the infallibility of the Church, the only question to be asked is, What does the Church teach? The fact that she teaches a doctrine sufficiently accredits it, sufficiently authorizes its belief, and renders him guilty of rebellion against God, who, knowing she teaches it, refuses to believe it.

This method is strictly logical, and the "motives of credibility" drawn from the historical facts and monuments in the case are amply sufficient. The argument for the Church, or for any particular doctrine she teaches, constructed in accordance with this method, is strictly unanswerable, and, objectively considered, perfectly conclusive. Yet all experience proves that this argument, however clearly set forth, however forcibly put, has practically very little, if any, efficacy in convincing non-Catholics of the truth of our religion. It silences, but it does not convince. They listen to it, examine it, confess that there is no flaw in it, and remain non-Catholics as before. Most of us, who are converts, have used this argument after our conversion, in our efforts to convert our former brethren; but very few of us, if any, were ever moved by it to enter the Church, and, if it had any weight with us before entering her communion, it was only after the principal work of our conversion had been already effected by other means.

Indeed, though our controversialists all use the Method of Authority, our clergy actually engaged on the missions have very little confidence in its practical efficacy. Nothing is more common than to hear them express their conviction that men are rarely, if ever, converted by argument, and that there is little or no use in arguing with those outside of the Church. They find their arguments so far barren of results, that they seem to distrust the efficacy of any method of proof that is or can be adopted, and to conclude that it is little or nothing that they can do toward the conversion of the heterodox. They even tell us that reasoning is useless—sometimes worse than useless—in the work of conversion, and that we must leave the conversion of unbelievers to the silent, invisible, and mysterious operations of divine grace. Nothing would be more unfair or unjust than to conclude that they are indifferent to the salvation of non-Catholics, and that they take no interest in their conversion. We must not suppose them wanting in Christian charity or in Christian fidelity. We are obliged, therefore, to suppose that their experience has demonstrated to them the practical inefficacy of the Method of Authority, and, aware of no other likely to be more efficacious, they are led to regard conversion as a miracle, to be effected only by the direct or immediate intervention of Almighty God himself.

The wide-spread conviction of the practical inefficacy of

the ordinary method may be gathered from the remarks we so frequently hear, that the difficulties in the way of non-Catholics are not intellectual but moral, and are in the heart, rather than in the head. When our controversialists have failed by their arguments to convince and convert, they ascribe their failure not to the insufficiency or inappropriateness of their arguments, but to the bad disposition of non-Catholics, to their hatred of truth, to their pride, their self-sufficiency, their immorality, or their aversion to the pure life exacted by the Church of her children, and conclude that it is necessary that grace should subdue the heart before logic can reach the understanding. There is, no doubt, much in this view that is true, and never to be lost sight of; but we should do great injustice to the heterodox, were we to assume that there are none among them who love or desire truth, who are not puffed up with pride, who are not averse to a pure life, and who never cry out from the very bottom of their hearts, What shall we do to be saved? There are men not in the Church, of high moral character, of sterling integrity, profound science, varied erudition, large experience, sincere and earnest minds,—men who have no overweening conceit of themselves, and are ready to embrace truth when they see it to be truth, wherever they find it, and whithersoever it may lead them. We may deny, and we do deny, to all who are separated from the Church, that supernatural life of which heaven is the completion and the reward; but we must not deny them all the natural virtues, and look upon them as one mass of corruption. We must be just to them, and we had better err by overrating than by underrating their moral worth. It seems to us, therefore, that we should seek some other explanation of the failure of our arguments to convert them, than their wickedness, immorality, hatred of truth, or love of error. Our arguments, it is far more reasonable to suppose, fail to convince them, because they do not meet their real intellectual difficulties, and remove the actual obstacles in the way of their conviction. Truth is always addressed to the understanding, and it is only truth that liberates. *Veritas liberabit vos.* Talk as we will of the heart, philosophy teaches us that truth must illumine the understanding before it can move the will.

When we have established beyond all reply from reason the infallible authority of the Church, and have found a particular doctrine which it is clear the Church teaches, we

conclude logically that such doctrine is and must be true. We grant it. But suppose this doctrine contradicts, or, what practically is the same thing, *appears* to contradict my reason, that it is a doctrine which I can by no means reconcile with other things which I know to be true as certainly as I can know any thing? What am I to do? If I am a Catholic, if I already believe, I may conclude that the doctrine is nevertheless true, that the contradiction or unreasonableness is only apparent, and due either to the weakness of my understanding, or to my misapprehension of the doctrine itself. Notwithstanding the difficulty, therefore, it presents, I am able to retain my faith in the Church and in her general teaching; but I really remain in a state of suspense with regard to the particular doctrine itself; for no one believes or can believe what contradicts his reason or that does not appear to his own mind reasonable. But suppose I am not yet a Catholic, that I am as yet engaged in investigating the claims of the Church and her right to be my teacher. What am I in this case to conclude, if such a doctrine is presented for my belief, on her simple external authority? I am logical and determined to admit every logical conclusion from undeniable premises. The infallibility of the Church is logically proved to me; I feel therefore that I must accept as true whatever she teaches. But here is a doctrine proved with equal logic to be false; for a doctrine that contradicts reason, or is irreconcilable with what I know to be true, *is* proved logically to be false. Now, supposing the doctrine to have this character, logic is found to be in contradiction with itself, and asserts and denies equally the infallibility of the Church. You have established conclusively by your argument that she is infallible; you have established by a logic no less conclusive that she is not infallible. What other practical effect, then, can your reasoning have than to create in my mind a distrust of logic itself, and to place me on the declivity toward absolute skepticism?

Now this is the state of mind into which not a few are thrown by the Method of Authority, when taken by itself alone. There are thousands who, listening to our arguments drawn from that method, feel that they cannot deny the infallibility of the Church, who yet feel it equally impossible to accept on all points her actual teaching. Of course we ourselves, with all Catholics, deny that the Church teaches any doctrines contrary to reason, or even

difficult to believe. But we are Catholics, and we see all her doctrines as parts of one whole, not merely as isolated and detached doctrines. We see them in their relation to the whole scheme of Gospel truth, and therefore apprehend their intrinsic or analogical reasonableness. But the heterodox do not so see them. They see them as isolated and independent propositions, and there is, perhaps, no doctrine of the Catholic Church, when so seen, that does not present insuperable objections to reason. We accept and hold without any wavering or shadow of doubt, all the Definitions of the Holy Council of Trent against the errors of the Reformers and-Innovators of the sixteenth century. But detach those propositions from the Evangelical system, take them as isolated and independent propositions, and not one would be credible or intelligible. Their meaning and their truth lie only in their relation to the whole, and it is only when they are seen and studied in that relation, that they are found reconcilable with one another and with whatever else we know to be true or worthy of credit.

Catholic doctrine must be studied as we study an author's writings. The most profound and orthodox writer may be made to teach heresy and even nonsense, if we select from his pages here and there a text, and interpret it as an independent proposition, detached from its context, and the general scope and design of the author. In this way men, by our mole-eyed critics, though acknowledged to be men of large intellects, logical force and acuteness, varied and extensive erudition, devoted heart and soul to the cause of truth, are made to teach gross absurdities and downright heresies. All the charges of error and contradiction brought against the Church, when not drawn from the misconduct of individuals, are obtained by taking her definitions as isolated and independent propositions, out of their proper relations as parts of the systematic whole which she teaches in her creed and is realizing in her life. The impropriety and injustice of taking detached passages from an author and holding him responsible for the sense they may have when detached or taken in other relations, and not seeking and considering the sense they must have when taken in connection with his whole discourse, is admitted by every fair, candid, and just-minded man. It is no less improper and unjust to treat in the same manner the doctrines and definitions of the Church, whether done by friends or by enemies.

Yet if, in our mode of presenting and defending Catholic truth, we present not that truth in its unity and universality, but merely in isolated definitions or propositions, what right have we to complain of non-Catholics, if they fail to take those definitions and propositions in their true relation to the whole, and to interpret them in the sense of that relation? Now, it seems to us that our ordinary method of presenting Catholic truth to the non-Catholic mind, which has not, or has lost, the apprehension of that truth in its unity and universality, errs precisely in so presenting it, in not showing the relation of those definitions and propositions to one another and to the whole body of truth in which they are integral, and in which alone they are significant and true. Its defect is not that it is syllogistically unsound, but that it does not present things in their true place and real relations. It leaves more to be supplied by the non-Catholic mind than it is in a condition to supply, and, in plain words, presupposes that it already understands and accepts the Catholic system as a whole, and objects only to certain details or particular facts and statements; which is by no means the case; for its precise difficulty is, that it does not embrace truth as a whole, in its unity, but solely in its multiplicity and variety.

Let us not be misunderstood. We do not object to the Method of Authority as unsound in itself, or as improper, or not necessary in its place, but as incomplete, and insufficient to meet the intellectual wants of the men with whom we have in our times to deal. Reasons for believing the Church infallible, however strong and conclusive they may be, do not and cannot convince them that Catholicity is the true religion, if they are required to receive blindly whatever she teaches. The age, whether to its credit or to its discredit, demands, in addition to the reasons called by our theologians "motives of credibility," to see the reasonableness,—in the intelligible order, the intrinsic, and, in the superintelligible order, the analogical reasonableness,—of whatever the Church teaches, or requires it to believe. Men now demand that truth be drawn out and presented to them under scientific forms, so that they may study it in its principles, in its relations, and in its consequences, and harmonize all parts of their intellectual life, and find no break or schism between the several orders of their intelligence, for they aspire to the *gnosis*, and are not satisfied with blind belief. They will not consent to carry reason

and science into all the departments of secular life, and to adopt blind and unreasoning belief in religion. They crave unity of thought, unity of science, unity of faith, and, in order to meet that craving, it is necessary to recognize to its fullest extent the province of reason, and to show that revelation, so far from breaking the unity which they crave, but find not, does itself demand it, propose it, and supply its condition. This fact we must understand, accept, and conform to, if we would really gain the command of our age.

The errors condemned by the Council of Trent, though great and terrible errors, are not the precise errors we have now to meet. They are errors of the past, rather than of the present, and have lost their principal hold on modern intelligence. It is important that their condemnation should stand in the Acts of the Council, a landmark to all future times; but their formal refutation as special errors has ceased to be a necessity. Undoubtedly, the errors we have now to deal with are, in some sense, the development of germs contained in them, but they are far from being exactly the same. Error as well as truth has a sort of life, and therefore an evolution of its own. But if, under certain relations, the errors of to-day are the errors of yesterday, they are, in their forms and subjective relations, widely different. Were a General Council to assemble to-day, it would find it had other work to perform than simply to repeat the Definitions of the Fathers of Trent. Finality can no more be predicated of Trent, than of Nicæa, Constantinople, Constance, or Florence; and, if no new Council has been summoned or needed since, it is because the definitions of the Holy See, without the Council, have been more generally received and acquiesced in than they were in former times.

Were we to confine ourselves to the Doctrinal Decrees of Trent, we should confine ourselves to the past, and fail to meet the wants of the present; we should be working for the dead, not for the living, and our labors would be fruitless. The human mind did not die with the Fathers of Trent, nor has the world either in or out of the Church stood still ever since. The human race has lived, and been as active in evolving both truth and error since as it was before, and renewing for us at each moment the problem: How to preserve the past without interdicting the future? or, How to secure the free development of intelligence

without losing the immobility and invariableness of Catholic dogma? Forgetfulness of this on the part of not a few of our theologians, is the chief reason why their arguments produce so little conviction. They recognize no progressiveness in the human mind, and overlook the fact that it lives only by evolution, that in its life it evolves both truth and error, and therefore that its expression of either, is never the same in any two successive moments. We objected to Dr. Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, because it seemed to us to strike at the unchangeableness and permanence of the divine element in Christian faith; but we had done well, if, at the same time, we had more distinctly recognized the fact that the author had in his mind while writing it a great truth,—as the late Dr. Channing would say, a “seminal principle”—which it is necessary to accept, if we would not leave Catholic theology to stagnate and die, or if we would reconcile authority with reason, the immobility of the Church with the progress of civilization, the immutability of the dogma with the development of intelligence, the divine unchangeableness with human variableness, or retain the past without foreclosing the future.

There are two classes of persons whose intellectual wants are now to be met: the heterodox outside of the Church, and the heterodox, the doubting, or unbelieving, nominally within her communion. For these two classes the Catholic controversialist has now specially to labor, and for the second class no less than for the first. Say what we will, boast as we may, both of these classes are now manifestly increasing, and, save by her missions in countries that remain in a stage of civilization below ours, the Church is manifestly losing ground. It is all very well when we wish to make up a table of statistics to set down France, Austria and Italy as Catholic countries, and to count the whole of their respective populations in the number of Catholics; but when we come to the sober fact, we are obliged to admit that only a minority, perhaps only a small minority of them, really adhere firmly in their minds and hearts to the Church. It will hardly be pretended that Catholic thought predominates, at the present moment, either in Italy or France; and the Catholicity of Austria may well be judged of by the city of Vienna. That city has a population of five hundred thousand souls or over, and yet we are told that only thirty thousand made their Communion last

Easter. We are making no inroads worth speaking of on heterodox nations, and the so-called Catholic nations are overrun with doubt, incredulity, and indifference. An intelligent Irish gentleman writes us from Ireland: "You would be shocked to see the number of young Irishmen that are growing up infidels." And if in our own country we keep up, or even increase, our numbers, it is only by new accessions of Catholics from abroad. These facts show clearly and undeniably that there is some defect either in our religion itself, or in our method of dealing with our age. The first alternative is inadmissible, and we must therefore conclude that our Catholic theologians, learned, able, zealous, devoted as they are, have not yet learned the secret of the nineteenth century.

We cannot as Catholics doubt that Catholicity is capable of meeting the intellectual wants and commanding the assent, the love, and veneration of the cultivated classes of our age, or of any other age. So to doubt would be to doubt that Catholicity is catholic. Our religion is catholic; and, when we say it is catholic, we say that it is not merely actually or potentially catholic in space and time, but that it is also catholic in Idea; that is, contains all truth, and all truth whether we speak of the intelligible order, or of the superintelligible. It is, then, and cannot but be, adapted to the wants of all intelligences, whether high or low, cultivated or uncultivated.

The present sad state of things throughout Christendom evidently is not owing to any defect in Catholicity itself. The reason why those out of the Catholic communion, and so many brought up in it refuse to submit to the Church, and to accept and defend her faith, is not on the side of our religion itself. It must, then, be mainly on the side of Catholics themselves, in the fact that either in their thought, or in their conduct, or in both, they remain far below the Catholic type, and present their religion in a restricted and exclusive form, instead of its broad and universal character. We attribute it to the fact that, obliged to carry on a war against Protestantism and various other errors, our theologians have been led to treat even Catholic theology in an exclusive spirit, and to present the Church very much in the light of a sect. Catholics, as we meet them to day, are in spirit and practice hardly less sectarian than the Protestant sects themselves. Not their religion, not their faith, not their Church is defective, but they themselves are de-

fective, and fail to recognize the fact that there is truth with those not of their communion, and that all truth, wherever found, and of whatever order, is Catholic truth, and belongs integrally to that Catholicity which it is our privilege and our glory to profess. It is because they themselves give a one-sided or partial development to Catholic truth, or only partially actualize it in their life, that others are led to break away from them, and to attempt to realize the portions of truth which they neglect in heterodoxy and schism.

Catholicity, rightly understood, embraces all truth, whether truth of the intelligible order or of the superintelligible, whether known to us by natural reason, or by supernatural revelation, and therefore embraces not only religion, but also civilization, not only faith, but also philosophy, not only the world to come, but the world that now is, and alike what is speculative and what is practical, for its type is the God-man, the union in one Divine Person of the human and the divine, the finite and the infinite. It is never exclusive, but always conciliative, mediative between extremes, and harmonizing all opposites. It asserts and countenances no contradiction between faith and reason, between religion and society, between earth and heaven, time and eternity, God and man. It contains and presents the dialectic principle by which these terms, though forever distinct, are harmonized, by which man is united to God, and the universe made one complete and dialectic whole. Such is Catholicity in its principle, and such is the end it contemplates. But this Catholicity is received by finite minds to be actualized in their own life, or to be practically applied by them, and their application of it will always, till the Final Judgment, be more or less affected by their own finiteness. The actualization, being the work of the finite, has always a tendency to become exclusive, one-sided, and, therefore, sophistical.

Now, if Catholics in any given age or country fail to perceive the universality of Catholic truth, and apply themselves to its development and actualization, not in its unity and integrity, but in one of its terms to the exclusion of the others, they become one-sided, and cease to be truly catholic—give to it a disproportionate development, exaggerate it, and destroy its harmonious relations, and provoke a like exclusiveness or exaggeration by those in whom the neglected terms predominate, in an opposite direction. Thus if they take the religious side as distinguished from that of

civilization, and turn their whole attention and energy to the cultivation of the ascetic life, to the relations of man to God and the ultra-mundane life, they disturb the proportion between religion and civilization, and leave that portion of Catholic truth which pertains more especially to secular society and human government, undeveloped and unapplied, or to be developed and applied in an irreligious sense, and in an anti-catholic spirit. A schism is thus effected in the Christian world, and the Church in her practical operations ceases to control the application of the whole truth committed to her keeping, and to preside over and to direct the development of all orders of human intelligence. Both religion and civilization become sophistical, each warring against the other,—two antagonistic worlds, without any recognized principle of dialectic union and harmony between them.

This is what actually happens in our own age, and throughout nearly all Christendom. A schism is effected in the body of Catholic truth, or between religion and society, heaven and earth, eternity and time. The two sides of Catholic truth are developed and applied separately as if distinct and, in some sense, contradictory truths. Religion and civilization no longer walk hand in hand. Although the great principles which the Church had infused into the modern world, and which the Vicars of Christ on earth have never ceased to labor to develop and apply, are still more or less operative in modern society as the elements of all its real progress, they operate without their proper religious connection, as if earth had no relation to heaven, or rather as if earth were itself heaven, the final destiny of man, and his complete glorification. Both religion and civilization suffer severely from their unlawful divorce. On the one side, civilization loses its Ideal character, its noble sentiments, and its spiritual aims; on the other, religion becomes exclusive in its spirit, stagnant in speculation, and impotent in practice. The Church loses her hold on the hearts and intelligence of the age, and seems unable to proceed in her work. The men who control society and its development pay little or no regard to her interests or her behests. Her excommunications have lost their terror for tyrants, and check not ambitious princes in their mad career of spoliation and sacrilege. The men who lead or give tone to the science and literature of the age are not in her communion, or, if in it, are not of it. Her children, those who profess the greatest devotion to

her as their spiritual mother, are cast down, despair of the future, and either seek consolation in contemplation or inaction, or else labor without hope and with only a factitious energy to reproduce a past which can never return.

Now, it is, in our judgment, to this state of things that we must attribute the little efficacy of the ordinary methods of Catholic controversy in recalling to Christian faith and animating with Christian life the two classes of persons that we have described. We make no account of the old theological errors and heresies of the Reformers, for they were doomed from the beginning to a short life; they lived at first, and could live, only by virtue of the Catholic truth the Reformers carried with them when they separated from the Church. When that truth should be exhausted, and exhausted speedily it was sure to be, they must die, and dead they already are, although as yet their dead bodies may remain above ground. Here and there you may find fossilized Protestants attempting to galvanize them into a sort of spasmodic life; but all we need say is, "Let the dead bury their dead." Protestantism, as it was held by the Reformers and Innovators of the sixteenth century, has exhausted the little of truth it had in the beginning, and must go the way of all error. We need not labor to refute it, for it has refuted itself. Time, the activity of the human mind, the progress of events has done our work for us; and its adherents, in so far as they are living men, are ready to enter our communion the very moment that we show them that religion and civilization, authority and liberty, the infallibility of the dogma and the progress of intelligence are not contradictories, but simple contraries united in dialectic harmony by catholic truth. And this which would suffice for those separated from our communion, would equally suffice to re-establish the faith, and imbue with Christian life those who are in our communion, but who are not of it.

Our controversial theologians seem to us for the most part to fail in the work they have now to perform, because they write in an exclusive or sectarian spirit, and proceed on the assumption that there is no error on the side of those in the communion of the Church, and no truth on the side of those who are separated from it. They proceed as if Catholics always gave to the truth they hold from the Church a really catholic development, as if they always fully understood it, appropriated it, and actualized it in

their life. They appear to take it for granted that it is not only necessary to preserve the past as the germ to be developed, but as the type or ideal to be realized. They contend for tradition, but do not appear to appreciate the fact that true catholic tradition is not merely an external, and therefore a dead tradition, but also an internal, and therefore a living tradition. They assert the Word spoken, but leave out of sight, at least to a great extent, the fact that the Catholic Word is not only the Word spoken, but the Word speaking. The Catholicity they assert is a Catholicity that has been, rather than a Catholicity that is; and the Church they propose is the Church of the Middle Ages, not the Church of the nineteenth century. That is to say, they are sectarian and not catholic, and fail to present the Church as really the Church of all ages and of all nations, as much at home in the modern world as in the mediæval world, and able to live in as harmonious relations with modern civilization as with the ancient. They, in fact, tend by their writings, to widen and perpetuate the schism between the Church and society, instead of diminishing and finally effacing it.

To meet the difficulties of non-Catholics in our times, it is necessary for our theologians themselves to rise to the conception of Catholic truth in its unity and universality, and to find in its principle, the principle of the dialectic harmony of all things, and thus attain themselves to a full understanding of that unity to which they would bring back the heterodox mind, whether in or out of the Church. All truth, of whatever order, is homogeneous, and is integrated in a common principle. There is distinction, but no separation between one truth or one order of truth and another. There may be contrariety, but there can be no contradiction. God and man are distinct, but not contradictories. The assertion of God as real, necessary, and universal being does not exclude the existence of man as his creature; nor does the assertion of the existence of man as an existence capable of thinking and acting according to the faculties given him, exclude the existence of God as his Creator. The two are distinct, but exist in dialectic harmony through the medium of the creative act. What we say here, we may say everywhere, of all realities, and of all orders of intelligence. There is no contradiction in nature, or in the works of God, or between God and his works. There can, then, be no contradiction between the authority

of God and legitimate human activity, and consequently none between Catholic dogma and human liberty (we say liberty, not license). There can, on the same principle, be no contradiction, taken in their real relation, between earth and heaven, time and eternity, the terrestrial destiny of man and his celestial destiny, between the goods of this life and the goods of the life to come. Hence no contradiction between the Church and society, religion and civilization, when both are rightly understood, or taken in their real relations one to another.

Having seized upon this great dialectic principle, the work of controversy becomes chiefly a work of exposition and explanation, that of pointing out and establishing the real relation between the several terms assumed to be contradictory, showing through what causes or mistakes the assumption of contradiction is made, and proving that it has no real foundation in the nature and constitution of things. Being a work of exposition and explanation, it is a work of conciliation, and to be performed in a catholic and not in a sectarian spirit; it is a work of love, not of hatred or wrath, and a work that tends to union and peace, not to division and war. In prosecuting it, we must not begin by condemnation or denunciation, but by presenting the truth to the understanding, and leaving it by its own light to correct the errors into which finite and passionate men may have fallen. It is a work which can and should be done with tenderness to human infirmity, and with respect for human dignity and strength. In our view of the case, little else is needed to heal the divisions of the present, and to bring back the heterodox to the orthodox faith and communion, than to present clearly and fully to the understanding of the age Catholic truth in its integrity, and the Church as she really is, alike in her relation to the Word-made-flesh, and to human society.

The chief reason why so many men fall into heterodoxy and schism is, that they regard the Church as merely an external, arbitrary, positive institution, without any real or necessary foundation in the constitution of things. They regard her as an isolated institution, with only an arbitrary relation to God, or Christ, the Redeemer and Saviour of mankind. They see no necessity for her in the divine plan or scheme of salvation, no reason for her but the arbitrary will of God, and no analogy between her and the natural order. They see no office she fulfils that might not,

in their judgment, be fulfilled just as well without her, by other agencies or ministries. Such an institution seems to them repugnant to the character of God, who does all things by weight and measure, and is always strictly dialectic and logical in all his doings, as he must be since he is the Logos, or Supreme Reason itself. Then, again, judging her by the character of her members, whether cleric or laic, they find it difficult to perceive that she really and effectually fulfils the office for which it is said she has been instituted. They do not perceive that Catholics are much freer from vice and error than other men, or that they have fewer disputes or less wrangling among themselves. The superiority claimed by Catholics either for themselves or their Church, is not always evident, and no history is fuller of scandals or apparently more discreditable to human nature, than the history of Churchmen. Putting these things together, the heterodox, however dissatisfied they may be with their own condition, or however anxious they might be to attain to a higher and more comprehensive unity, see not that they would gain much by entering our communion and conforming to the Church as she appears to them.

It will be of no use to begin by abusing them for their error, or charging them with being led to their anti-catholic conclusion by their vices, their pride, their hardness of heart, or their hatred of truth. Such indeed may be the case with them, and no doubt is with many of them, but we must bear in mind that they are men as well as we, and that human nature in them is very much what it is in us. They are wrong, fatally wrong, but their error is not to be refuted by simply asserting that they are warring against the truth and guilty of rebellion against God. It must be corrected by presenting them the Church as she is, not as they suppose her to be, and by showing them that the infallibility and sanctity we claim for her do not necessarily exclude the errors or the wickedness of individual Catholics. We must show them, what is true, that the Church is not simply an external authority, or an external institution to which is arbitrarily delegated authority in matters of faith and morals, but that she has her reason and constitution in the Incarnation of the Word; not merely an external delegated authority, but also an internal, inherent, and living authority by virtue of the in-dwelling and informing Word, whose Incarnation she, in some sense,

continues. The Church is not separated from Christ,—is not simply an outward and positive institution established and preserved by his power and authority, but is, in principle, Christ himself. In becoming really united to the Church, we become really united to Christ, are regenerated in him, and live his life, as individuals in the order of generation live the life of Adam. (*Quia ego vivo, et vos vivetis.*) The Word was incarnated in an individual, but the Incarnation extends beyond the individual assumed, as the generic principle of a new or regenerated mankind, so that, in some sense, the Word becomes incarnated in the race. The Church, if considered in its principle, is Christ, the God-man; if considered in relation to the development or effects of the Incarnation, it is the regenerated human species, or humanity raised to the palingenesiac order, and placed on the plane of its progress toward glorification, or its complete union through the Incarnate Word with God, the finite with the infinite. This, as we understand it, is the radical conception of the Church in her intrinsic and real character. Her relation, then, to Christ is not simply an external, arbitrary, or mechanical relation, but a real, internal, and necessary relation, as real, as intimate, and as necessary as the relation between the human species and Adam its progenitor.

Hence we may see the reason of the dogma that “out of the Church there is no salvation.” Salvation is only in the palingenesia or regeneration; for man has and can have, as a rational being, his perfect beatitude only in being united to God, since he has the innate and unquenchable desire for an infinite and unbounded good, to be found nowhere but in God, the Supreme Good itself. Now, a man out of the Church stands in relation to salvation, as a man in the natural order out of humanity. A man not in humanity—not born of Adam—is simply no man at all; he can neither live a human life, nor attain to a human destiny. So a man out of the Church is a man out of Christ, out of the order of salvation, and can neither live the life of regenerated humanity, nor receive its reward. If we suppose the order of regeneration at all, we must suppose the dogma, “Out of the Church, no salvation.” So far, there is and can be no objection to the dogma. The only question here to be asked is, Who are or who are not in the Church? or, What is or is not meant by being out of the Church? The question may be raised, and has been

raised, whether the dogma means or does not mean that salvation is possible to any who are not united to the external or visible body of the Church? It is no part of our present purpose to attempt to answer that question, one way or the other. No doubt all who belong to what theologians call the "soul" of the Church, that is, are united to Christ in the regeneration as their head, are in the way of salvation; and just as little that those who die without being so united can never be saved.

The outward or visible Church, in its essential constitution, is no more arbitrary or destitute of relation with Christ, than the Church internally considered. The progress of the Christian life is by virtue of the Word, not merely of the interior Word, but also of the Word exteriorly expressed. We may consider the Word as the substantial creative act in the interior of the divine being, by which all things are made, and without which nothing can be made; but, unless the Word is expressed, or, so to speak, exerted *ad extra*, there is no act of creation. So the Word Incarnate, which is the Church interiorly and intrinsically considered, must be expressed or extrinsecated, and this expression or extrinsecation in the outward or mimetic order is the visible Church. If we suppose the Word, and suppose it operative, we must suppose it creating, forming an external regenerated society, just as much as, if we suppose in Adam a productive principle actualizing itself successively, we must suppose a visible natural society, or human society in the natural order. If we suppose a visible society, we must suppose for it a government and laws; therefore a visible constitution which expresses and realizes or copies in the visible order the interior and invisible constitution; and hence you have the visible Church, with the Pope representing, in the visible order, the centre and head, which, in the invisible, is Christ.

The Church is no accident or after-thought in the Creator's works. Her existence is not exceptional or isolated in the plan of Divine Providence, and is essential to the fulfilment of that plan. Creation is the extrinsecation of the Word eternal in the bosom of the Father, and the full or complete extrinsecation of the Word requires the full and complete creative act; and the full and complete creative act requires the Incarnation, or hypostatic union of man with God, the finite with the infinite. Creation can go no farther than the Incarnation, for in it

the creature is raised to infinite power, and becomes one with the Creator. The Incarnation gives birth to the Church, which is, in some sense, its continuation, or rather its actualization in the race. Prescind the Church, or suppose her to fail, you suppose either God to have had no purpose in creating, or his purpose to be incapable of being effected. If you suppose creation, and suppose it such as it is, you must suppose the Church, and therefore that she enters as necessarily and as essentially into the original plan or constitution of things, as man or any other existence in what we term the natural order. The Church, then, is no more arbitrary or exceptional than is nature itself; her laws are no more arbitrary or exceptional than the laws of the natural order; and she and nature are both constituent and necessary parts of one complete and harmonious whole. The Church is as necessary, *necessitate a suppositione*, as the cosmos, and the cosmos itself is neither intelligible nor explicable without her. We say necessary, *necessitate a suppositione*, that is, on the supposition that it pleases the Word to create *ad extra*, or to give an external expression to himself, which he was free to do or not to do. It is always necessary to bear this in mind when we are explaining the Church, showing her place, her office in the plan of Divine Providence, or vindicating her claims to our love and obedience, in order to escape pantheism, or not give any countenance to the doctrine that God is a necessary Creator.

Christ bears to the Church the same relation that Adam, in the order of genesis, bears to the human family; and the Church lives in Christ the theandric life, as mankind live in Adam the purely human life. This living of the life of Christ is what we call the Incarnation in the race. The Church is in him, and he is in the Church; and as he is in the Church, and is the Word made flesh—perfect God and perfect man united in one Divine Person—she has in her the Word, the Idea, the Truth (*Ego sum veritas*), and therefore is and must be infallible. Her infallibility is her permanence or continuance, as the incarnation of the Idea or Word on the earth.—*Ego sum vobiscum*. The Idea, or the Word, cannot fail, for it is God himself; and the Church cannot perish or fail, unless God himself should perish or fail.

Modern Rationalists may concede this much, but when they do so they understand it in a pantheistic sense; for,

while they admit that the Word incarnates himself in the race, they overlook or deny that he incarnates himself in an individual, and, by so doing, recognize no proper incarnation at all. The Word was made flesh in an individual man, and the union of the Divine and the human is personal or hypostatic. God creates all existences each after its kind. The *kind*, the *universal* of the Schoolmen, is as really created as the individual, but never without the individual. The universal is real, but really subsists in the particular, and the particular subsists in the universal. Never is there the one without the other. There is no universal man without an individual man, and no individual man without the universal man. Through the Incarnation there is created a new order of life, which we call the "theandric" life; but this order of life must, according to all the analogies of creation, be created in an individual. Hence Christ is termed perfect God and perfect man,—perfect man, because in him humanity is complete, and humanity, like every other genus, is completed only in the individual. Hence we say the Incarnation is properly and primarily the assumption by the Word of an individual man, or of man individuated. The union between the Word and the individuated man is hypostatic and personal; but the union between the Church and Christ is not individual, personal, or hypostatic, but a union which, while it unites her intimately with him as her informing principle and life, leaves each of her individual members his distinctive personality, and therefore his distinctive personal activity.

Considered in her relation to space and time, or in her work on the earth, the Church is engaged in the explication and actualization of the life begotten by the Word made flesh, as men, in the order of genesis, are engaged in the explication of Adam or the potentialities of humanity. This explication and actualization is the explication and actualization of the Idea. It is twofold, internal and external. The external is the extension of her communion in space, or geographically, and goes on by what is called conversion; the internal is the explication and actualization of the intuitive Idea in the order of reflection, or its appropriation and application in the actual life of individuals and society. The life of the Church is in this twofold explication and actualization, or in the internal and external evolution of her principle of life. Whenever and wherever either of these ceases, she in the actual order becomes

inoperative, and no longer responds externally to the interior energy of the Word. Such a case has sometimes happened in particular countries and at particular epochs in her history. There are countries where the Church, once living and vigorous, seems to die out, either from external or internal causes; and there are times when she seems to pause in her career, to lose her hold on the human mind, to be incapable of progress, and to show no signs of spiritual or of intellectual activity; when faith seems eclipsed, charity to have grown cold, and her children, despairing of the future, turn toward the past in the vain hope of restoring its life, and making it again the present. But these eclipses of faith are never, and can be never more than partial; and the losses on one side are usually repaired on another; for her Ideal life is immortal and universal in its principle, intrinsically active, and can never cease wholly to find in her activity an outward expression and realization.

The condition of the internal explication and actualization of the Word in the life of men is the same as that of all intellectual explication and application of truth. Philosophy teaches us that all truth in its principle is given us in the primitive intuition, in the Divine judgment, "Being creates existences," affirmed by God himself to us, creating our intelligence, and presenting all truth as its object. But the human mind is incapable of perceiving by its own act the truth immediately in the intuition; for this would be seeing the truth in itself, which is the prerogative of God alone. If we could take the truth from its intuitive presentation, immediately see or apprehend it in itself, our intelligence would be the equal of the Divine intelligence, and our intelligencing would, like his, generate the Word and be identical with it. In consequence of our finiteness, it is not enough that the truth be intuitively presented; it is necessary that it be also sensibly re-presented. Hereafter we may be able, by virtue of our supernatural union with God, to see truth directly, without the reflex operation of the mind, and without sensible representation; but at present, at least, we can see and know the Word only as expressed. Without its external expression the Ideal is intuitively present indeed, but cannot be explicated and appropriated by our intelligence. This external expression of truth is the external word or language.

Now, Christ in the Church is intuition, and intuition is

the permanent presence of truth, and of all truth. But this truth becomes ours only through our act; and our act is an act of reflection. It is necessary, then, to the appropriation and possession of truth by us, that it should not only be presented intuitively, but that it should be represented through the medium of language, which is the instrument of reflection. The Church lives, evolves, and applies the ideal truth, therefore, only by the union of the word speaking and of the word spoken. The word spoken is revelation or external tradition. Revelation or tradition taken alone, severed from all relation with the internal tradition or Christian intuition, would be dead, or would be useless for us; because it would have no connection or possible relation with the principle of our interior life and activity; there would be in us no power to receive it, to apprehend it, to understand it, or to apply it, that is, to use it in the evolution of truth. It might as well be presented to an ox or a horse, as to a man. Yet, it is absolutely necessary to our practical understanding and explication of the intuition. We cannot hear the work speaking unless we hear also the word spoken. In addition, then, to the infallibility of the Church as ideal, as having all truth in her intuition, she must be infallible in preserving in its unity and integrity the word spoken, or language, which is the medium of all reflection. It is only on the condition of this infallibility that the Church can exist or fulfil her office in the explication and actualization of the theandric life, or the plan of Divine Providence in creation be realized.

But it is necessary that we be on our guard against misunderstanding this infallibility, against extending it beyond matters to which it properly belongs, or applying it in a sphere in which it has no existence. This infallibility extends only to the ideal, or the preservation of the ideal, in so far as represented by language, or what we call the word spoken. It does not extend to the evolution, the appropriation, or actualization of the ideal by the human mind. Dogmas are infallible, and the Church infallibly preserves them; but the dogmas are all ideal, that is, contain not the truth as appropriated and actualized by us, but the principle or principles to be by us developed, appropriated, actualized, in our own understanding and life. For after the Church has claimed to us infallibly the infallible dogma, we must still ask, What are its contents? or, What does it mean? This ques-

tion the Church does not answer by her infallible authority save negatively, or so far as to prevent us from losing on the one hand the ideal truth it contains, and, on the other, the superintelligible which it affirms. Beyond this there remain freedom and scope for the activity of our own minds, and the right and the necessity of examination.

We have stated that, though in a general or generic sense Christ is incarnated in the race, his Incarnation in the race is not a personal or hypostatic union between God and men. Our personal and individual activity remains, and must be asserted, unless we would fall into pantheism, the greatest of all sophisms. The infallibility of the Church, which is derived from the Incarnate Word, or rather is the infallibility of the Word itself, does not, then, extend to our personality, take away that personality, deprive us of our liberty of mind, or suppress our proper human activity. The ideal Church is infallible, but the individual members who compose the exterior body of the Church have no privilege of infallibility, and are liable to err both in their understanding and application of catholic truth. The infallibility of the Church, then, neither excludes individuals of whatever rank or dignity in the Church from error in the reflex or practical order, nor does it deny or supersede the necessity, in all who would comprehend and know the truth, of personal activity and private examination.

Catholics have not always been just in their criticisms on what they call the "private interpretation" asserted by Protestants. The error of Protestants is not in asserting the right of private interpretation, or the examination and interpretation for themselves of the doctrines or truth contained in the Holy Scriptures. They use their reason to ascertain in the best way in their power the real meaning of the language of Scripture; we do, and are obliged to do, unless we would remain intellectually dead, the same thing in regard to the doctrines and definitions of the Church. We can here no more dispense with examination and personal understanding than they can. In this respect neither they nor we are to be blamed. But the difference between them and us is very great. They deny the Living Tradition of the Church, in which, and in which alone, is found the key to the sense of the Holy Scriptures, and they have no infallible teacher to come to their assistance, and prevent them from ruining the dogma, losing the Idea the Christian is evolving, or explaining away the superintelligible, that

is, the mysteries, only analogically intelligible to our reason, and from falling into complete rationalism, whence the declension to pantheism is easy and, in fact, inevitable. We by means of the Church, which preserves the Idea in its integrity, and supplies us the living Catholic tradition, have a sure protection against either of these errors. The Church, by renewing her definitions whenever occasion demands, preserves the unity and integrity of language or the external word, and by her own interior life and instinct, in which all her members to some extent, if really her members, participate, prevents us from losing the Idea, or breaking the internal continuity of Catholic life.

Understood in this way, the infallibility of the Church and the freedom and activity of the human mind are seen to be not contradictories, as is sometimes supposed, but simply contraries reconcilable one with the other, and capable of coëxisting in dialectic union and mutual harmony. The same may be said of authority and liberty; they are contraries, but not contradictories; each has its appropriate sphere, and the sphere of neither excludes that of the other. The bugbear conjured up on this subject grows out of a pantheistic error, which absorbs the human element in the divine, and overlooks or denies, what the Catholic doctrine asserts, that the two natures are united by the Incarnation in one Person, but remain forever, without confusion or mixture, two distinct natures. The divine element in our religion never absorbs the human; the human element always remains, and always must remain; and consequently there remains, and always must remain, a sphere of human activity.

There is no doubt a tendency even in some Catholics to extend authority so far as to exclude human liberty, as amongst non-Catholics there is a much stronger tendency to extend liberty so far as to exclude authority. Both tendencies are wrong, and fatal in their nature. To extend authority so as to exclude human liberty, is pantheism; to extend liberty so as to exclude authority, is license, and, pushed to its last consequences, is nihilism. The authority, as the infallibility of the Church, is the authority of the Word, and therefore ideal. It does not pertain to individuals, and can never rightfully restrain the free evolution and appropriation by the mind itself of catholic truth. God created man a free activity, or free second cause, and therefore is said to have created him "in his own image

and likeness." In elevating him by grace to the theandric life, it could never have been his intention to restrict or supersede, in any respect whatever, man's original freedom. The design of the Gospel is not to take away man's freedom, but to confirm it, to elevate it, and to assist it in attaining to the end for which he was created. Man is to work out, with the assistance of grace, his own salvation. Authority so understood or so extended as to interfere with this free working, or to restrain man's spontaneous activity, would defeat the very design of Providence, and prevent him from attaining to salvation. The working would be transferred from him to authority itself, in whose hands he would become merely passive, and therefore dead. The meticulous orthodoxy of our age overlooks this fact, and, if it does not actually destroy our intellectual life, it at least impairs our intellectual health by over-watchfulness and over-nursing. It runs to the contrary extreme, and, in seeking to guard against the license of the age, it suppresses the natural and legitimate liberty of thought and action. The consequence is that truth makes little or no progress amongst us, the mind remains undeveloped, and we cease to be active and living men.

The exaggerations of authority into which we have been driven by the exaggerations of liberty on the part of non-Catholics, are the chief cause of the weakness of the Church in our times, of her inability to recall to her communion those who have broken away from it, and to retain her hold on the intellect and consciences of large numbers of the cultivated brought up in it. Under these exaggerations, no man is free to have convictions of his own, or, if he have convictions, to express them. The inquiry is not, what is true, what is necessary, what is good, what is proper, but, What does authority say? or, What does authority permit to be said? You are convinced perhaps that certain things are true, but you must not say them, because authority disapproves of them, or does not wish them to be said. In this way the lofty aspirations and noble instincts of the soul are repressed, life is stunted in its growth, and devotion to the right, to the just, to the noble, gives way to a low, narrow, and demoralizing expediency. The rights and dignity of manhood are sacrificed, and men become mere puppets in the hands of illegitimate authority, or seek indemnification for the repression of their nobler nature in low cunning, diplomatic arts, selfish intrigue, or the indul-

gence of the baser passions. While such is the case, it is impossible to carry on the explication and appropriation of the Word, either externally or internally, to make any favorable impression on those outside of our communion, or to re-establish in their faith and love those already in it, who are conscious of their manhood and cannot believe that the divine destroys the human which it creates and sustains. It is very necessary as it regards both the internal and the external evolution of catholic truth, that we be as much on our guard against the exaggerations of authority as against the exaggerations of liberty, and at least as much in earnest to favor the evolution of truth as the suppression of error. Truth is mightier than error, if you give it fair play; and its free and full evolution will without any care or thought on your part extinguish it. Truth suffers in the house of her friends, who are too afraid of allowing her to go abroad, lest she should take cold, sicken, or die.

What we say of authority, we may say of infallibility. Infallibility is the prerogative of no individual in the Church, for, as we have seen, the infallibility is internal in the Church as the theandric race, not in the Church as individuals. The Pope is infallible *ex cathedra*, that is, with the Church, and the Church is infallible with the Pope, though neither is infallible without the other; for neither without the other is, strictly speaking, the Church. The Pope individually, the bishops and clergy individually taken, or in their individual capacity, are individuals, and have no prerogative of infallibility, and, though always respectable, venerable in reference to the office they fill, to the Pontificate and Sacerdocy essential to the very existence of the Church which they represent, have infallible authority only in the Word which is the interior life of the regenerated human race. Their individual opinions and wishes may deserve great weight, and are always to be treated with profound respect, but, in so far as they are only their individual opinions or wishes, they are neither authoritative nor infallible. It does not follow, because I differ in opinion from my pastor, from my bishop, or even from the Pope, that I am wrong and must give up my opinion. I may hold my opinion until I am rationally convinced of its falsity or unsoundness, unless the Church herself, acting in her unity as the representative of the Word, declares it to be false, unsound, or dangerous. Any attempt to suppress my opinion or my

freedom of opinion, in any other way is repugnant to the real spirit and authority of the Church, and is an indignity offered both to my freedom as a man, and to the rights of authority itself; for it is an attempt to usurp power and play the tyrant. Usurpation offends alike legitimate authority and those subjected to it; and it is as much my right and my duty as a Catholic to resist usurpation, as it is to bow in submission to the legitimate authority.

Tradition, we have said, is both external and internal, and, rightly considered, is the continuity in the external and the internal life of the Church of the word speaking and of the word spoken. The great error of Protestantism was that, by rejecting tradition, it broke the continuity of the Christian life, and thus severed itself from the theandric life of Christ. But if we take only the external tradition prescinded from the internal, we fall into an error of the same kind, and no less fatal. The external is the past, is the word that was spoken, which it is always necessary to preserve, for there is no continuity of life without preserving the past. But there is also in the Church an internal tradition, or the continuity of her internal life, proceeding from the immanence of the Word. The Church speaking speaks always according to this interior tradition, her present interior life; and as this life is a continuous evolution and explication of the Word, it gives always to the external tradition a broader and a deeper significance; it destroys not its truth, renders it not false, but shows that there is more in it than was at first apprehended, that it covers a broader field or has a deeper and richer meaning than was at first supposed. There is in this way, or in this sense, a continuous development and progress of truth in the Church. The true rule, then, is always to interpret her monuments of the past by her present life, not her present life by her past monuments. This view is admirably brought out by Dr. Newman in his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, and is a highly important contribution to modern theology, for which he deserves the gratitude of every theologian. The denial of this would be to deny to the Church catholicity both in time and in idea or truth, or, what is the same thing, to deny that she is a living Church. It would be to make her a dead Church, as Protestants make the external written word a dead book. We must interpret, therefore, the past life of the Church by her present life, for, though she is ancient, she is never old.

This doctrine allows us to assert for the Church all the liberty or freedom of action with regard to modern civilization that she exercised in regard to either the ancient or the mediæval. Those who would confine her to the mediæval world, or bind her back to that order of civilization as the only Catholic order, or as the type of Catholic civilization, forget that she is a living Church, overlook her present freedom, and impede her in the evolution and application of catholic truth to the circumstances and wants of our own age. They place her in unnecessary antagonism to modern progress, and de-catholicize her, and compel her to anathematize it. Such are the worst enemies of the Church, and, in fact, though they know it not, are hardly less removed from Catholicity in the full sense of that term, than are the cultivated classes out of her communion. Catholicity does not and cannot war with human progress or the progress of society, for it is the principle of that progress itself, and not it, but mistaken and misguided Catholics, who comprehend not the Christian spirit, and forget their Church still lives, that are opposed to it, make war upon it, and seek to revive a civilization, a science, a literature, an art which the human race has outgrown. Because religion under the Roman empire after Constantine was associated with Roman imperialism, or because in the Middle Ages it was associated with feudalism, with privilege instead of equality, they imagine practically, if not theoretically, that it must always be so associated, and that to associate it with any other order of civilization, or of social organization, would be to deprive it of its essential character, and to manifest an un-Catholic and an irreligious tendency.

Here arises the conflict. Human society is progressive, and is continually evolving and appropriating the idea or principle in which is its life. On it goes, and on it will go, whether individuals go with it, or seek to hold it back. They only who go with it are powerful, for they have not only their own strength as individuals, but the strength of the race itself. They are irresistible in the natural order, for humanity itself works with them. But those who array themselves against them have only their individual strength, and are impotent before them. Now to attempt to array the Church against them, is to attempt to array her against humanity, and to place the Word, which is alike the life of the race and the life of the Church, in contradiction with

itself. This, to a great extent, is what has in our times been attempted by a certain number of our Catholic friends. They have, without intending it, and without perceiving it, brought about this conflict, and effected apparently a divorce between the Church and humanity, or, in other words, have dissolved Christ—against which the Apostle admonishes us. They have sought to prevent the life of the Church and the life of humanity from flowing on together as one dialectic and harmonious life. A war is thus stirred up between religion and society, which is alike injurious to both, and which, but for human infirmity, human prejudice, and human passion, could never have arisen. There is no necessity for it in the essence or in the teaching of religion; for religion accepts the earth as a means, and contemns, despises, or wars against it only as the end, or when substituted for heaven itself. To make any progress in recovering those who are lost, and in extending the influence of the Church over the world, it is necessary that these misguided Catholics should correct their mistake, and learn that to war against the irrepressible instincts of humanity is not a Catholic or a religious duty; and it is necessary, on the other hand, that the men of the age, who turn their backs on the Church and on religion, should learn that their social progress and development can never secure the good they seek, unless effected from religious motives, and in subordination and subserviency to the palin-genesiac destiny of man.

The sanctity of the Church, we may add, depends on the same conditions as the infallibility of the Church. Her sanctity proceeds from the indwelling Word, who is her life. As the Word is necessarily holy, so she, as the Ideal Church, must also be holy;—holy in her doctrines, in her spirit, in her tendency, in her life;—holy as Christ himself is holy. Of this there can be no question with any one who really understands what the Church is, or who does not confound her with a mere aggregation of individuals. Individuals are holy by participation of her life, or the Word immanent within her. This participation is by way of communion, and communion is by way of the Sacraments. In this we see the necessity and the significance of what is called the Sacramental System of the Church. We must be born into her life, or we cannot live it. We are born into it in the Sacrament of Baptism, hence called the Sacrament of Regeneration. But life needs to be sustained.

All life is sustained by assimilation, and the true Christian life is sustained by the assimilation to our life of the theandric life of the Word made flesh. This is done through Holy Communion, or the Sacrament of the Eucharist, which is therefore called the Sacrament of Sustentation or Life. But, as our freedom remains, we may lose by our misconduct this life, or interrupt our communion with the life of Christ. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be some means for recovering this life, when lost, and of renewing this communion, when interrupted by sin. Hence the Sacrament of Penance, the Sacrament of Restoration or Reconciliation. Had we space, we could go through with the other four Sacraments, and show that they are all necessary provisions for the origination, the continuance, and completion of this communion, through which we participate in the life of our Redeemer and Saviour. But this whole subject of the Sacraments, involving as it does that of the Pontificate and the Sacerdocy, is too vast for our present limits, and we must reserve it as the subject of future essays, should it please God to give us strength to write and opportunity to publish them.

Individuals have in the means of this communion with the Word all the means of sanctity, and are more or less holy in proportion to their more or less faithful use of them. That all individuals in the Church, that even all Churchmen attain to the highest degree of sanctity possible, is by no means pretended; but if the scandals in the Church are greater, as it is sometimes alleged, than in the world outside, it is because her type or ideal of perfection is higher, and more is expected of Catholics than of other men. If there is much in the history of Churchmen that is discreditable, we must remember that it is not because they fall below the average of mankind, or even so low, but because their type or ideal, with which we compare their actual conduct, is infinitely higher. The type of the priest is the God-man, the Word made flesh. His ideal is Christ;—and what wonder that he fails frequently to actualize that ideal? What you note as scandals in the clergy would not be noted at all, or at most but partially, in other men; and, though it must be admitted that the clergy in all ages fall far below their type, as was to be expected, since they are men, and have the natural infirmities of men, a passable acquaintance with history will satisfy any fair-minded man that, as a rule, they are far above, in intelligence and virtue,

in earnestness and sanctity of life, any other class of men, equally numerous, that can be selected. But, be this as it may, as we do not confound individuals with the Church, so neither do we confound the clergy with the priesthood. As the infallibility of the Church is in no sense individual, and in no sense depends on the personal character, intelligence, wisdom, or sagacity of individuals, so the sanctity and efficiency of the priesthood do in no sense depend on the individual or personal merits of the clergy. We need but understand the real character of the Church in all its branches, and to bear in mind that the Real Presence in the Eucharist has a general as well as a particular meaning, to prevent the conduct of individuals, whether cleric or laic, from scandalizing us, disturbing our faith, shaking our confidence in Catholic truth, or weakening our devotion to Christ as he lives and manifests himself in the Church.

We have opened in these remarks, we may say in conclusion, many questions and great questions, some of which would require even volumes thoroughly to discuss, and to render plain and fully intelligible to ordinary readers. Some of them we hope to be able to take up and treat more at length in our future numbers. Our purpose thus far has been not to settle the questions we have raised, nor to establish by elaborate arguments the points we have made. We have wished simply to indicate what, in our judgment, are some of the defects in our ordinary methods of presenting and defending Catholic truth, and at the same time to draw attention to a method not usually adopted, though by no means a contradictory method, which we think is better adapted to the present intellectual and moral state of the heterodox, whether in or out of our communion, and which may be made more efficacious in their conversion. We have indicated, rather than developed this method, and those to whom it will seem a novelty may fail to perceive all its bearings and capabilities, and therefore condemn it. All we ask of them is fully to understand it, and not to pass judgment without a full knowledge of the cause. The method is substantially that by which we were ourselves led into the Church, and, in setting it forth, we are giving the link which unites our present thought to that which led us out of rationalism, and, through divine grace, brought us to the foot of the Cross. We resume the continuity of our own life, which for a time, we own, was interrupted by causes not necessary here to specify. We resume our iden-

tity, and speak not merely from a Catholicity we have put on, but from a Catholicity which we have assimilated in our own mind, and integrated in our own life. This may be nothing in favor of the line of argument we have adopted, but then it is nothing against it.

ART. II.—*Metropolitan Record*. Official Organ of the MOST REVEREND ARCHBISHOP OF NEW YORK. Weekly. October 12th, 1861. Art. *Brownson's Review*. New York: John Mullaly, Editor and Proprietor.

ANY apology due to our readers for calling their attention to a weekly sheet like that of the *Metropolitan Record*, may be found in the fact that this sheet is the "Official Organ" of our Most Reverend Archbishop, and that the article *à propos* of this Review, in its number for the 12th of last October, has been publicly stated, and, as far as we know, not contradicted, to have been written, dictated, or at least inspired by the Most Reverend Archbishop himself. To take notice of an article written by the ostensible editor of that journal would indeed be a derogation from the dignity of a Quarterly Reviewer; but there can be no derogation from that dignity in taking even the most formal notice of an article written, or approved, by so distinguished a Prelate as the illustrious Archbishop of New York. The respect is then paid not to the weekly newspaper, or to its comparatively unknown editor, but to one of the most widely known and influential Prelates of the American Church. Any remarks by a writer occupying so elevated and so commanding a position among Catholics as the Most Reverend Archbishop Hughes, even though published in a weekly newspaper, deserve the attention, and even the grave consideration of the Catholic Reviewer, whoever he may be.

That the article in question was actually written, dictated, or inspired by the Most Reverend Archbishop, we have no positive proof; but it has been ascribed to him; it bears all the internal marks of genuineness; and, even if not actually written by him, it is too elaborate and too important to have appeared in his "Official Organ" without his knowledge and express approval. It has the stamp

of his peculiar genius, the well-known characteristics of his somewhat original mind, and is what we should expect him to write on the subject discussed. There can, then, it seems to us, be no impropriety in assuming it to be substantially his, or in awarding him the credit due to its author.

We know very well that his Grace's authorship of the article in question has been gravely disputed by some of the public journals, and various reasons have been assigned why he could not have written it. But to us none of these reasons, however weighty, are conclusive. They proceed on the assumption that the article, or the chief portion of it at least, is a defence of slavery and an apology for the slave-trade; and therefore conclude that it could not have been written by his Grace, for no Catholic Archbishop would or could defend the one, or apologize for the other. But this conclusion is drawn from an erroneous assumption, for, as we hope to be able to show, the article neither defends slavery nor apologizes for the slave-trade. His authorship has also been denied on the ground that its style is deficient in that dignity and classic purity always to be presumed in the writings of an Archbishop, and is a closer imitation of the "slang and billingsgate" of the *New York Herald* than could be expected in a writer who for years was on no friendly terms with its editor, and persistently refused to suffer a copy of it to enter his palace. But this imitation is not so close as is pretended, and, even if it were, it would not necessarily be conclusive against his Grace's authorship. The man who writes not merely to prove that he is a fine writer, but to produce an effect beyond his personal glory, adapts his style to the understanding and taste of those he seeks to influence; and it may be said in his Grace's defence, if he indeed wrote the article, that he was writing in the columns of a newspaper, and for a public whose taste and judgment had, to a great extent, been formed by the *New York Herald*, and kindred journals.

It has, furthermore, been objected that the article could not have been written by the Archbishop, because it is written against this Review, the only Catholic Review published in the United States, and which, it is to be presumed, a Catholic Archbishop would be more ready to uphold and defend than to oppose and denounce. But we know no reason why an Archbishop should not write against this Review, as against any other periodical, in

case he disapproves it, or thinks it necessary to put the faithful or any portion of the community on their guard against what he judges to be erroneous or dangerous in its pages. The article, however, is not written against us, or against any principle or doctrine we have set forth or maintained; and we are very far from accepting the sympathy of those of our friends who pronounce it "a brutal attack" upon our Review. The Archbishop, we believe, has usually expressed himself, publicly and privately, in terms of warm commendation of this periodical, and we have received, even since the publication of our last number, on very respectable authority, the gratifying assurance that he has "no doubt of our personal orthodoxy," and that he does not deem it expedient for either the Propaganda or himself to write any thing against us. This assurance would, no doubt, be conclusive against the supposition that he is the author of the article in question, if it were really written, or intended to be written, against us. But such is not the fact, as we trust we shall soon make evident.

Undoubtedly, there are points on which there are differences of opinion between the writer of the article and ourselves. We are both independent thinkers; and as neither is personally infallible, it is hardly possible that we should not now and then take different views, and fail occasionally to arrive at the same conclusions. But this is not to be taken as a grave objection either to him or to ourselves. He does not fully approve every judgment of ours, any more than we approve every judgment of his. He insinuates a doubt whether the answer we gave in the first article in our last Review to various objections and criticisms against us "will prove satisfactory to the Catholic portion of our readers;" but this does not necessarily imply that it ought not to be satisfactory to them, and we presume it is satisfactory to his own mind, or else he would not, as he does, assert positively that we do "*really* answer" them in "a way which is satisfactory to" ourselves. He says, indeed, of Gioberti, whom many people admire as an able writer and a profound philosopher: "he has written as much philosophical trash as any of his contemporaries, and an attempt at refutation, here or there, would be only a multiplication of that same trash." But his Grace and we may differ on a literary and philosophical question, or as to what is or is not "philosophical trash," we presume, without mutual hostility, and without impeaching

the orthodoxy or the Catholic standing of either. He says, again, in relation to our article on the *Reading and Study of the Scriptures*, that there is "a conglomeration of opinions on that subject, all of which are antagonistic to the Catholic sense and meaning of the Holy Scriptures;" yet he cannot expect us to understand him to assert any antagonism between our views and the real Catholic sense and meaning of the Holy Scriptures. He can only mean to assert an antagonism between our literary sense or taste and that of some Catholics; for he is well aware that we entered into no discussion of the sense and meaning of the Holy Scriptures, and confined our remarks simply to the respective literary merits of different English translations of the Sacred Volume. We preferred, and we must still prefer, the *English* of King James's Version to that of the Donay Version. If he does not, then his taste in English and ours differ, and there is an old maxim, *De gustibus non est disputandum*. But these differences of taste or judgment are perfectly compatible with mutual confidence and esteem.

But it is said that the main portion of the article is directed against our views in the article on *Slavery and the War*, which, we have been told, it refutes in a masterly and triumphant manner. But this is a mistake. The article is written *à propos* of ours, but not against it. It is written almost exclusively against the Abolitionists, with whom it would be ridiculous to seek to confound us, and, if it objects to our article at all, it is only as inopportune, and, as the writer fears, may be "mischievous" because "untimely." He controverts none of its principles, and does little more than question the fact we assert, that slavery is at the bottom of the Rebellion, or the cause of the war in which we are now engaged.

The writer says against us, "that slavery is the cause of the war * * * happens to be simply impossible, except in the sense that a man's carrying money on his person is the cause of his being robbed on the highway!" But we cannot accept this assertion. Cause, strictly taken, is that which produces an event or thing, and without which it could not happen or exist. No man can doubt that in this sense slavery is the cause of the Rebellion and therefore of the War, for if there had been no slavery in the country, there would have been no rebellion,—and no rebellion, no war. Even the writer's own theory of the war, which

attributes it to Northern abolitionism, virtually makes slavery its cause; for, if there had been no slavery in the country, there would have been no Abolitionism. We all know that slavery is at the bottom of the whole controversy between the North and the South, and is the real cause of that divergence of feeling and interest, of which the civil war now raging is the bitter fruit, and therefore, if not its immediate, is at least its remote cause. That it is the cause of the war is implied in the public speeches and declarations of Southern statesmen. For, why have the South seceded or attempted to secede from the Union, and taken up arms against the Federal government, but because they asked, and because the North refused to grant, or, in the election of Mr. Lincoln, showed that it was disposed to refuse to grant, through the Federal government, protection to the institution of slavery in territory where, as we hold, it has no legal existence?

The writer has been led to his conclusion by not observing that the war has been brought on not by the Abolitionists wishing to rob the man who carried the money on his person, but by the North showing itself determined to refuse to suffer the power of the Federal government to be used to protect those who insist on taking and carrying away other men's money, and using it as their own. No doubt if the North had passively submitted to the extension of slavery, and suffered its friends to have their own way in regard to it, there would have been no rebellion and no civil war. So, if the traveller should offer no resistance to the highwayman, but passively submit to have his pockets and valise rifled, there would be no strife between him and the robber. The writer overlooks the fact that the North is not the robber rifling the pockets of the innocent traveller, but the innocent traveller seeking to recover his own from the robber, and to protect himself from future robberies. This slight oversight, which is no more than any of us are liable to, is the reason, we presume, why he has differed from us as to the cause of the war.

His Grace, or whoever was the writer, says: "Dr. Brownson maintains that the end and purpose of the war is not, or at least should not be, merely to sustain the Constitution, government, and laws of the country, but to abolish slavery in the Southern States;" that is, beyond maintaining the Constitution, government, and laws of the country, the war should be prosecuted for the abolition of

Southern slavery. This proposition he undoubtedly controverts; but his assertion that it is ours must be regarded as made in his character of a newspaper writer, and be taken in a newspaper or "Pickwickian" sense; for he knew very well that we had maintained nothing of the sort. We say expressly in our article: "The liberation of the slave is *not* the purpose and end of the war in which we are now engaged. The war is a war against rebellion, an unprovoked and wicked rebellion, engaged in by the Rebels for the purpose of making this a great Slaveholding Republic, in which the labor of the country shall be performed by slaves, either black or white; and if, to defeat the Rebellion, the destruction of slavery be necessary, and be actually effected, it *will change nothing in the character or purpose of the war.*" Such being our own express language, and which was, undoubtedly, before the eyes of the writer, we must, in simple justice to him, suppose that his real purpose in attaching our name to the offensive proposition was not to assert it as ours, but to assert it as the one he proposed to controvert.

As to the proposition his Grace or the writer in the *Record* so elaborately controverts, there is no difference of opinion between him and us. He denies that the Federal government can rightfully carry on a war for the abolition of slavery, and so do we; and he concedes that it has the right to abolish it under the pressure of military necessity, as a means of preserving the Union, and maintaining the integrity of the nation. This is all that we ourselves have maintained. The Federal government has the constitutional right to maintain itself, and the constitutional duty to maintain inviolate, as far as in its power, the Union of these States formed by our fathers. It has, therefore, the right to use all the means at its command necessary to maintain this right and to fulfil this duty. If the abolition of slavery is necessary to this end, it has the right, and is bound, to abolish it. His Grace's "Official Organ" concedes all this. It does not oppose the liberation of the slave; it does not oppose his liberation by the Federal government as a necessary means to a lawful end, but only as an end in itself. Hence it says: "In the progress of the war it is difficult to foresee what turn events may take in the South under the pressure of military necessity;" and again, after asserting the legal right of the planter to hold slaves, it says: "It is only under pressure of military necessity dur-

ing a war that even the Federal government or the Federal troops would have any right to deprive him of his lands or of his servants." This is very true, but it plainly implies that such pressure of military necessity is possible, and that under it the planter may rightfully be deprived of his servants or slaves. This is all we have asserted, and all we pretend to assert; and we therefore maintain that the article in the *Record* was not written against us, or intended to controvert our position as to the right and duty of the Federal government to recognize under the war power the freedom of the slave, and to call upon him, if it judges proper, to assist it in maintaining the integrity of the nation.

Undoubtedly, his Grace and we differ as to the fact whether the pressure of military necessity actually exists or not. He honestly believes that there is as yet no such military necessity as would justify the liberation of the slaves under the war power. He, we presume, believes it still practicable to save both slavery and the Union, and therefore that the recognition of the slaves as freemen is not called for, and would be manifestly unlawful. We think differently. We think that persistence in the effort to save the Union without calling the slaves to our assistance must result in the destruction of the Union and the complete success of the Confederates. There is here, no doubt, a wide difference of judgment between us. Events may prove that he is right and we are wrong; they may also prove that he is wrong and we are right. Each of us makes up, and must make up his judgment from the facts and probabilities in the case, and neither he nor we can form or pretend to form an absolutely infallible judgment on the subject. But there is, however, this difference between our respective judgments: if ours be acted on and found erroneous, the most serious consequence would be that four millions of people, who like ourselves are of the human race, and for whom, as well as for us, our Lord was incarnated, suffered and died on the Cross, would be converted from slaves to freemen; while, if his should be acted upon and prove to be faulty, the consequence would be that rebellion would be successful, the laws would be trampled under foot, the Constitution would be overthrown, the integrity of the nation itself would be destroyed, and that liberty so prized by our fathers, and from which the friends of humanity throughout the world have hoped so much, would in all probability be rendered henceforth forever impossible on

this continent. Evidently, then, it would be better that the Administration should err with us than err with him.

We are, we grant, opposed to slavery in any and every form; but, if we believed it practicable to secure the end and purpose of the war,—the maintenance and defence of our Constitution and government, which imply the maintenance and defence of the integrity of the nation and the sovereignty of the Union,—without abolishing slavery, or calling the slaves to our assistance, our respect for legal forms and vested rights would compel us to deny the right of the Federal government or any branch thereof, to declare them free. We urge their liberation only as a war measure, a measure necessary to save the nation, justified and called for by military necessity. We believe it necessary to save the integrity of the nation, to put down effectually rebellion in the slaveholding section of the Union. On this ground, we urge it; that is, as a means necessary to secure a lawful end, but not as an end in itself, or as an end which Congress or the Administration might legally attempt to effect in ordinary times with or without war. As a necessary means to such an end his Grace concedes that it would be lawful, and should be adopted; but he is apparently satisfied that it is not necessary as a means, and that the Union can be restored, and peace re-established without resorting to it. Although we think him wrong, he may be right. It may be that loyal blood, and loyal treasure, and Northern skill and bravery will prove amply sufficient to put down the Rebellion without recognizing the slaves as freemen, and availing ourselves of their services and sympathies, and that hereafter, as heretofore, the Union and slavery may continue to exist together. If so, we shall glory in the generosity and bravery of the loyal States, and rejoice that the Union is restored, and make, as we have heretofore made, no efforts to abolish slavery by the action of the Federal government. We shall regret the continuance of slavery, but shall stir up no war for its abolition. We shall console ourselves and the poor negroes as well as we can with the scathing lines of the poet:—

“Yet, yet, degraded men! th’ expected day,
That breaks your bitter cup, is far away;
Trade, wealth, and fashion ask you still to bleed,
And holy men give Scripture for the deed.”

His Grace very properly maintains that Catholics have not enlisted and will not enlist in a war for the abolition of

slavery, and we fully agree with him when he asks in one of his most eloquent strains :

“ Was it for this our dauntless soldiers fell in battle ? Was it for this that many of them, together with their brave officers, are now pining away in the captivity of a Southern dungeon ? Take, for instance, Colonel Corcoran and his gallant fellow-prisoners of the 69th. Was it for this that Cameron fell on the battle-field, without any friendly eye to gaze on his countenance whilst he lay

“ Like a warrior taking his rest,
With his martial cloak around him !”

Was it for this that the noble-hearted and gallant Ward was, we might say, assassinated on the deck of his vessel ? Was it for this that the unyielding patriot and heroic commander of Fort Sumter, as well as the equally heroic Mulligan at Lexington, no less than the brave General Lyon who fell on the field, were so cruelly neglected and left to their fate until reinforcements came too late ? Was it to carry out the idea of abolitionism that these noble warriors, and thousands of less distinguished names, have already given their lives, as they imagined, for the support of the Constitution and the preservation of the Union ?”

But neither was it, we may add, to defend slavery, or to protect the property of rebel masters in their slaves, that those brave men fell, or languish in Southern prisons. Catholics, at least foreign-born Catholics, are not pro-slavery men, and if many of them have been found opposed to abolitionists, it has been from a scrupulous regard for the Constitution and the Union, not from any love for slavery itself, or wish to see it perpetuated here or elsewhere. The great body of our German population, it is well known, are strongly anti-slavery ; and there are no people on earth whose heart beats more warmly or vividly for liberty, or which has a deeper horror of slavery, than the Catholic Irish. Catholics by their religion are inspired with sentiments of loyalty and with respect for the sacredness of the oath of allegiance, and know that they may never do evil that good may come. They have believed it far better for the interests of liberty and humanity to endure the existence of negro-slavery in our Southern States, than to attempt to remove it by unconstitutional means, or by means which would endanger the safety of the Union and the integrity of the nation. But, judging them by ourselves, and we may so judge them, for the same heart that beats

in our bosom beats no less warmly in theirs, they will not hesitate a moment when they see that the alternative is presented, that either slavery or the Union must go by the board, to say, and to say with an emphasis not to be mistaken: "Let slavery perish, but the Union—it must and shall be preserved."

This undoubtedly is the sentiment of his Grace himself. Though not born in the country, he has so long lived in it that he feels that it is his own native land, and takes his stand for the Union against the Southern Slaveholding Rebellion. No doubt he treats the Rebels with tenderness, for he comes of a nation in which rebellion, or what England treats as rebellion, has been chronic for nearly eight centuries; still more, because his ministry is one of peace and love, and he looks to the future peace and harmony between Catholics of the North and Catholics of the South; but he still, as a right loyal citizen, insists that the Rebellion must be put down, and that private friendships and private interests, if need be, must be sacrificed on the altar of the country. He opposes the Abolitionists indeed, but he does not, as it has been charged against him, defend slavery. He is a Catholic Prelate, and declares true our proposition that "the Catholic Church is opposed to slavery." He is a man, and says: "We are not the friends of slavery. If it were still to be introduced, we would resist the attempt with all our might." He regards slavery as "a calamity," and speaks of American slavery as "terrific." He objects to it on the score of morality, the disrespect by the masters of "the marriage bond creating man and wife among slaves," the breaking up "of families, the selling of the husband in one direction, the wife in another, whilst their children are disposed of according to the highest price offered from any point of the compass." It is evident, then, that he is not favorable to slavery, that he regards it as an evil, the introduction of which should be resisted *à outrance*. Certainly, then, he would not make, nor urge others to make war in its defence, or condemn honest folk for simply wishing to abolish it. If he speaks now and then apparently in its favor or extenuation, he does so not because he approves it, but because he regards its abolition as impracticable, or the evil as irremediable. "The Church," he says, "is opposed to slavery, but only in the sense that she is opposed to the calamities of human life, which she has no power to reverse." Believing it an

irreversible calamity, an irremediable evil, an evil which is fixed upon us forever, he seeks, very wisely and justly, to reconcile us to its existence. To this end he shows, on the one hand, its redeeming features, and, on the other, that, however terrific a calamity it may be, "it is not alien from the condition of mankind in general," that it is only one of those calamities which original sin has entailed upon mankind, and therefore to be borne with patience and resignation. It is always the characteristic of a wise man to reconcile himself and others, as far as possible, to the existence of inevitable evils, and to endure without a murmur what cannot be cured, trusting that the wrong will be made right, and full indemnification be granted in another and a better world. This is pious, is wise, is just, that is, in the case of really incurable evils, and implies no approbation of the evils themselves.

His Grace, we doubt not, would, could he see any legal and practicable way in which slavery could be abolished without entailing a greater evil than itself, not only be willing to see it abolished, but would earnestly engage in the great and noble work of abolishing it. He is animated by the spirit of his religion, and, like his Church, in earnest to remove every evil that is removable. "The Church," we said in our article, and he will not deny it, "has tolerated slavery where she lacked the power to abolish it; but her whole history proves that she sets her face against it, and uses all the means at her disposal, without shocking the public peace, or creating tumults and disorder, to prepare the slave for freedom, and to secure his ultimate emancipation." The Church never enjoins resignation to evils which are removable, and she never, whatever too many of her children, whether cleric or laic, may do, tolerates any evil which she has the power to remove without creating a greater evil. Resignation to evils which afflict our brethren, or even ourselves, when not voluntarily assumed as penances, when we have it in our power to remove them, is not and cannot be either a human or a Christian virtue. Catholicity requires us to love all men as our brethren, and to labor earnestly and perseveringly for the good of society, the progress of civilization, and the freedom and manly development of mankind, as well as to cultivate the pious affections and the ascetic virtues. The latter we are to do, but not in doing it to leave undone the former. For he who says he loves God, and hateth his brother, is a liar and

the truth is not in him. All this his Grace knows far better than we do, and we must therefore presume that, were he to see his way clear, he would labor as earnestly and as persistently for the abolition of slavery as would any of those Abolitionists themselves, against whom he so vehemently directs his cutting irony and his biting sarcasms. To say less would be to doubt his Catholic spirit, and his devotion to the religion of which he is regarded as so bright an ornament and so illustrious a champion.

His Grace, in opposing the Abolitionists, does not oppose them on the ground that they are opposed to slavery and seek its abolition. He opposes them, as we understand him, on the ground that they fail to recognize the right of property which the law secures to the master in his slave, that they seek the abolition of slavery by unconstitutional means, and that their success would endanger the peace of the Union, and work no real benefit to the slaves themselves. On this same ground we ourselves have for twenty years objected to them, and opposed their movements. This ground of opposition is legitimate, and implies no approbation of slavery itself. The only fault with it is, that it has now ceased to be true in its more essential parts. It is inopportune, and can no longer serve the sacred cause of Union. The disruption of the Union apprehended has actually taken place, the peace of the Union is broken, and the slaveholders cannot be more embittered against the North than they already are, and they can attempt nothing worse than they are now doing. When the work was to preserve peace and union, it was well to oppose Abolitionists, but now when peace and union are broken, and the work is to restore them, such opposition is mistimed and altogether misplaced. It creates divisions among loyal citizens, and weakens our strength to put down the Rebellion.

After all, neither the Archbishop nor we can object to the principle of abolitionism or the end it seeks; for we both believe slavery an evil, a wrong, opposed by the Church, and as men and Catholics must believe that it ought to be abolished in case it can be legally and constitutionally. We can really object to Abolitionists only their too little respect for the alleged right of property in man and for legal forms and constitutions. Their error was not in seeking the abolition of slavery, but in seeking it by improper and unjustifiable means. This is all that we can say against them, for neither he nor we do or can

wish the perpetuation of negro-slavery. The negro, as we never cease to repeat, is a man, a man of the same race with ourselves. He, like us, belongs to the genus *homo*, and all men are members of the body of humanity in the natural order, as all Christians, in the regeneration, are members of the body of Christ, and members one of another, and no member can suffer without the whole body suffering with it. This great truth he and we must hold. Both he and we, then, must oppose slavery, for it is the greatest possible outrage upon the rights and dignity of man, and even an outrage upon the Creator himself, whose image and likeness it debases and disfigures in his creature. But the Abolitionists are not now seeking the abolition of slavery by any illegal, improper, or unjustifiable means. They ask no violation now of the Constitution, and waive the question of property, for the slaveholders by their rebellion have forfeited whatever right the law secured to them as loyal citizens. They are contented to accept abolition under the war-power, as a military necessity. There is, then, no longer any solid reason for warring against them.

Grant, as his Grace alleges, that the Abolitionists or some of them have said hard things against the Constitution of the United States; they have done so only on the supposition that the Constitution was in the way of redressing what they and we also regard as a great moral, social, and political wrong. They have, however, confined their opposition to words; they have never risen in rebellion, or labored to induce others to rise in rebellion against the Constitution. They have never made, and never proposed to make war on the Union for the sake of emancipating the slaves. They have used, and they propose to use against slavery only the freedom of speech and the press, which Congress is forbidden by the Constitution itself to make any law against. They may have said or may have written and printed many foolish, many imprudent, or many unpleasant, or even incendiary words against slaveholders and pro-slavery men; but they are not and never have been guilty of treason. Treason, according to the Constitution of the United States, consists only "in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort." The Abolitionists have never done this; they have never levied war against the United States; they have never adhered to their enemies, or given them aid or comfort. The raid of John Brown and his

band into Virginia is no exception to this statement. John Brown and his handful of adherents acted on their own responsibility, without the approval and without the knowledge of the great body of Abolitionists, as well as contrary to their avowed principles and mode of abolishing slavery. That they sympathized with the end, to wit, the freedom of the slave, is no doubt true; that they believed John Brown's motives were good, is possible; that they approved the means he adopted is untrue, and they are no more to be held responsible for his action, than his Grace, who wished to see Ireland free, and generously contributed five hundred dollars to purchase her a shield, but disapproved of the Young Ireland party, is to be held responsible for the Irish Rebellion which terminated so sadly at Slievenamon in 1848.

His Grace intimates in his Letter to Bishop Lynch, and he or his "Official Organ" insinuates in the article we are examining, that the chief blame of the present war rests upon Northern Abolitionists, not on the Southern Rebels themselves. We cannot argue with him in this; nor can we believe it wise or just on the part of the loyal friends of the Union to indulge at the present time in violent and bitter vituperations against any portion of our loyal citizens. That the *New York Herald* should do this, is in character, and can excite no surprise, hardly any indignation, for many persons honestly believe that it is really as much in the interest of Secession, and working as earnestly for the success of the Southern Confederacy now, as it was avowedly before the assemblage of New York citizens one day required it to raise from its office the flag of the Union. That those who for years gained political notoriety and influence by denouncing as Black Republicans or as Abolitionists all who opposed the extension of slavery, and sought in a legal and constitutional way to resist the encroachments of the slave interest, should continue on in their old way, and repeat their old slang phrases, unconscious of any change in public affairs, was to be expected, and can surprise no one. A change in them would be the surprising thing. But, we confess, it grieves us to find our own Archbishop, or even his "Official Organ," joining with them, castigating or ridiculing the loyal North, and holding it up as responsible for all the calamities which have befallen our beloved country. We are grieved, because it, to some extent, places our religion in a false posi-

tion, and can hardly fail seriously to impair the reputation of one of our most eminent Catholics, and most distinguished and highly esteemed prelates. His reputation is not a thing to be trifled with. It is the property of the Church, and is dear to every true-hearted Catholic, who cannot but be deeply grieved to find any thing occurring to impair it, or to lower his position, or lessen his influence in the American community.

We are confident that, in his war upon the anti-slavery party, his Grace has had no disloyal purpose, has been moved by no improper motive, and has had no wish but to serve the best interests of his country; but we beg his permission to say, and with all deference and respect, that he appears to us to have neglected to consult chronology, and has not noted with his usual care and sagacity the changes in the bearing of great public questions which one or two years have effected. He has suffered himself to be betrayed into the adoption of a policy manifestly behind the times,—a policy which, when there was no rebellion in arms against the Government, and no danger of any serious disturbance of the public peace, might have been judicious or, at least, harmless, but which we fear can now be regarded neither as the one nor the other. It seems to us now fitted only to give indirectly, if not directly, aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States; and we have no doubt that, were we to adopt it, we should find ourselves suddenly arrested for treason, and sent to keep company with some of our old friends at Fort Warren. Few things could more effectually aid and comfort the Rebels than articles and speeches by men in the loyal States exonerating them, and throwing the blame of having caused the Rebellion on the citizens of the loyal North, now in arms and pouring out their blood and treasure in defence of the Constitution and the integrity of the nation.

This is a matter which cannot be passed over lightly, and these are times when it will not do to study to keep up old party feuds and party animosities. These are times when all loyal men must sacrifice on the altar of their country their party and even their private loves, and, what to most men is still more difficult, their party and their private hatreds; for the Union can be saved only on condition that the whole North present an unbroken front and, to use a fine Scriptural expression, march "as one man" against the enemy, to put down the wicked and unprovoked Rebellion.

The South had never dared to bring her conspiracy to a head, to appeal from ballots to bullets, and to attempt by force of arms to reconstruct or destroy the Union, had she not counted on a divided North, and support from a party which was opposed to Abolition and even Republicanism, and in elections had always acted under her dictation, and sustained her policy. She expected to find opposed to her only the non-fighting Abolitionists and the Republican party, who both together constituted only a bare majority of the population of the non-Slaveholding States; and, if her expectations in this respect had been realized, she would in all probability have been able to succeed. Whatever, then, tends to keep the North divided, and to prevent the loyal States from entering into the contest with the hearty sympathy and co-operation of their whole population is really and undeniably aid and comfort given to the enemy, and is therefore under the Constitution of the United States virtually, if not formally, treason.

Party divisions, and especially party rivalries and animosities, are now mistimed and mischievous. They weaken the friends of the Union, and strengthen the hands of the Rebels. We know, and can afford to know, till the Rebellion is crushed out, no party divisions, and no division but that between Loyalists and Rebels. Hushed should be all party strife between loyal men, and even the usual *odium theologicum* should be suppressed. All loyal men, Protestants or Catholics, Republicans, Democrats, or Abolitionists, whether black or white, red or yellow, who are prepared to stand by our common country, and defend it, if need be, even to the last gasp, are of our party, are our friends, our brothers, and we give them our hand and our heart. If there are differences between us to be settled, we will adjourn them till we have put down the Rebellion, saved the Union, and made it sure that we have a country, homes, and firesides that we may enjoy in peace and safety, and, when that is done, perhaps, it will be found that most of those differences will have settled themselves, or, at least so far as personal or political, not worth reviving. We must be united, and not like the maddened Jews when their chief city was beleagured by the Roman cohorts, and Roman battering-rams were beating down the walls of their Citadel, divided into factions and wasting in spilling each other's blood the strength needed to save our national existence from destruction.

This is no time for an Archbishop or any other man to make war on Abolitionists and to crack stale jokes about an "Abolition Brigade," and the valor or want of valor of its suggested "Brigadier." Such things are "untimely and mischievous." The very existence of the nation is threatened, and threatened not by Abolitionists or their sympathizers, but by the slaveholding aristocracy of the South, and their dupes, tools, or aiders and abettors in the loyal States,—men who have no abolition sympathies, but as strong antipathies to all Abolitionists as John Randolph of Roanoke had to a sheep, which made him say, that he would at any time go a mile out of his way to give one a kick. The danger that threatens is not on the side of Abolitionists, but on the side of the friends and supporters of slavery, and very ordinary wisdom would counsel us, if we are true men, to face the danger where it is, not where it is not. There is no use in trying to gain credit with the loyal North by saying the Union must be sustained, and with the disloyal South by vituperating Abolitionists, and denouncing as abolitionists all who would not indeed overstep the Constitution to abolish slavery, but would abolish slavery as a means of saving the Constitution. No man can now be suffered to say, "Good Lord, and Good Devil." He must choose either the Lord's side or the Devil's side, and take the consequence of success or failure:

"Under which king, Bezonian? Speak, or die!"

He who is not with us is against us. No man can now be neutral, and he who attempts to serve on both sides, will in the end be scorned and rejected by both. Are you for the Union? Then you must be against the Rebels and all that favors their cause. Are you not against the Rebels? Then you are against the Union, and are no more a dutiful citizen than he would be a dutiful son who would stand by as a neutral, and see his own mother assassinated. Neutrality in a citizen, when his country is threatened by a foreign or domestic foe, is virtually treason, and more despicable than open treason itself, for it lacks the courage and the manhood to declare itself. We do not charge the writer with neutrality; we only fear that his desire to keep his friendly relations with his "Southern brethren" has made him less warm, earnest, and decided in his efforts to save the Union than we, both as a citizen and a Catholic, might wish to find him.

Nobody can suspect us of any undue sympathy with Abolitionists, for no man in the country has more steadily or more energetically opposed their movements for the last twenty years than ourselves; and we should continue to oppose them as steadily and as energetically, if we believed there were the least danger to the Constitution, or to the peace and safety of the Union, to be apprehended from them. We, no more than his Grace, are prepared to abrogate the Constitution in order to abolish slavery, and he, as well as we, is prepared to abolish slavery as a means necessary to save the Constitution and the nation from the destruction threatened by the Southern Rebellion, whenever he is convinced that it is necessary to that end. Yet it may be that we have all of us done and are still doing more or less injustice to those whom we have stigmatized as abolition fanatics. It is not our province to defend the Abolitionists; but we cannot help suspecting, as events are turning out, it would have done no harm to have listened to them with less contempt, and given more heed to their suggestions. They saw clearer than any of us the aggressive strength and tendency of the slave power, and they felt more intensely than any of us the gross outrage slavery itself is upon the rights and dignity of our common manhood. To us they seemed fanatics; but it is possible they were fanatics only in the sense that all living men are fanatics to the dead, all earnest men are fanatics to the lukewarm, all disinterested and devoted men are fanatics to the selfish, and all heroic men are fanatics to the cowardly. Perhaps, if we who have so long sneered at them as fanatics, had studied less to be wise and politic, and been more truly living men, more in earnest to assert and vindicate the rights of our race, more disinterested and less selfish in our disposition and aims, and more truly heroic in our devotion to the right and the just instead of the merely prudent and the expedient, their fanaticism would have revolted us less, indeed have seemed to us no fanaticism at all, and we been saved from the terrible alternative of either succumbing to the slaveholding aristocracy, or of maintaining our freedom and manhood at the expense of millions of lives, and untold treasure. There are few men who are wise betimes, and to most men wisdom comes only when it is too late to profit them. But, however this may be, the war for the Union cannot be successfully prosecuted on pro-slavery principles; and to us it is a "fixed fact" that we must give up either

slavery or the Union. Slavery is the bond of union between the Rebels, and it is the great instrument on which they rely for effecting their purposes; and they can be defeated and the Union cause secured a triumph, as we view the case, only by calling to our aid the anti-slavery sentiment of the country, and suffering the war to be not in its end and purpose, but in its incidental effect, a war of liberation.

Whatever our politicians may say, whatever the Administration may fear, whatever our Archbishop may think, the great body of the people of the loyal States are strongly opposed to negro-slavery, and there are few loyal men amongst us who are not anti-slavery men. Though they will violate no constitution or law, or public right, in order to abolish slavery, they will engage with none the less alacrity in the War by feeling assured that it will result in giving to the oppressed and down-trodden millions the opportunity to rise from their degradation, and prove their manhood. The conviction that such a result will come, and come in a legal way, as a means of defeating and punishing the public enemies of the country, will give additional energy to our brave volunteers, nerve them with greater firmness to endure the privations of a soldier's life, and fire them with more heroic courage to meet the foe on the battle-field. They will feel that then some good will come, incidentally at least, from their self-sacrifice, that they will have done something more than preserve the life of the nation so needlessly endangered, and that, if they fall, millions of warm hearts, free hearts, made free by them, will bless their memories, and bedew their graves with tears of gratitude.

O, tell us not that these brave husbands, sons, and brothers we have armed and sent forth to the battle will throw down their arms and retire to their homes, because, if they fight, the chains will fall from four millions of slaves! You who say it know nothing of the human heart, least of all of the true American heart. You dishonor your own manhood; you dishonor our common manhood; you belie human nature itself. There lives not the man in whose heart there is not a chord that vibrates to the slightest whisper of liberty,—liberty, man's true dignity, man's greatest glory, that for which God himself descended to earth, and assumed flesh to secure to him,—liberty, for which humanity everywhere pants as the thirsty hart for the water-brook, and for which she never ceases to struggle, and leaves her

pathway through the ages red with the blood and white with the bones of its martyrs. Tell us not that men will fight only for legal technicalities and parchment formulas. They will no more fight for these than for so much chaff of the summer threshing-floor, unless as a means necessary to secure liberty,—liberty for themselves, liberty for their wives and children, and, if they have any sense of their true humanity, liberty for all men and for all times.

We know very well that there is a strong prejudice in some minds, assiduously cultivated under Southern inspiration, against all men and parties avowing anti-slavery sentiments, affecting a certain number even of the officers of the army and navy. This prejudice has gone far to paralyze both arms of the service, and has had some influence in depriving it of several of its ablest and most accomplished officers, who have been induced by it to regard the Republican party as low, ungentlemanly, and plebeian, and to feel that it would be a degradation to serve the Union, which had nursed, fed, and educated them, under a Republican administration. This has, no doubt, operated unfavorably to the Union cause; but as the prejudice is unjust, and has no foundation in truth, it cannot long survive, and can, after all, affect only those who are influenced more by artificial society than by the natural sentiments of humanity. Even the slaveholders love liberty, and themselves feel that slavery is unjust, and loathe it even while they arm to defend it. We, some five years since, gave utterance to stronger anti-slavery sentiments in a public lecture, in Charleston, to the very *élite* of Charleston society, than we have heretofore expressed in these pages, and were loudly applauded. Always will the earnest and fearless tones of a freeman, asserting the rights and dignity of man, find an echo from every man's heart, for they touch and stir to the quick the very heart of humanity herself.

Yet, the prejudice we speak of exists, though artificial and unnatural, and is extended to all New England, and to Massachusetts especially, as the chief seat of anti-slavery sentiments and of anti-slavery movements. But for the "fierce democracie" of the old Bay State, it is pretended no resistance would have been offered to the encroachments of the slave power, and there would have been no rebellion of the slaveholding aristocracy, and therefore again, no civil war, and no interruption of trade and commerce. To concede this, which politicians and demagogues who take

no note of time or of the changes which it brings, urge as a crushing charge, would be unjust to the patriotism and humanity of other sections of our common country, hardly, if at all, behind her in their hatred of slavery, or their devotion to the Union. Yet New England in general, and the old Bay State in particular, have been surpassed nowhere in hatred of slavery, in disinterested devotion to the cause of humanity, and true-hearted loyalty to the Government of the United States. There may be faults in the New England character; but not for what is faulty in her character is she loaded with reproaches by the slaveholding aristocracy of the South and their Northern dupes and lackeys, but for what is noble, generous, disinterested, and manly. These reproaches are her wreath of honor, more enviable than the diadem that circles the brow of king or kaiser.

When, a year ago, it was proposed in this city, by Senator Benjamin, the *New York Herald*, and others, in the reconstruction of the Union to exclude New England, a noble young Irish gentleman, now an officer in the Federal army, and sure to do honor to himself and the country, replied, "Yes, you may exclude New England, but at the expense of excluding your brains." The New England mind, the New England spirit and energy, took the lead in resisting British tyranny and oppression, in creating the American nation; and it is still in New England that survives in greater purity and vigor than elsewhere, the genuine American national life. There still glows the fire that warmed the hearts of the patriots who signed the Declaration of American Independence, and of the sages who formed the Federal Constitution; and till it is extinguished there, the American nationality is not lost, and the hopes founded by the friends of humanity on American civilization may still be cherished. New England is not only the head, but the heart of America; and who knows her not, knows as little of the American nation, as he knows of Great Britain who has visited only Scotland or Ireland. Liberty, when retired from all the rest of the Union, will still find a home on her green mountains, amid her granite hills, in her smiling valleys, on her capes, and along her rivers and bays; and still shall her sons be rocked in the old family cradle preserved in her noble Metropolis.

We love the whole Union, and will permit ourselves to draw no invidious comparisons between different loyal sec-

tions of the Union; but we cherish as the apple of our eye the fair fame of our own New England, to which, wherever we may pitch our tent for the night or encamp for the day, our heart fondly turns as to a mother's face; and especially do we love and honor the Old Bay State—where we first received that second birth which gives promise of heaven; where first we learned to labor for truth, virtue, and immortality; where reposes, in the hope of a glorious uprising, all that was mortal of our loved ones; and where are the scenes of our deepest grief and our sweetest joys. Men who know her not may revile her, but all real American history centres in or clusters around her. Hers was the first blood shed in the struggle to make us a nation; hers, too, has been the first blood shed in the struggle to preserve us a nation. No braver men have fallen on the field, or are now wasting out their life in Southern dungeons, than the sons of Massachusetts; and though others may equal, none will more distinguish themselves in the holy war in defence of our glorious Union, and the rights and liberties it secures.

We hope our readers will pardon us these remarks, into which we have been betrayed by our wish to point out the madness in loyal men of that bitter prejudice some of our friends think it wise and politic to excite against New England, and against all who find it difficult to reconcile themselves to the perpetual existence of slavery on this continent, which should be sacred to liberty. There is no section of the Union, if we speak as Catholics, from which we have more to hope, than New England; and we place far more reliance for the promotion of Catholic interests on the Catholics of Boston, than on the Catholics of Baltimore. Catholics of Boston may have less wealth, less polish, and been less associated with the past history of the country, than those of Baltimore; but they give more signs of life, and live in a purer and more invigorating atmosphere, and are likely at a much earlier day to form the union, so much desired, between our religion and the true, legitimate, unmistakable American order of civilization. Ecclesiastically speaking, Baltimore is our metropolis, for its Archbishop is our Primate; but in civilization, in public spirit, in American principle, American patriotism, and American thought and energy, our metropolis is Boston, though it might be New York.

Never did our Catholic publicists and political and social

leaders commit a greater mistake, than when they seized the bait thrown out to catch the Spanish people, and reconcile them to the surrender of Cuba to the Southern slaveholders,—that slavery and Catholicity are the only two conservative institutions in the country, and that to strengthen the slaveholding power would be to strengthen the Catholic Church, place the country on the side of conservatism, and secure the salvation of souls. It was a sad mistake. In this country, as everywhere else, the interests of Catholicity are linked with the cause of freedom, and the proper alliance of Catholics is not with the friends of slavery, but with those who love, respect, and are ready to die in defence of the rights of man. In regard to civilization and the future prosperity of our religion on this continent, an anti-slavery Protestant is worth more than a pro-slavery Catholic. It is not from the slaveholding South that we can hope for accessions to our Church; and thus far, experience shows our accessions are to come, if they come at all, from the Free States, and first and foremost from New England and her descendants settled in other sections of the Union. Our religion can prosper in this country only as it accepts and consecrates true American civilization, and that civilization is represented by the free North, not by the slaveholding South. Hence we should resist *à outrance* every pro-slavery tendency that we discover in our Catholic community. The Catholic people are loyal in their intentions, and in their heart deeply and earnestly devoted to the Union; but in consequence of the accidental influence which Maryland has from the first exerted and still exerts, there are many amongst us who fail to perceive that the seat of true Americanism is north of Mason and Dixon's line, and by no means south of it. The present rebellion proves that, though there may still be Americanism in the Slaveholding States, the predominant tendency in them is to a nationality foreign from that which formed the Union, and is represented by it. Your Southern Americanism is a bastard Americanism, and it feels it, or else it would never have arisen and attempted to murder the legitimate heir. We wish our publicists, our politicians, our influential men, and we may say it, our clergy, to understand this fact, and suffer it to dictate their future policy. To attempt to unite the destiny of our religion on this continent with the inferior civilization of the South, would be manifestly against its true interest,

and to provide only for its future failure and extinction. The North may be Protestant, but the South is Pagan; and Protestantism, as much as we may dislike it, is always to be preferred to Paganism.

It is easy, therefore, to see why we cannot join with the writer of the article in the *Record*, in his jests and sarcasms against the anti-slavery men of the North, and why, even as a Catholic with the best interests of religion at heart, we must treat the anti-slavery sentiment, in the present crisis at least, with no little tenderness and respect. We agree perfectly with the writer, that the laws recognize the master's right of property in his slaves, and that we can, as citizens of non-Slaveholding States, no more interfere in the Slave States themselves with his property in slaves, than with his property in horses and cattle; but we maintain, what he seems to forget, the master by his rebellion forfeits that right, and may justly have the forfeiture enforced against him. Had he remained a loyal subject—had he not conspired against the legitimate authority of the Union, and taken part in the armed rebellion against it—he might retain that property, and the Federal government have no right to interfere with it. But, as the writer well knows, we have the right to deprive the rebel not only of his property in slaves, but even in his cotton, rice, and tobacco. It was, therefore, wholly unnecessary for him to construct his long and elaborate article to establish in the Southern States the legality of slave property. The slaves, whether slaves of loyal men or of rebels, whether legitimately or illegitimately held, may under the war-power, be recognized as free citizens, and, under the pressure of military necessity, be called upon to assist, in any and every way that the government judges best, in defending the Union; while the slaves of rebel owners may be declared free not only under the pressure of military necessity, but as a punishment which the sovereign authority has a right to inflict upon them for their crimes, and as a warning to all future rebels. It is on this ground, and on this ground only, that we, or any considerable proportion of the North, propose or ever have proposed to interfere with the master's right of property in his slaves, and to recognize the slaves as free citizens, owing allegiance to the Federal government, and entitled to protection from it; while the writer himself, as we have seen, concedes that on this ground it may be done,

and, at least, hints that, in his judgment, it may be necessary to be done.

But a more serious charge than that of favoring slavery has been urged against the writer, namely, that of apologizing for the slave-trade. We quote the passage from his article on which this charge is founded :—

“ Africa, it is well known, is a country of savages, not having the slightest gleam of hope as to prospective civilization. We may say that, in all the south-western section of Africa, there is no such thing known as the idea of a natural freeman. The tribes in the interior are in perpetual war, and the laws of war among them are, that a prisoner may either be executed on the spot, or sold as a slave. It is but lately that the savage called King of Dahomey immolated 2,000, some say 5,000, of his prisoners, or subjects, to crimson with their blood the grave of his equally savage father. This was according to what, in the barbarian spirit of that country, was called ‘THE GREAT CUSTOM.’ Now, if our philanthropists of the abolition school would pay the slightest attention to the instincts and hopes of human nature, whether in Africa or elsewhere, they would easily comprehend that these two or five thousand victims would prefer slavery to decapitation. This they might understand from what goes on here continually, viz., that a poor prisoner who is condemned to death by the laws of his country, chooses invariably, if mercy should interpose, the penitentiary for life in preference to the hemp of the gallows. This is human nature, of which our abolitionists do not appear to have any adequate conception.

“ Now, suppose that the savage King of Dahomey sent his subjects or prisoners to some of the factories on the coast, and sold them as slaves, would he be more guilty than if he had cut their heads off? Suppose the slavers at the dock should buy them off at \$1 25 a head from the massacre of their barbarous tyrant, would they be doing wrong? They would only have to choose between leaving those wretches to be butchered or transporting them to some of the slave colonies of America. We, of course, believe that no genuine Christian—no decent man—would be engaged in this kind of business, still we cannot discover the crime even of the slaver in snatching them from the butcheries prepared for them in their native land. When they arrive in those colonies would it be a crime for humane masters to purchase them at a sum which prospectively might cover the annual, or semi-annual, wages given to laborers in other parts of the world? These purchasers should be bound, and if they are men of conscience they would be bound, to take care of these unfortunate people. Under the circumstances, it is very difficult to discover in the purchasers any moral transgression of the law of God or of the law of man where that traffic is authorized. The terrific part of the question is, that not only

the individuals brought to the American continent or islands are themselves to be slaves, but their posterity, in like manner, for all time to come. This is the only terrific feature about American slavery. And yet it is not alien from the condition of mankind in general. Original sin has entailed upon the human race its consequences for time and eternity. And yet the men who are living now had no part in the commission of original sin. The drunkard, the thief, the bad man of any description, entails upon his posterity evils which the forfeiture of his own personal life cannot prevent or repair."

This, at first sight, looks very much like an apology for the slave-trade, for the writer not only says that he cannot discover the crime in the slaver, or that there would be any moral transgression of the law of God in the act, but even explains away the terrific part of the question that "not only the individuals brought to the American continent or islands are themselves to be slaves, but their posterity, in like manner, for all time to come," by likening it to the "consequences which original sin has entailed upon the human race," and therefore as "not alien from the condition of mankind in general." So understood, the writer has unquestionably incurred the interdict pronounced by the Church, for she not only excommunicates all who are actually engaged in the traffic, as he alleges, but "absolutely prohibits and interdicts all ecclesiastics and laymen from maintaining that this traffic in blacks is permitted, under any pretext or color whatsoever; or to preach, or teach in public or in private, in any way whatever, any thing" in its favor or extenuation. To excuse the traffic under any circumstances whatever, and to attempt to lessen our horror of it by likening its consequences to those of original sin, and assuming that the men who actually engage in it are free from all actual guilt in carrying it on, is plainly to do what Gregory XVI., in the words we have cited from his Bull given at Rome, the 3d of November, 1839, absolutely forbids and interdicts.

But we are far from believing that it was the intention of the writer, whether the Archbishop or some one else, to approve or apologize for the infamous traffic in blacks, for he says expressly: "We of course believe that no genuine Christian, no decent man would be engaged in this kind of business." Every reader of the article will have perceived that the writer adopts a popular newspaper style, and in no respect studies to be precise or exact in his language;

as is evident from his saying that "the men who are living now had no part in the commission of original sin." This he cannot be unaware, is theologically inexact; for original sin is really sin and punished as such in all men, to whom it is not remitted, with the loss of heaven, and no man can be punished for a sin of which he is not guilty, or be guilty of a sin in which he has had no part in committing. The race sinned in Adam, and we all sin in the race, for we all participate in it, since the race is in us, and we in it. But what he means is, no doubt, true, that is, that we, regarded as individuals, acting as individuals in our purely individual capacity, had no part in the commission of original sin, and therefore original sin is distinguished from actual sin both in its character and in its punishment. His intention clearly was not to represent the act of the slaver as one of the consequences of original sin, for which the slaver himself would not be personally responsible, but the evil which descends upon the posterity of the slaves as the consequence of his act, as descending in like manner as the consequences of original sin descend upon the individuals of the race, and therefore that there is nothing alien in this from the condition of mankind in general, since "the drunkard, the thief, the bad man of any description, entails upon his posterity evils which the forfeiture of his own personal life cannot prevent or repair." Understood in this way, we are under no necessity of so interpreting his language as to make it a defence of a traffic which the Church has condemned, and which all civilized nations regard as infamous and treat as piracy.

Newspaper writers and even essayists, who are obliged to write with haste and confine themselves to a limited space, must frequently express themselves without sufficiently guarding their language at all points from misconception, and should always be interpreted in a liberal spirit, according to what is their evident scope and intention, and not according to the sense which a narrow-minded and ill-natured critic might extract from their loose and unguarded expressions. An Archbishop, however strongly opposed he may be to abolition movements, however fervently he may wish to reconcile us to the existence of an institution or the continuance of a traffic which he believes to be inevitable, or at least not to be suppressed without incurring greater evils and more deplorable calamities than the existence of slavery or the continuance of the slave-trade, it is not to be presumed would, in the free North,

where he has perfect liberty to speak or not to speak, as he thinks, knowingly incur the censures of his Church, place himself under interdict, or expose himself to excommunication and deposition by defending, apologizing, or in any way whatever justifying, or even extenuating the infamous traffic in blacks. All the presumptions are that, both as a Catholic and as a man, he agrees with his Church, and regards that traffic with horror, and nothing but his most formal and express declarations should lead us to a contrary conclusion. It would be most horrible to believe that our illustrious Archbishop would or could, either by himself or by his "Official Organ," commit so gross an outrage upon Catholic sentiment and upon the intimate convictions of the whole civilized world. We can accept no such interpretation of his language, and even if we were unable to explain it away, we would still insist that he did not and could not mean it, and should wait with our confidence in him unimpaired till he should see proper to favor us or the public with his own explanations.

The writer seems at a loss to know what would be done with the slaves if they were freed, and to fear that their emancipation would lead to a repetition of the horrors of San Domingo. In answer, we suggest, as some relief to his mind, that the horrors of San Domingo did not result from the emancipation of the slaves, but from the obstinate refusal of the slave proprietors to recognize the partial emancipation decreed by the mother country. It was not the liberation of the slaves, but the refusal of that liberation by their owners, and their severe and barbarous punishments inflicted on those who simply asked that the laws in their favor should be practically observed, that led to those terrible scenes of pillage, murder, and incendiarism which slaveholders take a savage delight in holding up as the horrors of San Domingo, to discourage all efforts by the friends of humanity in behalf of the poor down-trodden slaves of the negro race. Had the masters done their duty, had they not set an example of greater barbarity than any subsequently practised by their slaves, had they treated the slaves as men, not as wild beasts, for whom hanging, chopping to pieces, or burning was too slight a punishment, we should have heard little of the horrors of San Domingo. The real horrors of San Domingo, those which are most revolting to humanity, and indicate the greatest barbarism, were enacted not by the black slaves, but by the white and

polished masters, before the slaves made their fierce and their terrible effort to free themselves.

The horrors of San Domingo read, indeed, a terrible lesson, but it is a lesson to be learned and pondered well in a contrary sense from that in which it is usually taken by our Southern slaveholders and our Northern apologists for slavery. Deny the slave, even the negro, all hope of being one day delivered from his bondage, and of standing up, sable though be his complexion, as a freeman, drive him to utter desperation, and you make him a tiger in ferocity, and he will rend you in pieces. That the horrors of San Domingo have not been re-enacted in some of the Southern States, is owing to the influence of these same Northern Abolitionists whom you vituperate, and to the hope they have enabled the slave to cherish in his heart that one day growing humanity, the progress of civilization, and a deeper sense of the obligations imposed by Christianity, would ultimately bring him deliverance. Beware how you extinguish that hope, and make that slave, who, after all, has a man's heart beating in his bosom, perfectly desperate. We, like others, had doubted whether the chains or the slave had not eaten into his very soul, and extinguished all manly feeling and all desire for freedom; but a slave in a Southern State set us right. He complained not of ill-treatment, of insufficient food, or of being overworked; but, to our enumeration of his advantages and the disadvantages of the free colored population at the North, showing him, as we thought, that he was better off than they, he looked us in the face, and said: "Very true, Massa, but you know a man likes to feel that he owns himself." That answer proved that he was a man and a brother, and that he had not lost all sense of the rights and dignity of manhood. It undeceived us, and corrected our error.

We may add, by way of calming the fears which the writer and many others have of the consequences of emancipation or of the repetition of the horrors of San Domingo, that it is not proposed to recognize the slaves as free only in so far as they come within, or are found within, our lines, and therefore only within the power of the Federal government. There is no intention of exciting them to insurrection against their masters, or of calling upon them to fight for their freedom where the Federal power is not present both to protect and to govern them, and to secure them from the vengeance of their late masters, and to pre-

vent them from doing any thing contrary to the laws of civilized warfare. The knowledge of the fact that all who come or are found within our lines are to be treated as freemen and be protected as such, as far as our government has power to do it, will speedily be conveyed to all the slaves throughout the Southern States, inspire them with the hope of freedom, make them our friends, cause them to regard our advance as a deliverance, and, at the same time, alarm the Confederates, and compel them to keep a large portion of their forces, many of which they would otherwise employ against our troops, at home to guard against the possibility of a servile war. Feeling that once within our lines they are free, they would hasten to come within them, bringing us most valuable information, and lending us important service as scouts and laborers, if not as soldiers. The great body of them would be practically liberated, or make any serious efforts for their own liberation, only as the Federal forces advanced. Our own troops, as they advanced, would serve as a police for them, as for all others in the rebel States, and protect them as they protect all loyal citizens. In this way their liberation would seriously weaken the forces of the Rebels, and vastly increase our own, and, at the same time, be effected without any of those cruelties and barbarities which usually accompany a servile insurrection or a war of liberation. In this way, too, their liberation could be effected without breaking up Southern society, or preventing it from assuming its peaceful and orderly character when the Rebellion shall have been suppressed, and the national flag again loved and honored throughout the whole Union.

As to what will be done with the negro population when emancipated and the Rebellion is over, we would leave them where they are, subject to the same stringent police regulations as are adopted in the loyal States in the case of white men. The writer fears they will come North and compete with our northern white laborers; but his fears are idle, for they are remarkable for their local attachments, and their labor will be in greater demand at the South than at the North. They are at home at the South, can more easily support themselves there than here, and their former masters will need, as heretofore, their services both as domestics and field hands. We own that if the Slave States had not rebelled and made emancipation a military necessity, we should never have proposed the

immediate and unprepared emancipation of the slaves. If we could have had our way, we should have begun by converting them into *adscripti glebæ*, capable of being bought and sold only with the land; we should have secured to them all their moral rights as men and as Christians, and then, as we found them advancing, we would recognize in them the civil right to acquire, hold, and transmit property, and finally elevate them to the full civil freedom of the free peasantry of Europe, with full recognition of their moral rights and obligations as men and Christians.

But it is seldom in this world that the good we seek can be obtained without some mixture of evil, and we are at all times obliged to do not the best we would, but the best we can. The regular, gradual, peaceful emancipation of the slaves is not now practicable, and their emancipation, if it comes at all, must come at once, and be full and complete. But with proper care and honest intentions on the part of those who regard themselves as the superior race, and who certainly have had superior advantages, no great harm need be apprehended either to the blacks or to the whites by emancipation. Great social transitions always involve a certain amount of evil, but we see no reason why the negroes should not after a short time settle down into an honest, peaceful, and industrious peasantry, and the white race, now corrupted and well-nigh ruined, at least in morals, be greatly benefited, for, after all, the chief curse of slavery falls on the slave-owners and their children. The only difference that will then remain between North and South will be, that the South will employ colored laborers, and the North white laborers.

In conclusion, we would say that, while we have frankly acknowledged various points of difference between the writer and ourselves, and given our reasons for regarding the line of policy which he and the *New York Herald* so vehemently defend, as dangerous, and pretty sure, if persisted in, to ruin the country, and prove that we of the North are, as the South pretends, cravens and poltroons, if not on the battle-field, at least in our politics, we have honestly endeavored to clear the writer in the best way in our power from the fearful accusations of defending slavery and apologizing for the African slave-trade. We can well understand that a Catholic, even a Catholic Archbishop, may deem it inexpedient and even wrong, under certain circumstances, and in certain times and places, to encour-

age abolition movements, and we ourselves always discouraged and even opposed such movements till the slave power rose in rebellion against the Constitution and the integrity of the nation; but we must believe that that Catholic has little knowledge of his religion and little reverence for his Church who can defend slavery on principle, and vent his indignation and wrath against those who honestly seek to remove it. Such a man has yet to learn that Catholicity requires him to labor assiduously for the progress of civilization as a means of fulfilling the proper destiny of man; that slavery is in its essence and in all its consequences opposed to civilization; and that its perpetuation is the perpetuation of barbarism,—the social state directly opposed to the civilized. We could not, therefore, suffer the charge against our Archbishop of being a pro-slavery man to go unrefuted.

The civilized world has—with the exception of individuals who for the sake of gain would worship his Satanic Majesty as God—agreed in denouncing the African slave-trade as infamous; and the Church not only excommunicates those engaged in it, but absolutely prohibits and interdicts all Catholics, ecclesiastics or laymen, from venturing to teach or to preach in public or in private any thing in its favor. She condemns as unworthy of the Christian name not merely those who reduce, or maintain that there is no wrong or crime in reducing men naturally free to slavery, as the writer would seem to imagine, but all who engage in or defend, or venture to maintain that the traffic in blacks is permitted under any pretext or color whatsoever, and without any reference to the fact that the blacks brought from Africa and sold into slavery were born naturally free or in servitude. The question whether the negroes are freemen or slaves in Africa, the writer will see, if he examines the Bull of the Pope, has no bearing on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the traffic. The notion which some entertain that the Church in her prohibition of the traffic, simply prohibits the reduction of men naturally free, is not correct: she prohibits the entire traffic in blacks, or, what is ordinarily understood by the African slave-trade. The writer, however carelessly or loosely he may have expressed himself, could not have intended to justify or in any sense apologize for that infamous traffic, and therefore be condemned by his Church as unworthy of the Christian name. Every friend he has must be indignant at finding

such a charge brought against him, and we could do no less than attempt to clear him from it.

The writer differs from us in regard to the policy of calling to our aid in suppressing this wicked Rebellion the slave population of the South; and so do many others. We think them wrong, very gravely mistaken in their policy, if they are really in earnest to put down the Rebellion, and save the integrity of the nation. Not otherwise do we believe it possible to save the national life, and secure a peaceful and glorious career for American civilization. But we can believe that these people are as honest in opposing as we are in advocating the liberation of the slaves, and, as far as they will engage in downright earnest to defend the Union, and crush out the Rebellion, we are ready to accept them as loyal citizens, and to work heartily with them. The life of the nation is at stake, and the salvation of that is now our supreme law. We must, in the forcible language of Cromwell, "secure the *being* of the Commonwealth, before proceeding to discuss its *well-being*."

ART. III. — *Metropolitan Readers. Illustrated Edition.*

Readers I., II., III., IV. By A MEMBER OF THE ORDER OF THE HOLY CROSS. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1861.

THESE admirable Readers, compiled by a Member of the Order of the Holy Cross for the use of our schools, colleges, and academies, have already been noticed in our pages, and are introduced again because we would renew our hearty commendation of them as the best series of reading books we have, and because they furnish us a very suitable occasion for offering some observations on Catholic schools and Catholic education, which will have, at least, the effect of "freeing our own mind" on the subject.

The importance of education in general needs in no sense to be dwelt on in our country, for no people are or can be more alive to its utility and even necessity than are the American people, especially in the non-Slaveholding States; and no people have, upon the whole, made more liberal provisions for its general diffusion. There would seem to be just as little need of dwelling on the importance and neces-

sity of Catholic schools and Catholic education for our Catholic population. All Catholics feel, or should feel, that education, either under the point of view of religion or of civilization, is useful and desirable no farther than it is Catholic. Catholic truth is universal truth, is all truth, and no education not in accordance with it is or can be a true or a useful education, for error is never useful, but always more or less hurtful. Every Catholic, then, indeed every man who loves truth and wishes to conform to it, must be in favor of Catholic schools and Catholic education, if they are Catholic in reality as well as in name.

So believing, our bishops and clergy, supported by various Religious Communities, have lost no time in making the imposing effort to provide under their own direction schools, academies, colleges, and universities for all our Catholic children and youth. They have felt the necessity of giving our children a Catholic education, as the best and surest way of securing their temporal and spiritual welfare, of promoting Catholic interests, and of converting this whole country to the Catholic faith. Yet, strangely enough, they are very far from receiving the hearty and undivided support of our whole Catholic community. Great dissatisfaction has been expressed, and in quarters entitled to respect, with our colleges and female academies, and not a few whose love of Catholicity and devotion to the Church cannot be questioned, refuse to join in the movements for parochial schools, or the establishment of separate schools for our children under the care of our clergy. Whence comes this division of sentiment? Whence comes it that our colleges and conventual schools do not meet the unanimous approbation of Catholic parents and guardians? Whence comes it that so many amongst us prefer the public schools of the country to schools conducted by Catholics? What is the explanation of these facts? How are they to be accounted for? If these schools, whether for the higher or the lower branches of education, are really Catholic, and educate throughout in accordance with Catholic truth, how should it be possible that honest and intelligent Catholics should differ among themselves as to the policy of establishing them, or that any should hesitate to give them their cordial support? These are questions which need and must receive an answer.

There are a great many people, honest people, but not over and above stocked with practical wisdom, who imagine

that whatever is done or approved by Catholics in any age or country, in any particular time or locality, must needs be Catholic, and that opposition to it is necessarily opposition to Catholicity itself. These people never doubt that schools and colleges under the patronage and direction of the Bishops, Religious Orders and Congregations, and the Regular and Secular clergy, must necessarily be truly Catholic in character and tendency, and hence they conclude that dissatisfaction with them or opposition to them must indicate a heterodox tendency, or the absence of a thoroughly Catholic disposition. They transfer to the bishops and clergy as individuals the veneration and respect due only to the priesthood and the prelacy, and to the individual members of the Church the infallibility that can be predicated only of the Church as the living body of Christ. But we are permitted neither by Catholic faith nor by Catholic duty to make this transfer, and all experience proves that there is neither wisdom nor justice in making it. It does not necessarily follow that schools and colleges are Catholic because founded and directed by Religious Orders and Congregations approved by the Church, or by bishops and parish priests; and therefore it does not follow that dissatisfaction with the schools and colleges, or even opposition to them, is any indication of a heterodox tendency or of any want of true Catholic faith and devotion. Such schools may themselves fail to educate in a truly Catholic spirit, or to give a truly Catholic character to their pupils, and thus leave it possible that the dissatisfaction or the opposition should arise not from the fact that they are Catholic, but from the fact that they are not catholic, or that, in spite of their name and profession, they are really sectarian and heterodox. The dissatisfaction, in such case, instead of being a reproach to those who feel and express it, would be no mean proof of their Catholic discernment, their strong desire for really Catholic education, and earnest devotion to Catholic interests.

There need be no question as to the purity of motive and honesty of intention on the part of those who are engaged in founding or supporting schools and colleges for imparting a Catholic education, or even of those who will tolerate the expression of no opinion adverse to the system of schools adopted, or to the quality of the education imparted. The bishops and secular clergy, the Religious Orders and Congregations of both sexes engaged in the

work of education, are animated, we doubt not, by the most sincere desire to do good, and are doing what they in their best judgment believe the most likely of any thing in their power to promote the interests of our holy religion, and to provide a truly Catholic education for our children. Any hostile criticism which should in any sense impeach their motives or intentions would be manifestly unjust, and should not be tolerated. But the subject of Catholic education itself cannot be prudently withdrawn from discussion, either private or public; nor can its discussion be confined to the prelates and clergy alone. The laity have, to say the least, as deep an interest in it as have ecclesiastics or the Religious, and they have in regard to it the common right of all men to judge for themselves. Parents have certain duties growing out of their relation as parents which they cannot throw upon others, and they must themselves discharge them according to the best of their ability. They are bound by the law of God to give their children, as far as in their power, a truly Catholic education, and they are free to criticize and to refuse to support schools, though professing to be Catholic, in which such education is not and cannot be expected to be given. They are not obliged to patronize schools, because founded or directed by Catholics, any more than they are to support a tailoring or a hatting establishment, because owned by a Catholic who employs Catholic workmen, or because recommended by bishops and parish priests. We protest against the assumption that so-called Catholic schools, collegiate or conventual, parochial or private, because under the control of Catholics, participate in the immunities of the Church, of the priesthood, or of the prelacy, and are sacred from public investigation and public criticism; or that we are necessarily bound by our Catholic faith and Catholic piety to patronize or defend them any farther than we find them Catholic institutions in fact as well as in name.

The first question, then, for us Catholics to settle relates to the catholicity of the education imparted in our so-called Catholic schools. Catholicity, as we have elsewhere shown, is the Idea in its plenitude, and therefore the Catechism tells us that the Church is Catholic, because "she subsists in all ages, teaches all nations, and maintains all truth." She, then, is Catholic (potentially) in space and time, and (actually) in idea,—as she must be, since her life is the life of the Word made flesh, of Him who was at once "perfect

God and perfect man,"—and therefore the whole truth living and individuated in both the Divine and human orders in their dialectic union. It is for this reason that the Catechism says she "maintains all truth;" and it is because she maintains all truth, and all truth in its unity and integrity, that she is called the *Catholic* Church; and it is because she is Catholic in idea, that is, embracing in her Ideal all truth, human and Divine, that she is actually or potentially Catholic in space and time.

Catholic would say *universal*, and when predicated of truth means universal truth, all truth, and all truth in and for all ages and nations. They whose views are not universally true, are not applicable to all times and places, and to all subjects, may have truth under some of its aspects, but they are not Catholics. They are heterodox, sectarian, or national. Men cease to be Catholics, in the full sense of the term, by denying the universality of the idea or life the Church is living, the principle she is evolving and actualizing in the life of humanity, and alike whether they deny this universality in relation to space or in relation to time, in relation to the natural, or in relation to the supernatural. They deny Catholicity who deny that it embraces the whole truth in the human order, as they do who deny that it embraces the whole truth in the Divine order. To deny it in relation to the natural order is as much to deny Catholicity, as it is to deny it in relation to the supernatural; and we depart as widely from it in denying its catholicity in time, as we do in denying its catholicity in space. The rule of St. Vincent of Lerins says, *quod SEMPER*, as well as *quod UBIQUE*. Catholic truth is simply truth, all truth in the intelligible order and in the super-intelligible, in religion and civilization, in time and eternity, in God and in his creative act.

Catholic education must recognize the catholicity of truth under all its aspects, and tend to actualize it in all the relations of life, in religion and civilization. Its tendency is to aid the Church in the fulfilment of her mission, which is the continuous evolution and actualization of the Idea, or the life of the Word made flesh, in the life of humanity, or completion in mankind of the Incarnation completed in the individual man assumed by the Word. The completion of this work is the complete union of men, through Christ, with God, the finite with the infinite,—the true term of human progress, or final cause of the Divine creative act.

All education, to be Catholic, must tend to this end, the union, without absorption of either, or intermixture or confusion of the two natures, of the human and the Divine, and therefore of civilization and religion. It must be dialectic, and tend to harmonize all opposites, the creature with the Creator, the natural with the supernatural, the individual with the race, social duties with religious duties, order with liberty, authority with freedom, the immutability of the dogma, that is, of the mysteries, with the progress of intelligence, conservatism with reform; for such is the aim of the Church herself, and such the mission given her by the Word made flesh, whose Spouse she is. Fully and completely up to this idea we expect not education in any age or in any nation to come, but this is the type it should aim to realize, and be constantly and, as far as human frailty admits, actually realizing. Such is the character and tendency of what we term Catholic education.

It is with this ideal standard of Catholic education that we have the right to compare our Catholic schools, and we must judge them as they, by the instruction they give, and the influence they exert, tend or do not tend to its realization. We hazard little in saying that our so called Catholic schools, in their actual effect, tend rather to depart from this standard than to approach it. They practically fail to recognize human progress, and thus fail to recognize the continuous and successive evolution of the Idea in the life of humanity. They practically question the universality of the Idea by failing to recognize as Catholic the great principles or ideas natural society is evolving and actualizing in its career through the ages. They do not educate their pupils to be at home and at their ease in their own age and country, or train them to be living, thinking, and energetic men, prepared for the work which actually awaits them in either Church or state. As far as we are able to trace the effect of the most approved Catholic education of our days, whether at home or abroad, it tends to repress rather than to quicken the life of the pupil, to unfit rather than to prepare him for the active and zealous discharge either of his religious or his social duties. They who are educated in our schools seem misplaced and mistimed in the world, as if born and educated for a world that has ceased to exist. They come out ignorant of contemporary ideas, contemporary habits of mind, contemporary intelligence and tendencies, and large numbers of them sink into

obscurity, and do nothing for their religion or their country; or, what is worse, abandon their religion, turn their backs on the Church, and waste all their energies in seeking pleasure, or in accumulating worldly wealth. Of the young men educated in our colleges, a certain number have become priests and Religious, and fill the ranks of the clergy and continue the religious orders. Of these we have nothing to say. But, of the others, we would ask: Do we find them up to the level of contemporary civilization, and foremost in all those movements fitted to advance intelligence, morality, and the general well-being of society? Do we find them showing by their superior intelligence, their superior morals, and their loftier aspirations the superiority of their religion and the salutary influence it is fitted to exert on civilization? With very few exceptions, we fear we must answer: This is not the case. Comparatively few of them take their stand as scholars or as men on a level with the graduates of non-Catholic colleges, and those who do take that stand, in most cases, do it by throwing aside nearly all they learned from their Alma Mater, and adopting the ideas and principles, the modes of thought and action they find in the general civilization of the country in which they live.

Whence comes it that such, in general terms, has been thus far in our country the effect of what we proudly call Catholic education? We cannot ascribe it to any innate incompatibility between Catholic truth and the civilization of the country, for that would be to deny the catholicity of the Idea; nor to any repugnance between it and modern society, because that would be to deny its catholicity in time. The cause cannot be in Catholicity itself, nor can it be in our American order of civilization, for Catholicity, if catholic, is adapted to all times and to all nations,—as the Catechism tells us, when it says, she “subsists in all ages, and teaches all nations.” If we educated in conformity with Catholic truth, those we educate would be fitted for their precise duties in their own time and country, and they would be the active, the living, and the foremost men among their contemporaries and fellow-citizens. When such is not the case, we may be sure that our education fails, in some respect, to be Catholic, and is directed to the restoration of a past severed from the present, and therefore an education that breaks the continuity of life either of the Church or of humanity; and therefore is essentially a

schismatic and heterodox education. It repeats substantially the error of the Reformers in the sixteenth century. These Reformers may have had honest and even praiseworthy intentions, for there was then in the Church, or rather amongst Catholics, as there always is, need enough of reform,—deep, thorough, and wide-reaching reform; but they erred fatally in breaking the continuity of the Divine-human life, and in aiming either at reproducing an order of things which had passed away, which they called “primitive Christianity,” or in leaping to a future which could have no connection with the past, and be no development of what it contained in germ,—the law of all true reform, as of all real progress. The cause of the failure of what we term Catholic education is, in our judgment, in the fact that we educate not for the present or the future, but for a past which can never be restored, and therefore in our education are guilty of a gross anachronism.

We do not mean, and must not be understood to say that the dogmas, that is, the mysteries, as defined in the infallible speech of the Church, are not scrupulously taught in all our schools and colleges, or that the words of the Catechism are not faithfully preserved and duly insisted upon. We concede this, and that this gives to our so-called Catholic schools a merit which no others have or can have. Without the external Word, the life of the internal expires, and when it is lost or corrupted, there are no means, except by a new supernatural intervention of Almighty God, of renewing the interior Christian life. This fact is of the first importance, and must never be lost sight of or underrated. The man who has not lost his faith, although his faith is inoperative, or, as theologians say, a “dead faith,” is always to be preferred to him who has no faith at all; because he has in him a recuperative principle, and it is more easy to quicken it into activity, than it is to beget faith in one who has it not. The education given in our schools, however defective it may be, must always be preferred to that given in schools in which the dogma is rejected or mutilated, and can never be justly censured, save when compared with its own ideal, or with what it should be and would be, were it truly and thoroughly Catholic.

The fault we find with modern Catholic education is not that it does not faithfully preserve the Symbol, that it does not retain all the dogmas or mysteries, so far as sound

words go, but that it treats them as isolated or dead facts, not as living principles, and overlooks the fact that the life of the Church consists in their continuous evolution and progressive development and actualization in the life of society and of individuals. They themselves, since they are principles and pertain to the ideal the Church is evolving and actualizing, must be immutable, and the same for all times, places, and men. They are the principles of progress, but not themselves progressive, for the truth was completely expressed and individuated in the Incarnation. The progress is not in them, but in their explication and actualization in the life of humanity. The truth contained in them is always the same, can neither be enlarged nor diminished; but our understanding of them may be more or less adequate, and their explication and application to our own life and to the life of society may be more or less complete. Their evolution is successive, progressive, and continuous. This fact, which lies at the bottom of Dr. Newman's Theory of Development, though not always presented by him in an orthodox sense, is what our Catholic education seems to us to overlook, and practically to deny. It seems to us to proceed as if the work of evolution were finished, and there remained nothing for the Christian to do, but to repeat the past. It aims not at the continuous evolution and realization of the Catholic ideal; but to restore a past age, an order of things which the world has left behind, and which it is neither possible nor desirable to restore, for it could be restored, if at all, only as a second childhood. It is now "behind the times," and unfits rather than prepares the student for taking an active part in the work of his own day and generation. It either gives its subjects no work to do, or a work in which humanity takes no interest and will not work with them,—a work which all the living and onward tendencies of the age obstinately resist, and which, if there is any truth in what we have said, is adverse alike to the present interests of both religion and civilization.

There can be no question that what generally passes for Catholic education, whether in this or any other country, has its ideal of perfection in the past, and that it resists as un-Catholic, irreligious, and opposed to God, the tendencies of modern civilization. The work that it gives its subjects, or prepares them to perform, is not the work of directing and carrying it forward, or of bringing it into dialectic

harmony with religion; but that of resisting it, driving it back, anathematizing it as at war with the Gospel, and either of neglecting civilization altogether, and taking refuge in the cloister, in an exclusive or exaggerated asceticism, always bordering on immorality, or of restoring a former order of civilization, no longer a living order, and which humanity has evidently left behind, and is resolved shall never be restored.

This, in our judgment, is its great mistake, a mistake that denies the truth of humanity, and virtually condemns or places in abeyance the human element of Christianity. It virtually denies the human, because it denies that the human evolves in its life Catholic truth, and pronounces its developments false, its tendencies irreligious, and its irrepressible instincts Satanic. We mean that its tendency is in this direction, and hence the manifest and undeniable schism to-day between the Church and humanity, between religion and modern civilization, which, if we understand it, implies a schism between God and man. It runs to one extreme, as rationalistic education runs to another and an opposite extreme. Extremes meet. Rationalists condemn the Church, because, they say, she is opposed to civilization, and to humanity itself; and many Catholics condemn the civilization 'humanity in her progress evolves and effects, because, they say, it is opposed to the Church, incompatible with religion and the rightful supremacy of God. Both agree as to the fact and the character of the antagonism, and neither seems disposed to inquire whether a medium of reconciliation, of dialectic union, be or be not possible, so that the Church, which presupposes humanity, and humanity, which cannot attain to its end, or realize its destiny without the Church, may move on in harmony, without any contrariety of will, as there was no contrariety of will between the human and the Divine in Christ, the God-man. If there is any truth in Catholicity, or unless our understanding of it be totally false, there is no necessity for this schism either in the nature of the Church or in the nature of humanity, and it does and must result only from a defective theology on the one hand, and a false philosophy on the other.

These remarks apply to Catholic education not in our own country only, but throughout no small part of Christendom. In scarcely any part of the Christian world can we find Catholics,—we mean men who are earnest Catholics,

firm in their faith, and unfaltering in their devotion to the Church,—among the active and influential men of the age. In all, or nearly all countries the Catholic population is the weaker, and the less efficient portion of the population in all that relates to the war of ideas, and the struggle of opinions. Those Catholics who see this and have the courage to place themselves in harmony with the times, are looked upon as, at least, of doubtful orthodoxy, and not unfrequently are held up to clerical denunciation. Even when they are not cried down as heterodox, they are pushed aside as imprudent or unsafe men. It is very widely and, we fear, very generally believed, that true Catholic duty requires us to take our stand for a past civilization, a past order of ideas, and to resist with all our might the undeniable tendencies and instincts of the human race in our day. We are required by the present dominant sentiment of Catholics, to resist progress in every sense and direction, except in the purely ascetic life of individuals, and to content ourselves with the explication and application of the dogmas of the Church, the great and immutable principles of Catholic life, given in past times, and embalmed in the opinions of the theologians of other ages, and the dry, technical, and well-nigh unintelligible formulas of the schools. Hence Catholic education, or rather the education adopted and generally approved by Catholics in our age, especially in our country, fails to produce living men, active, thinking men, great men, men of commanding genius, of generous aims, and high and noble aspirations; and hence it also fails to enable the Church to take possession of humanity, and to inspire and direct its movements.

But the objection we urge has a peculiar force and application to Catholic education in our country. Our Catholic population, to a great extent, is practically a foreign body, and brings with it a civilization foreign from the American, and in some respects inferior to it. The great majority of our congregations are of foreign birth, or the children of foreign-born parents, and the greater part of our bishops and clergy, and of our professors and teachers, have been born, or at least educated abroad, and they all naturally seek to perpetuate the civilization in which they have been brought up. Those even of our clergy and of our professors and teachers who have been born and educated in the country, have been educated in schools founded on a foreign model, and conducted by foreigners, and are, in regard to

civilization, more foreign than native. We state the fact as it is. We are not condemning it ; we may regret it, but we could hardly expect it to be otherwise. The original settlers of the country were, for the most part, non-Catholic, and but comparatively few of their descendants have been or are Catholics. The very large Catholic population now in the country has not been the growth of the country, but has been chiefly supplied by a foreign and a very recent migration. This is the fact,—a fact which is no fault of the Catholic population, but a fact that must be taken into the account in forming a judgment of the Catholic education in our own country. Catholics from the Old World necessarily bring with them their own civilization, which, whether we speak of France or Italy, Ireland or Germany, is, to say the least, different from ours, and, in some respects, even hostile to it.

But this is not all. The civilization they actually bring with them, and which without intending it they seek to continue, is, we being judges, of a lower order than ours. It may be our national prejudice and our ignorance of other nations, but it is nevertheless our firm conviction, from which we cannot easily be driven, that, regarded in relation to its type, the American civilization is the most advanced civilization the world has yet seen, and comes nearer to the realization of the Catholic Ideal than any which has been heretofore developed and actualized. We speak not of civilization in the sense of simple *civility*, polish of manners, and personal accomplishments, in which we may not compare always favorably with the upper classes of other nations ; but of the type or idea we are realizing, our social and political constitution, our arrangements to secure freedom and scope for the development and progress of true manhood. In these respects American civilization is, we say not the term of human progress, but, in our judgment, the farthest point in advance as yet reached by any age or nation. Those who come here from abroad necessarily bring with them, therefore, a civilization more or less inferior to it, and which, in relation to it, is a civilization of the past. If they educate, then, according to their own civilization, as they must do, they necessarily educate for a civilization behind the times and below that of the country.

The fact of this inferiority is conceded, or virtually conceded, by our bishops and clergy themselves, in the reason they assign for establishing separate schools for Catholic

children. They tell us, and, we must presume, tell us truly, that, if the children of Catholics are educated in the common schools of the country, they will lose their religion and grow up Protestants, or at least non-Catholics. But why so, if the Catholic population represents a civilization not inferior to that represented by the non-Catholic? If Catholic children and Protestant attend the same school, why are the Catholic likely to become Protestant, any more than the Protestant are to become Catholic? The danger alleged could not exist if the Protestant or non-Catholic children did not represent the stronger, and, therefore, the superior civilization. If the Catholic children represented the advancing civilization, the civilization more in accordance with the instincts and tendencies of humanity, and therefore the civilization that has the promise of the future, they would, though inferior in numbers, be the stronger party, and, instead of being themselves perverted, would convert the non-Catholic children, and the opposition to mixed schools would come from non-Catholic, not from Catholic parents and guardians. Why is it that so many of our children, as they grow up and go out into the world, abandon their religion, lose nearly all memory of the Church of their fathers, live, act, and die as Protestants or as infidels? You say, and say truly, that it is owing to the influence of the country; but does not this show that the civilization of the country is stronger, more energetic, and more living than that which you combine, and, to a great extent, insist on combining with the Catholic dogma?

Will you deny our inference, or seek to escape it by attributing the fact to the perversity of human nature, to the seductions of the flesh, and to the temptations and machinations of the Devil? To some extent you may do so; but you must take care lest you forget or deny the Catholicity of the Word, and forget or deny that humanity, in the natural order, even though suffering from the Fall, is living the life of the creative Word. The ideal of humanity which she is realizing in her progress, is true, an element itself of Catholic truth, and, though distinguishable, yet inseparable from the Ideal the Church is herself realizing in her Divine-human life. It will not do, then, to attribute solely to human perversity, to the influence of the flesh, or to the machinations of the Devil, the loss of so many of our children as they grow up; and, therefore, we must maintain that it is in great measure due to the fact that the

civilization which Catholics bring with them, and with which they associate their Catholic faith, is inferior, and therefore weaker than the civilization which has been attained to by humanity in our country, and which, unhappily, instead of being associated with orthodoxy, is associated with heterodoxy. The civilization of the country does not owe its superiority to the heterodoxy with which it is associated, any more than the civilization which Catholics bring with them owes its inferiority to the orthodoxy with which it is accidentally associated. The civilization of the country owes its superiority to the truth which it accepts and evolves, and is weakened and prevented from attaining its full development by its association with heterodoxy, as orthodoxy itself is weakened and prevented from gaining the successes it is entitled to, by being associated with an inferior civilization.

The inferiority of the civilization associated in our country with orthodoxy might be inferred *a priori* from the fact that the mass of our Catholic population are from the more uncultivated classes of the Old World, with whom it would be ridiculous to pretend that civilization has reached its highest point of development. Whatever respect we may have for the peasantry of Ireland or Germany, how much soever we may honor them for the firmness with which, under the severest trials and temptations, they have held fast to the orthodox faith, we can by no means take them in respect of civilization as the advance-guard of Humanity. But the facts themselves, facts which nobody can question, sufficiently prove, at least as to our English-speaking Catholics, that their civilization is of an inferior order. Their sympathies are far closer with the slaveholding South than with the free North, and we need not add that the civilization of the free North is far superior to that represented by the slaveholding South. The civilization of the South is based on slavery as its corner-stone, and slavery is the very essence of barbarism. The distinction between barbarism and civilization is precisely the distinction between slavery and liberty. The true American civilization has its type and seat in the Free States, and is best represented by the Puritans and their descendants, who were in fact its chief founders as they are its chief, or, at least, most earnest supporters. Yet, except with a certain number of converts of New England birth and descent, we rarely find a Catholic who does not look upon Puritan New England

as the most anti-Catholic portion of the Union, and consider that his best way of promoting Catholic interests is to fight against her.

The great body of our Catholics, no doubt, wish to Americanize, and conform to the civilization of the country, but they have hitherto Americanized, so far as they have Americanized at all, in a Southern rather than in a Northern sense. The type of the Americanism they aim to adopt is in Maryland, not in Massachusetts; Baltimore, not Boston; and nothing can exceed the hostility of the Maryland type, which, properly speaking, is the Virginia type, to the Boston, or New England type. Indeed, it is these two orders of civilization that meet in mortal combat in the civil war which now threatens the integrity of the American nation. The war is a struggle for life and death, a struggle between a civilization based on slavery, represented by the South, and a civilization based on constitutional liberty and the rights of men, represented by the Free States. And, in this struggle, if, as is the fact, the interest and loyalty of Catholics lead them in large numbers to take sides with the North, their sympathies are very generally with the South; and we cannot doubt that, if the South were the loyal party, they would much more readily fight with the South than they now fight with the North. Even, then, where our Catholics aim to be American, it is not American in the sense of the highest, truest, and most advanced Americanism; but in the sense of the lowest, the least advanced, that which is least remote from barbarism, and the farthest removed from that which the Church as well as humanity demands, and never ceases to struggle to obtain.

We are also borne out in our views by the political history of the country. Politically, the Southern leaders have for a long time formed their association with the least intelligent, the least advanced classes in the Free States, and these Southern leaders are those our Catholic population have followed with the most alacrity. This fact proves, on the one hand, that the South represents the lowest order of civilization in the country, and that Catholics are more easily engaged in supporting it than in supporting the superior civilization represented by the Northern States. It is not too much to say that the great influx of the Catholic peasantry of different European States into the country, and the conferring on them, almost on their arrival, of political franchises, have done not a little to corrupt our politics, and

to lower the standard of our civilization. Their orthodoxy, as yet, has done less to advance, than their inferior civilization has done to corrupt and lower, our civilization and morals. However humiliating this fact may be to us as Catholics, there is no use in attempting to deny it, or to disguise it. It is a fact which all intelligent Americans see and know, and it is one which we ourselves should dare look in the face. The opposition to us represented by "Native-American," or "Know-Nothing" parties or movements, is not opposition to us as orthodox Catholics, nor, in itself considered, to us as foreigners, but simply as representatives of a civilization different from the American, and, in many respects, inferior and opposed to it. We have practically, if not theoretically, insisted that our orthodoxy and our foreign and inferior civilization are inseparable; and the heterodox American people have in this agreed with us, and hence their opposition to us, and ours to them. Heterodoxy, with the heterodox of our country, is no longer a living principle, and is retained only because associated, accidentally associated, with a superior and more advanced civilization. Orthodoxy is opposed not because there is any opposition to it on its own account, but because it is believed to be inseparably wedded to that inferior and less advanced civilization that has come hither with it from the Old World, and which many honest Catholics think, if they ever think at all on the subject, is identical with it.

Now, the objection to Catholic schools, especially those for the people at large, is that they tend, and for a time at least must tend, to perpetuate the association of orthodoxy with this inferior civilization, and thus injure alike the country and the Church. These schools must be taught chiefly by foreigners, or, if not by foreigners, at least by those whose sympathies and connections, tastes and habits are un-American; because what is wanted by their founders and supporters is not simply the preservation of orthodoxy, but the perpetuation of the foreignism hitherto associated with it. Schools which should associate real Americanism with orthodoxy would be hardly less offensive or more acceptable to them than the public schools themselves. They must, therefore, be conducted and taught by men who will keep up the old association, and prevent the association of real Americanism with orthodoxy. Yet it is precisely this latter association which is desirable both for civilization and for religion, and it is only by breaking the old association,

and forming the new in good faith, as we are in fact required to do by orthodoxy itself, that Catholics can cease to be in this country an isolated foreign colony, or a band of emigrants encamped for the night, and ready to strike their tents, and take up their line of march on the morrow for some other place.

These are some of the reasons which have led many of our most intelligent, most earnest, and devout Catholics to form their unfavorable judgment of Catholic schools and Catholic education, as they now are, and for some time are likely to be, in the United States. They are solid reasons as far as they go, and fully justify the dissatisfaction with them we began by recognizing. They prove that here and elsewhere, but especially here, Catholic education, or the education given by Catholics, is below the wants of the age and country, and prove that, from the seminary down to the primary school, it stands in need, whether we consult the interest of orthodoxy or that of civilization, of a wide, deep, and thorough reform. Yet, after long reflection and much hesitation, some would say opposition, we must say that we do not regard them as sufficient reasons for abandoning the movement for Catholic schools and education supported by our bishops and clergy. It may be that the movement was premature, and that it would have been better to have used for a longer time the schools of the country, as the early Christians did those of the Empire, before attempting to establish schools of our own, save for the education of the clergy. But it is too late to discuss that question now. The movement has, wisely or unwisely, been set on foot, and gone too far to be arrested, even if it were desirable to arrest it. Our bishops and clergy have decided that the movement shall go on, and the Catholic cause can never be promoted by any anti-hierarchical action. Much good may be done that is not done by or under the direction of the hierarchy; but no good end can ever be obtained in opposition to it. This consideration is of itself sufficient to deter us from opposing the movement, and of inducing us to accept it at least as *un fait accompli*, and to make the best we can of it.

That we are to have schools and colleges of our own, under the control of Catholics, we take it is a "fixed fact." Whether the movement for them is premature or not, it is idle, if nothing worse, to war against it. Let us say, then, to those who regard the education actually given by

Catholics as we do, and who have not seen their way clear to the support of primary schools under the control of Catholics as a substitute, in the case of Catholic children, for the Common Schools of the country, that we regard it as our duty now to accept the movement, and labor not to arrest it, or to embarrass it, but to reform and render truly Catholic the whole system of Catholic education, from the highest grade to the lowest. Let it be our work not to destroy Catholic education, but to reform and advance it. The first care of all Catholics should be the preservation of orthodoxy, and, in the actual state of our Catholic population, it may be that orthodoxy will be better preserved by schools under Catholic direction than it can be by sending our children to the public schools. The objections we have set forth are, after all, only temporary and accidental. They grow out of the present and past state of our Catholic population, and must disappear under the slow but effectual operation of time and causes already in operation amongst us. We might gain something under the point of view of civilization by adopting the schools of the country; but, as our prelates and clergy are strongly opposed to them, and have done much to bring them into disrepute with Catholics, we should probably lose, under the point of view of orthodoxy, more than would thus be gained. Schools under the control of Catholics will, at least, teach the Catechism, and though they may in fact teach it as a dead letter, rather than as a quickening spirit, it is better that it should be taught as a dead letter than not be taught at all. It is only by preserving the dogma intact that we do or can preserve the Christian Ideal, or have the slightest chance of securing our final destiny. The hopes of the world for time and eternity are dependent on the preservation of the orthodox faith.

The reform in our schools and in education will go on just in proportion as it goes on in our Catholic community itself, and perhaps even much faster. The dissatisfaction we hear expressed with our collegiate education for boys, and with that of our conventual schools for girls, is an encouraging symptom; it proves that there is, after all, a growing Americanization of our Catholic population, and that the need of an education less European and more truly American is daily becoming more widely and more deeply felt. It will be more widely and more deeply felt still as time goes on, and as Catholics become more gener-

ally naturalized in habit, feeling, and association, as well as in law. It indicates also the revival of Catholic life in our population, that Catholics are becoming more earnest and living men, and unwilling that their orthodoxy should be wrapped up in a clean napkin and buried in the earth. In proportion as their Catholic life revives and grows more active, they will demand an education more in accordance with Catholic truth in all its branches, than is that now given. The demand will create a supply. And when the present civil strife is over, the integrity of the nation re-established, and American civilization has proved itself capable of subduing the barbarism of the South, and of marching onward and upward with humanity, in her career of progress to union with the infinite, we trust Catholics will find and feel themselves real Americans, differing from other Americans only in the respect that orthodoxy differs from heterodoxy, truth from error, life from death. Then our schools will assume their true character and position, and exert a truly Catholic influence. They will preserve orthodoxy not as a dead letter, not as isolated and inoperative dogmas, but as a quickening spirit, as living and operative truth. Then, under the point of view of civilization, instead of tending to recall a dead past, they will accept the living present, and associate the living civilization of the day with the orthodox faith,—reunite in a living and productive whole the scattered members of the torn and bleeding body of truth, and aid both the Church and the nation in carrying forward our civilization to the last term of its progress. Then our schools will send out living men, live with the love of God and of man,—men of large minds, of liberal studies, and generous aims,—men inspired by faith and genius, who will take the command of their age, breathe their whole souls into it, inform it with their own love of truth, and raise it to the level of their own high and noble aspirations. Let us console ourselves for what Catholic education now is with what it may become, and with what we may by well-directed effort aid it in becoming. This is the conclusion to which we ourselves have come, and if we are not satisfied with Catholic schools and education as they are, we are satisfied with their capabilities, and shall henceforth content ourselves with doing what in us lies to bring them under the great law of progress, which we have insisted on, and which is the law of all life, even of the Divine life,—as is proved in the eternal Generation of the

Word, and the Procession of the Holy Ghost, or in the assertion of the theologians that "God is most pure act," *actus purissimus*.

ART. IV.—*A Letter from a Friend teaching us the Catholic Doctrine on the future Condition of the Reprobate.*

WE had no intention in the few questions we asked last July concerning the doctrine of the Church on the future condition of the reprobate, to open a discussion on that subject. We recurred to it last October, indeed, but solely for the purpose of correcting the inaccuracy of some expressions which, owing to the condition of our eyes, had escaped us, and of stating clearly and distinctly the meaning which we ourselves gave to our questions. No good, in our judgment, can result from continuing a discussion, which, certainly, it was never our wish to provoke. But the following letter from a most pious and worthy clergyman is so well meant, so sincere and earnest, and written with so much kind feeling toward ourselves, that we are sure we shall be pardoned for laying it with a few comments before our readers.

"DEAR DOCTOR:—Though a stranger to you, I find myself compelled to write you a few lines in humble but sincere language, in order to express to you the Catholic belief on the punishment of the reprobate, for it seems to me that you did not pay attention enough to the common and universal belief of the Catholic people, when you wrote on that subject. But this is no little fault in a Catholic Reviewer, because Christ came into the world to preach to the poor, *Evangelizare pauperibus misit me*, and commanded his Apostles to do the same. The preaching of Christ and of his Apostles formed the universal belief,—the Catholic faith among the nations of the world, the perpetual tradition of the Church. The learned man, the philosopher, cannot be a Catholic philosopher, if he does not take his principles from the Gospel as preached to and understood by the faithful Catholic people, because Jesus Christ himself preached it, and commanded it to be preached to the poor and illiterate class.

"The doctrine of the holy Church is identical with the common belief of the faithful, and this common belief finds its experience in the lives of the Saints, who are given at the same time as models of life to the people. Such an experience is, for instance, given by St. Teresa of Jesus, whose manly spirit is admired even in our days, and whose writings are recommended by the Church of Christ in the following words: *Multa celestis sapientiæ documenta conscripsit quibus fidelium mentes ad supernæ patriæ desiderium maxime excitantur.* Brev. Rom.

"The Saint relates the following fact which happened to herself.— See her autobiography, chapter xxxii.

"Being one day in prayer, I suddenly found myself in hell, without knowing in what manner I had been carried there. I only perceived that God wished me to see the place which the devil had prepared for me, and which my sins had deserved [had she continued in the lukewarm direction, in which she was gradually declining]. It lasted for a very little time; but should I live many years, I do not believe it would be possible for me to lose the remembrance of it. The entrance appeared to be like a small street, long and narrow, and closed at one end, and such as would be the door of an extremely low, close, and dark oven. The floor seemed to me to be of dirt, very filthy, emitting an insupportable stench, and full of a very great number of venomous reptiles. At the end of this little street there was a hole made in the wall in the form of a narrow niche, into which I was thrust; and although what I have just related was much more frightful than as I described it, it could pass for agreeable in comparison with what I suffered in that niche. This torture was so terrible, that all that I can say would not be able to represent the least part of it. I felt my soul burning in such a horrible fire, that it would be the greatest difficulty to describe it as it was, since I would not even know words wherewith to express it.

"Physicians have assured me that I have endured as dreadful pains as can be suffered in this life, as well by the contraction of the nerves and in many other ways, as well as by the evils which the devils have caused me; but all the sufferings are nothing in comparison with what I then suffered, besides the horror which I had at seeing that these pains were eternal; and that even is yet little if we consider the agony in which the soul then finds herself. It seems as if she were strangled, as if she were smothered, and her affliction and her despair attain such an excess that I would in vain attempt to describe it. It is little to say that it appears to her that she is unceasingly torn in pieces, because this would be making it appear as if an eternal force was endeavoring to deprive her of life, whereas it is she herself who tears herself into pieces. (How fearful must be that second death, that continual agony! how far from any amelioration and natural beatitude!) As to that fire and that despair, which are the summit of so many awful sufferings, I avow myself to be still less able to describe them. ("For each one will be salted by fire." Mark ix. 46.) I did not know who caused me to endure them, but I felt myself burning, and as it were chopped into a thousand pieces, and this seemed to me to be the most frightful of all these pains. In a place so fearful there does *not* remain the *least hope of receiving any consolation*, and there was not room enough even to sit or to lie down. I was as in a hole made in the wall, and those horrible walls, against the order of nature, press and squeeze what they enclose. In that place every thing stifles, nothing but dense clouds ("And the smoke of their torments shall ascend up for ever and ever." Apocal. xiv. 11), without any mixture of light, and I do not understand how it could be, that although there was no light, all that is most frightful and painful to the sight could be seen.

"Although six years have passed since what I just relate took place, I am even now so frightened in writing this, that it seems to me, that fear freezes the blood in my veins. So that, whatever evils

and whatever pains I experience, I cannot call to remembrance what I then endured, without causing all possible sufferings to appear contemptible.'

"This narration of St. Teresa, and similar ones of different other Saints, as for instance of St. Frances of Rome, and the common belief, are identical, and form a true commentary on what the Scriptures tell us with regard to this subject. Touchingly they explain the state of the reprobate and of hell, that there is no life, no natural amelioration, no natural beatitude; but that there is the kingdom of death, an everlasting agony, no hope of change, but the stagnation of the evil. Reading St. Teresa's experience, we at once see the fire, and perceive what is meant by the 'worm that dieth not,'—an expression which our Saviour so emphatically repeats three times, Mark ix. 43, 45, and 47. Yea, we see the sting which is within the reprobate soul, as it 'is she herself who tears herself into pieces.' This is the one and the only description of hell, and this one and only description is just as Scriptural as it is popular, for it is given by our Saviour himself—given to the faithful in his time, given to the faithful at all times, given by the Apostles, given by the Catholic Church.

"How did our Saviour convey the idea of either life or death in the next world to the people? First, by parables; as for instance; Luke xvi. 19–31, in the parable of Dives he conveyed the full and true idea of reprobation to the minds of his hearers by stating: 1. That the unfortunate man was 'buried in hell.' 2. 'Tormented in this flame;' and, 3, that there is a 'separation which cannot be crossed;' 'between us and you there is fixed a great chaos.' (*χάσμα*, chasm.) In our present order of things if one is buried, he is cut off from society, so, in the second order, if a man dies the 'second death,' and is buried in hell, for in heaven there is no burial-ground,—being the land of the living,—he is among the dead, and in this manner, as long as the second order of things lasts, he is cut off from the society of the living, and even the yawning chasm would not permit any escape, and consequently, as there is no escape from hell, there is no escape from the flame, no escape from the torments. The resting-place, where Abraham was with Lazarus, may not have been far from the place of torments, for it is also called *inferi*, or 'hell,' or 'limbo,'—and our Saviour *descended* there—whilst it is said that he *ascended* into heaven. But, nevertheless, there was no reunion imaginable, far less with the lofty place above, with the mansions of heaven.

"Is there any substantial difference between what our Saviour preaches and what St. Teresa relates? At least the illiterate, poor people, to whom it was given by our Saviour, took it just as it was given, took just the idea which was intended by Christ. Dear Doctor, let us ask the illiterate, 'the little ones,' to whom it was explained by the Saviour of mankind, and let us not confide too much in our own wisdom, for it may be confounded. Yea, my Dear Doctor, stay a moment, and listen to the unchangeable sentence, which our Divine Redeemer once expressed: 'I give thanks to Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them to little ones. Yea, Father; because so it hath pleased thee.' Luke x. 21. So it has pleased the Father to ordain, so the Son has confirmed it; so it is. The Catholic philosopher, in order not to mount too high, must in all essential points ask and

consult the poor Catholic faithful people. '*Non plus sapere, quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem.*' Rom. xii. 3. And as the Apostle advises a few verses after: *Idipsum invicem sentientes; non alta sapientes, sed humilibus consentientes; nolite esse prudentes apud vosmet ipsos.* Rom. xii. 16.

"But let us proceed to another parable, given by the Redeemer: St. Math. xiii. 30-43, 'Wheat and Cockle'—the one to be preserved, the other to be burnt up, *ad comburendum, κατα καύσαι. Zum verbrennen*; that is to say, to burn it as long as there is any substance capable of being burnt. But as the immortal soul cannot be consumed, but in union with the body is confined to that awful place, which is separated from all communication—from which there is no escape—it follows that the burning is without any intermission, and forever. But what is meant by the cockle? Our Saviour explains it himself: 'And the cockle are the children of the wicked one!' The cockle on the field—the wicked as *viator*—as long as on the field it would be possible in the moral order of things for the cockle to change into wheat, and therefore permission is given, 'to let them grow both together'—as the servants might take and pluck out what afterwards is no more cockle but wheat;—but as soon as it is cut off—it remains either the one or the other. Therefore the cockle, the wicked, taken from the field is to be cast into the 'furnace of fire!' Does St. Teresa not speak of a furnace, or oven, or something like to it? Is this not the common belief of the Catholic people in all the countries of the world? Let us wait for no decision of a Council, when the simple believer is able to instruct us!

"St. Math. xiii. 47-52, follows with the parable of the net, which is filled with fishes, and after being drawn to the shore, the separation begins, and they cast forth the bad, (*σάρπα*, which signifies *putrid*) which are of no use any more: real outcasts!!

"In St. Math. xxv. 1, and following verses, in the parable of the Ten Virgins, we meet the expression: *Nescio vos*; 'I do not know you.' The reprobate are ignored by the Redeemer, as they have failed to become what they should have become, according to the idea of God. In the free creature co-operation is necessary. If therefore by the abuse of the free-will this end, which God had intended, is not obtained, the creature is abandoned and cast out of the creation, into the outer darkness. And when, therefore, our Lord addresses the foolish virgins with: *Nescio vos*, it is just as if he would have said: 'You have thrown yourselves out of the sphere of my ideal world, out of my kingdom, out of my life!' And St. Chrysostom remarks, that this expression, *nescio vos*, is worse than hell itself, and is identical with the sentence: *Discedite a me; ite in ignem aeternum!* It is the sentence of reprobation.

"So far the parables show the division either for life or for death; no medium, no recovery, no amelioration in man, as he is, as he historically is, in his present state. No natural beatitude can be expected when the supernatural is lost.

"But we have particular expressions, used by our Saviour and the Apostles, to signify the unchangeable and miserable state of the reprobate; expressions, which absolutely do not admit a mild explanation, or any natural life or happiness whatsoever. Therefore, in the second place, let us examine some of these weighty expressions.

"1. *Perdere in gehenna.* St. Math. x. 28. 'Fear not those that kill the body and cannot kill the soul; but rather fear him that can *destroy* both soul and body in hell.' The natural death is nothing—for there is a resurrection, but the second death is similar to destruction; no life whatsoever follows it.

"2. *Perire*; 'For God so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, *may not perish*, but may have life everlasting.' St. John iii. 16. And the same Apostle in the same chapter explains the *perire, perish*, in the last verse: 'He that believeth in the Son hath life everlasting, but he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth (*μενεῖ*) in the future, *manebit*) on him.' St. John iii. 36. Life and death are thus undeniably and most clearly expressed, and every other state excluded.

"3. *Hæc est mors secunda.* This is the 'second death.' Apoc. xx. 14. It is endured in the pool of fire and brimstone, where both the Beast (the luxurious, sensual and proud world) and the False Prophet (Antichrist and all his forerunners) shall be tormented day and night (without any intermission) for ever and ever (throughout eternity).' Apoc. xx. 9, 10.

"There is in that pool: 1. The Beast (wicked world). 2. The False Prophet; but 3. There is, moreover, every one else, who is not written in the Book of Life. 'And whosoever was not found written in the Book of Life, was cast into the pool of fire,' and, consequently, 'tormented day and night,' without any intermission, 'for ever and ever,' throughout eternity.

"By these expressions, of which many more are in the Scriptures, I intend to prove only, that there are but two states after this mortal life—either life, restoration and glory, in heaven; or death, misery and eternal reprobation; for any one who is not written in the Book of Life—is with the Beast and the False Prophet. There is no alternative—either life, or death; either with the False Prophets or with the Apostles; either with the Beast or with the Church; either in torments or in happiness; either in the outer darkness or in the unalterable light; either with the devil in the pool of fire or with the children of the Kingdom in the glory of the Father; either in hell or in heaven! The state of the reprobate is a complete ruin, a complete death, prefigured only by our natural death, which, though dreadful, is only a slight representation of what shall happen, when the agony is perpetuated, and death feeds, as it were, on the immortal spirit without being able to devour it. Yes, it is a complete death, and worse than annihilation, for in this case death would consume and destroy itself by once completing the work of destruction; but this cannot be, on account of the nature of the spirit, which, being simple, cannot be annihilated. Therefore was the fate of Judas lamented by our Saviour himself, of whom he spoke, without wounding charity, as he saw him as a real reprobate, in whom the last spark of that good-will, which is necessary to co-operate with divine grace, was extinguished. 'Woe to that man by whom the Son of Man shall be betrayed; *it were better for that man if he had not been born.*' St. Math. xxvi. 24. *Not to be, therefore, is infinitely better than to be a reprobate.*

"And this is the reason why St. Peter twice calls that state, '*destruction.*' In Second Pet. ii. 1, he speaks of false prophets 'bringing upon themselves swift destruction'—'whose destruction

slumbereth not;' and in verse 4, he explains what he means by this destruction: 'the place of torments,' into which the reprobate angels were cast. In Second Pet. iii. 7, he calls it: 'The perdition of wicked men;' and more palpably still in Second Pet. ii. 19, he calls the reprobate: 'Slaves of corruption.' What a perfect harmony between St. Peter and the Evangelists, where we found them saying, 'perish,' 'destroy,' 'the wrath of God abideth' on the 'slaves of corruption.' Is there a priest who could possibly find expressions as strong as these before us; and who blames him if he uses strong language in describing that 'pool of fire,' that place of 'torments?' Is that according to the spirit of Christ and of the Apostles, whom we so often hear repeating the punishment of the reprobate? No, my Dear Doctor, for the truth surpasses here every description, and it is the greatest charity to remind our sensual and indifferent century, that there are 'dreadful things in store for all who obey not the truth.' Rom. ii. 8. St. Paul 'fears and trembles' and 'chastises his body, and brings it into subjection; lest, perhaps, when having preached to others, he himself should become reprobate.' First Cor. ix. 27.

"Dear Doctor, 'I beseech you to contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the Saints,' Jud. i. 3; and not to console those that walk according to their own desires and sensuality; for such men have not the slightest idea of a 'beatific vision,' and do not wish it. 'Natural beatitude' is all they desire. That is the great change which I have observed in you since some time ago; that you advocate the aspirations of poor, fallen nature; and that, if you continue thus, it is you who will be *ἡ κορυφαῖος* of our time, leading and consoling those that have no hope.

"But if you do not believe me, ask others, ask men of piety and learning, ask the Sons of St. Ignatius, whose particular vocation it is to crush every germ of whatever indicates the slightest beginning of heresy: ask the theologian, and, as you yourself have formerly advised, ask the mystic-theologian; and they all will tell you that there is but one beatitude, consisting in life everlasting, and one reprobation, consisting in death, that last forever. They all will tell you, that whosoever is not found 'written in the Book of Life, is to be cast in the pool of fire.'

"But *nulla regula sine exceptione*. True, and even here there may be an exception with the children that die without being baptized. But this is a pious opinion only, and not more, and may be received—for there are good reasons to sustain it, as many learned theologians have proved. Nevertheless it is but an opinion, an exception, which confirms the rule still more.

"Now, my Dear Doctor, accept my good-will, my pure intention, which I had when writing these lines—all the rest is patchwork, and needs your benevolence, and begs for your excuse.

"Yours in Christ Jesus."

The highly esteemed writer, we hope, will take no offence if we say, that he tells us little that is new to us, or that we had not previously considered. We had read, before asking our questions, the *Life* of St. Teresa, and that of St. Frances of Rome; we had, also, read and carefully

weighed the several texts he cites from the Bible, many years before we became a Catholic Reviewer, and had even come to his conclusion, which we hold as fast as he does, that in the future life there are but two states; the one, heaven, for the saints; the other, hell, for the wicked; that these states are each everlasting; that those in heaven cannot fall into hell, and those in hell cannot ascend into heaven; and, finally, that those who receive heaven, receive it as a reward of their merits, and those who suffer hell suffer it as a punishment for their sins. This, as we understand it, is the substance of the belief of the Church on this subject, even as he himself represents it, and therefore there was no necessity of his undertaking to prove it against us.

Our theological friend labors under a grave mistake, if he supposes we deny that the punishment of the wicked is everlasting, or that we cannot, as well as he, say: "There are but two states after this mortal life,—either life, restoration, and glory in heaven,—or death, misery, and eternal reprobation; for any one who is not written in the Book of Life is with the Beast and the False Prophet. There is no alternative; either life or death; either with the false prophets or with the Apostles; either with the Beast or with the Church; either in torments or in happiness; either in the outer darkness or in the unalterable light; either with the devil in the pool of fire, or with the children of the Kingdom in the glory of the Father; either in hell or heaven." We know and believe all this. We stated expressly that the reprobate can never be saved, receive any lot or part in the palingenesia, can never see God in the beatific vision, or attain to any supernatural good, and therefore must be forever excluded from heaven, and remain forever in hell. There was little fairness or candor in arguing as if we held the contrary. We acquit the excellent writer of all intentional or conscious unfairness, but, upon reflection, we doubt not, he will admit that it is neither fair nor just to endeavor to prove against a man, as contrary to his opinions, what he undeniably and expressly maintains.

Our pious and learned friend says, that there is no such thing as natural beatitude, and that there is no alternative—it is either hell or heaven; for there are but two states after this mortal life; and labors very unnecessarily to prove it against us, for we assert natural beatitude in no sense in which he denies it. Yet he tells us we may hold that there is

"natural beatitude," for children that die without being baptized. "But," he says, "*nulla regula sine exceptione*." True; and even here there *may be* an exception with the children that die without being baptized. But this is a pious opinion only, and not more; and *may be received*—for there are good reasons to sustain it, as many learned theologians have proved. Nevertheless, it is but an opinion, an exception which confirms the rule still more." If there be "no rule without exception," it is also true that there is no dogma with an exception. All dogmas of faith express ideal truth, or truth of the ideal order, and therefore must be taken universally, and the admission of an exception to any one of them is simply the denial that it is a Catholic dogma. If, then, it be permitted to hold that infants are excepted from the second death, and are neither admitted into heaven nor placed in hell with the Beast and the False Prophet, who are tormented day and night in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone, then it is not a Catholic dogma that there are only two states after this life, and that there is no natural beatitude. The exception, if admissible at all, instead of confirming the dogma, simply denies it. The writer, then, must either deny that what he calls "a pious opinion" may be held, or he must modify his assertion that there are only two states after this mortal life. If any thing is certain, it is that infants dying unbaptized, and adults dying in actual sin alike descend to hell, and to the same hell, are in the same state of reprobation, only they are not all punished with the same degree of pain or suffering. Such is the doctrine of the Church as we have learned it. If our pious friend, then, concedes that it may be held that infants dying without baptism are not excluded from a certain natural good or beatitude, he must concede that every degree of that good or beatitude is not necessarily excluded from "hell," the "second death," the "lake" or "pool that burneth with fire and brimstone." The author's assertion, then, "no rule without exception," however true it may be in practical matters, is fatal to himself. His concession of an exception with regard to infants dying without baptism, concedes all that he is endeavoring to refute, all, indeed, that we ever thought of asserting.

Our worthy and pious friend writes, no doubt, under the impression that we hold there is for man in the world to come a natural beatitude, to which even the reprobate may finally attain, or be restored; but if he had paid attention

to the corrections and explanations we offered last October, he would have perceived that we hold no such thing, and that the melioration or diminution of their sufferings we spoke of, in no sense implies that they will ever attain either to the supernatural beatitude of heaven, or to what theologians understand by natural beatitude. This misapprehension grew out, we are willing to admit, of our use in July of the word *beatitude*, and which was understood by our theological friends in their sense instead of ours. We used the word not as implying that there is a natural destiny for man to which we supposed the reprobate might ultimately attain or be attaining, for we do not admit that man has or can have any natural destiny at all. His only destiny is supernatural. We used the term as the synonyme of good, some degree of which must always be supposed for man, if we suppose his existence at all as the creature of God. The complete severance of the creature, either from his first cause or his last cause, is not, as we said, his complete misery, but his total annihilation, since to the existence of any creature the final cause and the first cause are alike essential. Man by his creation participates of good in the first or cosmic cycle, and hence is said to be physically good; but, as he could not exist without a final cause, he must have an initial or inchoate good in the second cycle, and therefore is not and cannot be totally depraved. Hence St. Augustine may say with truth that existence is itself good, and that for the damned even it is better to be than not to be. The words of our Lord with regard to Judas cannot be understood according to the strict letter, and may simply be a strong way of expressing the deep and terrible misery to which Judas had doomed himself forever by his betrayal of the Son of Man.

If this reasoning be correct, it is not necessary to believe in the case even of actual sinners, that the damned are absolutely severed from all good, that is, from every degree of good; but simply to believe that they are eternally reprobated from heaven, and therefore, as the fulfilment or completion of man's destiny is heaven, forever remain initial or inchoate existences, forever below their destiny, deprived of all means and of all hope of ever attaining to beatitude, or the end of their existence. We never asserted that they would attain, or asked if we might not hope they would ultimately attain to natural beatitude or a natural destiny; but simply, if we might not hope that they would

ultimately attain to that degree of imperfect good called by our theologians natural beatitude. The term, we grant, was ill-chosen, because we do not believe in natural beatitude at all; for beatitude is in fulfilling our destiny, which is in the palingenesia or supernatural order alone. But it was not beatitude in any order, but simply an imperfect degree of natural good that we really spoke of.

It may be that in excluding from our conception of hell every degree of natural initial or inchoate good, we grievously erred; but still the doom of the reprobate, as we represented it, since it includes the loss of heaven, the loss of God, the Supreme Good, the loss of glorification, and all the joys of the Kingdom, and since it includes, in the case of all who die in actual sin, the internal torture of feeling that the loss has been voluntarily and maliciously incurred, and in the case of all the necessity of remaining forever mere initial or inchoate existences, forever below their proper destiny, without any hope or possibility of ever being able to attain to it, seems to us sufficiently deplorable, sufficiently wretched, sufficiently miserable to satisfy even those who luxuriate with the greatest fondness on the tortures of the damned, and are the most ready to improve on the maxim of the Holy Scriptures; "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom," by making it read: "The beginning of wisdom is the fear of hell." At least, we could wish no greater suffering to our most bitter enemy, and we can conceive it possible for the damned to suffer no greater misery, unless we suppose that God by a continuous miracle sustains them in existence for the sole purpose of enabling them to bear a punishment above their nature. Our view of the case supposes as much misery for the damned as they are naturally capable of enduring, and hence, as we cannot conceive them to be supernaturalized, that is, raised above their nature, we hesitate to believe that the Church teaches and requires us to believe that they will suffer any greater misery.

The melioration of the sufferings of the damned we incidentally referred to, as our friend might have gathered from our remarks in October, was not a point we very strenuously insisted upon. We inferred it from the expiatory view of punishment, which we were disposed to take, if permitted to do so by Catholic faith. Expiation is in itself good, and, as far as it goes, tends to good. We cannot, therefore, conceive the wicked to be forever expiating their

sins, without inferring the gradual diminution of the punishment they have incurred ; but, as their expiation can never be completed, their punishment can never completely end, and consequently is and must be everlasting. The diminution, therefore, is evidently only a logical inference drawn from the expiatory character of the punishment. The point, then, to make good against us, is that the punishment is not expiatory, but purely and simply vindictive. Hence the question we asked ; Are we obliged to believe the punishment of the wicked is simply vindictive, that is, vindictive in the popular sense of the term ; or are we permitted to believe that it is expiatory ? If our Reverend friend had told us what is the real doctrine of the Church on this point, he would have settled an important question for us, and answered the precise doubt we raised. We find in some theological writers deserving of great respect, the opinion advanced that the punishment is expiatory. If so, all that we concluded with regard to the gradual diminution of the sufferings of the reprobate must be conceded. If this view of their punishment cannot be taken, then we know no reason or ground on which we can assert it, or in any sense hope for it. Why has not our friend, who undertook to teach us the belief of the Church, instructed us on this point ?

He sends us for an answer to "the people," to "the poor and the illiterate," and says : "Dear Doctor, let us ask the illiterate 'the little ones,' to whom it was explained by the Saviour of mankind, and let us not confide too much in our own wisdom, for it may be confounded. Yes, my dear Doctor, stop a moment, and listen to the unchangeable sentence which our Divine Redeemer once expressed : 'I give thanks to thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones. Yea, Father, because so it hath pleased Thee.'—Luke, x. 21. So it has pleased the Father to ordain, so the Son has confirmed it ; so it is ; the Catholic philosopher, in order not to mount too high, must in all essential points ask and consult the poor Catholic faithful people." But to refer us on a difficult point of theology to the illiterate, though very humble and edifying in one who writes English, and quotes Latin, Greek, and German, is not, we must be permitted to say, altogether satisfactory ; for it does not seem to us that the illiterate and simple are those best fitted to give us the true Catholic

explanation. Our Lord, in the words cited, was not, as we understand it, contrasting illiterate, docile, and childlike Catholics with learned, scientific, and philosophical Catholics, and sending us to the former, instead of the latter, to learn the mysteries of Divine revelation; but docile and childlike Catholics, whether learned or unlearned, with the proud Gentile philosophers and the wise and prudent of this world, who neither know nor accept the true Catholic faith. That is to say, he contrasts Christians with non-Christians; those who are instructed by Divine revelation, with those who either have received no such revelation, or through their pride and self-sufficiency have rejected it. The poor, no doubt, have the Gospel preached to them, and it is a proof that the promised Messiah has come, that it is preached to the poor and illiterate; but it does not follow from this, that they who preach it are the poor and illiterate, or that science and learning are not very useful qualifications in those who are appointed to preach it.

If what appears to be the doctrine of our friend's letter, that we are to learn our faith from the poor and illiterate, be the doctrine of the Church, why does she demand a learned and highly-educated ministry, and why do we found colleges, seminaries, universities, and make liberal expenditures to educate not only the clergy, but the great body of our people? and why does our friend himself consult the Scriptures, the Fathers, and the writings and experiences of the Saints, and not content himself with simply consulting his housekeeper or his stable-boy? Why not shut up all our schools, burn all our libraries, and henceforth learn only what the unlearned are capable of teaching? We must believe that the writer, in his humility, has forgotten to inquire what would be the consequences of such a doctrine as this. It would tend to repress all thoughts and inquiry, render useless all literary or scientific culture; would condemn as useless, if not worse than useless, all the theological literature of the Church; declare worthless all the labors of the great Fathers, Doctors, and Philosophers of the Catholic world; would endorse with a vengeance De Rancé's plea for ignorance; and, if received as the doctrine and sentiment of the Church, would justify the charge brought by her enemies against her, that she crushes thought and forbids all inquiries and all discussions which rise above the reach of the illiterate and the simple.

The writer mistakes entirely the question at issue between him and us, if any question there be. It was not what the illiterate or the poor faithful Catholic people receive as the faith of the Church, we wished to ascertain; for of that belief we could hardly be ignorant. Moreover, we had and have some doubts whether the faith of the Church can always be concluded with infallible certainty from popular belief. We have great respect for the poor faithful Catholic people; we honor them for their fidelity, and we have great confidence in their Catholic instincts; but it would be idle, it seems to us, to pretend that all that is popularly believed, that all the notions circulating among the ignorant and illiterate, and are held by them to be true, are to be received as Catholic dogmas, or the true and full expression of the belief of the Church. They have many opinions which no well-instructed Catholic entertains, and many practices which every enlightened Catholic regards as childish and even superstitious. It is possible, then, we may know the belief of the poor, ignorant, and illiterate people, without being quite sure that we have the belief of the Church. The question does not turn on what is the belief of the illiterate, but how far is their belief itself true Catholic faith? Even supposing them to hold in words the dogma, it may still be asked, if they understand the dogma in its true sense. Our questions did not relate to the terms in which the dogma is expressed, either in the language of Scripture, or of popular belief, but to the sense in which that language or those terms are to be taken. It is evident from the very nature of the case, that on this point the poor faithful people, the illiterate and uncultivated, however humble or docile they may be, can give us no information.

One is almost tempted to think that the pious writer of the letter has never felt the need, either for himself or for others, of understanding the Catholic dogma, and ascertaining its scientific significance. This may be a merit in him, and he may, perhaps, not unwisely thank God that he is quite willing to accept the infallible speech of the Church without asking what it means, or whether it means any thing or not; but we can assure him, all men have not, as yet, attained to his degree of perfection,—or indifference, and that, in our times at least, there are a great many respectable persons who have a strong desire to understand what they read or hear spoken, and who really wish to

penetrate beyond the mere letter, seize the intellectual sense, and give it a scientific expression, both for themselves and others. There are men, and, we confess, we are among them, who would understand what they believe, and be able to render a reasonable service to God—*obsequium rationabile*. These persons may be very wrong, and regarded by our friend as proud and haughty philosophers, against whom all honest men should be on their guard. But still there are such persons, and we cannot, for ourselves, agree in the wisdom or justice of rejecting their demands, much less of excluding them from the pale of our charity, and consigning them over to Satan, as incorrigible. It would be doing Satan quite too much honor. It is far better to allow them to use their reason, and to do our best to enable them to understand according to the best of human ability the word of God.

We really know and understand nothing till we see and understand it in its principle, in its relation to the whole of which, if it be not a mere chimera or *ens rationis*, it is an integral part. Take the popular belief on this subject of future punishment,—we must still ask, What is the principle or reason of this belief? What is its relation to the whole system of Catholic faith? Do you tell me that the Church teaches it, and therefore I must ask none of these questions? Let me tell you, if I am a thinking man, really a live and not a dead man, my mind does and will ask these questions, and others like them; and the only way that I can prevent it from asking them, is by a violent effort of my will absolutely refusing to think of the subject at all. The mind has its own laws, and, if it acts at all, it does and will act in accordance with them. When once it has been quickened into activity, it is in vain that you come forward with wise and prudent, or even pious admonitions, and tell it that it must not ask this or that question, and that, if it does, it will only wander from the truth, be involved in the inextricable mazes of error, and find its place at last with the Beast and the False Prophet, in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone. Either you must prevent the quickening of the mind, the bursting into life of its activity, or you must suffer it to think, think freely, think earnestly, think deeply, and aid and direct it to think truly, wisely, and justly.

The suppression of thought, of all mental activity, may be attempted, but it can never be more than partially suc-

cessful; for it is at war with the very nature of the intellect, and the manifest intention of Divine Providence. Why were we made intellectual beings, why were we endowed with reason, if we are to live and die as if we were unintellectual and unreasoning animals? Why did God give us understanding, if understanding is not to be exercised? And if understanding is to be exercised at all, where will you fix its limits, set up your stakes, and say: "Hitherto, but no farther?" To suppress our mental activity is to suppress our manhood; is not to make us pious, devout, faithful, and docile Catholics, but mere brute-beasts. The great men, the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, your Basils and your Chrysostoms, your Jeromes and your Augustines, your Gregories, Hilarys, Ambroses, Anselms, Thomases, Bonaventuras, and even Bossuets and Fénelons were thinking and living men, men of the highest, the most cultivated, and the most advanced reason of their respective ages, and they labored not to suppress thought, to suppress inquiry, to suppress reason, and keep the multitude ignorant and brutish, but to quicken thought, to instruct intellect, to enlighten the ignorant, and to answer fully and scientifically all the legitimate questions the human mind asks or is disposed to ask. If we are men, living men, who love the truth, and seek the glory of God in the redemption, intelligence, and love of mankind, we too shall labor not to suppress, but to quicken, guide, and assist the activity of the mind, the characteristic of our nature.

We wish our friend would understand, what we are sure he is not disposed to deny, that belief is an intellectual act, and that no man believes a proposition itself, any farther than he understands it, and sees and assents to its reasonableness. You may tell me the Church teaches an unintelligible proposition, and as I believe her, because I have reason to believe her God's Church, and that she has authority to teach, I must believe it. Very true, I believe her, but I believe it, and can believe it, no farther than I understand it, and I understand it no farther than I see its relation or its analogy to the system of truth which has been committed to her keeping, or as a part of the whole doctrine of which she is the teacher. Beyond this I may accept the words, but they are to me empty words, with no distinct meaning.

I have no difficulty in believing that they who die unre-

generate are eternally excluded from heaven, and suffer forever in hell, for that follows necessarily from the fact that heaven is the crown of the regeneration, and, to attain it, one must be regenerated, and live the regenerated life in this world. This eternal reprobation and the misery of the reprobate, as the consequence of the abuse of free-will, harmonize with the whole system of rational and revealed truth the Church teaches, explains, evolves, and applies in her life through the ages. So far as this is the popular belief, so far the popular belief is reasonable and Catholic. But if you go farther, and tell me the wicked are excluded from heaven not because they exclude themselves, but by an arbitrary act of God, by way of wreaking his vengeance on those who have obstinately, during this life, refused the good he proffers them, I naturally ask: What do you mean by this vengeance, and on what principle of natural or revealed truth do you assert it? Do you mean that this punishment is any thing more or less than the natural consequence of the reprobate state or condition in which the sinner dies and enters the world to come, and from which there is and can be for him no redemption? Is this your meaning? Then I understand you, and have no difficulty with the popular belief. If it is not, and you say that the Church requires me to believe more than this, I ask you to tell me in plain and unequivocal language, what it is that you really mean, and what in addition Catholic faith requires me to believe? I ask you, also, to show that what, in addition, is required of me, harmonizes with the known attributes of God, and with the general principles of revealed truth.

Now, what is the teaching of the Church on this subject, in relation to the precise difficulty we have stated, we do not pretend to know; but we must know it, we must understand it, and we must see its consistency with whatever else we are required to believe, or else there will be in spite of ourselves a doubt in our mind, a doubt which cannot be mechanically removed, or in any way removed without some intelligible reason addressed to our understanding. You may tell us that such a doubt is sinful, and that, if we entertain it, we are no true believers. But that will not remove the doubt. The motives you adduce are addressed to the will, not to the intellect, and may make us wish to get rid of the doubt, but they cannot convince the understanding. To will or not to will is always in our power, but not

to believe or to disbelieve. There is no use in finding fault with us for this, for thus far we are not and cannot be blameworthy. Doubt is sinful only when it arises from some malice in the will, some indifference to truth, some neglect to seek for it, or for the evidence that it is truth; that is, it may be sinful in its cause, but not in itself as a purely intellectual act. Indeed, doubt is the first act of the reflex understanding, and he who has never doubted has never learned any thing. The merit of faith is in the fact that it is an act of love as well as of understanding.

But we have no disposition to prolong this discussion, and whatever opinions we may have, directly or indirectly, advanced on the future punishment of the wicked, we, in intention at least, hold the Catholic doctrine, and wish to have on this, as on all other subjects, no doctrine not in accordance with it. The only two opinions we have advanced, which are supposed not to be in harmony with the teachings of the theologians and the belief of the people, are: 1. That the punishment of the wicked is not a positive infliction, but a necessary consequence of the state or condition in which the sinner dies, and vindictive only in the sense that it vindicates the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the creative act; and 2. That the future punishment of the wicked, which in the case of all actual sinners is a *perpetua gehennæ cruciatus*, involving what theologians call the *pœna sensûs*, though, in our judgment, the pain of internal rather than of external sense,—but nevertheless is not punishment by material fire, as that term is ordinarily understood, in a literal lake or pool that burneth with literal fire and brimstone. With regard to the first point, St. Teresa's experience testifies to nothing against us, for her experience does not represent God as inflicting pain, or the pain itself as produced by any external fire, but declares it to be "the soul herself who tears herself into pieces," which shows that the sufferings of the soul grow out of her internal state, not that God positively inflicts them. On both points, however, we are content with the doctrine of the following passage, which we find in Archbishop Kenrick's Theology: "*Attamen necesse non est eum concipere pœnas irrogantem; nam ex ipsa peccatorum conditione, quum procul sint a regno cœlorum, vehemens oritur dolor, qui, omnibus fatentibus theologis, est maximus damnatorum cruciatus, pœna damni dictus. Quæ autem supplicia ignis nomine in Scripturis designantur,*

non satis feliciter quis explicuerit; nec enim igni quo fovemur est similis. Cæterum carceris ipsius, ut ita loquamur, adjuncta haberi possunt quæcumque sint externa damnatorum supplicia, quin Deus ea inferens concipiatur."*

This, if we understand it, teaches that it is not necessary in order to hold the Catholic faith to believe that the punishment is a positive infliction, and therefore a supernatural punishment; but it suffices to believe that it grows out of the state or condition in which the sinner has placed himself, or in which he is found on entering the future world. As that state is the natural consequence of the abuse of his freedom, which constitutes the dignity and glory of his nature, we see no injustice, nothing contrary to the essential attributes of our Creator, who is good and goodness itself, in leaving the reprobate to suffer it, and we see not how God himself could, without reversing the whole order of his providence, do otherwise. But as we regard all suffering, even in this life, as expiatory in its nature and character, we regard this future punishment as an everlasting expiation for sin. Whether we have a right to hold this latter view or not, is a point on which we have asked for instruction from those who have authority to teach, and are capable of setting us right, if we are wrong. The expiatory character of future punishment is, in our mind, connected with a general principle which runs through all the Creator's works, and without which we could never discover or establish the dialectic character of pain of any sort. All the Creator's works are dialectic, and every thing in them, when rightly understood, has a dialectic sense. Several highly-esteemed and learned theologians, to whom the very name of Gioberti is an abomination, have objected even to our criticism on that philosopher's assertion that sin has its dialectic side, and assure us that we are wrong in saying that it is on no side and under no aspect dialectic, that is, reconcilable with good.

With regard to the second point, as to the *pæna sensûs* asserted by our theologians, we are not disposed to say any thing more than is said by Archbishop Kenrick in the passage we have quoted. We by no means deny what theologians call the *pæna sensûs*, but we consider it rather a pain of internal than of external sense, and look upon it

* *Theologia Dogmatica. De Impiorum Supplic.* Resp. Obj. 10. As we are referred to the illiterate to collect our faith, it would be quite unnecessary to translate the Latin into English for their benefit.

as growing necessarily out of the loss of heaven, or the supernatural destiny of man, which leaves the sinner and compels him forever to remain an initial or inchoate existence, and therefore in the world of the senses, infinitely below that world of mentality in which the Blest are. That the reprobate will suffer from creatures in hell, on the principles and in the way they suffer from them here, is possible and not improbable; but that they will be crowded into "ovens," thrown into "pits," or plunged into a "lake" literally burning with "fire and brimstone," and actually punished by material fire, as the term is ordinarily understood, we by no means deny; we only say that we do not believe that it is necessary to believe it. These and various other images used by the Scriptures and by our preachers, and taken literally by the illiterate or the vulgar, we content ourselves with regarding as used to express the greatness and intensity of the sufferings of the damned. So much it is evident the Archbishop in his Theology would concede us, and nothing more can really be collected from the experience of St. Teresa quoted in our friend's letter. There may be great doubt whether the highly figurative or symbolic language of the *Apocalypse* has any reference at all to the condition of men after this mortal life, and, at any rate, there is no more reason why the Beast should be taken figuratively to represent, as our friend says, "wicked world," than that the lake of fire and brimstone should be taken figuratively. St. Teresa nowhere says that the damned are subjected to a literal burning, or that their agonies proceed from literal fire. Her language is highly figurative, and she uses the strongest expressions in her power to express the intensity of the sufferings of hell. But, after all, we place no great reliance on the Saint's experience. She was a great saint, a noble woman, and a classical writer, yet it is not necessary to believe that she was inspired to reveal truth, or that she ever actually in her own person experienced the tortures of the damned. We have great respect for the experiences and visions of saints, but we are not disposed to take them as infallible commentaries on the Holy Scriptures, or as of any special value in determining what is or is not the Catholic dogma. We believe in the perennial inspiration of the Church, that is, in the sense of a never-failing assistance of the Holy Ghost, but only to the end of preserving inviolate in its unity and integrity the Idea, or Truth itself, which she in

her whole life is engaged in evolving, explaining, and applying, to the glory of God and the salvation of souls. But we regard this inspiration or assistance as given to the Church as the new or regenerated human race, not to individuals, however learned, or saintly, or worthy to be venerated on our altars.

Still, if our friend insists upon the literal interpretation of the language of Scripture and of the popular belief, we shall not quarrel with him; we shall only tell him that we think he has no right to accuse us of denying hell because we do not agree with him that it is literal fire. He may hold his opinion, but not impose it upon us as Catholic dogma. We would, however, say to him and to others who have accused us of denying the everlasting punishment of the wicked, that they seem to us to take a very low view, not of hell indeed, but of heaven. They seem to consider the loss of heaven, of the supernatural, that is to say, of their proper destiny, therefore of their Supreme Good, as a very trifling affair, and to imply no hell at all. Perhaps if they had a little more of that spiritual-mindedness and penetration into celestial things, which they are so ready to deny to us, they would perceive that we might more justly accuse them of denying heaven, than they us of denying hell. They seem to us to attach very little importance to the supernatural destiny of man, and therefore to the Incarnation, and to think somewhat more of escaping hell, than of securing the joys of heaven. Will they permit us to suggest that, if they would more frequently prefer life to death as the subject of their meditations, they would be none the worse theologians, and none the weaker Christians?

Since the foregoing was written, we have received another communication from a learned and able theologian, and which, as we wish to have done with the subject, we append with a few brief remarks:—

SIR: Excuse me, if I take the liberty of offering to your attention a few remarks relative to the two last numbers of your Review. I should, perhaps, not have been under the necessity of doing so, if you had seen my short exposition on the eternity of punishment in a German newspaper, the *Wahrheitsfreund*. Though I am not a great theologian, nor, in comparison with you, in the world of science of any importance, still I feel in the present case a great confidence in being able to give such answers to your questions as will put an end to the whole controversy.

Your questions are founded on a false principle, on a false idea of

eternity. If you had the right notion of eternity, you would never come to conclusions like yours. According to the Holy Scriptures, eternity is the natural opposite of time; or, better, time is the true opposite of eternity. In eternity, as far as it is eternity, there is no time—*quia tempus non erit amplius*. Apoc. x. 6. But if there be no time, then there is no succession; if there be no succession, then there is no mutation of will and of punishment. "The will is in eternity" is equivalent to this proposition, "the will is immutable;" as long as it is mutable, it is not yet in eternity, but in time. In eternity *vermis non moritur, et ignis non exstinguitur*. Mark ix. 48; because there is no transition from existing to not existing, or from not existing to existing; no mutation, no annihilation, because there is no succession, no time any more. Whilst time reflects itself in motion, eternity finds its picture in repose; whilst time is succession of the state of potentiality to the state of act, eternity is a simple state of act. There is only this difference between the necessary Being and contingent beings, that the eternity of the former excludes all state of potentiality, be it anterior or posterior, whilst the eternity of the latter excludes only the state of posterior potentiality. But in any case eternity excludes all succession of the state of act and potentiality, so that the definition of eternity is necessarily this: "*Eternity* is a state of act excluding all succession." It is a simple moment of existence enduring without change.*

I think it would not be so difficult to show to a rationalist the rationality of this idea. There is nothing extraordinary, nothing impossible in it; on the contrary, it concords with reason and experience. A man with a fixed idea offers us a partial picture of the state of the wicked in eternity. His reason is directed to one point, from which even with the greatest labor it cannot be removed. It is in the state of immutability, of fixity, and in so far no more subjected to the laws of time. Suppose now, that his intellect and his will, all his conceptions and acts of will were in this state of fixity, then we should have a perfect image of the state of man in eternity. A man with a fixed idea through exterior influences can certainly come again to the full use of reason, because he is not yet quite free of the law of time; but if he were in the state of fixity with all acts of intellect and will, he never could be saved from such a state.

After this, it will not be very difficult, Sir, to answer your questions. But first, I might make some few other remarks. Your doctrine, Sir, is, when not quite destructive, at least very dangerous to Christian morality. Human nature is so inclined to evil, that, if we should offer to the impious hopes of natural beatitude, crime, which nevertheless predominates, would reign to a far greater extent. Then your doctrine destroys the free-will of men. You say: "If they (the wicked) continue to commit sin, how can we say, that Christ has triumphed over sin, that he has overcome Satan and destroyed his works?" Now, I ask you, if a man should be obstinately determined to commit sin throughout eternity, how could you suppose him not committing sin, without doing violence to his free-will? But is this not the grossest

* Vide *Tourausti et sa Doctrine, jugée par l'Enseignement de l'Eglise*; par Pierre Semenenko, Docteur en Théologie. Paris: Jacques Lecoq et Cie. This same notion of eternity, as the Holy Scriptures give it us, you will find, also, in the Scholastics. As I have no other books at hand, I beg you to read St. Thomas *Summa*, P. 1, Q. 10, A. 4, and elsewhere.

contradiction,—free-will and violence? He who is compelled, is not free, and he who is free cannot be compelled. So the triumph of Christ over sin cannot involve the consequence you draw from it, that men cannot continue to commit sin. But you ask perhaps: Should the wicked in eternity continue to sin, would they remain eternally bad? This question is a contradiction of terms, as you easily will understand, when you remember, that their will, being in eternity, is necessarily immutable.

I come now to your fundamental questions. You ask: 1st. "Are the wicked everlastingly punished because they are everlastingly sinning?" Answer: Yes. They enter with their sin in eternity, and so this sin, *though they do not commit new sins*, is everlasting; they enter, as Dr. Klee says, into the state of Satanity.* In Luke, viii. 18; the debt remains the same, consequently the punishment remains the same. You ask, 2dly: "Is their punishment vindictive, or simply expiative?" Answer: There is no difference, whether the punishment be vindictive or expiative, since it is eternal. Call it as you like, it is always the same punishment. But it is really both; it is vindictive and expiative, but remember well, *eternally* vindictive for an eternal sin, and *eternally* expiative of an eternal sin. Does not Jesus Christ say himself of the wicked: *Non videbit vitam, sed ira Dei manet super eum?* John, iii. 36.† In hell, Sir, there is no grace any more; but expiation in your sense, that is, satisfaction, involves and supposes grace. I beg to consider also the following oracles of the Holy Scripture: "Vae genti insurgenti super genus meum; Dominus enim omnipotens vindicabit in eis. . . . Dabit enim ignem et vermes in carnes eorum, ut urantur et sentiant usque in sempiternum." Judith xvi. "In flamma ignis dantis vindictam iis, qui non noverunt Deum, et qui non obediunt Evangelio Domini nostri Jesu Christi, qui *pœnas dabunt in interitu æternas*." Sec. Thessal. i. In the same sense St. Cyprian says: "Quos *inerpiabili malo* sæviens ignis *æterna scelerum ultione* torquebit." Laud. martyr. 618, Bal. You ask, 3dly: "Does it necessarily include any thing more than is implied in the loss of heaven or supernatural good?" Answer: Though the loss of God is, according to the Holy Fathers, the hell in hell, still the Scriptures and the Fathers and the Church in her definitions speak always of positive, not only of negative or privative sufferings. But even supposing, that the eternal punishment does not necessarily include any thing more than is implied in the loss of heaven or supernatural good, we still must protest against a consequence such as this, that with eternal punishment natural beatitude can coëxist. For it is self-evident, that to be out of God, consequently to be out of all good and within all bad and evil, is to be in hell, and likewise that the highest *pœna damni* is also the highest *pœna sensus* (vide Klee's Dogmatik, T. ii. p. 463). You ask, 4thly: "Because none but the elect can receive any supernatural good, is it therefore necessary to exclude the reprobate from all diminution of their sufferings under the expiation eternally going on, or from gradually attaining to that degree of imperfect good foreshadowed in what theologians call the state of pure nature?" Answer: Certainly it is; as in

* (Katholische Dogmatik von Dr. H. Klee, T. II., p. 462). And does not Jesus Christ speak himself of an eternal sin? *Qui autem blasphemaverit in Spiritum Sanctum non habebit remissionem, sed reus erit æterni delicti?* Marc. iii. 29. In the same view St. Ambrose says: *Post mortem nequeunt merita mutari.*

† *Proprie loquendo pœna æterna non est vindictiva neque expiativa, sed retributiva.*

eternity there is no time any more, so there can be no succession, no mutation, no gradual diminution of suffering, no transition to any degree of perfect or imperfect good. Does not also the Holy Gospel indicate the impossibility of this alleged mitigation in the parable of the rich man, to whom a drop of water, *i. e.*, the smallest mitigation is denied? You see, Sir, that all my answers are founded in the true Biblical idea of eternity, whilst your questions suppose eternity to be a time without limits, which is, you will agree with me, a chimera. Do you still require definitions of the Church? I am here living, Sir, in the country, far from all communication with large cities; I have not all the books I should have to write on theological matters, I have not the *Decreta Pontificum*, nor the *Concilia Ecumenica*, nor the Holy Fathers; I have nothing else than some books of theology, and some remarks written during the time of my studies; I am a poor missionary in Upper-Canada, and so I cannot furnish you with a great apparatus of science; but I hope you will not ask too much from me. I have said nothing but what a candid spirit must admit, and the whole of what I have said can convince you that your theory is not in harmony with the doctrine of the Church. So this is not a point in which popular belief needs to be modified. Yea, the popular belief itself is a real argument against you. What is popular belief else, than the belief of all ages, all countries, and all the people of God, of the whole mystic body of Christ, of the Church herself?

"Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est, non est erratum, sed traditum." When Nestorius in the fifth century asserted that the blessed Virgin was only the mother of a man, it was not yet defined by the Church, but it was popular belief, that she was the mother of God, and is not this popular belief considered till now as the strongest proof against the heresiarch? Before the last Decennium the dogma of the Immaculate Conception was not yet decreed, but it was popular belief, and this popular belief was the strongest argument for our theologians. On this popular belief Father Passaglia founded his large work, *De Immaculato Conceptu*, and Father Ballerini's *Sylloge Monumentorum ad Mysterium Conceptionis Immaculatæ illustrandum*, is nothing else than a proof of the popular belief in this dogma.

Another remark we have to make before closing this already too long letter. We believe in your good-will, in your orthodoxy; we believe that you have not the slightest intention to assert any thing against the Church; we are happy, to see in your last Review such a firm declaration of your readiness to subject your opinions to the decision of the Church; but, Sir, you must concede, that you were in an earlier number of your Review a little too incautious in speaking of the Index. In your article, *Gioberti's Philosophy of Revelation*, (page 285), you say: "We know also, that modern orthodoxy is timid, and its defenders are more ready to denounce, to place upon the Index, or to pillory a man's writings, than to refute them, to silence by authority than to convince by reason." Are such expressions not incautious? Can you conscientiously speak so about a congregation of the greatest dignitaries of the Church and the most learned theologians of the

* cf. Marc. xiv. 21. "Væ autem homini illi, per quem Filius hominis traditur. Bonum erat ei, si non esset natus homo ille." Ergo existentia damnati non est melior conditio quam non-existentia.

world, who never place a work on the Index without having examined it on all sides, to whose decisions the greatest men of the Catholic world, such as a Ventura, Rosmini, Hirscher, Gunther, &c., &c., willingly and humbly subjected themselves? But "errare aut errasse humanum est."

Excuse me again, Sir, and believe, that I would not have said any thing against you, if not compelled by my conscience and my love of the truth and of our holy Church, to whose service I offer my little faculties, my little labors, and my whole life.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant.

We were not ignorant of the definition of eternity given us by the writer, but the word *eternal* is frequently used in the sense of *everlasting*, in which sense it does not exclude the conception of time, or potentiality. When applied to punishment, it must be so used, and can only mean that the punishment is endless, or never comes to a conclusion. Taken in the sense in which it excludes all conception of time and potentiality, it applies and can apply only to God. Defined as our critic defines it, eternity, since it excludes all potentiality, is pure act, and only God is or can be pure act, for he only is or can be absolutely infinite. Eternity, in his sense, is God, who alone is eternal, or the Eternal One. To be in eternity is to be in God, and the Blest are eternal, possess eternal life, only in Him. To be "in eternity," in the sense that it excludes all time, is to be in God, is to be God, for what is in God is God. The Saints in Glory participate in His eternity, because they have returned to Him in the palingenesia,—and through union with the Word made flesh, are united to Him as their final cause, and are thus, as St. Peter says, made "partakers of the Divine nature," *divinæ consortes naturæ*.

But this cannot be said of the reprobate. They are not in eternity, for they are not in God,—are not united to him in the palingenesia, for they are reprobate precisely because they are not and never can be so united. In them the potentiality of their nature is not reduced to act, and their misery is that it never can be; or, in other words, they have not attained, and never can attain to their final cause,—have not reached and cannot reach the term of their existence; that is, have not fulfilled and cannot fulfil their destiny. Hence they remain forever initial, inchoate, unfulfilled, or incompleted existences. Hence they are and must remain forever subject to time and its mutations, never reaching eternity. Possibly it did not occur to our critic,

that, if the wicked are in eternity, they have reached the term of their existence, have reduced their potentiality to act, have fulfilled their destiny, and therefore are neither wicked nor miserable, but deificated and blest, are in fact saints in glory, which, he will permit us to say, is a "contradiction in terms."

Time and eternity are not contradictories, but simply opposites, reconciled and brought into dialectic harmony in the palingenesia. Time and space are related to eternity and immensity precisely as the creature is related to the Creator; and as Creator and creature are not contradictories, so neither are time or space, and eternity or immensity. Time is initial eternity, and space is initial immensity, and each is complete or completed only in God, who is eternity and immensity in his own real and actual being. The Blest have fulfilled their destiny, have returned to God as their final cause, and in them the final chronotope has not been destroyed, for they remain creatures still, are not absorbed in God, as the Budhists teach, but are brought into dialectic union and harmony with the infinite Chronotope, that is to say, the eternity and immensity of God, indistinguishable from the Divine Essence itself. The difficulty with the reprobate is, then, that this union and harmony are not and cannot be attained to. They remain eternally in finite time and space, out of their dialectic union and harmony, out of the Logos, and are therefore sophistical. Had our critic duly considered this, he would have had less confidence in his demonstration of the impossibility of the sort of melioration under the expiation, forever going on, we spoke of. This demonstration is founded not on a false notion of eternity, but on the false notion of the relation of time and eternity, in supposing them to be contradictories, when they are only simple contraries, susceptible of reconciliation. Time has its origin and its being in eternity, as the creature has its origin and being in the Creator.

We cannot conceive of time being no more without conceiving of the total annihilation of all creatures. The time for This or That may come to an end, but not all time. The time of probation ends at death, and the unregenerate are from that moment fixed in their state of reprobation forever. There is no time for them to enter the palingenesia, and they must remain forever in their state of reprobation. On this point there is no disagreement between the critic and ourselves. But that their condition within

the limits of this reprobation is immutable, may be true, but is not, we maintain, a necessary logical conclusion.

This disposes of the philosophic argument adduced against us. In answer to one of our questions, the critic concedes that the reprobate do not commit *new* sin, and simply contends that they remain forever in the same sinful state in which they enter the world to come. Substitute the *same reprobate state*, and we accept his answer. That the wicked, as he maintains after Dr. Klee, "enter into the state of Satanity," is a proposition that we do not fully understand, or which, if we understand, we do not accept; for we do not recognize two eternal principles, one good, one evil,—or the Manichæan dualism. He says, furthermore, that it makes no difference whether we call the punishment vindictive or expiative, since it is eternal. With his permission, we think it does make some difference, if the word *vindictive* is taken in its popular sense, and it was only in its popular sense that we objected to it. Popularly, the word *vindictive* means *revengeful, given to revenge*, and in this sense we doubt the propriety of calling the punishment of the wicked *vindictive*. In the other sense of the word, the sense in which we use it when we say we *vindicate* a proposition against an opponent, or a truth against him that denies it, we are willing to admit that all punishment is vindictive. In the punishment of the wicked, God does not *avenge* or *revenge* himself, in the vulgar sense of those terms, but vindicates the logical or dialectic character of his own providence, proving it in harmony with the eternal Logos, which he himself is. He does universally and effectually what our critic is attempting, on a small scale, to do to us, that is, to vindicate the truth against our sophistry. The pain and mortification we should feel by being convicted would be our expiation of having been illogical, and vented sophisms. All sin is a sophism, is an error of logic, or an error against the dialectic truth of things, and really consists in the sophism of assuming on the part of the creature that he is not creature, but God. The expiation is the just reward of the error or sin, and is therefore *retributive*.

But when our critic talks of an "eternal sin," he talks again of something we do not understand. An eternal sin can be the act only of an eternal sinner, and therefore again only of an infinite sinner; an infinite sinner must be an infinite being; but an infinite being is *actus purissimus*, and therefore incapable of sinning. He only can commit an

eternal sin who is in eternity ; but eternity is God, and God cannot sin, nor he who is in God. Man may commit a sin that will never be forgiven, therefore a sin whose punishment or expiation will never end ; but that is something very different from an eternal sin.

The writer concedes our proposition that "hell does not necessarily imply any thing more than the loss of heaven or supernatural good," but protests "against a consequence such as this, that with eternal punishment natural beatitude can coëxist. For it is self-evident, that to be out of God, consequently to be out of all good and within all bad and evil, is to be in hell, and likewise that the highest *pœna damni* is also the highest *pœna sensûs*." If he had paid attention to what we said in October, he would have omitted what he here says of "natural beatitude." In the proper sense of the term, we believe in no natural beatitude ; for beatitude is in the palingenesia, not in the cosmos. Yet the cosmos is initial palingenesia. The reprobate have no palingenesiac existence ; yet, since they exist, they have a cosmic existence, and therefore an initial good. To deny this would be to deny that the reprobate have any existence, and if no existence, they can be the subjects neither of happiness nor of misery. But we have sufficiently explained this point elsewhere. We only add here, that, in our October number, we frankly admitted the inaccuracy of our language, and explained what we meant. There is neither fairness nor candor in our critics continuing to assert that we maintain that the reprobate attain or even may be attaining to natural beatitude. All the good pertaining to what theologians call the "state of pure nature," which they, not we, call natural beatitude, is simply an initial or inchoate good, as the cosmos is initial or inchoate palingenesia, or as man in the order of genesis is an initial or inchoate Christian. The reprobate never get beyond this initial or inchoate state, never attain to the stature of full-grown men, never actualize the potentialities of their nature or race, and therefore remain forever dishumanized and below their destiny, and hence are said to be in hell, *infernus, the below*.

Our critic says that "to be out of God, consequently to be out of all good and within all bad and evil, is to be in hell." Will he tell us what he means by being *within all bad and evil* ? Are *bad* and *evil* something positive ? Are they positive entities ? If so, they must either be eternal or

created. If you say eternal, you are a Manichæan; if you say they are created, you deny that all the Creator's works are good, and maintain that God can do evil, therefore be bad and wicked. He says "the Scriptures, the Fathers, and the Church in her definitions, speak always of positive, not only of negative or privative sufferings." No doubt of it. But do they ever speak of evil as a positive principle, or a positive existence? Nobody denies that suffering is positive, that is to say, actual suffering; but it is so not by virtue of the presence of a positive existence called evil, but by virtue of the absence of a positive good. It is not necessary, Archbishop Kenrick tells us, to believe that the punishment of the wicked is a positive infliction,—and he, we must believe, is as good a theologian, as learned and philosophic as even our critic. We have no doubt that the suffering of the reprobate is very real and very intense, but we are disposed to regard it not as a positive infliction, but as the natural and necessary consequence of the loss of God, the privation of heaven, which compels the reprobate to remain forever mere initial, inchoate, unfinished existences, intensified in the case of actual sinners by the consciousness that it is through their own fault they must forever so remain.

With regard to popular belief as a criterion of Catholic truth, we have already spoken. Popular belief is orthodox, so far as it conforms to the external and internal tradition of the Church, and no farther. The external tradition is the infallible speech of the Church maintained by her definitions and decrees; the internal is the Idea or Word whose Divine-human life she is evolving in her own life, as we have elsewhere explained. As to the words of theologians and even of Scripture, we wish it to be understood that the question is not what they are, but what do they mean. This question it requires a higher authority than either his or ours to answer. As to the moral effect of our alleged doctrine, we reply, first, that we have nothing to do with it, because we do not hold the doctrine objected to; and, second, that the fear of hell is a restraint only to those who believe it, and, if we present hell in such a light that nobody will or can believe it, the fear of it will restrain nobody. We thank the critic for the confidence he expresses in our personal orthodoxy and good intentions, but we are not aware that any one can justly suspect them, or that they need any special endorsement. As to the complaint he makes of an incautious expression of ours when

speaking of Gioberti, we assure him that we have very little sympathy with the meticulousness of modern theologians. We complain not that bad books are placed on the *Index*; that is all right and necessary as a guide to the faithful; but we mean to say that that is not enough. The discipline of the *Index* can be enforced in the case of very few who would be injured by reading the works censured. To place a book, in our times, on the *Index*, only creates a greater eagerness to read it. It is necessary in addition to refute bad books. This is all we meant to say, and this, we think, no one can censure.

There are two or three other points in the letter which we intended to notice, but we think we have said enough; and if, after the explanations we have given, our critics persist in accusing us of maintaining that there is natural beatitude to which the reprobate attain or can be attaining, or of denying the everlasting punishment in hell of the wicked, they must be a little dull of understanding, or deficient in fairness and candor. Our views on this, as on all other theological subjects, are submitted in humble deference to the Holy See, with the promise to abide by her decision. We seek to ascertain, to accept, and to obey the Catholic faith as committed by Him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life to the Church, not to make a Catholic religion, a Catholic faith, or a Catholic Church to suit ourselves, or after our own image. With these remarks the discussion of the subject in our pages is closed.

ART. V.—*The first Annual Message of the President of the United States to the two Houses of Congress.* Washington, D. C., December 3, 1861.

MANY worthy people regard war, especially a civil war like that which is now raging in the American Union, as the greatest calamity that can befall a nation, and so great is their horror of war that they seem willing to purchase peace at any price, even by national dishonor and national degradation, yet war is rather the effect of evil than the evil itself. The real evil is in the causes that precede and lead to it. In our case it is the effort of the sound part of the nation to expel a disease long since contracted, and

which was gradually but steadily approaching the seat of life, and threatening us with complete dissolution. To the eye of enlightened patriotism our condition as a people is less deplorable to-day than it was four years ago before the war broke out.

War is never lawful for its own sake, and can be rightfully undertaken only for the sake of a true and lasting peace; but, when necessary to that end, it is not only justifiable, but sacred and obligatory. It is a severe remedy for a desperate disease, what physicians call an "heroic" remedy, therefore good, but one which in certain cases must be resorted to, if recovery is not to be despaired of. Without it, we had no chance of prolonging our national life. With the slave interest in full power in nearly one half of the Union, and by its combinations ruling the councils of the nation; with Young America, reckless and destitute of principle, managing our politics at the North under the lead of Fernando Woods and New York Herald; with the laxity of morals becoming almost universal in politics and business, in public life and private; with the growing tastes and habits of luxury and extravagance prevalent throughout the land, we were well nigh a lost people; our destruction as a nation was, if no change came, only a question of time, and thoughtful and far-seeing men were beginning to despair of the Republic. The impending ruin, in the ordinary providence of God, could be averted only by the war which has broken out, and is now raging. We deplore with all our heart the causes which made the war necessary and inevitable, but we do not and cannot grieve that it has come, or lament the sacrifices it compels us to make.

War is a less calamity to a nation than the effeminate and luxurious tastes and habits generated by a long peace and its attendant exterior prosperity. It can never be so fatal to a nation as the loss of virtue, courage, manliness, and love of glory, which we had suffered during the thirty years preceding the outbreak of the present Rebellion, and which renders it yet doubtful whether we have the moral qualities requisite to restore the Union, and preserve our national existence. What is the loss of blood or treasure in comparison with the loss of country or of national life? What are all the losses war can occasion in comparison with the possession of our manhood, and of those self-denying and self-sacrificing virtues which war demands and seldom fails

to develop? Indeed, we look upon the war as our only means of salvation, as sent in mercy to a privileged people to enable them to be a living people, a great, heroic, and chivalric nation, fitted to receive and fulfil the holy mission of proving what is the nobility of man when and where he is free to be himself. Better to be moved by the inordinate love of glory than by the inordinate love of gain or sensual pleasure, and far nobler are the qualities of the soldier than those of the demagogue or even the shopkeeper.

Instead of sighing over the calamities of the war, its disarrangement of business, its interruption of ordinary pursuits, or its expenditures in money and in life, we should bring our minds up to the high thought that there are nobler things than these and far more worth living for. No man ever rises to the dignity of true manhood who has not hovering before him an ideal above all things of this sort, and in whom there has not been developed the power of heroic self-abnegation, and of wedding himself to a cause that transcends all the goods of time and sense, and of counting no loss, no toil, no suffering, no sacrifice in its defence or promotion. Such a cause is religion, and first on the list of those honored on earth and in heaven stand her martyrs. Next to religion, and never separable from it, is the cause of our country, and humanity honors, next to her saints, the brave and heroic soldier, next to her martyrs for the cause of God, those who nobly fall in battle for the honor, dignity, and defence of their country. The Church agrees with the human race in all ages in her estimate of the soldier, and bestows peculiar privileges on those who fall in fighting for a just and sacred cause. Let not modern skepticism or mistaken philanthropy attempt to reverse the verdict of the Church and of humanity. He who marches to the battle-field, and pours out his life in defence of his country is the brother of him who marches to the stake or the scaffold, and gives his life for his faith. In both it is the heroism that the world loves and worships, the forgetfulness of self, the power of self-sacrifice, the devotion to the great, the noble, the true, the good. The heroism, in the true and nobler sense of that soul-stirring word, which the war for religion or for country generates or develops is worth more to a nation than all it costs, for, without it, no nation is really a living or an advancing nation. When a nation has ceased to produce heroes, as a religion when it has ceased to produce martyrs, it has culminated,

is on its decline, falling or fallen into the dead and putrid state of Turkey, India, or China, and has no longer a work for either God or man.

If we are wise, we shall accept the present civil war as a much needed and a salutary discipline, necessary to arrest us in our downward career, and to recall us to the virtues of our heroic fathers. We shall even accept it with thankfulness, as giving us the opportunity of rivalling, and even surpassing them in glory. It gives us the opportunity to prove ourselves men, and to achieve greatness for ourselves. Our fathers won us a country, we can now prove that we are able to defend, preserve, and ennoble a country. We can now prove that the race has not degenerated in this New World, and that man here is still man in all his vigor, in all his proud daring, and in all his noble deeds. We of the Free States have been taunted by the slaveholding South with being cowards and poltroons, with being ready to sacrifice honor, dignity, and glory, for the sake of trade and its profits, and poltroons in our politics we have been; we can now prove that if we have been ready to make any sacrifice, even that of honor, to prevent the dissolution of the Union, it has not been through sordidness or cowardice. Our honor, our very manhood as a free and living people are now at stake, and must be redeemed. We must wipe out the disgrace of our past concessions, our past crouching to the "Barons of the South," and prove that those concessions were not wrung from a timidity that springs from a want of manhood or from insensibility to national honor or national glory; that we have not crouched because we wanted spirit to assert, or strength to defend our own rights and dignity, but because we loved the Union, and are now ready to make any sacrifice to preserve the integrity of the nation. This we can and must now prove. We are now called upon to prove that there still lives and burns in our hearts the spirit of our fathers; that we have the old American energy and indomitable perseverance that won this continent from the savage and the forest, that forced the proud mother country to acknowledge our Independence, framed the Federal Constitution, and made us a nation full of promise to the future of the world.

But to do this we must take the matter in earnest, and understand and feel that the war is a reality, and that it must be conducted on war, not on peace principles. The amiable speculations of our late "peace-men," and the

charming sentimentalities of well-meaning philanthropists, with which we wiled away the "piping times of peace," for the want of something more amusing, interesting, or spirit-stirring, must be laid aside for the present, for we are now face to face with the stern realities of war. The real, not the mimic stage is now before us, and the actors are actors in real, not mimic life. The tragic deeds are *doing*, not merely represented before our eyes. They are real, not pasteboard soldiers that pass and repass before us, and the charge sounded is a real charge to a real battle, in which the life of a nation, perhaps the whole future of humanity, is at stake. We are not sitting at our ease in the parterre or a private box, and witnessing a theatrical battle. There is no artifice, no phantasinagoria, no painted scenery here; it is all real, sternly, terribly real. The reality itself is before us, and we must meet it with a sternness, a gravity equal to its own. It is real blood, not red paint that flows, and real life-warm blood must still flow, and flow in torrents. We must have not only the courage to be killed, but we must have for brave and generous souls the harder courage to kill,—not simply to bear, but to do harm, to strike the enemy in his tenderest part our quickest and heaviest blows. War demands not the passive virtues alone; it demands the active virtues, and is the work not of women, but of men,—of men wound up to the highest pitch of their manhood, acting in the terrible energy of their full masculine strength, and the whole directed with an invincible will to the beating down of every obstacle to its advance. There must be no dilly-dallying, no Chinese making up of faces, and trusting to painted dragons and devils, or real noise and clamor. There must be a downright, straightforward, and earnest advance, with all the death-dealing instruments of war. The war, while it lasts, is and must be inexorable. There must be no fear to strike, lest we fell a foe, no fear to fire, lest somebody should be shot. This fear or hesitancy may do when we are playing soldiers, but it is out of place now. The very design of war is, while it lasts, to inflict the greatest possible injury in the shortest possible time, and with least possible loss to ourselves, on the enemy, in order to force him to submit, and cease resistance. When he submits, but not till then, may pity, compassion, tenderness, love be displayed, and exerted in all their divine sweetness and power.

There is no question that the people of the loyal States

are not yet fully wrought up to the stern realities of war, nor fully alive to the gravity and magnitude of the struggle we are now engaged in for the existence of the nation. We are not yet fully convinced that we are in face of a real rebellion, or that the Confederates are really attempting any thing more than their old practice of gambling on our love for the Union, and seeking by the game of bluff to force us to make them new and greater concessions. We half persuade ourselves that the war is only a bravado on their part, and that the controversy will be settled, as so many controversies between the North and the South have heretofore been, by some political *coup de main*, by some new "Compromise Bill," or, at least, by some unforeseen and lucky accident. But the day for concession and compromise has gone by. The rebel states are in earnest, and this time the wolf has really come. They demand our retirement from the family mansion, and the surrender of the family estate to their management, and that we trust to their generosity or their filial piety to dole us out the bare pittance necessary to keep soul and body together. There is no half-way measure possible. They will make the Union theirs, or they will dash it to atoms. In this there is no mistake. Their motto is, "Rule or Ruin."

Even the Administration, able and patriotic as it is, we fear is deceiving itself with a specious, but illusory theory. Its theory is, that no State has seceded from the Union, and that the Rebels are merely a faction in their several States, who, by a wicked and artful conspiracy, have usurped the functions of their respective State governments, and are exercising a gross and intolerable despotism over the people, who are in general loyal and devoted to the Union. The true policy, it holds, is to strengthen the people in the States where the faction has usurped the government, and to enable them through the ballot-box to recover their political ascendancy. Hence while defending itself against the Rebels, it must protect the people of the seceding States,—the Union people,—and avoid irritating them, or doing any thing that might drive them to make common cause with the Rebels, or prevent them, when the Rebellion is suppressed, from readily fraternizing with their Northern brethren, and from looking upon them in any other light than that of deliverers. Hence it shows itself scrupulously tender of their feelings and prejudices, and forbears to exercise its full rights, either as a sovereign or

as a belligerent, toward even the Rebels themselves. It concentrates not its energies on suppressing the Rebellion, and saving the life of the nation, but suffers its arm to be paralyzed by vain efforts to protect the constitutional rights of rebel States, and to provide for the well-being of the Union after the war is over.

This theory may have had some reason in its favor last February, perhaps even last March; but it is worse than idle now. Prior to the breaking out of the war, a majority of the people of nearly all the Southern States, very likely would have preferred the Union to secession, and, perhaps, had not secession been attempted, a majority of them would even yet vote against secession; but we only show our ignorance of the seceded States, if we suppose there is a majority of the people in a single Southern State, or even a respectable minority—except, perhaps, in two or three of the Border Slave States—that is prepared to aid in putting down the Rebellion by force of arms, or that would now even give their votes in favor of the Union. We really can count on no Union party in those States, or a party worth naming that really wishes success to the Federal arms. If the seceded States return to their allegiance, their government and politics will be controlled as now by the leaders and people who have made, and support the Rebellion. There may grow up a Union party at the South, after the Rebellion has been suppressed, but it will not find its nucleus in any Union party now existing. The old Union party in them is defunct, and *revocare defunctos* is impossible. Having declared their independence and founded a Confederacy of their own, which has successfully resisted all the power of the Federal government for nearly a year, State pride, interest, and even loyalty, as they understand it, naturally operate on the mass of those who would have preferred the Union should remain, and compel them now to throw in their lot with the Secessionists, and the Administration must treat the people of those States as substantially a united people.

As a question of *right*, no State has seceded or can secede, for no State has or can have any right to secede; but, as a question of *fact*, eleven States have seceded, and are practically as much out of the Union as if they had never been in it. In these eleven States the Rebels are the PEOPLE, and it is worse than useless to proceed as if they were only a faction. The Rebels are, whether we like

to own it or not, really rebel or revolted States, not simply individuals acting in their individual capacity. They are practically communities or provinces in revolt, not simply individuals in rebellion. They are the vassal at war with his suzerain. In the technicalities of law no State has seceded, and the theory of the government is sustainable; but as a matter of fact, the whole eleven are out of the Union, and constitute a confederated power, though as yet unacknowledged, and, God helping, never shall be acknowledged. We must rise above legal technicalities, and look at the facts as they are. The Rebels are not simply individuals, but communities in revolt, and warring against the legitimate sovereign, and it is as such it is necessary to regard them. The business of the sovereign is to reduce them by force of arms to their allegiance, or, if unable to do that, to recognize them as an independent foreign nation.

The Federal government has the right and is bound, if in its power, to reduce them to their allegiance, let it cost what it may, or whatever havoc it may play with our theories; but it must not flatter itself with the vain illusion that in this contest it has only a faction, or even a party, in the seceding States to deal with. It is the people of those States who are in rebellion, and who second their leaders with a zeal and energy, a unanimity surpassing any thing we see in the loyal States in support of the Union, and submit to toils, hardships, and sacrifices to which we have not yet proved ourselves equal. We honor the government for its respect for the technicalities and even empty formalities of law; but we should honor it still more, if it would rise above them, and look the facts as they are full in the face. These technicalities and formalities are wisely devised to restrain its action and limit its power in time of peace, or in the normal state of the country; but they embarrass it, they paralyze its arm, when it has to put down a rebellion of the formidable proportions assumed by that it has now to struggle with, and the sooner it abandons them, and deals with practical realities, the more easy will it be for it to suppress the Rebellion, and restore peace and constitutional liberty. The surest way of building up a Union party at the South is to put down the Rebels.

So long as the government proceeds on the supposition that the seceding States are still in the Union, it is bound

to treat them in their State capacity as loyal States, and to fulfil toward them all the constitutional obligations it is under to the non-seceding States. It cannot treat them as States in revolt, but must treat them as equal and loyal members of the Union. It must respect all their constitutional rights, all their State laws and usages, and exercise its sovereign, or even its belligerent rights, only in accordance with, or rather in subordination to them. Assuming them to be, as States, still in the Union, it can war only against individuals, and legally let fall its blows only on those who can be proved to be personally involved in the crime of rebellion. All others it must presume to be loyal, a hair of whose head it can touch only at its peril. This is a serious embarrassment to the government in its work of suppressing the Rebellion. It makes it afraid to strike the Rebel lest it should hit a Union man, and will bankrupt the Federal Treasury, when the war is ended, and the Union men, who will be numerous enough then, make their demands on it for indemnification for losses incurred during the war, whether losses occasioned by Federal or Confederate troops. The States having been declared not out of the Union, but loyal States in the Union, their citizens can prefer no claim of indemnity against them for damages caused by the Rebels, and consequently they will have the right to claim it from the Federal Treasury, which will be bound to pay it.

It might have been wise in the outset to set up the theory the Administration has adopted, for then public opinion was hardly up to the point of prosecuting the war on national principles. Public opinion had been so long debauched on the subject of coercing a State, that even we ourselves thought it prudent last June, when writing our article on *The Great Rebellion*, to seek a ground on which we could defend the war without asserting the right of the Federal government to coerce a State or the people of a State. But public opinion advances with the war, especially as the war assumes more and more formidable proportions; and experience already proves the inconveniences of the government theory. We are compelled by it to conduct the war on States Rights principles, and to respect and protect the constitutions, laws, and usages of the seceded States, and to enforce the Federal laws in their favor, even while arming and putting forth all our military strength against them. It obliges us to respect for rebels the constitutional

rights of loyal citizens, while they themselves respect no rights of the government, and seek by every means in their power to overthrow it. This is waging war at a terrible disadvantage, and imposing upon the loyal States a burden as unjust as it is intolerable. It is time, we respectfully suggest, for the Government to adopt and act on the principle that the Constitution exists only for the loyal, and that rebels, whether States or individuals, by their rebellion forfeit all their constitutional rights, and are placed at the mercy of the sovereign against whom they have rebelled.

The people of the loyal States must understand and feel that they are at war with the political PEOPLE of the seceding States,—so far as any such political people can now be said to exist,—acting illegally indeed, but still acting through their old State machinery, and under their old State organization and officers, not with a disorderly mob to be put down as we put down a mob or riot in one of our great cities. Such, indeed, the Rebels are in strict law; but practically they are States combined and acting as a single confederated power. It is this practical aspect of the case that should govern us in our war against them. To concede this, concedes or abridges none of our rights against them as rebels; for we have got beyond the twaddle about coercing a State, and it is now understood that we have as much right to put down a rebel State as we have to put down rebel individuals. States as well as individuals may rebel, and the sovereign has the same right against the one that he has against the other.

The war on the part of the Union is defensible only on the ground that the Union is supreme, and represents the sovereign authority of the nation. If we deny that the American people are a nation, and maintain that the constitution framed by our fathers is merely a league of sovereigns, we must give up the contest, and admit the right of secession. The question whether the United States are or are not a nation represented by the Federal government, is precisely the issue between the loyal and seceding States, and which the war must settle. We of the loyal States assert that we are a nation, and that the Federal government, though limited in its powers by those reserved to the States so long as they remain loyal, is yet a supreme national government, and all laws and treaties made in pursuance of its constitution are "the supreme law of the land," and override all State constitutions, laws, and usages. In this

national character of the Federal government is founded both its right and its duty to suppress the Rebellion, and the right and the duty are in no sense weakened by the fact that the rebellious party is a State or several States combined. Both the right and the duty are full and undeniable, if the Federal government be, as we maintain, a true national government.

We should, for ourselves, take little interest in the war, if it were waged on any but national principles, by the national government, for national existence, and the integrity of the national territory. We support it, and make all the sacrifices in our power to sustain it, as a war for national existence, against a rebellion that seeks to dismember the Union, and destroy our national life. This is what gives to the war its terrible significance, and justifies its demand for every sacrifice needed on every man who loves his country, and would maintain national life and national integrity. We do not believe the war can, and we have no wish that it should, be successfully prosecuted on any other principles. If it does not prove us a nation, if it leaves it to be maintained that we are simply a confederacy of sovereign States, however it may terminate, it will have settled nothing, and all the old sores will remain to fester and break out anew. We should gain nothing by putting down the Rebellion on States Rights principles, for the old pretension of the right of a State to secede would be strengthened rather than weakened, and we should have our old battles to fight over again.

As we look deeper into the controversy raging, we think less and less of the effort that has been made to prove that the secession ordinances of the seceding States were not the acts of the people of those States, but of a faction illegally usurping their authority. We deny not that the secession ordinances were, in some instances, perhaps in all, passed in violation of the State constitutions, and therefore are not by State law legally binding on the people of the several seceding States; but we prefer to regard that as a State question, to be settled between the citizens of the State and the authority that professes to act as the State. We prefer that the Federal government should regard these ordinances, even if informal, as in fact ratified by the general acquiescence of the people, and therefore treat the Rebels as rebellious States rather than as rebellious individuals. We prefer this, because it brings the controversy to a distinct

issue, and the war must settle once for all the question whether we are a nation or only a confederacy of sovereign States, and establish the nationality of the government without destroying its federal character.

If we are a nation, we have the same right, we repeat, to coerce a revolted State as an individual into submission. If we have not that right, we are not a nation, and the attempt to enforce the Federal authority over the people of any particular State, is, even if defensible in law, worse than useless. A Union which is only a confederacy is, in our judgment, not worth seeking to maintain; for its action will always be impeded, and its wise and salutary administration prevented, or at least embarrassed, by threats of dissolution from one section or another. We have seen it for the last thirty years. The Northern States have been more attached to the Union than the Southern, and more ready to make concessions for its preservation. Southern politicians and statesmen have known this, and for thirty years have gambled on it. Whenever we showed a disposition not to vote to suit them, or to persist in a policy which, though constitutional, did not happen to meet their approbation, they have resisted us with threats to nullify the acts of Congress, or to dissolve the Union. They have at last attempted to carry their threats into execution; and now we wish it settled once and forever, whether the pretended right of nullification or of secession is to be continually held up, *in terrorem*, to compel the sincere and earnest lovers of the Union to forego their rights, and stultify their own judgments. Ever since we were old enough to vote, we have voted under threats of the dissolution of the Union, if we did not vote to please the slaveholding South. We have borne this long enough. We want an end put to those threats, and to know, once for all, which is sovereign, the State or the nation. We wish, therefore, the issue distinctly made up, so that it shall be decided by the result of the war, whether we are or are not a sovereign nation, with the right of protecting itself against dismemberment or death.

Such being our view of the case, we are anxious that this war should be conducted on strictly national principles, against insurgent States, as well as against insurgent individuals. So conducted, the success of the Federal arms will settle the question forever, and put an end once for all to the threats of dissolving the Union. It will also relieve the Administration from numerous embarrassments occa-

sioned by the rights of real or pretended Union men, and the necessity of protecting the constitutional rights of States practically in revolt. It will much simplify the contest, for it at once, as against the Union, abrogates all constitutions, laws, and usages, in the case of such States, and reverts their citizens to their State government for redress in case of Rebel injuries. It would also enable the Administration with less seeming impropriety to treat the Rebels as belligerents, which they in fact are, and to arrange for a mutual exchange of prisoners according to the usages of civilized warfare. Such exchanges would affect none of our rights toward the Rebels that we shall ever seriously insist on exercising. All engaged in the war are rebels and traitors, but nobody supposes that, if the Government triumph, and the Rebels submit, there will be any executions for treason of persons taken in arms. They will be treated as prisoners of war, and released when peace is made. We should have to depopulate the seceding States if we proposed to shoot or hang all Secessionists. We expect the men now in war against us, if beaten, will return to their duty as American citizens. Instead, then, of standing upon a technicality unworthy of a great and strong power, and especially instead of going through the empty formalities of swearing and then releasing them, it would be much better to exchange the Confederate soldiers that fall into our hands, for our own who have the misfortune to fall into the hands of the Rebel authorities. It will prejudice no right that we need insist on, and will present no obstacle to a final settlement.

But while we are willing to accord the Rebels in certain respects the rights of belligerents, we insist that the war shall be prosecuted on war principles, and that we avail ourselves of all the advantages allowed by civilized warfare. We insist that, while we observe toward the defenceless, or those who have ceased to resist, the tenderness and compassion of Christians, we shall conduct the war as a war against public enemies, not against friends, and inflict, till they submit, the surest damage in our power on the revolted States and their supporters.

Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.

We must understand that to-day our business is *debellare superbos*; to-morrow it may be *parcere subjectis*; but to-morrow will take care of itself. We need not fear that, if

we bring home to the revolted States all the horrors of war, we shall make them one whit more hostile to us than they now are, or more difficult to be reconciled to the Union after the war is over.

We wish the people of the loyal States to understand well that the people of the disloyal States will regard any show of forbearance, tenderness, or magnanimity on our part only as weakness, tameness, or fear of losing them forever as our customers. These things are thrown away upon them, and injure instead of serving the cause of the Union and reconciliation. The South will never believe in our sincerity and magnanimity till we have given them a sound drubbing, and proved ourselves the better men. Then they will respect us, and consent to live in peace and brotherhood with us. They take every advantage of us, and we must take every advantage of them, and force them by the damage we do them into submission. Nothing else remains for us. They will not submit, unless forced to submit; but when forced into submission and fully convinced that farther resistance is vain, they will, we doubt not, with far less difficulty than many imagine become reconciled to national union with us. They have great respect for power, and worship Force as a god. With them, as with all men in their stage of civilization, perhaps even in ours, the stronger is the better man, and to real superiority they will deem it no dishonor to yield.

If the contest end favorably to us, as it certainly will, unless we throw away our advantages, we shall lag behind no one in our efforts to make the terms of reconciliation easy; but we urge now the prosecution of the war with all of war's severity, and with all the energy of a free government and a brave and heroic people. Especially do we protest against any compromise. If we are beaten, as we may be, for the race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, we will submit to the victor, and take what comes. But we insist on preserving our dignity as men, our honor as States, and fall, if fall we must, with our principles. Let no man dare breathe the word "Compromise." The day for compromise has gone by. The man, be he President, or Secretary, or Senator, or General, who shall propose and effect a compromise, will stand branded in history as an infamous traitor to his country and to humanity. The rights of this nation we hold as a sacred trust from our fathers to be transmitted inviolate to our posterity. We

have no right to barter them away, or by our cowardice and want of manhood to suffer them to be wrested from us. Private wrongs we may compromise or forgive, but not wrongs to our country.

While we write, the President's Annual Message to both Houses of Congress reaches us, and we read it with eagerness. We cannot say much in its favor, and it does not comport with our duty to the Chief Magistrate of the Union in the present critical juncture of our national affairs to say much against it. Mr. Lincoln, in part, for the moment, represents the nation, and we cannot well stand by the nation without standing by him; certainly not, till it is clear that he is, through incompetency or some other reason, on the eve of betraying it. We believe him patriotic, conscientious, and anxious to do the best for the country in his power, and, although we regard his policy as far less bold and determined than that the danger that threatens us demands, we remember that he is placed by his countrymen in a position which for him is and must be one of great embarrassment,—of great difficulty and delicacy, and we are disposed to give to all his words and actions the best possible construction, and to make the most liberal allowance for what may seem to us low, narrow, defective, or tame in his mode of conducting the war for the preservation of our national existence. We are loyal to the nation, and will be loyal to the Administration, so long as it shall be loyal to itself.

The Message is comparatively short, and, though it can lay claim to no grammatical purity, or literary elegance, it is a plain, sensible, business-like document, not much above, nor much below what we expected. We believe the President is disposed to save the Union, but, in our judgment, he has no adequate conception of the conditions on which, and on which alone, it can be done. He is timid where we should wish him to be fearless, and fearless where we should be willing he should be timid. He is bold enough before loyal men, timid almost to shrinking before disloyal men. He is afraid to touch with his little finger the "divine" institution of slavery; but has no fear of sacrificing any number of freemen and any amount of national treasure, to prevent a hair of its head from being singed. He would seem to regard it as a more imperative duty to keep the Border Slave States nominally in the Union, than to suppress the armed rebellion against it.

We fear that he has not emancipated himself from the old slavery domination, or risen above the old notion that the government must be administered in the exclusive interest and according to the wishes of Southern slaveholders. The rights and interests of millions of freemen he apparently counts for nothing in comparison with the duty of protecting the doubtful rights of slavery. This is sad, and, if persisted in, will render all the efforts and sacrifices we have made, or are making to save the Union, worse than pure loss.

We tell the President, and we desire to do so with all possible respect, that even the restoration of the Union on a policy shaped expressly to conciliate "Ole Kentuc'," or the slaveholding interest of any of the Border States, would now, if possible, not be worth effecting. Why was he elected to the Presidency? Why have we of the loyal States placed him in his present elevated position? No man better than himself knows, that we voted for him, at the risk of civil war and the dissolution of the Union, because we were determined that the slave interest should no longer shape the policy and govern the councils of the nation. It was this determination on the part of the freemen of the East, the North, and the West that took Mr. Lincoln from his law-office, and made him President. He was not elected to preserve slavery, nor to abolish slavery; but he was elected to emancipate the administration and the Republic itself from the domination of the slave interest; and we protest, therefore, in the name of those who elected him, against the perpetuation of that domination, even though confined to the slave interest of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. Slavery may or may not continue to exist, but we insist that the government shall cease to be administered in its interest, or under its dictation. The government must be administered in the interest of freedom and loyalty. If not, better yield to the Secessionists at once, and take Jefferson Davis for our President. We will not pour out our blood and our treasure, we will not send the flower of our youth and the glory of our manhood to rot in camp, die on the battle-field, or languish in Southern dungeons, for the sake of bringing the Union again under the domination of Southern slaveholders, and of exposing ourselves to be again insulted and bullied, or cheated out of our rights and our manhood by the Davises, the Toombses, the Hammonds, the Masons, and the Slidells.

We have resolved that our government shall be emancipated, whatever becomes of slavery and its worshippers. This is what we beg the Administration to bear in mind. We should be glad to believe that the President has not forgotten it, and that he is prepared to assert his own independence of the slave power, and that of the Government, for we tell him never will there, and never can there, be a reunion of the separated States under the domination of the slave interest.

We have no concessions to make to Kentucky, or to any other Border Slave State. The slaveholders have rebelled against the Union, and by so doing have absolved the Union from all obligations to protect slavery in either loyal or disloyal States. If Kentucky, the native State of the President, will not remain in the Union, unless permitted to dictate its policy, and make her slave interest its law, then let her be treated as a rebel State, and coerced as we are coercing the other rebel States into loyalty. We will no more consent to allow Kentucky than South Carolina or Georgia to impose her slave policy upon the Government. We of the free States intend to assert and maintain our own freedom, our own rights and dignity, and to be something else hereafter in the Government of the country than the mere lackeys of Southern slaveholders. We are fighting to vindicate our own rights, and our government must recollect that in this contest it is bound to take our rights, the rights of freemen, into the account. We wish the Administration to consider that we of the free States have accepted the issue tendered us, and that we will spend our last dollar and our last life before we will suffer this Union to be sacrificed in the vain endeavor to preserve the infamous institution of negro slavery; and before the slave interest shall ever again shape the policy of the Government, or dominate in its councils. If Mr. Lincoln has not learned this yet, he will, perhaps, learn it before the close of the present session of Congress. We have been in bondage to the capital invested in slavery long enough; we have long enough cowered and crouched under the lash of slaveholding dictators, afraid even to say our souls are our own, lest we should endanger the peace and safety of the Union. We will do it no longer. By the memory of our fathers who fought at Bunker Hill, Saratoga, Monmouth, Yorktown, whose blood yet courses in our veins, we have sworn we will not. Timid, weak, narrow-minded, pettifogging politicians

may quake at these words, or shrink from them as meaning something, but their day is gone. There is a spirit rising in the free States, that does not believe in "the divinity of slavery," or that all other interests must be sacrificed to it; and, what is more to the purpose, that *does* believe in freedom, that it is right, is law, and before it slavery must and shall give way. Events march, as we said three months ago, and they are marching with fearful rapidity. We are all carried along with them. To many of us what six months ago seemed the extreme of rashness now appears timid, tame, and cowardly. The Government, if it would guide events, must march with them. The President, we perceive, marches, slowly indeed; but, nevertheless, he marches, and his message proves that he is at least some steps in advance of where he was at the close of the extra session of Congress. He will probably march at a more rapid pace by and by, and perhaps catch up with public opinion.

We do not want the war waged or prosecuted for the abolition of slavery; but we do insist that it shall not be waged or prosecuted for the protection of slavery, and its reinstatement in power. Slavery has rebelled, and let it pay the forfeit. We have no confidence in the wisdom, we had almost said, in the loyalty, of the statesman who insists that the Government has any further obligation toward it now, than to brush it aside, if found in its way. We do not suppose the President is any more favorable to slavery than we are, but we do fear that he does not perceive that he is under no obligation to protect it, and that with less assumption of extraordinary power than he has assumed in arresting and incarcerating persons suspected of disloyalty without form of law, or bringing them to a speedy trial, a power we do not deny him, he might treat the relation of master and slave as *non avenue*, and declare the slaves free men. Why can he not be as bold against slavery as against freedom? Let him go as far in the slavery question, as he has gone in many others, and he will satisfy the loyal people who are now in arms to save the life of the nation. Let him make an end of the "Eternal Nigger," and feel, think, and act as the chief magistrate of a free people, and we shall be content, and not only support him as our chief magistrate, but do so with cheerfulness and alacrity, with confidence and hope that our sacrifices will not be in vain.

What the President says on the comparative merits of the two systems of labor, namely, slave labor and hired labor, is very true, and well worth considering, although we are no friends of the system of large industries, which collects together in workshops, factories, or mills, dense masses of operatives, the system now generally adopted in England, France, and our own manufacturing States. We believe that system unfavorable both to the physical and to the moral well being of the operative classes. But this is no time for such questions. We must prove that we are a nation, and have a national government, before it can be profitable to raise or to discuss them. We thank the President, however, for his suggestions.

We are not altogether pleased with the spirit and tone of the Message on our foreign relations. The President, we think, might have spoken in terms which would have inspired more confidence in the continuance of friendly relations with foreign powers. What he says, coupled with the measure of sending certain gentlemen abroad, known to be either favorable to slavery, or at least favorable to the restoration of the slave interest to power, to exert an influence on foreign nations, cannot fail to cause uneasiness in many minds, as tending to confirm the suspicion already entertained, that some members of the government contemplate an early settlement of our difficulties by a compromise, and seek to force the people of the loyal States into acquiescence by displaying before them the danger of a foreign war. There are those who believe this policy is seriously entertained, and they go so far as to say that these members would not scruple even to provoke a war, especially with Great Britain, as the surest and speediest way of restoring peace either by a liberal concession to slavery, or by an amicable separation of the republic into two mutually independent nations. Suspicion even names the individual who is the prime mover of this suicidal policy. But God grant that the suspicion prove unfounded, or insure its early defeat.

There is no danger of a foreign war, or of foreign intervention in our affairs, unless we ourselves provoke it. Great Britain has declared her policy of neutrality and it will take much to drive her from it. We have had enough of this dragging in of Great Britain whenever some great concession to slavery was to be made, or some new crime against freedom was to be committed. We have not for-

gotten the annexation of Texas which Mr. Calhoun induced us to favor, by personally assuring us that he had proof positive that Great Britain was about to take possession of that State as a British Colony. We have grown wiser since, and we choose to confide in the good-will and loyal intentions of the English people and government, who have nothing to gain by seeing us cease to be a great nation, a strong and prosperous people. We expect and ask no favors of England, but we do wish her neutrality, and that, we think, we may be sure of, if we treat her with common fairness or common decency. We trust our Government will not try to raise up any additional enemies, and that, while respecting all the rights of foreign powers, it will put forth all its energy to crush with as little delay as possible the Southern Rebellion, and restore peace to our bleeding country, and gladden the hearts of freemen and the lovers of constitutional liberty throughout the world.

ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *Our Nineteenth Volume.* It was announced at the conclusion of our last Volume that we should commence with this number a new policy in the business arrangements of this Review. We gave notice of our intention of strictly adhering in its future publication to the Cash principle. We did this, however, not solely to secure ourselves against pecuniary losses, but also to give those who have heretofore patronized it, if dissatisfied with the manner in which we have conducted it, a fair opportunity of discontinuing their subscriptions without being obliged to write those ungracious words, "Stop my Review." Many persons, if the Review were sent to them, would continue to take it through a very natural reluctance to order its discontinuance, although really wishing to receive it no longer. The new plan relieves all persons of this class of their good-natured embarrassment, and confines the circulation of the Review to those who take sufficient interest in it to order it and to pay for it, and to them for no longer a time than they choose, whether it be one number, or a current volume. This is treating them fairly, and places the business relations between us and our readers on its proper footing.

Our losses since the commencement of this Review have been great, but we mean not to imply that we have not for the most part of the time received a generous support from the Catholic public, especially from the Bishops and Clergy, for which they have our cordial thanks. Whether the like support is to be continued for the future or whether it is to be mainly withheld, will depend entirely on their own free-will. We make no claim of right to it, and wish, if, it is given, it

should be freely given. We do not think that, if continued, the Review will hereafter be found less worthy of their support than it has been heretofore, at least it shall not be, if it is possible on our part to prevent it. Yet it is due to them and the public generally to say, that some changes in the character of the Review, or rather in the mode of conducting it hereafter, will be made. The contents of the Review will be less special, and be at least more general in their character, such as may be read without offence by candid and intelligent readers who are not of the same religious communion with its Editor. More space will be given to political and national questions, and even in theological discussions the aim will be not controversy in its ordinary sense, so much as to present Catholic doctrine on its positive side, as the affirmative truth, without taking any special pains to point out the opinions it may contradict. Indeed an effort will be made to ascertain whether it be possible to break down the wall which now separates the Protestant and Catholic reading publics into two distinct publics, and to some extent unite them in one republic of Letters. To this end the study, in all cases, will be to avoid treating the Church as a sect, and to present truth in its catholic, not in its sectarian or negative aspects.

The Review will carefully abstain from all mere party politics, but will always take its stand on the side of the Union and the country, and be thoroughly American. It will support the war for the integrity of the nation as long as it shall last, and will defend all measures judged to be necessary for prosecuting it with vigor and success, and for guarding against the breaking out of any future war of the same or a similar sort. It will not be abolition in the vulgar sense of that term, but will never defend slavery, in any form or for any class of persons whatever, and it will let pass no opportunity of opposing it, whenever there is the least chance of opposing it with any advantage. In its spirit and tone it will be free, and earnestly defend for all men without distinction of race, nation, or complexion, the largest liberty compatible with the maintenance of civil government and social order.

Heretofore on theological questions our articles have, for the most part, been submitted to theological revision and censorship before publication; hereafter they will not be so submitted. We shall write according to our own honest convictions, and publish our articles as we write them, simply holding ourselves responsible, after publication, to the proper authorities for any abuse we may make of the freedom of the press guarantied to us by the constitution and laws of our country. Each number as it appears will be sent to Rome, and any corrections of any sort the Holy See may require or suggest will be most cheerfully made, and at the earliest opportunity, for we recognize her full right to teach and to govern the Church. Objections to our views from other quarters will be listened to with respect, will be carefully weighed, and acknowledged whenever in our judgment they seem valid, or conclusive against us. We trust we shall always prefer truth to our own opinions, and be grateful to every man, in whatever spirit he may do it, who helps us to correct our errors.

We wish it to be distinctly understood, that the Review resumes the character expressed in the title "*Brownson's Quarterly Review*," and that nobody but its Editor is to be held in any sense responsible for what may be found in its pages. It is the organ of its Editor, and of no one else. Yet the Editor is a Catholic, a firm, conscientious, and

devoted Catholic, and, though he may not accept as Catholic all the traditions of Irish, French, German, Italian, or even Baltimore Catholics, he accepts without equivocation or reserve Catholic Tradition, and will in no case knowingly deviate from it, or run counter to it. His main purpose in his theological and philosophical essays will be to show the harmony between Catholic dogma and modern civilization, especially between it and that advanced type of it the American people have it in charge to develop and realize in their national, domestic, and individual life. Notwithstanding the dark clouds that lower over the American Union, we have hope in the Republic, and believe in the civilizing mission of the American people, and to that mission what remains to us of life is unreservedly devoted, both as a Christian and as a Patriot.

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2. *Sermons preached at the Church of St. Paul the Apostle, New York, during the Year 1861.* New York: VAN PARYS, HUGOT & HOWELL. 1861. 12mo. pp. 845.

WE welcome this volume of Sermons not only as the first-fruits of a rich literary harvest we expect from the new Congregation of the Paulists, but for its own sake. It is a volume of exceedingly valuable and interesting sermons, suitable alike to the pulpit and the closet,—such sermons as are always wanted and seldom met with. They are plain, practical, direct, and, as our old people were accustomed to say, *searching*. In reading them one forgets the proverb, “Dull as a sermon.” They are not dull; they are full of life, freshness, energy, and hopefulness. One feels that their authors are live men, men in earnest, men who believe and love the religion they profess, and are bent on doing all in their power to make it believed, and loved, and practised. They are addressed by Catholics to Catholics, but they may be read without offence, and with profit, by all earnest-minded men who are aware that they have souls, and souls to be saved, whatever their special communion. They are courageous sermons; they attack actual vices where they are, and as they are, without fear or favor. They strip from sin all its disguises, and show no more respect for it in high places, than in low places; in the saloon, than in the garret or cellar; decked in satins and furs, than clad in rags and dirt. We thank the authors for the valuable present they have made us, and we commend these admirable and useful sermons with all our heart and soul to the public, and to the whole public, as sermons full of truth and unction, which no one can read without instruction and profit, without new insight into his own heart and condition, or without acquiring new love for religion, and forming a new and firmer resolution to obey it even unto death.

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3. *Monumenta Vaticana, Historiam Ecclesiasticam Sæculi xvi. illustrantia. Ex Tabulariis Sanctæ Sedis Apostolicæ secretis excerptis, digestis, recensuit, Prologomenisque et Indicibus instruxit* HUGO LEMER, SS. Theologiæ et Philosophiæ Doctor, Presbyter Varniensis, Missionarius Apostolicus. *Una cum Fragmentis Neapolitanis ac Florentinis.* Friburgi: Herder. 1861. 8vo. pp. 504.

“THESE MONUMENTS of Ecclesiastical History,” says the Publisher’s Circular, “extracted from the copies of the secret archives of the Holy

Apostolical See, and arranged in chronological order, regard chiefly the commencements and progress of the so-called Reformation of the sixteenth century, and refute current errors touching the traditions of the Church which repose on immutable principles.

"The Documents now published are either instructions of the Popes or of their Secretaries of State for the Legates and Nuncios of that period—Polus, Verallus, Rorarius, Ferro, Contarini, Santa-Croce, &c.,—monuments of Christian diplomacy which never separates the wisdom of the serpent from the simplicity of the dove, or memorials, articles of conventions and advices, or, finally, the relations of the Nuncios from different countries of Europe—immeasurably preferable to the well-known Venetian ones—which begin with the year 1521, and originate especially from Aleander, Campeggi, Vergerio, Morone, Mignanelli, and others."

The volume has but just reached us, and we have had no time to examine its contents, written for the most part in the Italian of the sixteenth century; but we risk nothing in asserting their deep interest and inestimable value for the history of the epoch to which they relate. We shall in the Essays we are preparing on the History of the Reformation have occasion to make no little use of them, as well as to speak more particularly of their historical character and value. Even the material facts of the Reformation are as yet very imperfectly known, and a just appreciation of that great movement has hardly been attempted either by Catholic or Protestant. We doubt if a true, impartial, and just appreciation of the movement under all its aspects has ever been possible before our time, and we think it is only in what we see going on now in Italy, France, England, and our own country, that a key can be found to its real significance, to either its truth or its error, its good or its bad. Moehler in his *Symbolik* has set the example of the true way of studying it, and under the dogmatic point of view, he has much abridged the labors of his successors. We have some thoughts, not precisely hackneyed thoughts, on its character and place as a world-movement, that, if our eyes and the times permit, we hope one day to be able to digest and give to the public.

The error, the great crime, of the Reformation, as we have elsewhere said, was in severing the development and actualization of the life of humanity from that of the Theandric Life of the Church, but we believe it more profitable to explain it by the good its authors aimed at effecting, than by their alleged evil intentions, base passions, or disorderly lives. He who studies it will, perhaps, be led to the conclusion that it originated not in a desire to break the unity of faith, but in an attempt to bring up, develop, and supply certain elements of truth, which Catholics had neglected or suffered to become obscure, and partially inoperative. These elements, always elements of the truth held by the Church, they took in an exclusive sense, and gave them a one-sided and therefore an exaggerated and a sophistical development. Their followers have always felt the need of integrating what they call the "doctrine of the Reformation" in a higher and more comprehensive unity. They have felt that, after all, they were severed from true catholic life, and have been and are dissatisfied with their position. We think no greater service could be rendered to religion than he would render, who should faithfully interpret the Church to Protestants on the one hand, and with equal fidelity interpret them on the other, to

Catholics. He would lay the foundation that is already laid by Jesus Christ and his Apostles, for reunion and peace,—not a forced reunion or a fictitious peace, but a voluntary reunion, and a real, solid and durable peace founded in truth and conviction.

4. *De la Richesse dans les Sociétés Chrétiennes.* PAR CHARLES PERIN, Professeur de Droit Publique et d'Economie Politique à l'Université Catholique de Louvain. Paris: Lecoffre. 1861. 2 Tomes. 8vo.

THIS is a work on Political Economy by an able, learned, and highly-esteemed professor in the justly renowned Catholic University of Louvain. We have had no time even to glance through its pages since it reached us, much less to study it, but the well-known character of its author, and two or three passages we have read, justify us in recommending it as a work of rare interest on a subject of vital importance in modern civilization. The main idea of the author, as we gather it, is the harmony in principle of Catholicity and the wealth and material prosperity of nations, and his aim is to show that both spiritual and material progress demand, as their indispensable condition, renunciation, or self-denial. How far he has worked out his idea, and accomplished his aim, we hope hereafter to be able to examine and report.

5. *The Principles and Practice of Obstetrics.* By GUNNING S. BEDFORD, A. M., M. D., Professor of Obstetrics, the Diseases of Women and Children, and Clinical Obstetrics, in the University of New York; Author of "Clinical Lectures on the Diseases of Women and Children." New York: Samuel S. & William Wood. 1861. 8vo. pp. 731.

THIS is a work out of our line, but we may say that it has been well received by the Profession, with whom Professor Bedford deservedly holds a high rank, and the practice he recommends accords with the highest moral and religious principles. We have no room to speak now of what we have remarked as especially noteworthy, except his urging a more general resort to the Cæsarian Operation, instead of the murderous practice of destroying the child. We are satisfied that the Cæsarian Operation resorted to in season is far less dangerous than it has usually been represented, and may often be the means of saving the life of the child without seriously hazarding that of the mother.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1862.

ART. I.—*Liberty and Authority—the Catholic Church not Despotic—a Government of Law, not of Will.*

IN some remarks at the end of our last number, we made the following announcement :

“ Heretofore on theological questions our articles have, for the most part, been submitted to theological revision and censorship before publication ; hereafter they will not be so submitted. We shall write according to our own honest convictions, and publish our articles as we write them, simply holding ourselves responsible, after publication, to the proper authorities for any abuse we may make of the freedom of the press guaranteed to us by the constitution and laws of our country. Each number as it appears, will be sent to Rome, and any corrections of any sort the Holy See may require or suggest, will be most cheerfully made, and at the earliest opportunity, for we recognize her full right to teach and govern the Church. Objections to our views from other quarters will be listened to with respect, will be carefully weighed, and acknowledged wherever in our judgment they seem valid, or conclusive against us. We trust we shall always prefer truth to our own opinions, and be grateful to every man, in whatever spirit he may do it, who helps us to correct our errors.”—*January, 1862, p. 133.*

Singularly enough, this which we intended as a pledge to the Catholic public of our submission to the proper authorities of the Church, and as an assurance in advance that, though we might sometimes err, we would never become a heretic, has been construed, even in quarters where we expected better things, into a bold defiance of Episcopal authority, and the proud declaration that the editor of this

Review will recognize no court, but the court of last resort. It has seemed to many Catholics, and to some non-Catholics to be a step backward towards independence of all Ecclesiastical authority, and has disturbed not a few who would gladly be our friends. The interpretation given to our language, and the suspicions it has excited or strengthened, would not a little surprise us, if we had not lived too long in this world to be surprised at anything uncharitable, unjust, unreasonable, or absurd. We need not say, the interpretation is not ours.

The freedom of the press guaranteed us by the laws of our country, to which we alluded, ought to have given our readers the key to the sense of the first part of the announcement. Our laws leave the press free, but punish, or profess to punish, the abuse of its freedom. What we disclaimed, was the censorship, previous to publication, to which we had in theological matters hitherto, for the most part, submitted our articles. This previous censorship had never been exacted of us, and had been sought by us for our own instruction and protection. Neither Rome nor any local authority had ever required us to submit any article to theological revision before its publication, and not a few of our Bishops had requested us not to do it, for they had, they were pleased to say, more confidence in our judgment than in that of any theological censor we were likely to select. In the announcement we made, we were, we supposed, simply complying with their wishes, and assuming for ourselves the sole responsibility of whatever might appear in our pages. We had no thought of declaring or insinuating our independence, after publication, of the bishops or courts in the first instance, for we said expressly that we should hold ourselves "responsible to the *proper authorities* for any abuse we might make of the freedom of the press guaranteed to us by the laws of our country." The simple sum of what we announced is, we shall publish what we think proper, without censorship before publication, but shall submit to the censure, after publication, which the proper authorities may judge us deserving. We had never understood, that in a country like ours, where freedom of the press is guaranteed by the civil constitution and laws, anything more is required of any Catholic publicist. You may punish one after he has sinned, not before.

Members of Religious Orders are free to write and publish only *Permissu Superiorum*, but that is by virtue of

the special constitution of those orders, and the special vow of obedience taken by religious. Presbyters in strictness, especially in the anomalous state of the Church in this country, where there is no canon law, may not be free to publish anything without the permission of the Bishop; at least, it may not be prudent for them to do so, for he is their absolute master, and may remove them, or withdraw their faculties at his pleasure. But a layman and secular is under no obligation to ask permission to write or to publish. I, as a Catholic layman, am under only the universal discipline of the Church, and may write and publish what I please, only holding myself responsible to the proper authorities for anything I may write or publish contrary to faith or morals. There is no power in heaven or on earth that can lawfully prohibit me from publishing and defending Catholic truth, or prevent me from doing any good, through the press, in my power. I am obliged to ask no one's permission to do either. It is my right, given me by Almighty God in the charter of my manhood, or of myself as a free moral agent. Undoubtedly, I am bound to do either in an orderly, not a disorderly manner, but only because neither can be done in any other manner. I can do neither against the hierarchy, but I can do either without the formal permission of the hierarchy. But if I attempt to do either without such permission, it is at my own proper peril, and I must take the penalty of failure, if I fail. Of that penalty, the Ecclesiastical authority, the local authority in the first instance, the Holy See in the last, is the proper judge, and I cease to be a good Catholic if I refuse to submit to it.

It is said, though we have not seen it, that there is an old canon of the sixteenth or some earlier century, which forbids laymen and seculars to publish any thing on religion, without ecclesiastical permission. If there is such a canon we know not the circumstances in which it originated, or the special purpose for which it was promulgated. But be its intent what it may, it is not of force in this country, for the canon law has never been promulgated in the United States, and even if the canon were in force here, it would not affect us personally, for we have received the permission of the Bishops and Archbishops of the country, nay, their request to publish our Review, and that request or that permission up to this moment has in no instance been withdrawn. We say furthermore, and the venerable Hierarchy

will bear witness to the truth of what we say, that the request or permission was given without any express or implied understanding that our articles were to be submitted, before publication, to theological supervision or correction. Nothing of the sort was exacted of us, and when we removed to New York, its Most Reverend Archbishop refused to supervise our articles, and assured us that he wished them to emanate from our own mind, and that we should be perfectly free, in conducting our Review, to follow our own judgment and convictions. In either case, we are safe from all charge of rebellion or disorderly conduct; and we wish both Catholics and non-Catholics to take notice that, if we formerly submitted our articles to theological revision before publication, it was because we chose to do it, not because any ecclesiastical authority required it, nor because we supposed we were obliged to do it by the discipline of the Church. The Church gives us far more freedom than some Catholics imagine, and altogether more than is generally believed by non-Catholics.

As for defying the Bishops or local authorities, and announcing that we would submit only to Rome, the supreme authority, we have done no such thing. We have said nothing to warrant any charge of this sort. We say expressly that we hold ourselves "responsible to the proper authorities;" not, indeed, before publishing, but "for the abuse we may make of the freedom of the press." Who are the "proper authorities?" Of course the Bishops; for, if we had meant only the Holy See, we most likely should have written "proper *authority*," not "the proper *authorities*,"—in the singular, not in the plural. We say, also, in the article on *Catholic Schools and Education*, p. 82, "The Catholic cause can never be promoted by any anti-hierarchical action. Much good may be done that is not done by or under the direction of the hierarchy, but no good end can be obtained in opposition to it;" and we assign as a sufficient reason why we should not oppose, and why we should support Catholic Schools, the simple fact that our Bishops and clergy have manifestly decided in their favor. Does this indicate a spirit that would defy the Bishops, or reject their local authority? We defy not the Bishops, but we do defy the bitterest enemy we have to adduce a single instance, since we became a Catholic, in which we have refused obedience to the order of any local authority, Bishop or simple priest, within whose jurisdiction we resided. No Bishop or

Archbishop, in his own name, and in his official character, has ever yet brought the slightest charge against us, or breathed the slightest reprimand, for either our public or private conduct. One or two Bishops have made private suggestions to us, and one in a private letter berates us most unmercifully for the course we have taken in regard to the present civil war in which our country is unhappily involved, charging us with holding Robespierrean principles, because we demand the liberation of the slaves, and as being able "to see things only through New England spectacles;" but we considered him as writing, not in his official character as Bishop, but in his un-episcopal character of Secessionist, or Sympathizer with Southern slaveholders. Bishops and Archbishops may have criticized us in anonymous articles or unsigned editorials in their "Official Organs;" some of them, perhaps, have denounced us to Rome; but no one has officially complained to us personally of any thing we have published, said, or done. Consequently, however rebelliously inclined we might be by nature, we had and could have no occasion to defy the Bishops, or declare ourselves independent of the local authorities. Whether in any case we should do so, it will be time enough to inquire when the case is presented. Whatever else may be said of us, it cannot be said of us that we have ever yet refused to demean ourselves before authority, in the first or last instance, as an humble and docile Catholic.

Suppose our critics would read our announcement without any foregone conclusion against us, might they not find in that announcement evidence of something else than an uncatholic spirit? It was whispered all round, or openly talked in influential Catholic circles, that the Editor of this Review was growing "*shaky*" in his faith, and he found himself treated, where he had been a welcome guest, with the coldness and reserve hardly to be expected by an apostate. The non-Catholic press were almost on the point of welcoming him back to the ranks of Protestantism, and the so-called Catholic papers were nearly unanimous in denouncing him, or, at least, were laboring, and having the prestige of "Official Organs," were laboring not without success, to excite distrust of him in the minds of Catholics generally. Now, why could it not occur to his critics that in the announcement he made he meant to reassure the few friends he might still have in the Catholic ranks, and furnish them with an answer to his enemies? Be it that he says, while he submits to

the requirements or suggestions of the Holy See, the objections to his views from other quarters will be treated according to their merits; it must still be borne in mind that his submission to the Holy See is declared to be full and unqualified. "Any corrections of *any sort* the Holy See may require or *suggest*, will be most cheerfully made, and at the earliest opportunity; for we recognize her *full* right to teach and to *govern* the Church." What Catholic could say more, or what more could be required of or promised by the most humble and docile Catholic? We promise here all that our faith and duty as a Catholic can ask of us, and our promise must be held good till it is broken, or symptoms of breaking it are shown. Here, then, is the most positive assurance of full and unqualified submission to the Holy See, Mother and Mistress of all the Churches. In the next place, we promise to listen respectfully to the objections to our views from other quarters, in whatever spirit they may be urged, to weigh them carefully, and to acknowledge them, that is, yield to them, whenever they seem in our judgment valid, or conclusive against us. What more does Catholic faith or Catholic duty require of any one? Here is no defiance of the local authorities or refusal to recognize them, for we speak of "objections to our *views*," not of charges of uncatholic conduct, or breach of catholic discipline. In regard to these we had already acknowledged ourselves responsible to the proper or local authorities.

We may be asked why we referred to the Holy See at all, in distinction from the local authorities? We did it, first, because it is our duty to submit to the Holy See, and second, because we wished to assure our readers that we knew, and were prepared to perform our duty. We distinguished the corrections required or suggested by the Holy See from objections proposed against our views from other quarters, first, because such distinction is proper in itself; second, because we wished to remind those who in the newspapers were cavilling at us, and misrepresenting us, that we should treat their objections with the respect due to their intrinsic merit, but should not take them as the voice of authority, to which, on our allegiance as a Catholic, we were bound to submit; and thirdly, because we did not wish to confirm non-Catholics in their false notions of Catholic authority. We also did it, because our enemies had themselves, without summoning us before the local tribu-

nals, or giving us personally any notice of charges against us, lodged their complaints against us directly at Rome. We only recognized and accepted the Tribunal before which they had summoned us to plead, and before which they were seeking our condemnation. We did nothing more than they made it necessary and proper for us to do. Moreover, we had received assurances from Rome that the Propaganda were satisfied with the promise we had previously given, to submit all our publications to the Holy See. As the pledge privately given had satisfied the Propaganda, we innocently supposed, if given publicly, it would satisfy the Catholic community, even our accusers themselves. The public statement was made with the knowledge and advice of the theologian, trusted by the Propaganda with the matter. We hope this explanation will prove satisfactory to all who are willing to be satisfied, and convince those who secretly try to get condemned at Rome, a man who is wearing his life out in the cause they profess to have at heart, that Rome acts with deliberation, and with a sense of justice.

We know Rome was displeased with some remarks we made on the temporal sovereignty of the Supreme Pontiff, but before learning her displeasure, we had announced that the discussion of the subject would not be continued in our pages. With the assurance that we would not reopen the discussion, and that we would make any explanations, modifications, or retractions the Holy See might exact, the Propaganda expressed themselves satisfied. Subsequently, a list of charges was lodged at the Propaganda against us, not one of which, as stated to us, was true; but on the reception of a letter from us previously written, the Propaganda threw them out, and wrote our Archbishop to tranquilize his mind as to our Catholic dispositions. These things we should not have publicly referred to, if our promise of submission to the Holy See had not publicly been made a charge against us, and tortured into a proof of our un-Catholic and rebellious disposition. We refer to them in our own defence, and if they are displeasing to our enemies, we know they will not be so to our friends. We refer to them also that we may bear publicly our testimony to the fair dealing and honorable course of the Propaganda, and express our full confidence, that the humblest Christian, when his case is fairly represented at Rome, may be sure of having substantial justice done him. Rome is less hide-bound than some of our meticulous Catholics.

But why are we bringing any of these questions before the public at all? We are too obscure an individual for the public to take any interest in what affects only our personal interest or reputation, and it imports little to the Catholic or the non-Catholic community, whether we can or cannot defend ourselves. We know all this, and if we had no purpose beyond our personal vindication, we should be silent. But we have undertaken to prove to our non-Catholic countrymen, both by our words and our example, that they wrong our Church when they pronounce her a despotism, and her communion the grave of thought and freedom. Because we have expressed ourselves with more freedom and independence than they suppose she allows, they are inferring that we are shaking in our Catholic faith, and some of their journals are representing us as dissatisfied with the Church, and not unlikely to follow the example of our friend Dr. Forbes. Now, we wish to disabuse them. We wish them to regard us as a staunch, uncompromising Catholic, for we should be ashamed to be anything else; and we wish to convince them, that the freedom and independence we manifest, and which they approve, are not anti-catholic, are not uncatholic, but really and truly Catholic, and in strict accordance with the free and large spirit of our holy religion. We thank their journals for the kind manner in which they have latterly spoken of us, and especially the *Illinois Teacher*, for correcting a very common mistake about us, which the Catholic journals, taking their cue from the *New York Herald* and kindred prints, treat as no mistake at all, and when friendly to us, excuse on the ground of our former Protestantism, and when hostile, reiterate as a fixed and condemnatory fact; but we cannot accept any personal compliments at the expense of our Catholic character. It is not that we are uncatholic in the things they approve, but that they in those things see something of real Catholicity. They suppose us uncatholic, because they have a false idea of what Catholicity is, and do not recognize the Church when we present to their understanding her real character. It is not we who are departing from Catholicity, but they who, through us, are approaching and venerating her. A non-Catholic said to us the other day, "If all Catholics wrote as you do, there would be no Protestants." We verily believe that if Protestants really perceived the Church in her true character, not as represented by ignorant, narrow-minded, and unworthy

Catholics, they would readily abandon their Protestantism, and return to her as their Spiritual Mother. The greatest obstacle, in our judgment, to the conversion of the world to Catholicity, is not the bad disposition of those outside of our communion, but the ignorance and narrow-mindedness, above all, in modern times, the meticulousness of a large portion of Catholics themselves. We need a reform in the Church, not *out* of the Church, nor *of* the Church, but *in* the Church, so that the Church in her idea, and in her children, may be presented as truly catholic, before we can make much progress in the work of converting those outside.

A reform *in* the Church, and *by* the Church, was needed in the sixteenth century, and was effected in the Council of Trent. A reform, not of the same sort indeed, but a reform more especially touching the relations between religion and civilization, understanding by *civilization* all that can be included under the terms human organization and human culture, is needed by the Church, and in the Church now. For such a reform, on and by Catholic principles, we confess, we look and labor as the means of bringing back the world to Catholic unity, and advancing the cause both of religion and civilization, the Church and society. Here is in the main, no doubt, the cause of the hostility to us of a portion of the Catholic, and the friendship of the non-Catholic press, of the fears we excite in Catholics, and the hopes we excite in non-Catholics. In our judgment, the fears and the hopes are alike fallacious. Brought up in Protestantism, and acquainted with most of its forms, before coming into the Catholic Church, we know all it has to offer, and it has and can have for us no seductions. Having freely, and with our eyes open chosen Catholicity, and devoted eighteen of the best years of our life to its study, not wholly forgetting its practice, we can hardly be supposed to be ignorant of its principles, or of the lengths we can go without falling into heterodoxy. Err we may, inaccurate in our expression we sometimes may be, but we hope we know enough not to follow our errors so far as to get out of the orthodox communion, and have humility enough—though, we confess, we have no humility to boast of—to correct our errors when we see them, and to recoil from the abyss when we behold it yawning before us. The fears of our Catholic brethren are idle, for, if in a life now not short, we have given proof of anything, it is that of not

being obstinate in error, or in adhering to our own opinions. We are, we would fain hope, too old, and have devoted too much time, not wholly without success, to the study of philosophy to suffer our passions, which, though quick, were never strong, to blind our judgment, or precipitate us into heresy, and we are, and always shall be too unpopular to precipitate others there. There is no danger of our ceasing to be unpopular as long as we assert our honest independence, and there remain so-called Catholic newspapers in the country.

Equally unfounded are the hopes of non-Catholics. We renew no quarrel with them. A quarrel with them could serve no good purpose to them or to us, and we have got out of the mood of it. But, because we recognize their good dispositions and worth, and acknowledge they have much truth and valuable truth, they must not conclude that we are disposed to pass over to their side. They hold much truth, and could not live a moment without it, but they do not hold the truth which they have in its unity and catholicity, as we find it held in the Church. We may find fault with much that obtains amongst Catholics; we may think very little of the philosophy taught in our schools, and still less of the literary ability, the catholic spirit, and the foreign aspect and policy of our Catholic journals, even though professing to be "Official Organs" of the Bishops; but both Catholics and non-Catholics will always find us, when it comes to the test, staunch and uncompromising Catholics, liberal indeed, not in the sense of giving away half or all of our faith, but in the sense of catholic truth and catholic love, neither of which is narrow or exclusive.

The aims we have avowed, and which have excited fears on the one hand, and hopes on the other, are, we maintain, really and truly Catholic. The Catholic Church is not an arbitrary creation, but has her reason and her law in the reason and constitution of things. She is not a despotism, she is not subject to mere will and caprice, nor does she govern by mere will or caprice. She is herself under law, and in her action acts by law, and a law which has its origin and ground in the eternal reason and will of God. The Pope is not above law, but is as much bound by law as the humblest member of the Church, and though as the supreme governing power, he may enact both with or without the Council canons of administration, he cannot create any new faith, or make anything a moral duty not made so

by the law of God. The Bishops have each in his diocese no arbitrary power. The Bishop does not make the law; he is appointed to administer in his diocese the law of God, already known and promulgated. If either the Pope or the Bishop assumes arbitrary power, or to be as Cæsar claims to be, the living Law, he assumes to be what he is not, and usurps a power to which he has no right, and offends against the very law he is divinely appointed to administer. The Pope is a pastor, not a dominator; the Bishops are pastors, not dominators; the servants, not the lords of God's people. "The Son of Man came to serve, not to be served." "Let him that would be greatest among you be your servant." Hence the Pope, the Chief Pastor, calls himself "the servant of servants," *Servus Servorum*.

The Church defines, but does not make the faith. The faith is given her by Divine Revelation, and her office as Teacher is to keep intact the *Depositum*; to bear witness to it, and to guard it against error. Even in defining the faith, the definition is and must be the work, not of any one individual member or minister of the Church, but of the whole Church. The Pope is infallible speaking *ex cathedra*, but the Pope *loquens ex cathedra* is the Pope with his auditory, and his auditory is the whole Church. The single bishop has no authority to define an article or dogma of faith. He can teach nothing as faith which the Church does not teach, and in censuring our doctrine, he can no more censure it on his own authority, than we can his doctrine. His assertion never suffices to convict us of error or heterodoxy, and he must sustain it by the authoritative declarations of the Church, just as we should be obliged to sustain ours. If he requires us to believe any thing the Church does not teach, we are not bound to believe him. Hence, speaking of objections to our views from any other quarter than the Holy See, we recognize our obligations to listen to them respectfully, to weigh them carefully; but we acknowledge no obligation to yield to them, even if urged by a Bishop, unless the reasons he assigns, and the authorities he cites prove that he is right and we wrong. The reserve we expressed, even if extended to bishops, and to our own Bishop, although, as a matter of fact, we had, in expressing it, no reference to the bishops, would be strictly correct. No single bishop can define the faith, or condemn an opinion as heretical on his own authority; nor can all the bishops of a province, nor all the bishops of

a nation, assembled in plenary council, nor all the bishops of the world, without the Pope, the successor of Peter. There are many simple presbyters, who are entitled to far more weight in theological questions than the bishop; for it by no means follows that the bishop is a great theologian, or the best theologian in his diocese. Even the theological judgment of a layman is entitled to more weight than that of a priest or bishop, if he be a man more richly endowed by nature, and has superior theological learning and science. The grace of Orders confers the power of performing sacerdotal functions, which the layman cannot perform, but it is no part of Catholic faith or doctrine that it increases the quantity or quality of a man's brain, or the sum of his science and learning. Some bishops are great theologians, some can hardly be called theologians at all. The same may be said of some priests.

We speak thus far of doctrine. The bishop has authority to govern his diocese, but according to law, and not by his own arbitrary will. This authority he receives from God, through the Holy See; but it is restricted by the constitution and canons of the Church. He is not in his own diocese even, a despot; he is not even here to be obeyed as a General of Jesuits, but only as the shepherd of the flock, feeding and governing them as an officer of the law. If he teaches heresy, nobody is obliged to accept his teaching, but every one who knows it to be heresy, is bound to reject it. Even the laity may cry out against him, if they know he is teaching heresy, as the laity of Constantinople cried out against Nestorius, when he denied the Incarnation, and the whole palingenesiac order, by denying that Mary was the Mother of God, *Deipara*. In all matters of discipline, within the scope of his jurisdiction, he is to be obeyed, and respected as the court in the first instance. But there lies an appeal from his decision and from his court, if we are rightly informed, according to the present discipline of the Church, before as well as after his judgment is pronounced, to the supreme court at Rome. The bishop has, no doubt, some discretionary powers. He may, by dispensation, regulate the use of flesh-meat during the Lenten Fast, and his publication binds every good Catholic in his diocese, whether he carries the dispensation to the full extent of his dispensing power, or not. He can, no doubt, if he judges proper, assigning his reasons therefor, prohibit or interdict the circulation, among the faithful in his diocese,

of any periodical or newspaper, and good Catholics would be bound to refrain from taking it until the interdict was removed, providing he does it on the ground of danger to Catholic faith and morals,—not for political, or simply secular reasons, for his authority is spiritual, not temporal. He is a spiritual pastor, not in this country a temporal lord. In the exercise of his spiritual jurisdiction, our own Bishop may interdict us as editor and publisher of this Review, but only so far as relates to the discussion of questions which he judges dangerous to faith and morals. He could not oblige us to suspend its publication, because we are a layman, and its publication is our lawful business. He could only interdict the publication in its pages of the matters which he judges dangerous to the spiritual welfare of his flock. And we should be obliged to obey him so far, till he himself should raise the interdict, or we, by an appeal to the supreme court, should succeed in getting it raised. This is essential to order, and must be conceded, or the Bishop could not discharge his duty to the flock committed to his pastoral care. But even here he must be governed by the law of the Church, and has no right to interdict us for slight and insufficient reasons, from mere will, caprice, or personal dislike. He must do it on legal grounds, for legal reasons, or otherwise his interdict is of no force, and does not bind us.

The Bishop may excommunicate us, and so, *a fortiori*, may the Sovereign Pontiff. That would be bad; but the great horror manifested by non-Catholics at the exercise of the terrible power of excommunication, proceeds from their mistaking the real character and effect of excommunication. Excommunication is a severe chastisement, the severest the Church can resort to, but it is not a curse, intended to consign its subjects to hell. "Curse not," applies to ecclesiastics as much as to laymen. Excommunication is not a curse, nor is it intended to cut the excommunicated off from communion with God, and doom them to eternal perdition. If such were its design, nothing could excuse it. Its real meaning is separation from the *external* communion of the faithful, delivering the excommunicated over to "the buffetings of Satan *for the destruction of the flesh*." If the person excommunicated belongs to the internal communion, or the soul of the Church, the excommunication is, no doubt, an act of injustice, but does not sever him from that communion; for from that nothing but his own voluntary act

can ever sever him. Nothing but my own deliberate act can separate me from the love of God. It simply cuts him off from the external communion of the faithful, and debars him, till absolved, from approaching the Sacraments, a great damage certainly, but not absolutely irreparable. It was a much severer chastisement formerly than it is now, for it formerly shut out the excommunicated from all social intercourse, and was tantamount to the prohibition of fire and water by the old Roman Republic. Now it only debars from the Sacraments. It is still a severe chastisement, but it was and is intended only as a parental chastisement, for the benefit of the chastized. In itself, however, it is simple separation, and the anathema, in principle, is no more than some sects express by "withdrawing fellowship." The notion that many people have that the priest, if offended, can curse the offender, and that God will ratify the curse, and consign the cursed to hell, is a notion which finds no countenance in Catholic theology or Catholic discipline. The notion belongs to Paganism, not to Christianity. The Church devotes no one to the Infernal Gods, for she remembers the Son of Man came to save souls, not to destroy them; and all her chastisements, from the lightest to the severest, are parental and amendatory in their design, although, owing to the offender's free will and strong passions, they may sometimes fail of their effect.

Another notion is entertained by non-Catholics, that in our Church the laity count for nothing. But the Church, as the body of Christ, is the congregation of the faithful, and includes in one indissoluble whole both clergy and laity. In the Church our Lord has appointed some to be apostles, some to be bishops, and some to be presbyters. for the sacerdotal and prelacy, are inherent in Christ himself, in his twofold character of Priest and King, are essential, and must be expressed in the Church. The clergy are not the Church, but are functionaries in the Church. The Church is not for them, but they are for the Church; and they, if such there are, who suppose the clergy are the whole Church, by no means understand the nature and constitution of the Catholic Church, and fall into as fatal an error as they do who make the king, or the functionaries of the civil government the state. The clergy have an official character and position, and functions which no layman is capable of performing. The layman can perform no sacerdotal functions, but even laymen can perform prelatical

functions. Cardinal Antonelli is a prelate, and has a powerful voice in the Ecclesiastical government of the Catholic world, and yet, if we are rightly informed, he is not even a simple priest. Nevertheless he receives his authority from the Pope, who is a priest, and possesses the sacerdotal in its plenitude. The laity have, and as simple laymen, can have no sacerdotal or apostolical authority, and are usurpers when they assume to themselves sacerdotal or prelatical functions. The clergy, the hierarchy, including the several orders of the priesthood, have their rights and duties clearly defined, and no Catholic can lawfully usurp their rights, or place any impediment in the way of the discharge of their duties. But beyond this, in their simple character as men and Christians, all Catholics are equal. The Pope, as a Catholic, is bound by the same law that binds me, is under the same obligation to confess his sins to a priest, and has the same need of ghostly absolution.

The laity had originally a voice in selecting their pastors, and for a long time the Pope himself was chosen by the clergy and people of the city of Rome; and in most, if not in all, Catholic nations the laity as represented by the civil government, by the king or emperor, have even yet the right virtually of nominating bishops, though their confirmation is reserved, as it always was, to the Holy See. This power of nominating, or presenting candidates for vacant Sees, now exercised by sovereigns, was originally exercised by the faithful people themselves; but whether exercised by the temporal sovereign or by the people, it is a power exercised by the laity, and being exercised by the laity, shows that in the eyes of the Church the laity do not count for nothing. The influence of the laity has always been great, and when supported by the civil government, has sometimes proved preponderant, to the great detriment of religion and civilization. The part assigned the people, however, varies with time and place, according to the position held by them in the social and civil order. It was far more important before the Barbarian Conquest of the Roman Empire, than it was for many centuries after, owing to the ignorance and barbarism into which that Conquest threw the greater part of the world; and it will always depend very much on the degree of their progress in civilization, intelligence, moral culture, and civil importance.

The part of the laity among savages and barbarians newly converted will always be comparatively insignificant. Thus

the Jesuits in the *Relacions* of Paraguay managed not only the spiritual matters of their neophytes, but all their temporal matters, even to their buying and selling, and for this purpose established, under a Jesuit Father, an agency in Europe. The good Father failing in his business operations, it is well known, brought no little reproach on the Society itself. In barbarous times and countries, the clergy perform nearly all the civil functions of society, because they are the only educated and capable class, at least the best educated and most capable class. In those times and countries the clergy are apparently everything and the laity nothing. In Ireland, for the last three centuries, we have seen the clergy everything, and the laity nothing, at least apparently, because confiscations and penal laws had deprived the Catholic people of wealth and education, and reduced them to poverty and ignorance—a poverty and ignorance honorable to them indeed, because voluntarily incurred by adhesion to and defence of their old Catholic faith, nevertheless a poverty and ignorance which must be recognized as a fact. Their natural temporal chiefs either apostatized or were stripped of their estates by fines and confiscations, and reduced to the ranks of the peasantry; the clergy were the only capable class remaining, and the clergyman was for the poor but faithful people, not only the parish priest but the chieftain of the clan. Hence the little apparent importance of the laity in the Irish Church, and the extraordinary power wielded by their clergy over them. It was natural, inevitable, and salutary at the time, but cannot survive, and it is not desirable that it should survive the growth of the intelligence and civil importance of the Irish laity.

We may as well say here as anywhere, that the chief source of the distrust of us in Catholic ranks, is found in the fact that we do not believe that it is necessary to transfer to this free and educated country, usages which have outlived their time and their reason. We have, as an American, never been trained to the state of things these usages presuppose, and we believe that whatever temporary benefit they may have in regard to those migrating hither from countries where that state of things has obtained, they can here be only an impediment to conversions, and tend to confirm the prejudices against our Church already well nigh invincible in the minds of our non-Catholic countrymen. We know our countrymen well. They yield to no

people on earth in their reverence for the clerical character. Hardly will a priest, travelling in any part of the country, have reason to complain of insult, and we know from our experience that a man travelling as a minister, will always, in any part of the United States, be treated with special respect on account of his supposed sacred calling. Even since we have ceased to be a minister, we have received much consideration and many attentions, solely in consequence of our once having been one. It is only Catholics, for whom we were always, as we are, only a layman, who pay us no consideration on that account. No people more cheerfully than the American, will render an enlightened and filial obedience to the clergy, but they will obey them only as far as in obeying them they are obeying the law. They will never regard the priest, the bishop, or the Pope as the living law. They are not and will not be Cæsarists in religion any more than in politics, and do and will, in regard to the clergy, as they do in regard to their civil rulers, distinguish between the man and his office. The man they will reverence and esteem according to his personal intelligence and worth, but in his official character they will yield him cheerfully what is due to his office. To insist on more will be, with individual exceptions, to get less. Blind obedience, or obedience to persons in their unofficial character, is not in their nature, nor compatible with their views of moral right and moral duty.

We are not aware that our bishops and clergy exact any thing more than this, or that this is not precisely the sort of obedience that best pleases them. But, accustomed to a different sort of obedience from a portion of the faithful, some of them may, no doubt, fear that the Catholic who says that he will yield only this obedience, has in reality the seeds of disorder and rebellion in his heart. And this is the fear entertained of us. It is not that we are disobedient, it is not that we say any thing which as a Catholic we are not free to say, but they fear that the disposition which leads us to say some things we do say, may carry us farther, and that even our saying them may have a bad effect on others who have been trained differently. With regard to the first, the fear is idle, for we speak from a clear, well-defined, and fixed principle, not from passion or prejudice, and if the principle is sound, we are not likely to go farther than it legitimately carries us. With regard to the second, we will not pretend that there is no reason for it; but no trans-

ition from one state of things to another can ever be effected without more or less injury to some. If we are to wait before correcting a usage that has outlived its time, till it can be corrected without disturbing any one, we can never correct it at all. A usage just, inevitable, useful in its origin, when it has outlived its time, becomes hurtful, and the more hurtful the longer it is continued. The chief hostility to the Catholic Church to-day grows out of the fact that her children insist on perpetuating usages which have no longer any reason, and are repugnant to the real, not the false intelligence of the age. These usages will never be removed unless somebody calls attention to them, and demands their correction. Whoever does it will be sure to stir up a hornet's nest about his ears, and be regarded by many as a dangerous man, and even be dangerous to some, on the principle on which our Lord said, though his mission was one of peace to men of good will, "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth. I am come not to send peace, but a sword;" or, as the Apostle said, "To some, we are the odor of death unto death, but to the others, the odor of life unto life."

Let us illustrate our meaning. Last October, there appeared in the *Metropolitan Record*, an article criticising in rather flippant terms several articles in our Review, and bringing out certain views in regard to slavery and the war, assumed to be in opposition to views we had ourselves set forth. The article was supposed, and we believe justly, to have been written, dictated, or inspired by the Archbishop himself. We replied to it, as we judged proper, though in terms courteous and respectful to the supposed writer, differing from him in some respects, and defending him where we could against charges that had been preferred in the public press against his doctrine. For doing this, we were accused in no gentle terms by a Catholic journal in this city, of differing from *authority*. It took the article in the *Record* as authoritative, one that it was not lawful to criticise. Why was it considered to be the voice of authority? Simply because it was believed to be written by an Archbishop. Assuming it to be authority, then the aforesaid journal was able to turn all the reverence innate in the Catholic heart for authority against us, and to prevent all examination of our reasons, and to crush us, not by argument, but by the weight of authority, which it would be uncatholic to resist. Now it is this we complain of.

The Archbishop, if he wrote the article, would be the last man to approve of such an uncatholic course. In the first place, the article, if written by the Archbishop, was not written in his official character, and we find it reported from the Paris journals which criticised it with some severity, that he declares, not that he did not write it, but that he does not hold himself responsible for it.

The simple fact is, the article, if written, dictated, or inspired by the Archbishop, was done so in his capacity of journalist, not in his capacity of Archbishop of New York, and had just as much authority, aside from its intrinsic merits, as if it had been written by the ostensible editor of the *Record* himself, and no more. But even if it had been signed by the Archbishop with his own name, it could not have been an authoritative document, nor even a privileged document, for its subject matter was not privileged, or one in regard to which an Archbishop has any more authority than a layman. On every point touched upon, we had as a Catholic layman the same right to criticise him that he had to criticise us; and to bring in the weight of his Episcopal character to give force to his criticisms, would be simply taking an undue advantage of us. It is only the false notion with regard to the province of authority as distinguished from intrinsic reason and argument, entertained by a portion of the Catholic public, that gave him this advantage, and it is this false notion that we say should, for the interests of religion and civilization, be corrected.

The main argument in our article, and the article in the *Record* touched on matters in regard to which the Archbishop receives no authority by virtue of his Archiepiscopal office. They were matters which he can discuss only as a citizen and a publicist, and as a citizen and a publicist he stands only on an equality with ourselves, and has no advantage over us, save in his superior knowledge and ability. What he writes, like what we wrote, should be judged solely on its merits. Let the Archbishop publish in due form an Episcopal *Mandement* with his name and properly certified, and we will recognize it as authoritative, as far as an Archbishop by the law of the Church has authority. But when he writes anonymously, even if we know that it is he that is writing, we are under no obligation to treat what he writes as authority, and hold ourselves as free to criticise it, to point out its misstatements or its sophistries, in case it contains them, as though it were

written by an ordinary layman, merely observing the *bienséances* which, by the way, should in no case be neglected. If an Archbishop descends to write anonymously for a newspaper, and misrepresent me, shall I not have the right to tell him so, and correct his misrepresentation? If he uses wit against me, may I not, if I happen to have it, use wit against him? In a matter not privileged, in a matter where I have as much right to my judgment as he has to his, may I not do my best to refute him, if I think him wrong?

Now, it is not, as a general thing, the clergy, especially the bishops, who are wrong in this question of authority. No doubt they are human, and may not always be quick to rebuke those who assume more power for them than their office gives them; but the error is on the side of the laity, who understand neither their rights nor their duties, who pretend that every thing said by a bishop or priest is authority which must not on any account be gainsaid. We have heard of a bishop, and a very conscientious and devout bishop he was too, who sang in a private parlor "Jim Crow," and "Jim along Josey." Must these two negro songs be regarded, therefore, as approved by authority, and reckoned henceforth among the hymns of the Church? Even the very question is of doubtful propriety. But this is not the worst of it. These people who are so ready to allege authority against you when they fancy it makes for them, or chimes in with their convictions, passions, or prejudices, will be the first and loudest to resist it, or at least to clamor against it, when it runs athwart their own favorite notions, schemes, or wishes. We remember well when we had to defend the legitimate authority of the bishops and clergy against the very journals that now seek to adduce that authority against us. Let our bishops and priests attempt to persuade our Irish Catholics to distrust the Democratic party, notwithstanding we owe to it the terrible rebellion still threatening the life of the nation, to persuade them to support the Republican party, and to lay aside their hatred either of Old England or of New England, and you will find their organs saying, as they did in 1848, "We respect the clergy as long as they keep within their own sphere, and will obey them; but when they step out of it, we shall treat them as we treat other men." The obedience of men yielded on a false or mistaken principle can never be counted on. They may flatter you, but you must court and flatter them in turn, or in the time of need they will desert

you. When we found authority assailed, we defended it, and went to the extreme limits in asserting its rights; when we find authority used to crush out legitimate liberty, we in turn defend liberty, and if necessary will go to the extreme limits in its defence; for we love both, and will give up neither. In the one case as in the other we are alike Catholic, for we place obedience on the true catholic principle, a principle which harmonizes authority and liberty,—obedience to law, not to persons, to reason, not to mere arbitrary will or caprice. It is as much our duty to resist the usurpation of power by persons in authority, for that encroaches on the legitimate rights of authority, as it is to defend authority against encroachments in the name of liberty.

In a highly civilized state of society, where intelligence is generally diffused among the people, the laity necessarily and rightfully rise in importance, and do themselves many things which in a less advanced civilization, and where intelligence is only sparingly diffused among the people, are necessarily done by the clergy. Catholicity embraces both religion and civilization, and civilization is, where they are capable, the province of the laity. The evolution and application of the great catholic principles of civilization under the spiritual direction of the Sacerdocy, is the proper work of laymen, as follows logically from the acknowledged separation of the two powers, and the distinction of Church and State. Here is the sphere of the laity, and in this sphere they owe to the clergy only that general subordination in which the temporal is always placed to the spiritual. Here they work or should work for the same end as the clergy, for civilization does not stand opposed to heaven, but is related to it as means to end. How often must we repeat that the way to heaven lies through the earth, and that civilization is initial religion, or initial Christianity, as cosmos is initial palingenesia? The mistake into which non-Catholics fall as to the true Catholic doctrine on this subject arises from supposing that the practices of barbarous and ignorant ages, in which the people are nobody as to intelligence or political position, is necessarily the practice approved by the Church in civilized ages and nations, in which the people are educated and possess political rights and powers. The principles of the Church are as immutable as the God whose Word they are, and are the same in all times and in all places, but the discipline of the Church is variable according to the character and wants of different

ages and nations. Many things were just and necessary in the Middle Ages that would be wholly out of time and out of place now. Then almost every bishop was a temporal baron or a temporal prince, and joined a certain secular jurisdiction to his spiritual jurisdiction. Such an arrangement, however consonant to the spirit of the times, and however necessary and useful it was then, would now be manifestly absurd, especially in a republican country like ours, where no civil princes or barons are allowed. Other changes have been effected, and many others may be effected as social changes go on, and go on they will and must while the world lasts. In a country like ours, where—bating the negro slaves at the South—every man is a freeman, and the civil and political equality of all men is recognized as the basis of our civilization, and where means are adopted or in progress to give every child born into the Republic a good education, the Middle Ages, based on inequality and privilege, must in time wholly disappear, and the Church find herself, so to speak, in a new world. To be at home in that new world she must divest herself of all mediæval accidents, and accept the *régime* of equality and republicanism.

In this new state of things, the laity will and must acquire new importance, because they will have new capabilities, and, as the people, they must take the place of kings, princes, and nobles in other times and other nations. With the advance of civilization and diffusion of education the clergy cease to be the only educated class, or to possess any marked superiority over the laity, save in their sacerdotal character and functions. Their superiority will become less and less personal, and more and more exclusively official. They will always be officially superior, because the spiritual is in its own essence superior to the secular, and its representatives must always, in the very nature of the case, be superior to the representatives of the secular order. The laity in other respects will attain to equality, and have their equality recognized. Perhaps they will at times forget their proper sphere, and attempt to subordinate the spiritual. That, no doubt, is a danger to be guarded against. Still we apprehend that it will be found necessary to leave to laymen all that may be done by men not in Orders. There will be nothing uncatholic in this elevation of the laity, but, as we view it, a real advance in religious and social interests. Such a state of things would seem to us to be a fuller,

a more perfect realization of the Catholic idea, than has ever yet been realized. We look for the scene of this realization in our country, when the Catholic faith and the American order of civilization have been united, and each has the aid of the other.

That some Catholics, cleric as well as laic, do not see or believe this, and regard every change from what their fathers loved, and what they themselves have been accustomed to from their youth up, as a departure from perfection, and to be deprecated, we do not deny, and that this fact operates to confirm non-Catholics in their persuasion that our Church is wedded to a past order of things, and can neither accommodate herself to such a new order of things, nor give it her blessing, we are far from calling in question; but this does not disturb our convictions, or dampen our hopes. Men are prone to regard the old times as better than the present, especially after, like us, they have passed the meridian of life. The old man who brought us up constantly repeated in our ears the proverb, "Each generation grows wiser and wickeder than its predecessor." We understand well the feeling that resists all change, and up to a certain point we respect it. We by no means pretend that all change is progress. But the objection against Catholics of clinging to the usages of their fathers, of not discerning the signs of the times, foreseeing the storm, and providing against it, lies not specially against them. You find in every sect the same tendency, and in the Oriental sects the tendency far stronger than in modern Protestant sects, and in modern Protestant sects far stronger than among Catholics. Who does not know that in every sect, even among Unitarians, there is a conservative party which acts as a drag on the zeal of the younger and more ardent members? Go where you will, you will find a Reform party and a Conservative party, often at open war, for the two parties have their root in catholic truth. Catholic truth, however, rightly understood, reconciles them, by making the reform not a new creation, but an evolution of the past, the future the development of germs already in the past, so that a man may be at one and the same time a reformer and a conservative. The conservative Catholics, aside from their opposition to us on sentimental grounds, distrust us and our friends, because they think that we are disposed to cut loose from the past, and break the continuity of Catholic life. But in time they will understand us better. They

will see that what we seek has its root in the past, and is only its necessary evolution. They will see that we are seeking only to fulfil the past, not to cut ourselves loose from it, to carry out according to the demands of time and place, in submission to law and order, the thought, the idea, the intent, of those who preceded us, and will gradually cease their opposition, become our friends, and cheerfully and effectually co-operate with us.

Catholics are human, and fall like other men into errors common to the race. The mass of mankind see not why things need to change, why things may not remain as they are,—be to-day what they were yesterday, and to-morrow what they are to-day. They consider the men who labor to introduce changes in the political and social order, in general or particular civilization, as disturbers of the peace, disorderly persons, moved by an evil spirit, and deserving to be repressed by the strong hand of authority. They understand not that all life is in evolution, and the evolution of the germ in the seed, is the destruction of the body sown, and the life in the evolution passes from the old seed to the new plant. The life of individuals and of nations is the continuous evolution of the divine and infinite idea, of which the cosmos is the expression in what we call the natural order, and the Church in what we call the palingenesiac order, and the cessation of this evolution is simply death. Man, as Gioberti has well said, is crescent and progressive to the Infinite, in which alone he finds, or can find his complement, his fulfilment, his rest. We can rest, find repose only when we arrive at home, and our home is in the Infinite. Hence in this life we are on the way, we are travellers, *viatores*, seeking our true country, *patria*, *Vaterland*, which is Heaven. Hence, all the individuals and nations that assume that the evolution or progress is or may be completed in this world, that the end is here below, and count themselves to have attained this end, cease to live. Where there is no future, there is no progress, and where there is no progress there is no life. All history proves it. All nations in proportion as they cease to evolve the Idea, and assimilate it, stagnate and die. Witness India, China, Japan, Turkey, and all the barbarous and savage tribes and hordes of all ages. The principle is insisted on by all the masters of spiritual life, who tell us that not to advance in our interior Christian life, is to fall back, in other words, to die.

This great law of life is obeyed by Catholics far more

generally than it is understood, for they have, when true to the Ideal of the Church, the principle of life dwelling and operating in them, and they are carried forward, so to speak, *ex opere operato*. But not all Catholics discern the signs of the times, and recognize the successive moments of the evolution, each when it comes. The Jewish Commonwealth was organized on the promise of a Messiah to come, and the Jewish people believed in and hoped for his coming; but when he came they failed to discern him. "He came to his own, and his own received him not." It is just so in every age of the Church. All Catholics believe in progress, and in reality hope for it; but when it comes they see "no form or comeliness" in it that they should desire it, turn away from it, declare it no progress, no evolution of life, but an evolution of death, or of satanicy, and reject it, as the carnal Jews rejected the promised Messiah when he came, and crucified him between two thieves. There are always carnal Jews in the Church, always Scribes and Pharisees, who can discern the sky, but not the signs of the times. This, no doubt, is a damage, but we must hear them, do as they say, but not as they do. The Idea of the Church is divine and catholic, and by virtue of the divinity and catholicity of the Word, she is a living Church, and though often impeded in her work by the ignorance, obstinacy, or selfishness of individuals, she never ceases her labor, and subdues not only one generation after another of barbarians, but, what is more difficult still, one generation after another of Scribes and Pharisees; and it is only Catholic nations, and those nearest to them, and living to a greater or less extent in catholic truth and catholic principles, that are even in the secular order living and progressive nations.

What leads some Catholics and most non-Catholics into error on this subject, leading the former to oppose progress in civilization, and the latter to oppose the Church, is a mistaken notion of the Catholic doctrine of infallibility. The Church certainly has infallible science and infallible speech, but her infallible science pertains not to Catholics as individuals, whether they be cleric or laic. Infallibility is the privilege of no individual, not even of the Pope. It is a privilege of the whole Church, not of any particular part of the Church, and the Church is infallible only in her Idea, in the Word whose life is her life, only in regard to the law or principles. Her judgment in defining principles,

or in declaring the laws are infallible, but in practical matters, in matters in which her judgments depend on human wisdom and human testimony, her judgments are venerable, and in the order of discipline obligatory, but not infallible. She judges from the facts before her, but she cannot say that the facts before her are always the facts, and all the facts in the case. Some Catholics would seem to claim infallible authority for every bishop and priest, and that, too, in every thing, even in matters of business, such as buying, selling, and swapping horses, and to feel that they have the right to denounce you as resisting authority, in case you prefer to follow in such matters your own judgment. No bishop or priest claims such authority, or countenances such a mischievous exaggeration—an exaggeration which, however useful it may seem for the moment, or for a special purpose, is dangerous, and in the long run more or less hurtful, and not the least injury it does is the necessity it imposes on the sincere Catholic of contradicting it. The correction of an exaggeration often appears like denying the truth exaggerated, as the correction of superstition, which is an exaggeration, often weakens the hold of true religion. If the infallible authority of the Church had not been exaggerated, and made to cover particulars which must vary with time and place, no prejudice would ever have been excited against it, and the Church would never have been opposed by non-Catholics on the ground of her being a despotism, hostile to progress and the grave of free and manly thought. None of the earlier sects objected to her on any such grounds. They all objected on very different grounds, on the ground of her not being sufficiently conservative, and suffering an unwarrantable evolution to proceed in the explication and application of the principles contained in the Creed. So objected the Arians, the Nestorians, and, at a later period, the Greeks. The Reformers in the sixteenth century objected to her on the ground that she favored liberty at the expense of the Royal and Imperial authority; that she had departed from the faith, created new dogmas, new rites, and new canons, &c.—all objections to her on the ground of not being sufficiently conservative and stationary. It is only recently, only since the Catholic world has been to a great extent recast in the mould of a Society whose constitution was copied from the absolute monarchy of Spain, that the principal objections the Catholic has now to meet, have been seriously and extensively urged.

There is nothing that strikes the student of ecclesiastical history more forcibly, than the contrast between the liberty of thought and expression practically asserted by Catholics in the early and middle ages of the Church, and that which has been allowed for the last two centuries. In these latter centuries orthodoxy has grown meticulous, and the repression of error is far more studied than the evolution and application of truth. The political absolutism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries seems to have passed into ecclesiastical discipline. The consequence is that the Church during these centuries has hardly made any progress except in centralization, and in the transfer of obedience from obedience to law, to submission to persons. The mission of Genius in the Church has been rejected, or discouraged, and has been carried on, as far as carried on it has been, outside of the Church, without the conservative and sanctifying influence it would have had in the Church. Here is the reason of the new kind of objections that are brought against our religion. But for this change in discipline, which may or may not have been wise and necessary, we should never have heard of these objections.

We have spoken of the Church according to the Idea she is realizing in her life, her essential constitution, her universal law, and her discipline where she is in her normal state. In this country she is at present in an abnormal state. Our country is included in the number of Missionary countries, not in the number of those denominated Catholic nations. Our correspondence is with the Propaganda, not with the Cardinal Secretary of State. The canon law has not been generally introduced among us, and the power of the bishops is not restricted by its provisions. Each bishop is well nigh absolute in his own diocese, and the freedom of the second order of the clergy has no security but in the will and conscience of the bishop. Their position, legally considered, is one of absolute dependence, and that dependence, instead of being mitigated, would seem to be, if possible, rendered more absolute by the canons and decrees of our own Councils. The bishops can order a priest to any post he pleases, remove him when he pleases, and withdraw his faculties when he chooses, without being responsible to any one, but to God, for he can do it without being obliged to assign any reason therefor, or convicted of violating any canon recognized as in force. A slight step in protection of the second order, we confess, has been taken in some Prov-

inces, but it is only a slight one, and we believe is by no means recognized in all our Provinces. We are far from saying or from insinuating that any Bishop has ever abused his power, or ever will abuse it, but as long as he has despotic power, its influence will affect more or less unfavorably those subject to it, and we believe the spirit and tone of our clergy would be much elevated, their zeal increased, and their duties more cheerfully and more energetically performed, if they had the protection they have in other countries where the canon law is in force. That the Church approves the present order of things, we know is not true, because the very existence of canon law proves the contrary, and she evidently submits to it only as a present necessity, and as a provisional and temporary state of things. Of the necessity and advantage of it in the present state of things we are not competent judges, and, if we refer to the fact, it is solely to show our non-Catholic friends that they have no right to conclude from it any thing against our assertion that the government of the Church is a government of law, not a government of persons, or of arbitrary will.

The Church here is in an abnormal state in another respect. In all countries where the Church is established, if we except Judea, she has been introduced by foreign missionaries, and necessarily so. But in our country the Church has not been introduced by foreign missionaries converting the natives. As yet there have been properly no missionaries sent hither for the conversion of the American people, and the mission here has been to a Catholic population as foreign as the missionaries themselves. A small band of Catholics settled one of the original Colonies, but only the smaller part of their descendants have remained Catholic, and their missions were not missions for the conversion of the country. Aside from these, and the remnants of some French and Spanish colonists subsequently incorporated into the body of the American people, the Catholic population is composed of a comparatively recent migration hither of Catholics from all Catholic countries, together with their children born since their arrival. The missions have not been sent to a non-Catholic people, but to a population already Catholic. This presents an almost entirely different state of things from what has ever been in any other country. The Catholicity in this non-Catholic country is not the effect of conversion, but of the migration hither of a Catholic population, consisting of both clergy and laity.

Our bishops and priests are bishops and priests to an old Catholic people, not to a non-Catholic or newly-converted people.

The consequence of this is that the Church has here a foreign aspect, and has no root in the life of the nation. The Church brings here foreign manners, tastes, habits, a foreign civilization, and a foreign faith and worshippers, with foreign believers and worshippers, and whatever we may say, or whatever may be the case hereafter, the Catholic people in this country are as distinct from the American people, in all except their political and social rights, as the people of France, Italy, Spain, England, Germany, or Ireland. As yet it is idle to pretend that both are one people, living one common national life. It is no such thing. When the priest refers his people to their ancestors, he refers not to our American ancestors, but to an ancestry of some foreign nationality, and Catholics themselves distinguish non-Catholics as *Americans*, as in Ireland they call themselves *Irish*, and Protestants *Sassenagh*, or Saxons. They intrinsically feel that they are not Americans in the sense non-Catholics are. The fact, disguise it as we will, is that, though for the most part American citizens, Catholics in this country, speaking in general terms, are a foreign people, think, feel, speak, and act as a foreign population. An old American, like ourselves, feels, in the first and last moment of his intercourse with them, that, though he and they are of the same faith and worship, he belongs to a different order of civilization from theirs, has ideas on most subjects different from theirs—in a word, that they are not his countrymen.

We do not present this as their fault or as ours. It is nobody's fault, but it is, nevertheless, a fact, and a fact not without important consequences, and which cannot be regarded as having no influence on the conversion of the country, and none on the American civilization itself. In the first place, it enlists against the Church, in addition to the prejudices of non-Catholics against Catholicity, all the prejudices of natives against foreigners. Especially is this the case, when it is seen that the majority of those who enter as converts the Church, enter also and become naturalized in the foreign colony, and virtually forsake their own countrymen, without going out of their own country. In the second place, the bishops and clergy being educated and consecrated to the service of a people already Catholic, are not missionaries to our non-Catholic population, and do

not feel themselves called upon to labor specially for the conversion of the American people, and do little or nothing to that end. We often boast of the progress of our religion in this country, but we deceive ourselves. As yet the Church has made little or no progress in converting the American people, and what we call her progress is only the augmentation of the foreign colony. Catholic missions to the American people have not yet been opened. The missions in the country are to the foreign colony of Catholics settled here. No doubt a few converts are made, but they number, all told, we should judge, not a tithe of the perversions of Catholics that take place. Besides, as we have just intimated, the majority of these converts join the foreign colony, become far more assimilated to the foreign colony, than Catholic foreigners settled here do to the American people proper. So that, in reality, our Catholic progress consists not in Catholicizing, but in foreignizing the country.

Now, here is the source of much difficulty. The American who becomes a Catholic, but cannot consent to denationalize himself, in all respects save his political and civil rights, and who is determined to live, think, feel, and act as an American, do his share of the work in developing and advancing American civilization, finds himself in a most awkward predicament. He is separated by the civilization which he defends from his Catholic brethren, and by his religion, regarded as foreign, from his non-Catholic countrymen. Believing the civilization of the foreign colony inferior to the American, he is obliged in conscience to resist its extension, and believing his own countrymen heterodox, he is obliged to make war on their heterodoxy. This is the position in which we find ourselves placed, and the fire from the Catholic ranks is much more destructive than that from the Protestant ranks. As long as this state of things remains, the Church here is certainly in an anomalous and false position. Her own children are accidentally an impediment to her progress, and the more they multiply and the more influential they become, the more opposed to them become the American people proper, and the greater the danger to American nationality and civilization. The mass of the Catholic people see nothing, dream nothing of this, and rather wish to destroy American civilization, thinking their own much superior to it. The bishops and clergy, mingling chiefly with their own people, and sharing their

feelings, passions, and prejudices, either do not see it, or see no way of remedying it. Only non-Catholics and converted Americans, or such Catholics as have imbibed real American sentiments, see it clearly, and attach importance to it. But the matter really is one of grave consequence, and graver than is commonly thought, under the point of view both of religion and civilization.

We lay it down as certain that the foreign colony will not absorb the country, and though it may weaken, and to some extent corrupt, will not displace its civilization. If they who manage our Church affairs insist on keeping Catholics as a foreign body, our numbers will decrease instead of increasing, when emigration from Europe ceases. Our children, especially the brightest, most energetic, and the most ambitious, will, as they grow up, Americanize, and if the Church remains foreign, they will virtually, if not formally, abandon her communion, and when the old folks from the old country die off, Catholicity with us will die out. Here is the sad prospect before us. Yet few but foreigners or foreignized Americans can be bishops or priests. The real American, not being understood, and being though obedient, not obsequious, is distrusted and set aside, and a foreigner or the son of a foreigner, sympathizing heart and soul with the peculiarities of the foreign colony, is preferred. He is more flexible than the American, and therefore regarded as more manageable. We, for ourselves, weep over this. We cannot but raise our feeble voice in the name of the Catholic religion and American civilization against it. Are our own countrymen to remain forever debarred of the faith, the hopes, and the consolations of our holy religion?

Yet, however discouraging to the American who feels a deep interest in the progress both of the Church and of American civilization, this state of things may be, we must remember that it is only accidental, that it is abnormal and cannot last. It is no objection either to the Church herself, or to the necessity of the Catholic faith to the full evolution and realization of the American idea. We are not blind to the faults of our countrymen, whether North or South, East or West, and no man has lashed them more severely than we have. When we speak of American civilization, we speak of the type, the order of civilization the American people have it in charge to realize. We have never pretended, and should be sorry to be thought capable of pre-

tending, that we have as yet fully realized it. In its continuous evolution and realization in law, institutions, manners, customs, habits, &c., consists the life in this world of the American people. We have not yet attained to the end of that life; we have not yet fulfilled our mission, done our work, and harmonized practically religion and civilization. We cannot do this without orthodoxy. We cannot do it without the Catholic faith and worship, without the Catholic Church and Catholic discipline. But hitherto the Church has been presented to us not as the catholic Church, but as a foreign church. We need the catholicity, but not the foreignism, for that foreignism which Catholics bring with them and perpetuate in their foreign colony is uncatholic and antagonistical to the American idea, and has thus far done more injury to our American order of civilization, than the catholicity they also bring, has yet done to aid it. The spread of Catholicity associated with the foreign civilization, throughout the country, would destroy the American order of civilization, and reproduce in our New World that of the Old World, on which ours is, in our judgment, a decided advance. The American people see this, and hence the little or no progress of the Catholic religion among them.

But we do not despair either of American civilization or of the Catholic religion, for they have a natural affinity for each other. The divorce between them is abnormal and injurious to both. The American order of civilization is the best expression the world has yet seen of catholic truth on its human side, and as in the catholic Idea the human and Divine are inseparably united, there is and must ever be a strong tendency for them to unite in their practical realization. This tendency will gradually eliminate from the Catholic body their foreignism, and render them more American, by rendering them more catholic. The tendencies of Catholicity and Americanism are in the same direction, and necessarily strengthen each other. Besides, as time goes on, American converts will less readily abandon their Americanism, and feel more deeply that, in becoming Catholics, they are bound, for the sake of their religion and of their non-Catholic countrymen, not to denationalize themselves, or to make themselves foreigners. Before long, too, missions will be opened to the American people, and the missionaries, even if not of American birth and breeding, if they are missionaries not to foreigners in America, but to

Americans, will present their religion in its Catholicity, without coupling with it a civilization inferior or antagonistical to our own. There is no necessity that the missionaries should be native Americans; for it would be ridiculous to pretend that only natives can convert natives. What is more necessary is, that there should be a really American clergy for the foreign Catholics colonized in the country. The evil is greatly exaggerated by having both clergy and congregations composed of foreign Catholics. American clergy for the foreign congregations, for the Catholics now in the country, and foreign missionaries to the American people, would not be objectionable, but in many respects would be a very good arrangement. Foreign-born and foreign-educated priests do not foreignize a country, or injure its civilization, but introduce much that is advantageous to it; they are objectionable only when their congregations are foreigners, for it is only then that they render their religion foreign. Then they are forced by the influence of their congregations, by the necessity of managing them, and advancing their spiritual welfare, to conform to or to suffer to go unchanged the foreign notions, usages, and habits they bring with them. We ask as far as practicable an American clergy for the Catholics already in the country, for the sake of thoroughly Americanizing them at the earliest practicable moment, but we do not ask that missionaries to non-Catholic Americans should be either American born or American bred, as in some respects non-American missionaries would be preferable.

But be this as it may, the American missions must soon open, and when they do, large numbers of Americans will become Catholics, for large numbers of them are ready to become Catholics when they see they can become so without abjuring their country or American civilization. These converts will remain Americans, and be the nucleus of the Catholic-American population. Around them will gradually gather, and to them will be gradually assimilated the whole Catholic population of the country, and the distinction between foreign-born and native-born Catholics will be obliterated, as will also the distinction of foreigners and Americans as a distinction between Catholic and non-Catholic Americans. Both will be alike Americans, and differ only in matters of faith and worship. There will remain for a time at least the distinction of orthodox and heterodox, a very important distinction indeed, but there will be no distinction

under the point of view of civilization. Catholics and Protestants will not as now constitute two distinct peoples.

To this end, also, we believe our present civil strife will greatly contribute. Up to the actual levying of war against the government, the great body of our Catholic population undoubtedly sympathized with the South. They were attached to the Democratic party, whose strength had always been in the Slave-holding States; they were, many of them, like ourselves, strongly attached to the doctrine of States Rights, which was made the basis of the right of Secession, and the metropolis of the Catholic colony was in Baltimore, a city of strong Southern sympathies. They had been taught to regard the Abolitionists as Puritan fanatics, and dangerous to the peace and safety of the Union, and the Democratic journals had assured them that the Republicans were only disguised or undisguised Abolitionists. But when the rebellion broke out, and its real character and purposes became manifest, Catholics very generally in the loyal States, especially Catholics of foreign birth and their children born here, refused to support it. To their shame be it said the old American Catholics in this struggle of the nation for life, have proved themselves far less American, far less loyal than the foreign-born Catholics settled amongst us. Boston Catholics, nearly all belonging to a recent migration, have been far more American than Baltimore Catholics claiming to be descendants of the Maryland Pilgrims. The *Boston Pilot* has been far less un-American than the *Baltimore Catholic Mirror*, and the *Pittsburgh Catholic*, edited by both foreign-born and foreign-educated Catholics, has shown a far more truly patriotic spirit than the *Telegraph and Advocate*, whose senior editor is an American and a convert. A large portion of Catholics of the old American stock have been and, we presume, still are disloyal, while the mass of foreign-born Catholics in the Free States, have sided with the Union. It is a singular phenomenon, which, however, we have no space now to explain. But the fact that our adopted citizens have so generally sided with the Union, and volunteered to fight its battles, has already greatly softened the American prejudices against them both as foreigners and as Catholics, and before the war is over will soften them still more. We, ourselves, who are an American of Americans, are proud of them, while we are ashamed of our disloyal or peace-prating Catholic countrymen.

But what is still more to the purpose, the Catholics who have sided with the Union, these Catholic officers and men who with hearty good-will are fighting her battles, rendering so much service to the country and suffering so much for it, learn to feel that it is their country, and that they have part and lot in her history. Their sympathies become enlisted in behalf of American civilization, for which they are fighting, and they will return with their laurels from the battlefield with American hearts, an American people. This war has been sent to us in mercy. It has come as a chastisement on both the North and the South, and will arrest us in the false directions we were taking, recall us to the real American principles from which we had departed far, and were departing farther. It will have a salutary effect both on old Americans and on Neo-Americans, and mould both into one truly American people. It will, unless we Catholics foolishly throw away the opportunity it gives us, open a fair field for Catholic activity and enterprise, and enable us to bring our religion to bear, not in destroying but in evolving, advancing, and perfecting American civilization, and giving to the world a practical example of the *régime* of liberty it may well attempt to imitate. Then our Church will be here in her normal position, and she will no longer be confounded with her accidents, or embraced or rejected for what she is not.

But we have extended our remarks to an unreasonable length. Yet we had many things we wished to say, and we have after all said only a few of them. The reader will see that our aim has been something more than our personal defence, and that our wish has been to explain the anomalies presented by our religion in this country, and without concealing or palliating in the least what we regard as anomalous, and to non-Catholics is inexplicable in the Catholic body, to prove to our non-Catholic countrymen that we can be a good Catholic, and love liberty as firmly as they do, and join heart and hand with them in defending, sustaining, evolving, and perfecting American civilization. What is foreign or un-American in our Catholic population or in the position of our Church is only accidental, and must as things go on disappear. Many Catholics will fail to understand and appreciate our motives, and imagine that we are only venting our ill-humor with them. But that is their affair, not ours. We have no ill-humor towards them or anybody else, unless it be towards imbecile

statesmen, and dilatory or lukewarm military commanders. But we think more of American civilization than they do, and are more anxious to reunite it and our religion for the benefit of both. We wish to see our countrymen Catholics, and we wish to see all Catholics heartily sustaining the American order of civilization.

ART. II.—*Essays Theological, Philosophical, and Historical, on the Reformation in the Sixteenth Century.*

ALL facts are symbolic, and reveal or symbolize to him who knows how to read them, a truth or reality which transcends and informs them, that is their principle and cause, and which they exteriorly express or manifest. Creation is a fact, but not a fact complete in itself, signifying no reality or relation beyond itself. The creative act, and therefore the universe as a whole and in all its parts is simply the expression *ad extra*, or the extrinsication of the Eternal Word or Logos, who was in the beginning, who was with God, and who was God, and nothing created is really understood or intelligible, save in its relation to the creative Word by whom all things were made, and without whom nothing is made, or can be made. Our senses may apprehend the visible phenomena of the universe, but we really know or fully understand the universe or any thing in it only as we penetrate beyond the visible or the sensible, the symbolic veil or mimetic bark, and seize the intelligible, the *νοητόν* that transcends it, and which it expresses. The real word is never the sensible word, the sounds which strike the ear, or the characters written or printed on paper, and which are addressed to the eye, but the sense or meaning they symbolize to the understanding. The visible or sensible phenomena of the universe, natural or supernatural, are simply sounds or characters, the external word, if you will, what the Greeks call the *mimesis*, but significant only as symbols or imitations of the internal word, and the internal word or meaning symbolized, if in the created order, is itself dependent on a more interior word still, and is significant only as it is apprehended in its union with the Eternal Word through the medium of the Divine creative act.

Hence, real science, as Plato taught us long ago, does not consist in knowing facts in their simple visibility, or in the simple apprehension of sensible phenomena, but in knowing the intelligible, or *idea*, on which they depend as their cause and principle, in which is their real significance, and which they symbolize to the understanding. The sensible, copies or imitates the intelligible, but the true object of science is the intelligible or supersensible, not the sensible. We do not know nature, even though we know all the sensible or material phenomena of the universe, if we know them only as sensible and unrelated phenomena, with no recognition of their intelligible meaning and relations. The sensible does not stand alone, or rest on itself; it depends on the intelligible, what Plato calls the *idea*, both to exist and to be known. As there are and can be no sensible phenomena without intelligible reality that transcends and informs them, so can there be no sensible apprehension, as distinguished from mere organic affection, without intelligible intuition. It is never enough, then, in any case whatever, to apprehend the simple material fact, it is always necessary to go farther, and ascertain its intelligible meaning, or the idea it symbolizes, manifests, or reveals to the understanding.

The facts or events of history are symbolic in like manner as any other class of facts. The facts are the sounds and characters, the sensible word of history, but they are not in themselves history, or the internal or intelligible word in which is all real historical significance. A man may know them all, but if he knows them only as sensible and unrelated facts, he knows as little of history, as he knows of the Greek language who knows only its written characters; for to him the characters are inexpressive, insignificant, and present or represent no intelligible or noetic object. Sensible facts, as external words, are significant only to the mind, and truly significant only to the mind that knows how to read and interpret them. The historian but imperfectly performs his task who is a mere chronicler. Chronicles are sounds or characters, but not the intelligible words of history. They are often preferable, when full and faithful, to many, so-called, elaborate philosophic histories, because they give the materials which the student may use and interpret for himself. But they are not history. The history is in the intelligible facts symbolized by the material or sensible facts.

It is necessary in reading historical works, by whomsoever written, to bear this in mind, and to guard against supposing that we know general or particular history, because we are familiar with the sensible or material facts in the case. No fact or event stands alone in God's universe. All the facts or phenomena of any given history have an intelligible origin, or a supersensible principle on which they depend, and take place only by virtue of and in accordance with some supersensible or transcendental law, in fulfilment of some purpose or plan of the Creator. None of them are arbitrary, accidental, or isolated, for all creation is by the Eternal Word or Logos, and therefore must be logical in their origin, medium, and end, and therefore in dialectic relation to the principle, medium, and end of creation itself. To know any, apparently the least significant fact of nature or history, really to understand it, is necessary to see it not merely as an isolated or unrelated fact, but in its relation with all other facts, and to the dialectic law of all life. In fact, we cannot see or apprehend it in its real character unless we have in our minds the true theory or *schema* of the universe, natural and supernatural, and its relation to God as its prototype, archetype, and creator. The true historian must be a theologian and a philosopher, and study and relate historical events from the point of view, and in the light of a true and adequate theological or philosophical doctrine.

Every man does and must write history from the point of view of his own theology, from the point of view of his own doctrine of God, and the universe. He cannot do otherwise, if he would. Every man must look at or contemplate objects as they appear from his own stand-point. If his stand-point is not sufficiently elevated, and his vision sufficiently comprehensive to take in the universe of facts in their completeness, in their true order and real perspective as they appear to the Creator himself, he can never write absolutely true history, or history absolutely trustworthy. The only absolutely trustworthy history is the history written under divine inspiration, as that given us in the Holy Scriptures. He who sees things only from a low, narrow, sectarian stand-point, a narrow, unsound, or defective theology or philosophy, not only cannot give a true interpretation of historical facts, not only cannot give a true appreciation of them, but he cannot even give a true, full, and impartial narration of them. All are not even

perceptible from his stand-point, and all that are perceptible and even perceived will not be noted. Many not unrecognized will be neglected, or thrown into the background, as insignificant and of no account. A false perspective will be maintained throughout, and facts will be exaggerated, mutilated, presented in a prominent light, or thrown into the shade, according to the exigencies of his theological or philosophical doctrine, and this, too, without any malice, or any intention of misrepresenting, perverting, or falsifying history. This is inevitable, so long as human infirmity and human imperfection remain.

J. Merle d'Aubigné has written several volumes of what he calls the History of the Grand Reformation. He is a Swiss Calvinist, and writes from the point of view of the Calvinistic theology, a modified Manichæism. He proceeds from the assumption of two principles—Divinity and Satanity—in eternal conflict, without any medium of reconciliation or dialectic harmony between them. Being a Protestant, Rome represents for him Satanity, and Protestantism Divinity, and the significance of the great Movement of the sixteenth century was God rising up to put down Satan. All his facts are adjusted to this theory, and those which do not tend to sustain it are omitted, misstated, or explained away. The distinguished Catholic Bishop of Louisville, not rising always to the point of view of the Catholicity he professes, and not always bearing in mind that Catholicity is catholic, and embraces and integrates in itself all truth, differs from the Swiss historian very little, except in assuming in opposition to him that Protestantism represents Satanity, and Rome Divinity. For him, though there were abuses among Catholics that needed reforming, the Reformation was Satanic in its inception, progress, and termination. It originated in impatience of restraint, in the spirit of disobedience, in the love of riches, in a craving for license, and hatred of truth and holiness. Its significance for him is an uprising of Satan to dethrone the Son of God, King of kings, Lord of lords, and Author and Finisher of our Faith. He corrects many of the errors and misstatements of his Protestant contemporary, brings out and places in a prominent light many facts the Calvinist had neglected or suppressed, but from him hardly more than from his adversary can we get a real insight into or understanding of the Protestant Reformation as a world movement, or production of the *Welt-Geist*. From neither, nor from both

together, can we get a full, clear, faithful, and impartial statement even of the sensible facts in the case. Neither, in fact, writes history. Each writes as a controversialist, and each introduces only the facts necessary to make out his case, and establish his side in the controversy. One is almost as sectarian as the other, and neither approaches the subject from the real catholic point of view, and studies it in the light of the Idea which, as Theandric, embraces at once in their distinction and union all the truth of God and all the truth of man, and whose life is the life of the Church or the regenerated human race. Both remain as far as possible in the sensible region, and the Catholic Prelate makes almost as little account of the Theandric idea and life of the Church as the Protestant Minister himself.

If there is any truth in the doctrine we are asserting, the historian of the Protestant Reformation should approach the study and explication of its facts from the really catholic point of view, for it is only catholic truth that enables us to do it from the point of view of the creative Word, or from the point of view of God himself. Catholicity is the Ideal truth, or Idea, or Word made flesh, who says of himself: I am the way, the truth, and the life. Catholic *truth* considered in itself or objectively, is God incarnate, and the *life* of the Church, that is the regenerated human race, is the life of the Word made flesh, as the life of men in the order of generation is the life of Adam, and the *way* to God as our final cause, or to our end, to eternal beatitude, is by living this life. In this there is nothing arbitrary, nothing anomalous, nothing not in harmony with the universal order of things.

The whole Christian order, nay, the whole created order, rests for its basis on the mystery of the Trinity or Triunity of God. God is inconceivable as living being, as actual God, or, as the philosophers and theologians say, most pure act, unless conceived of in the threefold relation of Father, Son and Holy Ghost. God cannot be actual unless he acts, for without acting he can be conceived only as potential, or *in potentia ad actum*. He cannot be infinite intelligence without infinitely intelligencing, for an intelligence that does not intelligence is simply no intelligence at all. The intelligence to be actual, must express itself, at least interiorly, and to be infinite it must have an infinite expression. The interior expression of intelligence, the expression of intelligence to itself, or expression of itself by taking itself

as its own object, is the generation of the Word, the exact image of the intelligence expressed. The Father as generative principle knows himself, and this knowing of himself, as the object of his own intelligence begets the Son, or generates the Word, who, though bearing the relation to the Father of filiation as the Father bears to him the relation of paternity, is yet identically God, and the express image of the Father. The Father must turn to the Son, and the Son to the Father, and from their mutual spiration must proceed Love, or the Holy Ghost. Deny this, deny the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Ghost, eternal and immanent in the divine essence, and you deny that God is most pure act, or actual in himself, and are obliged to assume with Hegel, that he actualizes himself only extrinsically in creation, and first attains to self-consciousness in man.

This view of the Godhead neither denies nor obscures the unity of God, for the unity of God is predicable of his being, or entity, and the triple relation of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, asserted by Christian theology, is the mystery of his interior essence, and is the interiority, or very essence of his being. If we may so speak, it is prior to his being and constitutive of it. The very essence of God is relation, but a relation that has its terms in the essence itself, not out of it. The unity is not the primum, is not prior to the triplicity, and the relations do not proceed from unity as first, second, third; but the relations themselves are the primum, and precede, if the expression be permissible, unity, as in being *essentia* precedes *esse*. They are the essence of the Divine being, and constitutive of the Divine unity, by virtue of which God is perfect, complete, actual, living being, or real being in opposition to the *das reine Seyn*, of Hegel, which is simple possibility, and as such identical, as Hegel truly says, with *das Nichts-Seyn*, or not being. The error of Hegel is in not perceiving that what he calls *das Seyn*, *das Ideen*, and *das Wesen*, are intrinsic, and that the progress from the first to the second, and from the second to the third, which is living, active being, or being in its plenitude, is intrinsic in the bosom of the divine essence itself. He makes them extrinsic, and hence supposes that God in himself is incomplete, and completes himself in the universe. The complete, full, actual living God according to him, is God and the universe, or, rather, the universe is God completed or actualized. Hegel understood perfectly

well that the three relations asserted by Christian theology are essential to the conception of the Divine Being as actual or living being, but he did not understand that they are intrinsic relations without extrinsic terms. He understood that there must be a progression in the Divine life, but not that the progression is intrinsic and immanent in the Divine essence. Not understanding the Christian doctrine, he made the progression necessary to his completion as *das Wesen* or living being, extrinsic, toward an extrinsic term. Had he conceived the relations, the progression, or Divine generation and procession as in the very bosom of the Divinity, therefore necessary, eternal, and immanent, he would have escaped his pantheism, and the nihilism in which his philosophy as all pantheistic philosophy necessarily terminates.

The Triad asserted by Christian theology, including the relation of subject and object, generator and generated, pater-
 nity and filiation, and their mutual spiration, or love, the end or consummation of all operation, in the very essence or intrinsic nature of God, is not opposed to the unity of God, but is that unity itself, which is not a numeral, but a supernumeral unity. Numeral unity is finite, is a unit, and may be followed by other units; but the Divine unity is a universal unity, a unity all-embracing, and all-sufficing. God as one is not simply one in number, but one universal, complete, independent, and self-sufficing being, including intrinsically the principle of unity and multiplicity, of identity and diversity. That is to say, he is a living and self-sufficing unity, or being in its plenitude. Embracing the Triad in his essence, he is pure act. His potentiality and actuality are eternally and necessarily coincident in the bosom of his own being, and consequently there is in him no potentiality to be actualized, no abstract to be con-
 creted, no idea to be realized, and we can say of him that He is, not that he is *becoming*, *das Werden*. Hence we escape the error of Hegel, Leroux, Cousin, as well as of the Budhists, that God is in himself simply *das reine Seyn*, or mere potentiality, and becomes actual, or attains to the plenitude of being only in creating or in operating extrinsically. Indeed, all philosophy that excludes the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and starts from simple unity with the old Eleatics, runs necessarily into some form of pantheism. It starts and must start with the idea of the Same, the Identical, and exclude the idea of the Diverse; but without the

Same and the Diverse dialectically united in the Prototype it is impossible to conceive of a universe distinct from God, or of a universe distinguishable from him even by his creative act. The only possible refutation of pantheism is in the assertion of the Mystery of the Trinity, the internal generation of the Word and procession of the Holy Ghost eternal and immanent in the Divine Essence itself. For it is only by that assertion that God can be asserted as being in its plenitude, and therefore in himself sufficient for himself.

The generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Ghost are necessary and eternal operations immanent in the Divine Essence itself, for by them is only asserted the eternal actualization in himself of his own essence. He is necessarily and eternally what he is—is what he is by the intrinsic and eternal necessity of his own being, not by a free voluntary act of his own will, for the Divine will itself is one and common to all the Persons of the Godhead. By virtue of the intrinsic, necessary, eternal, and immanent operations he is in himself, necessarily and eternally, actual being, perfect being, being in its plenitude, or, in scholastic language, most pure act, and therefore is in himself sufficient for himself, needing nothing, and capable of receiving nothing from without, or from any extrinsic operation. Hence he can never be under any necessity, internal or external, of operating extrinsically, or of creating an external universe. While the internal operation is necessary, the external operation, or the extrinsication of the Eternal Word in an external universe, is and must be a free, voluntary act, dependent entirely on his own will. Hence all theologians tell us creation, or every act of God *ad extra*, or extrinsic act, is a free act. God is free to create or not to create, as he sees proper; but if he creates at all, he must create after the divine pattern or archetype in his own mind, that is to say, after his own eternal and immutable Word or Idea, identical, as St. Thomas teaches us, with his own essence. *Idea in mente divina nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei*. The universe has and must have its prototype in the Divine Essence, and be an extrinsic copy out of himself of the eternal and immanent operations in himself,—the extrinsication of his own essential Triad. *Deus est similitudo rerum omnium*, says St. Thomas after Plato, or rather after St. Paul, who teaches that the terrestrial copies the celestial, as the Lord says to Moses, “See that thou make

all things after the pattern shown thee in the Mount." It must be so, otherwise creation would not be the expression of the Word, and we could not say that God creates all things by his Word; or of the Word or Logos, with St. John, "All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing that was made."

The prototype of the created universe is in the Trinity or interior essence of God, and the universe therefore must copy extrinsically in the Chronotope the interior and immanent motions eternal and immanent in the bosom of the Divinity. These motions are two: the generation of the Word, and the procession of the Holy Ghost. In the generation of the Word the action is from the Father as principle, and in the procession of the Holy Ghost the action, immanent action, returns to the Father as end. And hence we may say—only remembering that we are speaking of the interior essence of God, in so far as made known to us analogically by revelation, and that the terms of the relations are intrinsic in the Divine Essence itself—that the Father is the principle, the Son or Word the medium, and the Holy Ghost the end or consummation. The universe which is the Chronotope or the expression of the Divine Essence in time and space, or, so to speak, God extrinsicated, must have the two corresponding motions, the motion from God by way of creation, which we call the cosmic motion, responding in time to the generation of the Word in eternity, and the motion to God as the end, without absorption in him, responding in the Chronotope to the procession of the Holy Ghost in eternity, or in God. In creation or every act *ad extra* all the Persons of the Godhead concur, the Father as principle, the Son as medium, the Holy Ghost as end, consummator, or sanctifier.

The Word generated turns necessarily to the Father, the generator, because in essence one with him, and living only in him, and this turning to him completes the generative act, consummated in the procession of the Holy Ghost. The act is completed in God, because it is intrinsic, having its term in the Divine Being itself. The external act as the Divine creative act must copy this act, and receive its complement or consummation only in returning to God from whom it proceeds. Hence creation has not only the cosmic motion, or motion from God as creator, but a motion of return to God, through the medium of the Word, as final cause, or the Holy Ghost, which return is End, Consum-

mation, Sanctification, Glorification. The second motion complementary of the cosmic motion, we call palingenesiac, from the Greek palingenesia, (*παλιγγενεσία*) new-birth, or regeneration. This second motion must be that of return to God, for the creature has not its being, either the principle or end of its being, in itself, but in God only, and exists only in that it participates of the Divine Being, through the Divine creative act. Hence its origin, medium, and end are alike in God. "In him we live, and move, and have our being." "Of him, and by him, and in him are all things." "The Lord hath made all things for himself." God is the principle, medium, and end of creation, which is, as far as it goes, the extrinsic expression or image of himself, having the type it is realizing in his own essence.

Pantheists and Emanationists are right when they restrict their doctrine to the interior, immanent, and eternal operations within the Divine Essence; they are wrong only when they transfer it from the intrinsic to the extrinsic, from eternity to time and space, for then it becomes sophistical, and denies itself. For, if God be intrinsically only Byssos, as say the Gnostics, Void, with the Budhists, *das Reine Seyn*, with Hegel, which is the *potentia nuda* of the Schoolmen, he cannot operate either intrinsically or extrinsically, and cannot render himself Plenum or Pleroma by creation. Yet the created universe copies the intrinsic relations of the Divine Essence, and is not the Divine Triad in itself, but its external copy, image, or expression, that is to say, God extrinsicated, or, so to speak, the extrinsic God, proceeding from the intrinsic by a free creative act, and completing itself only in returning to God, since God in creating creates God. The two motions asserted by the emanationists are intrinsic in God, and copied by the created universe. The universe proceeds from God, and returns to God, *mediante* the creative act, and in return to God as its end it becomes God, as the emanationists say, but only God by participation, not by nature or by identity of essence. The cosmos may in this sense be regarded as the initial extrinsic God, and the palingenesia as the extrinsic God, or God in the extrinsic order, actualized or completed. That is, in the palingenesia the creature attains to oneness, not identity, with God, and is God in the only sense in which the creature, remaining creature, can be one with the Creator, the finite with the infinite. It is only by this return to God in the palingenesia that the creature can be completed, its

potentiality actualized, and its beatitude obtained, as all religions and all philosophies of any nerve unanimously teach. The motion to the end is given initially in the creative act itself,—“The Lord hath made all things for himself,”—and hence palingenesia is the completion or fulfilment of cosmos.

But the initial or incomplete cannot complete itself by itself, for the potential is reduced to act only by the actual, and the cosmos can no more return to God, than proceed from God, without the Divine creative act. God was free to create or not create, that is, to extrinsicate the Word or not, as he chose, and, having resolved to extrinsicate the Word, he was still free to give it the highest possible extrinsication or not, as it pleased himself. But, if he resolved to extrinsicate his creative act, he must express his Word, and therefore extrinsicate his own eternal and immutable idea, or, in other words, follow in his creation the type eternal in his own essence. So, if he resolved to carry his creative act to its apex, to give extrinsically the fullest possible expression of his own intrinsic essence, he must become incarnate, and take the creature up into hypostatic union with himself. Neither creation nor incarnation is absolutely necessary, for God, as we have seen, suffices for himself; but both are necessary *necessitate a suppositione*, as say the schoolmen. The Incarnation is necessary to the completion, consummation, or glorification of the cosmos.

The Incarnation is not initial creation, but, as it were, a new creation, presupposing the initial or cosmic, and referring solely to the medium and end or consummation of the cosmos. The Incarnation of the Word, though not the Passion of Christ, would have been necessary on the supposition that God intended to give his creative act its highest complement, even if Adam had not prevaricated, and the human race fallen from its original state of innocence. Whether he would have become incarnate, if man had not sinned, we know not. The common opinion of theologians is that he would not, and this may be thought to be confirmed by the *O felix Culpa* which the Church sings in her Office for Holy Saturday, and by the fact that our Lord is most frequently represented in the Holy Scriptures under the character of Redeemer, Liberator, or Saviour. “Thou shalt call his name Jesus, for he shall save his people from their sins,” and by the further fact that his work is represented as one of mercy, pointing to and culminating in his death

on the cross. But however this may be, the Incarnation would have been necessary, even if man had not sinned, to complete the creative act, and effect the complete reconciliation or dialectic union between the creature and the Creator.

In himself God is complete being, being in its plenitude, by virtue of the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Ghost, eternal and immanent in his own essence. As the superrational Triad, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the divine essence is dialectic, and contains the prototype of all dialectics. The Father is the principle, the Son or Word is the medium, and the Holy Ghost is the end. There is in the divine essence itself a progression, immanent and eternal progression, be it remembered, from the principle through the medium, to the end or conclusion, the consummation, or completion, as is taught us in the *Filioque* in the Creed. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son,—from the Father as principle, and from the Son as medium. To deny the *Filioque*, and maintain, as the Greeks are said to do, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father alone, would be to deny the essentially dialectic character of the Divine Being, to deny all medium of progression from the principle to the end, and to represent the divine essence as consisting of the two extremes without middle term, or medium of union. The Father and the Spirit would stand without their *nexus*, as absurd as it would be in logic to attempt to draw a conclusion from the extremes without a *medius terminus*. The same heresy transferred from the interior of God to the Chronotope or Divine extrinsicisation, would present the extrinsic and intrinsic as two extremes incapable of reconciliation. It would make both God and the universe sophistical. It would deny all *nexus* or medium between God and creature, and deny alike the procession of existences from God and the return of existences in the palingenesia to God. It would disjoin fundamentally the first cause and the final cause, and sunder absolutely the principle and end. This is the grand heresy, as we shall see before closing our Essays on the Protestant Movement in the sixteenth century, of all rationalists, and most pietists and mystics. These deny all medium of the return of existences to God, and fall either into complete pantheism or into an absurd dualism, and represent God and the universe each as standing by and sufficing for itself. The denial of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son as medium,

is tantamount to the denial of the unity of God. It denies all logic, because it suppresses the middle term. It denies the copula between subject and predicate, Being and existences in the Ideal formula. The universe can proceed from God only by means of the creative Word, and return to him as their final cause only by the same medium. Hence it is by the Word all things are made, and by the Word as mediator that we return to God as our last end. The orthodox doctrine of the Trinity is therefore the origin and basis of all logic, and they who deny it, they who omit the Word, the Logos, whence logic itself, as the medium, are doomed to an incurable sophistry, if they attempt to make any assertion at all. Deny the Father as principle, you can assert no medium or end; deny the Son as mediator or medium, and you have no connection or relation between the principle and the end; deny the Holy Ghost as end, and you can only say two, two, never two and two make four. Whether, then, we speak of the procession of existences from God, the cosmos, or the return of existences to God, the palingenesia, we must recognize the Word, called by the Greeks also the Divine substantial or immanent creative act,—for the type or idea, according to Plato, is not passive, but causative, creative,—as the medium between the principle and the end. In the cosmos the Father is principle, and the Son is the medium; in the palingenesia the Father is the principle, the Son is the medium, and the Holy Ghost is the end; and hence while the Son is called the Mediator, the Holy Spirit is termed the Sanctifier, that is Consummator, represented in every syllogism or argument as the conclusion.

The generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Ghost are eternal and immanent in God; but the Incarnation is in time, is chronotopical, and therefore an act *ad extra*, and an act in which, like every act *ad extra*, the whole Godhead concurs; but as an act mediatorial, as a means to the end, only the Word or Son, medium in the Godhead between the principle and end, is incarnated or can be incarnated. The Incarnation, or the assumption of human nature in hypostatic union with God, not being in the cosmos, for if it were it would deny all distinction of principle, means, and end, and identify the two cycles, the cosmic and the palingenesiac, generation with regeneration, and therefore deny all progression from or to God, must be effected by the immediate creative act of God, and therefore supernatural—in the sense that every immediate

act of God, or Divine act not done through the agency of second causes, or concreative act of creatures, is a supernatural act, and gives birth to a supernatural order,—not disconnected or essentially different from the natural order, indeed, but in reality related to it, and harmonizing dialectically with it. Supposing God intended when resolving to extrinsicate his creative Word to give it the highest possible expression, and to complete his creative act, by raising the finite to infinite power, the creature to oneness with the Creator, the supernatural is not an afterthought in his creation, but integral in his original plan, and the natural and supernatural are but parts of one indissoluble whole, and differ from each other only as the initial or inchoate differs from the completion or fulfilment. It is well for those who are in the habit of supposing that the natural and supernatural, nature and grace, stand opposed one to the other to bear this in mind, for they are opposed only as the initial is opposed to completion or fulfilment.

Taking the view of catholic truth as thus far presented, we find the Trinity, or the eternal and immanent generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Ghost, which we must assert, if we assert at all God as actual living being, or being in its plenitude. God expresses his intelligence in himself, and generates the Word, the express image of himself, and the same in essence with himself. "The Word was with God and the Word was God"—"the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his substance." The Son turns to the Father, and the Father to the Son, and from their mutual spiration, the Father as principle, the Son as medium, proceeds Love or the Holy Ghost, the complement or perfection of the immanent progression of the Divine Being. God chooses to express himself externally, and thus creates the universe, which is himself extrinsicated, for it must express his Word or not be any expression of him at all. It expresses his essence externally in time and space, as the Word expresses it internally, in his own bosom, to himself. He chooses, as we learn from revelation, not only to redeem man from the Fall, but to carry in man his creative act to its apex, to complete the Divine Being in the extrinsic or participated order, and thus incarnates himself in man, and raises the creature to union with himself, making the finite one with the infinite, the created one with the Creator; that is to say, God *mediante* the creative act. The type copied is in

his own essence, the Father concurring as principle, the Son as medium, and the Holy Ghost as end. So that by the return of the creation in man to God, which is in the second cycle and responds externally to the procession of the Holy Ghost internally, the participated being is completely actualized, perfected, and God is all and in all, externally and internally.

Here as to the principle, medium, and end is catholic truth, that is, universal truth, one and catholic, for it embraces at once in the real order, and in dialectic harmony, both God and the universe; God in his interior essence and in his exterior manifestation or expression. But we have seen that there is in God a progression, immanent indeed, eternal, with its term in his essence itself. This progression has its expression in the external universe, or in the extrinsicisation of the creative act, and this progression in the external cannot be immanent and complete instantaneously, as it were, but is in time and space, the chronotope, and therefore is successive. It, however, copies the Divine idea, and follows its type. It must, then, not only develop in time and space, the external expression of the internal chronotope, or ideal time and space, that is, the ability of God to extrinsicate his creative act, but it must have its own interior and exterior expression, for the universe as a whole and in all its parts, represents the Divine idea, and copies the progression of the interior essence of God. Each creature is, in its order, God in miniature, or the created God representing the eternal, uncreated, living, and self-sufficing God, in its own order and from its own point of view. The extrinsicisation of the Word or creative act is the created universe. The completion or fulfilment of this extrinsicisation is the Incarnation, or the creature become God. The extrinsicisation of man become God, or of the Word made flesh, that is, of the Theandric Word, is the Church; bearing as to the Word Incarnate, first, the relation which the universe bears to the internal, by whom all things were made; and second, the relation analogous to that which the human race, in the order of genesis, bears to Adam, its progenitor, as has been time and again explained in these pages. The Incarnation being in time the Theandric Word is the Word extrinsicated, and therefore must follow the law of the chronotope, and the progression of its life must be progressive, not in eternity only, but in time, and therefore be the successive explication of the Theandric Idea. But this suc-

cessive explication and realization in time would be impossible without its extrinsic expression. Hence the necessity of the external Church as well as the internal. The Church is the Theandric universe, or universe successively returning to union with God, or in the participated sense, becoming God, attaining to its end or consummation, which is its transfiguration in God or glorification.

The universe is the extrinsic explication of the mystery of the Divine essence, and as such must have in time a progression responding to the immanent and eternal progression asserted by the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, in that essence itself. But in the extrinsic, that is, in the chronotope, the explication is successive, and the progression is from a principle, by a medium, to an end or term not identical with itself. Hence the creature does not attain the term of its existence at once, in the very instant of its creation, but is created *in potentia* to its end. Hence God creates all creatures in genera and species, creates kinds, which are each, according to its own law, successively developed. This order of successive development is the order of generation, having its origin and archetype in the generation of the Word, whence the relations of paternity and filiation. The genera and species do not subsist without individuals, any more than individuals subsist without genera and species. There is no humanity separate from the individual man, and no individual man without humanity,—*humanitas*. Adam was a perfect man in the order of genesis or generation, for in him both the race and the individual were coincident. He was created as the race individuated, and though all individual men as individuals were in him only *in potentia*, in him was the entire human race, and therefore potentially all individuals. The successive individuation of the race, through successive births, is only the explication in the actual order of what was virtual in him. Hence we can understand why his fall, or the degeneracy of the race in him, affects all his posterity, or how it is that all men sinned in him; for all were in him as the race, and it is only as the race that original sin is asserted of Adam's posterity.

The Theandric Word, or Christ, is at once the Theandric Individual, and the Theandric race. The Word assumed human nature individuated, completed in the individual assumed, not, however, an individual isolated from the race, but an individual in whom the race subsisted. He was the

second Adam, the Theandric Adam, and the progenitor of the whole Theandric race. All who pertain to the Regeneration are virtual in him, as all pertaining to the order of generation were virtual in Adam. Hence his power to expiate or atone for their sins, and their ability to share in his merits. They suffered and bore the penalty of their sins in him, because they were in him, and for the same reason they share his merits, and enter into his glory. They were in him, as included in the Theandric race; and when actually regenerated by grace, or are born into the palingenesis, actually individuated in the order of regeneration, they are in him individually, or one with him, according to his prayer to his Father, "Let them be one as we are one."

But if all the elect are virtually in Christ as the second Adam, their individuation in him, or the explication of the potentiality of the Theandric race, as in the first Adam, is progressive, successive in time, and therefore must follow the law of all progression, and have its principle, medium, and end. The principle is grace, for we are born of Christ by grace, not by natural generation; the medium is the Sacrament or Sacraments, the end is the Holy Ghost, or Love, the complete union with God. But as the prototype is always in the Divine essence, and the archetype in the Divine progression or explication of his Word, the progression must be an extrinsic as well as an intrinsic progress, and have its extrinsic as well as its intrinsic medium. Hence the Church must be external as well as internal, and express externally as well as internally the Theandric life or progression, as the body is the outward expression of the man. The external is the extrinsic expression of the internal, and therefore must copy or imitate it as its idea or model. Now, as God is one, and in creating expresses one Divine Word, giving origin to one universe, as the Word made flesh is one, giving origin to one Theandric race, and as the internal Church is one, being the Word made flesh, so must the external Church, which expresses the internal, be one. As the internal is catholic, since it is the Word made flesh, the indissoluble union of Divinity and humanity, and therefore including all truth and all reality, for man is the *résumé* of all created orders, and all creation in his return to God attains to its end, the external Church must be one and catholic, potentially catholic in time and space, and actually in the Idea, or the Ideal truth it ex-

presses. As there is but one God, as there is but one cosmos, but one Word made flesh, but one Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, there can be but one faith, one baptism, and but one Church, either externally or internally.*

If there be any truth in what we have thus far advanced, there is in the Divine Being his own reason of being, and the law, not the necessity, of all external creation. He could not have expressed his Word extrinsically, without creating an external universe, nor could he have made that universe an extrinsication, so to speak, of Himself, without adding to generation regeneration, to the generation of the Word the procession of the Holy Ghost. Without its return to God in the Holy Ghost, through the medium of the Word, the progression would have been initial, incomplete, and no image, even in the external order, of his infinite, immanent, eternally consummated progression. This return could not have been effected without the second act, or Incarnation of the Word; for without that act, you would have had generation, but no regeneration, and no procession in the extrinsic order of the Holy Ghost, and consequently no consummation, no sanctification, no glorification, consequently no beatitude.

It may be said that God might have made the return of the creature instantaneous with its birth, or the palingenesiac cycle consentaneous with the cosmic, leaving no interval of time between them; but to have so done would have destroyed the liberty of second causes. If he created man after his own image and likeness, he must create him with moral freedom, and leave his return to God to the freedom of his own choice. He must, in such case, have made a universe which would by no means express his own freedom in the act of creation, or express in time his own progression; for the external expression of the progression of the Divine being is and must be a progression in time,—not a progression without any term indeed, as our modern progressists assert, which is the most lively image of hell we are able to conceive, but a progression whose term is the infinite. Progress forever going on, and never reaching its term, is the greatest of all sophisms; is, in fact, the hell of the reprobate. It does not imply that man is infinitely progressive, but that he is not progressive at all,—

* We refer, for a further exposition of this point, to what we have said in the Review for January last, p. 19, *et seq.*

that he remains forever seeking and never finding. Infinite progress is progress to the infinite, and finds its term in the infinite, which is heaven, glorification; for then the finite is glorified in its union with the infinite. Progression in God is immanent progression, and excludes all idea of succession, or of time. But progression in creature involves, necessarily, the idea of the Chronotope, and is inconceivable without an interval, longer or shorter, between the beginning and the end.

Besides, if we suppose genesis and palingenesia coincident and consentaneous, we resolve progression in the extrinsic order into the intrinsic and Divine immanent progression, and take away all concreative act of creatures, and the end is attained to by the immediate supernatural act of God, without the co-operation of creatures. Creatures then cease to be second causes, or to be in any sense concreative, that is, creative by the aid of the Divine *concursus*. This would deny the Divine image in his works, deny that he creates after the idea or type eternal in his own essence, and would make him the only actor in the universe, which would place us on the declivity to pantheism.

Yet the objection implied amounts to nothing. God expressing himself extrinsically expresses himself under the relation of time and space, and his expression in regard to creatures leaves, necessarily a potentiality to be reduced to act, genera to be specificated, and species to be individuated, the initial or inchoate to be finished, fulfilled; but in regard to himself his act is eternally complete, and there is no interval between its commencement and its end. For him there is no past, no future, but "one eternal now." All in his mind, as in his decree, is present, is fulfilled. The interval is in relation to us, and it is we, and we only to whom moments succeed, because, being finite, we can attain to the infinite only successively, by a succession of acts. Man is not in his origin God, but a God—by participation—that begins. The potentiality of Adam is only successively actualized, and only by successive births and generations is the race complete in him individuated. The individuation is completed in the new-born infant, but the capabilities of the individual are not all developed and actualized by the Divine creative act, without his own concreative act, or series of acts. So with the Christian. All the elect, all the predestinated were really, from the first

instant of the Incarnation, in Christ, as you and I were in Adam, when God created him in his own image and likeness, and created him with the male and female principle,—“male and female created he them”—as much as we were when he separated the female principle from the male, and formed woman from the side of Adam, “bone of his bone, flesh of his flesh;” but as individuals we are virtual, not actual in him, till begotten anew by grace, and regenerated or born again. Time and space pertain to the potential, and mark the process of its reduction to act; and as this reduction is only by the co-operation or concreative act of the creature, it must be in relation to the creature successive, in time, though in regard to God it is simultaneous. Consequently, whether it is done a day earlier or a day later, as we say, if so be space is left for the free election and co-operation of the creature, it in no way affects the reason or truth of things.

If we are right as to the principles of Catholic theology we have briefly and inadequately stated, our position must be conceded that the proper point of view for studying the great Movement in the sixteenth century, as any other great world movement, is that of Catholic theology, for that theology is really catholic, universal, embracing all the truth of God and the universe. It places the student at the point of view of God himself, the point of view of the Divine Word or Logos, by whom all things are made, and of which the universe is the extrinsic expression. From this point of view we may appreciate it as truly and as fully as fallible men may appreciate any thing.

We will say, in conclusion, that what we have thus far said, must not be taken as a full and complete treatise on the great Mysteries touched upon, or as containing a solution of all the questions that may be asked in relation to the Trinity, the Incarnation, Creation, or the Church. We have left many gaps, some of which, the reader, if good-natured, may fill up from what we have heretofore published in these pages on the same topics, and others will be filled up as we proceed with the Essays to which this must be regarded as a theological and philosophical introduction. Our design is, if we are spared the sufficient use of our eyes, to furnish our readers with a series of articles intended to present a thorough theological, philosophical, and historical appreciation of the great Protestant Movement, and, in principle, of all heterodox movements in ancient or modern

times. We may move slowly, and not unlikely disappear before completing our task. But we shall do what we can.

In what we have said, we have laid down the principles we shall develop and apply as we proceed. The appositeness of some of our remarks will not be seen till we advance, and till then many things will appear to be too indistinctly stated, and to be left unsupported, or to be assumed without sufficient reason. We could not help it, unless we had expanded our Introduction into a whole course of theology, and made it longer than the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas. Nevertheless, perhaps, taking what we have said by itself, independently of what is to follow, it may not be worthless. It may lead some minds to a better understanding of the dialectic character of the Divine Essence and creative act, and to trace the relations of the created universe back to their prototype in the triple relation of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, eternal and immanent in the Divine Essence. We have wished, as far as our limits would permit, to show that the universe, internally and externally, is the extrinsication of the Divine essence, and its procession from God in the cosmos, and return to God in the palingenesia, is an external manifestation and realization of what is essential, eternal, and immanent in the Divine Being,—God producing exteriorly a created God, responding to himself, and in its consummation to be united to him, as the human nature is united to the Divine in the Incarnation of the Word.

We do not suppose that we have said any thing to which the eminent prelate, whose History of the Reformation we have referred to, for he is a Catholic prelate, and far more learned in Catholic theology than we are, would object. We venerate his character, and have heretofore prized, and should still prize, were he not disposed to withhold it, his private friendship. All we permit ourselves to say is, that in our judgment he does not write his history from the really Catholic point of view, and, though he is orthodox as to dogma, he is sectarian, partisan, in spirit and tone. Also, that he fails to penetrate the external fact, and to seize its methexic sense. We think there is more in the Movement than he sees, that it has a deeper and a less unchristian sense than he detects, or than we ourselves had detected in our earlier essays on the subject.

All our readers know that we regard the Protestant Movement as heterodox, and heterodoxy as always in itself

hurtful to men and society. We are Catholic, not Protestant; but we wish, if possible, not merely to show the sophistical side of the so-called Reformation, but also its dialectic side. We wish to show its truth and its error, its good and its bad, and to fix its real character in relation to the evolution of truth and the progress of civilization. This done in a calm and catholic tone, with a spirit of justice, and with a tolerable comprehension of the Movement as a world movement, can justly offend no Protestant, and need give umbrage to no Catholic. Catholicity embraces and integrates in itself all truth, wherever it discovers it, for all truth is hers. She is strong enough in herself to be always just, always impartial, always sedate, without prejudice, without passion, without fear. We can never hope to recall the heterodox to Catholic unity till we can gain from them a hearing—and a hearing from them we cannot gain till we learn to treat their understandings with respect, and their characters with justice.

No man worthy of the name ever consents to compromise his principles for any end whatever, for no good ever comes of a lie. An uncompromising Catholic is simply a Catholic, nothing more, nothing less. We make no compromise with heterodoxy when we recognize in the heterodox some elements of truth, and commend in them what is worthy of commendation. There is neither wisdom nor justice in endeavoring to keep our own people orthodox by painting the heterodox blacker than they are. Falsehood, deception, even for a good end, though too often practised, is never allowable. All deception, every lie is a sophism, and a sin against the dialectic order of things, and against God, in whose essence is the prototype of all dialectics. "The first of all gospels," says Thomas Carlyle, "is that a lie is a lie, and no lie shall live." No casuistry can explain away the sophistical character of falsehood, or make deception harmless. We have no right to practise what are called "pious frauds." Catholicity is real, truthful, honest, straightforward, and can tolerate no sham, make-believe, or humbug. All such things are sophistical and heterodox. Besides, such things are bad even as a policy. Let us bring up our children to believe that Protestants have nothing but falsehood in their doctrines, and wickedness in their practice, and the first decent Protestant they meet will convince them of our own want of truth and honesty. In many things very commendable, and very important in the progress of civilization, there are

Protestants who are superior to not a few Catholics. The old safeguard system no longer serves any good purpose. We must protect our children from error by teaching them the truth, and being always truthful in all our relations with them and with others.

ART. III.—1. *The War: a Slave Union or a Free?* Speech of Hon. MARTIN F. CONWAY, of Kansas, delivered in the House of Representatives, Thursday, December 12th, 1861. Revised by the Author.

2. *The Power and Duty of Congress to provide for the common Defence and the Suppression of the Rebellion.* Speech of Hon. JNO. A. BINGHAM, of Ohio, in the House of Representatives, January 15th, 1862.

OUR highly esteemed friend of the *Pittsburgh Catholic*, the ablest and most loyal Catholic journal at this time published in our country, takes care to tell us that in his judgment, it is unwise to agitate the slavery question, and that in the present crisis of our national affairs only harm can come of discussing it. He will pardon us, we hope, if we tell him, in return, that we think it both wise and useful for every man who loves his country to agitate that question, and thoroughly discuss it. Slavery has produced our present national crisis. The rebellion itself is, at bottom, only the armed phase of the slavery question, and to suppose it possible to suppress and extinguish it without touching the question, would be like attempting to cure a man of drunkenness without touching the question of temperance. Slavery is now the question, the great question, the whole question before the American people, and it depends on the disposition we make of that question whether we are or are not to continue to be a nation. We cannot blink it, if we would. It enters vitally into the struggle of the nation for life, and we must dispose of it, so that it can never again come up, or all our efforts will be idle, and all our sacrifices of men and money will be worse than lost.

The Southern Confederacy, against which the United States are now hurling their armed forces, rests on slavery as its corner-stone, and derives from it the very reason of its existence. Grant, if you insist upon it, that the sole object of

that illegal and dangerous Confederacy is not the preservation or extension of slavery, still the objects of that Confederacy, the ends for which it has been formed, demand the continuance of slavery. The preservation and extension of slavery may not be the end the rebels have in view, but slavery is the indispensable means to that end. They would not seek to form a separate and independent republic, if it were to be a republic based on the Free Labor System, for they are not such fools as not to know that such a republic would have fewer advantages than the present United States—could never be so strong, never command so high a place in the world's estimation or in the world's history. The whole is and always must be greater than a part, and a man of real ambition would always say, with the old Athenian, "I would rather be second in Athens, than first in Eubœa." Even supposing, then, that the rebels had not originally, or that they have abandoned the intention of reconstructing the whole Union on the basis of the Slave Labor System, they must still preserve that system as the necessary condition of the separate existence, and of the greatness and power they hope to attain to as an independent people. The abolition of slavery would take away all motive, all reason, and all desire for a separation from the Union. Being unable without slavery to attain to the objects they contemplate as a separate and independent political existence, they would naturally desire to remain in the United States, and share the greatness and glory of one united republic.

The productions on which the seceded States rely as the means of securing to them the hegemony of the commercial nations of the world they aspire to, they believe, demand the system of slave labor. "The only reason for desiring slavery," said to us an eminent physician of Charleston, South Carolina, and himself the owner of a hundred slaves, "is that in the management of large plantations the planter must be able to command labor when he wants it, and to be always able to do this, he must own it. Aside from this consideration, slave labor is less economical than free labor. Its advantage over hired labor, or your Northern system of labor, is in the fact that the planter can command it at the very moment he needs it. If he depends on hired labor, he is likely to find his hands striking at the critical moment, and compelling him either to lose the proper time for planting or for gathering his crops and preparing them for market, or to pay them wages that would swallow up all his

profits, and end in his ruin. What is said about the inability of the white man to perform the labor now performed by negroes is worthy of no attention. There is no climate, there is no position in which you can place the negro and the white man side by side in which the white man will not kill the negro. Negroes are preferred, not because they are hardier or more enduring than white laborers, even in our climate; but because they can be kept in slavery, and men of the white race cannot. I know no other argument for negro slavery." Now, as the rebels rely principally on their plantations, on growing and exporting cotton, rice, and tobacco, for their greatness and prosperity, it is clear that, in their view at least, slavery is essential to the end they have in view. Free the negroes, and they are deprived of the means to the end for which they have rebelled, and have formed their Confederacy.

It is, we suppose, the object of the United States in the present civil war to break up the Southern Confederacy, to put down, and utterly extinguish the present rebellion, and, as far as human foresight and human ability can go, to guard against any like rebellion in future. The aim of every nation should be, first of all, self-preservation, or the maintenance of its own existence and the integrity of its territory. Our nation can do this only by rendering universal either the Slave System or the Free Labor System, legalizing slavery everywhere in the land, or permitting it nowhere. Were we to beat, as we are beating, the armies of the Confederacy, and crush its present military power, we should so long as slavery occupied its former position, at best gain only a truce for some few years, no solid or durable peace. The embers of the rebellion would still slumber, ready to break out and burn afresh on the first opportunity. The slaveholding interest might consent again to govern and use the Union for its own ends, but it would not be extinguished, and would break out in a still more formidable rebellion, and again convulse the nation, the moment that the interest of free labor should show itself able and determined to assert its own rights and legitimacy.

It is useless to multiply words about it. There can be no permanent union of freedom with slavery, no national unity and integrity with slavery in one half of the States and freedom in the other. We have tried the experiment for the best part of a century, and it has failed, utterly failed. Freedom has made all conceivable sacrifices to

slavery. Compromise after compromise has been consented to. We have suppressed the utterance of our noblest convictions, done all that we could to stifle the irrepressible instincts of humanity, lest by some word or deed we might endanger the safety of the Union, and the result has been contempt on the part of the South for the Union-saving North, and the present rebellion. A new trial of the experiment can succeed no better, for the people of the loyal States, if they would retain the slightest approach to self-respect, cannot possibly make greater concessions, or do more than they have already done to render practicable and permanent that union. The experiment has failed, as fail it always will and always must. It is not constitutional government, it is not republicanism, as some of our European friends pretend, that has failed; but the attempted union of freedom and slavery, of two essentially hostile and mutually repellent systems in the same State.

We cannot, then, we repeat, blink the question of slavery if we would. It meets us on the very threshold of the controversy in which the nation is now engaged, and they who petition Congress to put down the rebellion and let the negro question alone, and they who imagine that the present rebellion can be suppressed and extinguished without disposing of the slavery question at once and forever, only show, if not their lack of loyalty, that they have thus far comprehended simply nothing of the terrible question which now involves the life or death of the nation. The advertisement of some players, that they would present on the stage on a given evening Shakspeare's *Hamlet*, with the part of the Prince of Denmark left out by particular request, has long been referred to as a capital joke; but the joke is not half so capital as that of those worthy people who in the discussion of our present national affairs leave out, by particular request, the slave question. Why, the slavery question is the whole question, that without which there never would or could have been any question at all. To refuse to agitate the question of slavery is simply to refuse to agitate any question at all really important in the present crisis. The whole question of extinguishing the rebellion, of restoring the unity and integrity of the nation, and of sustaining our national life and securing future glory, turns on the slave question. You may, as we have said, beat the rebel armies; you may gain victories by sea and by land; you may even gain an armistice or a truce; but to suppose that you can

re-establish peace, and be really a nation, unless you go farther, and remove the cause and mainspring of the rebellion is sheer folly, absolute fatuity. The old union of freedom with slavery under one and the same constitutional government has failed. Slavery, not freedom, has broken it, and broken it, we would feign hope, forever. You cannot restore it, if you would, and you should not, if you could. No man is worthy of the name of statesman, who does not assume this as a fixed fact, and take it as his starting-point in all discussions having reference to our present difficulties and their final settlement. The slave interest, treated with the utmost tenderness, and allowed to have its own way in almost every thing from the very origin of the government, has declared its secession from the Union. It has declared its secession and separation final and irrevocable. It is for freedom to take it at its word. For ourselves we accept the declaration, and insist that it shall be final and irrevocable. We never loved that union, but as it had been consented to by the framers of our Constitution, we have always felt it our duty to avoid doing any thing to endanger it. The dissolution has been by no act of ours, and by no act of the United States. It has been effected by the act of slavery itself, and since slavery has seen proper to secede, and to declare that it will have no farther connection with freedom, we are not sorry, and are resolved on our part also, that they shall never again be united, or their union find a place in the Republic.

We have no patience with those politicians, demagogues, and pettifoggers, who labor to restore the old Union of slavery and freedom, who believe, or profess to believe, in the possibility of its restoration, and who try to persuade us that on that union depend the future greatness and glory of the Republic. The slave interest had always the right to secede from the Union, if it chose, and in this sense we recognize the alleged right of secession; for the United States never made slaveholding obligatory on any particular State, or on any of their citizens. The slave interest had always the right, if it chose, to go out of the Union, to cease to be an interest in or of the nation. It had the perfect right of self-destruction. But having gone out of the Union, and ceased to be an interest in the Union, we deny the obligation of the United States to force it back, or even to permit its voluntary return. It has gone out, and we say, let it stay out. But the right of slavery to secede by no means in-

volves the right of the slaveholding States themselves to secede. Slavery might secede, but it could not carry with it any portion of the national territory, the national property, or the national population, and as the slave has no rights and no property of his own, it could carry no rights and no property with it. Its secession, therefore, leaves to the United States all the territory previously occupied by it, and the plenary right of sovereignty over that territory and the population occupying it. The secession could only dissolve the union between slavery and freedom, it could not abrogate the rights of freedom. It, by seceding, necessarily left to freedom the whole national territory, none of which could ever rightly again become slave territory. Rightly and legally considered, the question of slavery in the seceding States is not, whether it shall or shall not be abolished, but whether it shall or shall not be re-established. By the act of secession slavery has no longer a legal *status* in what was the territory of the seceding States, and the population held to service are free, because there is now in that territory no law by which they can be so held. What we demand is, not an act of the government abolishing slavery, but a refusal on the part of the United States to allow the success of their arms over the rebels to be used to re-establish it, or to remand to slavery a population made free by the secession of their masters. Here is the position of the slave question to-day,—a position far in advance of its position yesterday.

While the slave interest, or the interest created by slavery, held fast to the unnatural union of slavery and freedom, and was loyal to the Federal authorities, we opposed all efforts for emancipation by the national government, and threw on the Slave States themselves the whole responsibility of the infamous System they sustained. We, as citizens of the non-Slaveholding States, washed our hands of that System, for we had no rights over it, and were responsible neither for its adoption, nor its continuance. The case is now altered. The slave owners by their rebellion have unquestionably forfeited their right under the Federal Constitution to be protected in their slave property, or as to that matter, in any other species of property. If slavery be ever again recognized as legal, therefore, the responsibility will attach not to Slave States only, but to the whole people of the United States, and we of the Free States will become, clearly and decidedly, *particeps criminis*. Here is a very grave consideration for those who insist on letting

the slave question alone. If we of the Free States suffer the negroes in the Seceding States to be remanded to slavery, the crime and the sin will be not the crime and sin of particular States, but of the nation itself, and of the Free States no less than of the Slave States themselves.

Our readers are aware that we have from the outset maintained that the rebel by his rebellion forfeits his right to property, liberty, and even life, and that States by rebellion are dissolved, or cease to have any laws or usages that anybody is bound to respect. We hold with Mr. Sumner in his noble Resolutions, creditable alike to him as a statesman and a lawyer, that the State by rebellion commits suicide, and lapses as a civil and political entity. All laws, customs, or usages depending for their vitality, force, or vigor on the State, are rendered null and void by its secession, and are to be treated as *non avenues*. Slavery exists in any country only by municipal law, in no country by the *jus gentium*. In our political system it exists by the local law, or by the law or usage of a particular State, in distinction from a law or usage of the United States. Even Chief-Justice Taney in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, does not pretend that slavery exists by virtue of the law of the United States, though he maintains that it has the right to exist wherever it is not forbidden by local law, assuming, as it would seem, that it exists by virtue of the law of nature. But as his opinion was a mere *obiter dictum*, we venture to maintain with a previous opinion of the Supreme Court, with the decisions of the English Courts, with the general principles of law, and with common sense, that slavery being a violation of man's natural liberty, can exist only by virtue of municipal law, and in our country only by the law or usage of a particular State. Consequently it lapses when the State itself lapses. The State by the act of rebellion lapses, and consequently the rebellion of the State abrogates the only law by which negroes are held to service, either to persons loyal or to persons disloyal to the Federal government; for the Federal government never guarantied to any man property in slaves after it had ceased to be property by State law. Any State may abolish slavery within its limits. Should a loyal State even see proper to emancipate its slaves without any indemnification to the owners, the owners have no claim of indemnity against the United States. Their remedy would be only against their own State.

That a State in its State capacity can under our system, rebel, admits of no doubt, if we concede it to be, though in a subordinate sphere, a civil and political entity, or a civil and political person. It is if a person capable of State action, and when as a State it resists the legitimate authority of the General government, and arms its citizens against it, it rebels. If we deny the autonomy of the State, deny that it is a civil and political person, that is, in the sense a corporation is called a person, we eliminate the federal element of our political system, and make our Republic not a federal, but a consolidated or centralized republic. If we take this ground, slavery nowhere on our territory has any legal existence, for it is evident there is no law of the National government authorizing it. Taking the other ground, a State can rebel, and its rebellion is and must be its dissolution as a State. It ceases from the moment of its rebellion to have any legal existence. Consequently all that depends on its existence for vitality ceases to live, and nothing lives except the natural law, and the Constitution and laws of the United States; but as no one has under either of them any title to slaves, slavery necessarily lapses with the State authorizing it.

That this doctrine reaches far we do not deny, we maintain that under our system a State may rebel, and that the rebellion of a State, *ipso facto*, dissolves it as civil and political society, and consequently vacates all rights and remedies created or afforded by it. There remains after its rebellion no State law in force. Its rebellion vacates all titles held under it, dissolves all contracts, and annihilates all property created by it, and takes away all civil protection for even natural rights, save so far as that protection is given by the Federal government. It abrogates all civil laws respecting marriage, all the laws authorizing the transferring, devising, transmitting, or inheriting property, for these under our system are all left to the State government. The courts of law are all dissolved, and the remedies afforded by them can no longer be enforced. The rebellion, in a word, kills the whole State, and every thing dependent on it. Whether the State be revived and permitted to return to the Union depends entirely on the good pleasure of the Federal authority. It cannot be claimed as a right by the population on the territory of the defunct State. As they could not take the territory out of the Union, and as they so long as they remain on it are within the jurisdiction of

the United States, the Federal government has authority to govern them, and may govern them either as a territory or as a conquered province.

We trust the time will come when the defunct States will be revived, or more strictly speaking, new States be formed with the old names and boundaries, and admitted into the Union on terms of perfect equality, although this ought not to be done till the rebels have unconditionally surrendered. When they have unconditionally surrendered, and thrown themselves on the mercy of the Federal government, the United States will, no doubt, after having compelled rebel property to pay the expenses of the war, permit the people to reorganize themselves into States, and confirm all who give evidence of loyal intentions, in their former civil and political rights. It will not restore, for it has no constitutional right to restore the relation of master and slave. It cannot deprive free men of their liberty, except for crime. The negroes having been freed by the rebellion of the States whose laws authorized them to be held as slaves, are henceforth free men, and the Federal government must protect and govern them as free men.

Undoubtedly there is something severe in treating the rebellion of a State as State suicide; but we have yet to learn that the way of rebellion ought to be graded, macadamized, and made easy. We see no wisdom or humanity in leaving a State free to rebel, convulse the nation, create a fearful civil war, with all its sacrifices of men and money, and be free to resume its former *status* the moment it ceases fighting, because fighting ceases to be of any avail. No government that has any self-respect, any consciousness of its rights and duties, any regard for justice or the public weal, can ever allow rebellion such impunity. It will make as it ought to make, the way of the political transgressor hard. We must not forget that the States forming the Southern Confederacy have no legal existence, and no legal authority to make war or peace. Every soldier in the National army killed in battle by their soldiers is murdered, just as much murdered as I should be, were a robber to break into my house, and kill me while defending the inviolability of my dwelling and my property. We say not that every Secession soldier who kills a National soldier in battle is a murderer *in foro conscientiae*, but we do say the killing of such a soldier is a murder. All our brave soldiers—officers or privates—who have fallen in this civil war

have been murdered, barbarously, treacherously murdered ; and every man who voluntarily and knowing what he is about, has entered into the Rebellion, originated, fostered, or in any way aided and abetted it, is answerable, either as principal or accessory, for their murder, and for murdering them while in the discharge of their highest and most solemn duties to their country. This is undeniable ; for they act without warrant of law, and deliberate killing without warrant of law is murder, and murder in the first degree. We hope we shall not be regarded as a moral monster, if we have the harshness to say that we are not willing to pass lightly over the treacherous murder of so many fathers, husbands, sons, and brothers, guilty of no offence but that of rushing at the call of their country to the defence of law, the rights of authority, and the integrity of the nation against traitors and rebels.

We know very well what the Constitution says with regard to the punishment of treason, and also what is the law of Congress on the subject ; but neither the special clause in the Constitution limiting the penalty of treason, nor the special statute of Congress governs the present case. A rebellion, when it rises to certain proportions, and assumes the character of a civil war, is never regarded or expected to be treated as a case of ordinary treason which can be put down by the civil authority. Besides the Constitution and the law relate only to individual traitors, not to treason committed by a State. The rebellion of a State must be treated according to its natural and legal effects. The court in recognizing those effects to be as we have stated, violates no clause of the Constitution and no law of Congress. The court deprives no man of his property beyond the term of his natural life, for he has been deprived of all property which it refuses to recognize as his, by the rebellion of his State. In recognizing the suicide of the State, and leaving its citizens to the consequences of that suicide, it does not confiscate the traitor's property ; it only refuses to restore to him or his children property which had lapsed by the action of his State, before the national authority took possession of it. The law makes the punishment of treason death. The principle of that law is not violated, but conformed to, by treating the rebellion of a State as State suicide. The deceased State leaves no heir, and the nation in assuming and administering its effects, preserves at least the principle of the law. All lapses to the Union,

because under our system a State can have no other successor. Individuals can hold henceforth property once held under its authority only by a law of Congress confirming their titles, or under patents granted by the United States. By the lapse of the State, the whole property held under its authority becomes vested in the United States, the only successor of the State. This we apprehend is the law in the case, and, severe as it is, it inflicts no severer penalty than State treason deserves.

No doubt the property will, in the case of loyal persons, be confirmed to their former owners, as, to some extent, will be their former property to Rebels, after they have given evidence that for the future they will demean themselves as peaceable and loyal citizens. The Government will be bound by justice, and the people of the loyal States will require it, to reorganize civil society in the seceded States at the earliest practicable moment, and with as little change in former possessions and social relations as a due regard for the whole people of the Union will admit. The Constitution has been violated by the Rebels, but nothing we demand or recommend is any violation of that sacred instrument by the Federal authorities. All its provisions will remain intact, and it will be as before, the Constitution of the country.

The great danger now to be guarded against, does not come from the avowed Rebels. At the moment we are writing, our victorious armies have penetrated into Tennessee, and taken possession of its capital, and already we hear that a new State government is soon to be elected, and Tennessee is to have her full representation in both Houses of Congress. The press recommends to the Government, that as fast as a State is reconquered, it shall recognize it as loyal, allow it to elect its State and Federal officers, and resume its place in the Union. Whether the Government will adopt such a policy or not, we know not, for we are not its organ, and are not in its secrets. We hope it will not, for such a policy is, in our judgment, under present circumstances, the shallowest, the maddest, and the most suicidal policy that can be proposed. That such a policy should have been entertained in the beginning of the struggle, can be excused. There was then much to be said in its favor. The Administration did not know its own strength, and could not tell how far it could count on the patriotism of the people. It knew there was a strong Southern and

Pro-slavery party in the Free States, and it had reason to fear that it would prove a disunion party, and make common cause with the Rebels. Besides, it was supposed that there was a strong Union party in the seceding States, whom it was necessary to secure, and who must at any cost be prevented from being irritated and estranged from the national cause. The restoration of the *status quo*, or the suppression of the Rebellion without affecting the *status* of persons held prior to the Rebellion to service, was all that was generally contemplated; or that, except by the very boldest, it was thought prudent to contemplate. Everybody disclaimed all intention of subjugating the Rebellious States, and nearly all were prepared to allow them to return to their allegiance, and to resume their former position in the Union, very much on their own terms. But we are not where we were when President Lincoln issued his first Proclamation; we are not where we were even three months ago. Events have marched, and men have marched with them. The policy which might have been prudent in the beginning, would now be a shameful surrender. We are now in a position to enforce the law in the case, and to make the Rebels pay the just penalty of their treason and rebellion, and to teach State treason a lesson it will never forget.

But precisely now comes our danger, and never at any moment since the secession of South Carolina, has the danger to the Republic been greater or more imminent. The old Pro-slavery party at the North, aided by the Border States nominally in the Union, but in the Union only through fear of our battalions, rears its head, and threatens to render all our sacrifices useless, and all our victories abortive. This party is all the more dangerous, because it professedly adopts what was in the outset apparently the policy of the Administration itself, and claims to approve and sustain the executive—a policy, the useless and dangerous character of which Mr. Conway, of Kansas, in the remarkable speech placed at the head of this article, was the first thoroughly to expose. Let Tennessee and one or two more of the Rebellious States, or even Tennessee alone, be represented, and this party has regained its majority in Congress, and the whole nation is brought again under the domination of the slave interest, represented now principally by the Border States, nominally loyal, but really disloyal. Here is the danger, which will only be increased by any ad-

dition to the representation in Congress of the so-called Union men in the seceding States.

We would not be unjust to the Border States, but we say frankly we have no confidence in their loyalty. It is "neither fish, nor flesh, nor fowl, nor yet good red herring." It is the loyalty of neutrality, like that of the affectionate wife in the battle between her husband and the bear. "Fight Husband, fight Bear; I am neutral." Missouri was for neutrality, and three times have we had to conquer her Secessionists: Kentucky was neutral, that is to say, against the Union; and Maryland would have openly seceded but for the presence of the Federal troops and the timely arrest and imprisonment of a part of her Legislature. Both Missouri and Kentucky are represented in the Rebel Congress, and no doubt would have openly seceded with Virginia and Tennessee, if it had not been for the proximity of the great North-West and a secret conviction that they would serve the cause of Rebellion more effectually in the Union than out of it, or by pretended neutrality than by avowedly taking sides with the Rebels. To these may be added Western Virginia, treated as the old State of Virginia, and allowed her representation in Congress. There are, no doubt, in the Border States nominally within the Union, as well as in the seceded States themselves, individuals who are unsurpassed by any, in any section, for their loyalty to the Union; individuals whom we love and honor, and in whose patriotism we would confide as unreservedly as in our own. But, in general, the Union men in all the Border States, as in the seceded States, are tainted with the heresy of State sovereignty, and are willing to remain in the Union only on condition of dictating its policy, and placing it under the domination of the slave interest. Kentucky never voted to sustain the Union, or to discharge her duty to the Union, till the President had modified General Fremont's Proclamation, freeing the slaves of Rebels, and her prominent men had received assurances that the triumph of the National cause should work no detriment to the "divine and sacred" institution of negro-slavery. Protect slavery, and she will be loyal; leave slavery to follow the surcease of the States that authorized it, and she will go over to the enemy. Such is her loyalty, a conditional loyalty, which we treat as disloyalty, and despise more than open treason and rebellion.

Western Virginia has demonstrated the impolicy of treat-

ing the professed Union men of a seceded State, as a State, and allowing them a Congressional representation. This policy is unjustifiable, and in adopting it, the Government sanctions a more fatal revolutionary principle than that asserted by the Rebellion we are seeking to suppress and extinguish. Mr. Pierrepont may be a very worthy and respectable gentleman, but who thinks of him as the Governor of Virginia, and what court of law would recognize as the acts of Virginia the acts of the pretended government at Wheeling? The recognition of that government of conditional and revolutionary loyalty by the Administration, was worse than a fault, it was a blunder; and it will not do to repeat it. The Administration might have taken, and should have taken military possession of the loyal counties of the Old Dominion, and Congress might have provided for their government as a Territory. But to recognize them as the State of Virginia, and give them the representation of the State in the Senate, and their proportionate representation in the House of Representatives, without any legitimate State action, was a blunder in policy, a blow at legitimate State Rights, and an act of gross injustice to the loyal States, on whom, for the present at least, is thrown the chief burden of saving the Constitution and the integrity and life of the nation.

The policy adopted in the case of Western Virginia, is based on the false assumption that a State, as a State, cannot rebel, and therefore that the several seceding States, as States, are loyal, and that the loyal people of those States retain all their constitutional rights unimpaired by the Act of Secession. This is the grand fallacy which has embarrassed the Administration and Congress from the outset, and greatly impeded its military operations. If the State were, as some pretend, a sovereign State, it could not, we grant, rebel, for in that case there would be no superior on earth for it to rebel against. But if the State is autonomous, a political entity, capable of acting as a political person, and yet subordinate to a superior, it can rebel as well as an individual, and does rebel when it refuses to obey, and takes up arms against the legitimate authority of that superior. The rebellion of a State carries away all the rights, even of loyal persons, depending on their being citizens of a particular State. Such persons are citizens of the United States indeed, but they are no longer citizens of a particular State, and necessarily fall into the condition of persons *squatting*

on Federal territory, for which no State or Territorial government has as yet been organized and put into operation. They have for the present no political rights whatever, and consequently no right of representation in Congress. This is the case of the loyal population even of all the seceded States. Virginia had seceded, and by her act, her whole population were deprived of all the rights of the people of Virginia, for by that act, the people of Virginia ceased to exist.

That a State by rebellion, in case it can rebel, loses its *status* in the Union, and therefore all its rights as a Federal State, we presume will not be questioned. That a State under our political system *can* rebel, we think is undeniable. The generic character of our system is that of a Federal Republic. We are a nation, one nation, and therefore have one national sovereignty, but the government is not a centralized or consolidated government. The government is formed by the Union, not league, of several individual or particular States, or civil and political communities, and in relation to one another separate and independent states. These States have each in its own sphere certain rights, which are not derived from the National government, or held as grants or concessions from it. In other words, all rights and power in the Republic, though held in subordination to the legitimate authority of the National government, do not emanate from it, and are not held subject to its pleasure. The National government recognizes and protects the rights of the States, but does not create, and cannot abrogate them. The matter is best explained by regarding the several States as holding before the Federal government a relation analogous to that held by individuals before civil society. Civil society derives its powers, *mediante* the people as individuals, from God, and hence its legitimacy. But the individual after the creation of civil society, as before its creation, has certain rights, called the rights of man, which he holds by a law antecedent to civil society, which it does not create, cannot revoke, and is bound to recognize and protect as sacred and inviolable, among which, according to the Declaration of American Independence, are "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." These rights I hold by the patent of my Creator, by the charter of my manhood. They are inalienable, and, so long as I do not forfeit them, the civil society of which I am a member, is bound to protect me in their peaceable

enjoyment. I may hold them up before the State, and say, "These are mine: touch them not." But I may forfeit them by my misdeeds. I forfeit my right to life by murdering my fellowman, and society may hang me. I forfeit my right to liberty by abusing it, and rendering it incompatible with the equal liberty of others. I forfeit my right to pursue my happiness, when I insist on pursuing it in a way destructive of the happiness of others, or in a manner dangerous to the existence or peace of society.

The same may be said of the several States before the Federal government. The Federal government derives its powers from God, through the people as States, and therefore holds them legitimately. Each State has certain rights, which it holds by a law anterior to the Union, and independent of it. But the state may forfeit its rights, and even its existence as a State, because though a State, and in its subordinate sphere a complete State, it is not a sovereign but a subordinate State. It is subordinate, because the United States are made by the Constitution the supreme government. Article VI. of the Constitution says: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." No language can more clearly assert the constitutional supremacy of the United States, and therefore the subordinate character of each particular State. By making the United States the supreme government, and their Constitution and constitutional acts the supreme law of the land, the American people are made one civil and political people or community—not an aggregation of peoples—a sovereign nation whose sovereignty excludes all others, for sovereignty is and must be one and indivisible. But the powers of Government are, under our system, not concentrated in the same hands, but are divided and distributed among an indefinite number of autonomous though subordinate civil and political communities. These communities, so long as they keep within their sphere, are independent of the Federal Government, and may resist its invasion of their reserved or antecedent rights, as an individual, so long as he abuses none of his rights, may resist any encroachment on them by civil society. So far we assert States' Rights

as an essential element in our political system, and as an element we can never consent to see eliminated. It is the grandest and noblest feature in our institutions. This has always been really our doctrine on the subject; and if in some of our writings we have at times seemed to go farther, we have seemed to go farther than we really intended. We had accepted in early life, Mr. Calhoun's theory of States' Rights, but we never understood this theory to mean the right of a State to secede, or that State sovereignty denied the constitutional supremacy of the Federal government. Mr. Calhoun was a nullifier, but when we knew him he was not a secessionist. "You cannot," said he to us, in 1841, when authorizing us to speak officially for him,—“you cannot coerce a State, because you can never get power enough to do it. So many other States will make common cause with the State it is proposed to coerce, that the Government will be compelled to desist from its attempt, and withdraw the acts that have given offence, and which the State has nullified.” Mr. Calhoun did not deny, as he explained himself to us, the *right*, but simply the *ability*, of the Federal government to coerce a State. The moment it should attempt to coerce the nullifying State, other States would intervene, arrest its action, and compel it to accept a compromise, as in 1832. State sovereignty, in any other sense than that the State derives none of its rights from the Union, and that all the States are independent States in their internal relations to one another, was always, in our judgment, a political heresy; and it is unquestionably this political heresy that has justified, in the minds of the Southern people, the fearful schism they have attempted, and which the Federal authorities are now laboring to suppress.

Conceding that a State has autonomy, but denying its sovereignty, we can consistently maintain that a State, as well as an individual, may rebel. Any person, natural or artificial, that owes allegiance to a superior, is capable of rebellion—because capable of resisting and warring against the legitimate authority of that superior. The States have a superior, since the constitutional acts of the United States are the supreme law of the land, and override their acts. That government, whose acts are the supreme law of the land, is unquestionably the supreme government of the land; and if the Federal government is supreme the States can be only subordinate. If subordinate to the Federal government, they owe it allegiance, and are bound to obey it in

the constitutional exercise of its authority. They being autonomous, capable of self-action, are capable of resisting that authority, refusing it obedience and taking up arms against it, and therefore are capable of rebellion. To say a State can do none of these things because they are illegal, is to overlook the reason of their illegality on the one hand, or to maintain, on the other, that an act done illegally is not done at all. Any act done by the political people called a State, acting through their State organization, and by its authority, is an act of the State in the full and proper sense of the term. The secession ordinances were passed not by the people as population, by the people outside of their state organization, and irrespective of State authority, but by the people as the State, acting through the State organization, and according to the forms of State law. They were passed by the highest authority in the State, and have been recognized, acted on, and enforced by all the authorities of the State, legislative, judicial, executive, and military. In the eyes of the State these Ordinances, and the acts following them, are not illegal, but legal and valid. The individuals in arms against the Federal government are not rebels to their respective States. So far as State acts can go, they are, in relation to their own States, loyal and patriotic citizens, and simply fighting at the command of authority for their country, not against it.

The illegality is not illegality in relation to State authority, but to Federal authority. The acts justify the citizen in the State court, and would, in that court, be a valid plea; but they do not justify the citizen, nor can he plead them, in the Federal courts. They are illegal and void, not because they are not acts of the State, but because they are acts in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and acts in contravention of the supreme authority of the land, which is superior to the State authority, and overrides it. They are illegal, and bind nobody, because they are in contravention of a superior authority, not in but out of the State, and to which the State is bound to conform. The citizen is not bound by them, because the allegiance of the citizen is due to the superior authority, and he is bound to obedience to his State only as far as compatible with that allegiance. The allegiance that can be claimed by a State is a subordinate and conditional allegiance, and is restricted by the higher allegiance due to the national sovereign. The vassal swears to his immediate lord to be his true liegeman,

saving against the lord paramount. The State acts illegally in seceding, but the law it violates is not State law but United States law; and as that law overrides all State law, her illegal acts can bind no citizen of the United States to obedience, not because they are in the State court *non avenues*, but because they are null and void in the Federal courts. Their illegality, therefore, is no proof that they are not acts of the State, or her legal acts, so far as herself is concerned, but a proof that she has usurped the sovereign power, and therefore destroyed herself as a Federal State.

Secession, there can be no question, is rebellion, for it is an act of hostility to the superior, the total denial of the superior's authority. The State, then, in seceding, loses all its rights and its very existence as a civil or political community. The population and territory remain within the jurisdiction of the United States, but the entity called the *state* is out of the Union, as completely so, as if it had never been in it, and therefore is no longer a state at all, for a state without territory or population is a sheer nullity. It does not, as it imagines, become by secession a separate and independent state, because its act being illegal, null, and void, as against the superior, cannot carry either the population or territory essential to its existence with it. It does not fall back on the people in their original and primary capacity, because the people in that capacity are simply population, and the people, as population, so long as they remain on territory within the jurisdiction of the United States, are not an independent people, but simply a part of the population of the United States, bound to obey the constitutional acts of the Federal government as "the supreme law of the land." Its act of secession is simply an act of self-destruction, and the surcease of its authority. Its Secession Ordinance has killed it. The population and territory belong to the Union, but are not in the Union as a State, consequently have no right of representation in the Federal Congress, and, till reorganized into a State or Territory, no political or even civil existence whatever.

That Congress may reorganize the people of the geographical districts vacated by the decease of the seceding States into Territorial governments, and then authorize the Territorial people to assemble in conventions, adopt a State constitution, and apply for admission as States into the Union, we readily concede; but we deny the right of Congress or of the Executive to recognize them as States till they have

been so organized and formally admitted. There is now no State of Tennessee. The State of Tennessee has abdicated, and the word is now only a geographical expression. The gentlemen from the geographical district called Tennessee, now sitting in Congress, are most estimable gentlemen, but they represent no political entity, and have, so far as we can see, not a shadow of right to the seats they occupy. The same must be said of the gentlemen in Congress from Western Virginia. Western Virginia is not and never was a Federal State. It is included in Virginia, and Virginia as a State is no more. The loyal people remaining in the seceding States lost their Federal rights by the suicide of those States. They are not anywhere States or successors of the defunct States, and have no power of themselves to organize themselves into States, with the right of representation in Congress.

The policy we oppose, and which we devoutly pray may never be adopted, is to treat the loyal men found in a seceded State as the State itself, and to recognize the defunct constitution as still in force. But this is only an indirect way of imposing a constitution on a State, the capital error of Mr. Buchanan's Administration with regard to Kansas. These people are not the State, and the old constitution is not in force. Neither Congress nor the Executive can revive that constitution, nor organize these people into a State. Congress can organize them into a Territory, and pass in their favor an "Enabling Act," as it is called. But the act of organizing them into a State, and adopting a State constitution, must be the act of the people themselves, though of a legally recognized and defined Territorial people. These Union men, or the population on the territory of any of the lapsed States, are not such people. For the Federal Government to treat them as such, and allow them to act under the old constitution, and elect State and Federal officers, as in Western Virginia, would strike a deadly blow to constitutional government, and violate in a most flagrant manner our Federal system and the rights of the loyal States.

The States that have remained loyal, and that now constitute the political community called the United States, have the constitutional right to settle the affairs of the nation, without the intervention of gentlemen who have no constitutional right to seats on the floor of either House of Congress. We know to a moral certainty that, if the Gov-

ernment treats as a State the population of each district it recovers from the so-called Confederacy, and concedes them the full State representation in Congress, the *status quo* will be restored, slavery be re-established, the slave interest again be dominant, and our political condition after the war be more disgraceful and humiliating than it was even before. In every one of the seceded States there are, no doubt, Union men, and, as our armies advance, they will become much more numerous. Some will be heartily Union men, a much larger number will be Union men because Secession is the losing and the Union the winning side. Nowhere are these men the State; nowhere can they claim to be the State, or by any State law hold a regular election for either State or Federal offices. There is no possible way for them to perform any legal or constitutional State act. All their acts must lack authority, and in their principle and essence be illegal and revolutionary. To allow them to send representatives to Congress, is therefore an outrage upon the loyal States, which deprives them of their constitutional rights, for these representatives, though representing population, would be the representatives of no State. It would destroy constitutionalism by placing the unorganized and unconstituted population of a geographical division of territory on the same footing with a legally organized and constituted State. It is States according to population, not population simply that is represented in the Lower House of Congress, and States alone that are represented in the Upper House or Senate. Let those who are ready to adopt this policy, and who profess to be the special friends of the Constitution ponder this well.

These people in Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas, that it is proposed, under these names, to treat as States, even if loyal, are not and never were States. They are in all the States named, we presume, only a minority, though that is not fatal, for it is only the loyal majority of a legally constituted people that is of moment. Now, to allow this population to be represented in Congress is an outrage on the Federal principle of our government. We then make population alone, not States, the people represented, and thus in principle convert our Republic from a Federal to a Centralized Republic, and sanction the wildest and most irregular democracy ever broached by the most rabid Jacobin or Radical. We should not in this way preserve our Federal system, our Federal constitution, but should revolu-

tionize and destroy it. We should put an end to the Republic of Washington and Adams, Jefferson and Madison, and attempt the dangerous experiment of a pure, centralized democracy. We are not prepared for such a revolution. We love our country with all her faults, for she is *our* country; but we love her institutions, because we have studied them, and believe them the wisest and best the world has yet seen. It is our political civil constitution, not our learning, our science, our polish, or our personal morals, that places us in the front rank of the grand army of civilization. To destroy the Federal element in these institutions would ruin them, and ruin the country no less than Secession itself, for all centralism is absolutism, whether democratic or monarchical centralism. We should err on the one hand, were we to adopt it, as much as the Confederates do on the other.

Receive back, without territorial discipline, the seceded States the moment they cease fighting, because fighting has become a losing game, and you simply pay a premium for rebellion, and make treason more profitable than loyalty. The Border State representation, aided by Democratic proslavery representatives, and a few renegade Administration members, even now all but control Congress, and make it well nigh impossible to pass any comprehensive measure punishing Rebels, or for indemnifying loyal men, by confiscating Rebel property. The slave interest is nearly as dominant in Congress now as it was before the secession of Toombs and Davis, Slidell and Mason, Wigfall and Hunter. It must be protected at all hazards. No damage must be done it, whatever becomes of loyalty. It thwarts the patriotic action of Congress, and has from the outset paralyzed the arm of the Executive, only just now beginning to be emancipated. For a long time every military precaution was neglected lest the Border States should be irritated and secede; and the finest months in the season for military operations were suffered to wear away without any thing being done, and the wisest strategic movements were sternly forbidden to be made, and the most important strategic points were left to the enemy, lest the Union men of Kentucky should vote to join the Confederates. Let now Tennessee, North Carolina, Arkansas, and one after another of all the seceded States return to the Union, and send their delegations to Congress, and it is easy to foresee the injustice that will be done to loyalty.

If one thing more than another should be insisted on, it is that the expenses of putting down the Rebellion should be paid out of the property of the Rebels, of Rebel States and Rebel individuals. This is alike the dictate of justice and sound policy. But even as Congress is now constituted this could hardly be effected. Let all the seceded States come back, and the United States would soon find that, in addition to the Federal debt, in addition to the damages done to the property of so-called loyal men, by either army, Federal or Confederate, the Federal treasury would be drawn upon to pay the scrip of the Confederacy, and discharge all the obligations contracted by the Rebels in their war against the Union. Some Northern "doughface"—say the Honorable Mr. Diven, of New York, for instance, could be found to introduce a Bill to that effect; it would be supported by all the Union men of the Border States from interest and the desire to stand well with their neighbors, late rebels to the Government, by the whole Southern delegation, as a matter of course, and by a fair share of Northern men who would be anxious to prove that the era of good feeling had returned, and that they entertained no grudge against their Southern brethren, and the Bill would be passed, if necessary, even over the Presidential Veto. As sure as the armies of the Union continue to be victorious, and the seceded States are suffered to return to the Union the moment they lay down their arms, this is what will be done. It will be the Rebels, not the Loyalists, to whom will inure the victory. Slavery will again be in power, and the Cotton Lords will dominate as of old in the halls of Congress, the Executive chair, and the Departments, threatening anew, if we of the Free States show any disposition to assert our own rights, to secede, to convulse the nation again with civil war, to murder again our fathers, husbands, sons, and brothers, till they break our spirit, and we become as tame and docile as their own negroes. Is this the premium to be paid for treason? And this the penalty to be inflicted on loyalty?

We trust in God that the Federal government will never adopt, or, rather, that it will not persist in so insane and suicidal a policy. We trust that it will abandon the *πρότον πσεύδον* with which it started, and will understand that a State may secede, that State secession is State suicide, and that the Slaveholding States, by seceding, have lapsed as States, and that even loyal men inhabiting

the geographical territories once under their jurisdiction have lost by the lapse of their respective States, all right of Federal representation; while it itself is absolved from all obligation to protect or to recognize any of their municipal rights derived from State legislation, or State authority alone. By the secession of the rebellious States, and by the rebellion of the greater part of the slaveholders throughout the non-seceding Slaveholding States, slavery is legally well-nigh extinguished. We earnestly beseech the Government, whatever it may do in regard to slavery in Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and Delaware, it will never recognize its existence anywhere else, and resist *à outrance* the return of the slave interest to power. As sure as it exists in the nation, that interest will rule it, for it must rule or die. We plead not now for the black alone, but for the white also; not for the abolition of slavery, but especially against reducing again to slavery the recently emancipated free men of the North. Nowhere on territory under the usurped rule of the so-called Confederacy, has black slavery to-day any legal existence. We say to the negroes of all the seceding States, you are free. No law or usage now in force binds you to service. The rebellion of your masters has restored you to the ownership of yourselves. Your wives and children are your own. Let the Federal government refuse to suffer you to be remanded to slavery, and you will be free, and the poor white men of the North will also be free.

The two most important measures ever introduced into the American Congress are, first, the Resolutions of Mr. Sumner in the Senate, declaring that a State by rebellion commits suicide, and, second, General Ashley's bill in the House, from the Territorial Committee, providing for the Government of the Rebellious States as Territories. We fear the Democratic and Border State influence, aided by a certain number of "doughfaced" Republicans, may be too strong for their friends, and defeat the whole utility of the war, by forcing the acceptance of some base, timid, and disgraceful compromise; but they are wise and noble measures, almost the only measures introduced into the present Congress that belong to high and comprehensive statesmanship. Let those measures be adopted, and our government will rise from its degradation, will reassume its majestic port and step, and command anew the admiration of the world. Their adoption would save

constitutional government, and give new guaranties of man's capacity for freedom. But whether these measures be adopted or not, Mr. Sumner's Resolutions will serve as a platform on which will take their stand all in the country worthy of consideration for their political sagacity, their wise statesmanship, their disinterestedness, and their nobility of sentiment.

Never have we trembled more for the fate of the Republic than we do at this moment when the shouts of victory are ringing in our ears. Yet we do not despair. If the present Congress fails in its duty, we shall regret it. If it receives back revolted States, and restores them to their former *status*, permitting them to remand the persons now legally free to their former servitude, we shall blush for our country, and hold that she knows not how to avail herself of this, her hour of visitation; but we shall not cease to labor for liberty, or to hope for its final triumph. We shall, if slavery be re-established in the territory of Rebelldom, hold the Federal government and the whole nation responsible for it, and therefore treat slavery as a matter that comes legitimately within the sphere of the political action of the citizens of non-Slaveholding States. It will then be our business as much as it would be if we lived in South Carolina or Tennessee. We shall then have the right to agitate the slave question politically, for the adoption of the policy we oppose makes slavery, if it exists anywhere on the territory of the seceded States, henceforth a national and not a mere State question. The Government and people may be sure, if the policy we have opposed prevails, they will find it necessary, though in a different way, to reckon with the friends of freedom as well as with the friends of slavery.

If the view of State suicide we have taken be accepted, and the Territorial Government Bill before Congress adopted, the slave interest will be crushed in all except the Border States, now nominally in the Union. The slavery question when confined to these Border States, will not amount to much. The slaves of Rebels may be liberated under a confiscation act, and the few owned by loyal masters may be liberated under the war power, and their owners indemnified, or they may be purchased and set free, or, in fine, left as they are. In these States slavery will not long remain, after it is abolished farther south, and the market for their surplus stock of slaves is cut off. Confined to these States and forbidden to expand, it will soon die

out. We are far from being sanguine that there is either statesmanship enough, or love of liberty enough, left in the country, to adopt, though evidently legal, constitutional, and just, the policy we recommend. There is one cause that operates powerfully in keeping the negro in bondage, the horror of Africanizing free American society. This horror is the greatest obstacle the friends of freedom have to overcome. The majority of the people in the Free States are anti-abolitionists, not because they approve of slavery, but because they do not like the negro for an associate, a neighbor, or a fellow-citizen. They believe he is a man, wish him to enjoy the rights of man, but not in their community. Not a few of these believe with the late Mr. Calhoun, that if the two races are to live on the same territory, it is best both for the white race and the negro race that the negro should be retained in the condition of a slave. Here is the great obstacle in the way of adopting Mr. Sumner's and General Ashley's policy. If the slaves were of the white race, that policy would be speedily adopted, and our Republic made in reality, as well as in name, a free Republic.

We have no space left for the discussion of this question. We suppose we share in the common prejudice against the negro race, and have no wish to see our free American society Africanized. But prejudice, however strong, must not be permitted to override justice. We are not now pleading for the abolition of slavery, but against its re-establishment. In all the seceding States the slaves are freed, and what we ask is, that their freedom should be recognized. We want them treated as freemen: of their social and political *status* we say nothing. If recognized as freemen, we think, as white men press in to take their place as laborers, they would gradually, yet effectually, disappear from our Republic by emigration to Hayti, or other black communities, where they can be free, and form integral portions of communities of their own race. We would urge no forced colonization; we would compel no emigration, but we believe the force of circumstances would lead them to emigrate, and we should have no objection to the Government taking measures to facilitate and aid their emigration, providing their emigration is voluntary on their part, like the emigration hither of Irish and Germans. However this may be, we insist that no prejudice of race or color should induce us to remand to slavery those, who by the crimes of their masters, or the surcease of the State authorities

making them slaves, are now legally freemen. We must insist on this as an act of justice to them, as a duty we owe to God, and cannot neglect with impunity, and as the only way of saving the country from the domination of the slave interest, and enabling it to live, flourish, and fulfil its civilizing mission.

- ART. IV.—1. *The Uprising of a Great People. The United States in 1861. To which is added a Word of Peace on the Difference between England and the United States.* From the French of Count AGENOR DE GASPARIN. By MARY L. BOOTH. New American Edition, from the Author's Revised Edition. New York: Scribner. 1862. 12mo. pp. 298.
2. *Our Country and the Church.* By N. L. RICE, D. D. New York: Scribner, 1861. 12mo. pp. 93.

COUNT GASPARIN's book on the "Uprising of a Great People," is a remarkable book for its keen foresight, its broad statesmanlike views, its inspiring eloquence, and its noble sentiments. Our only wish while reading it is, that our countrymen were less unworthy of the high praise the enlightened French nobleman awards them. The election of Mr. Lincoln in 1860 to the Presidency was indeed a great event, less indeed on account of the man elected than on account of the cause he represented; and we are not surprised that foreigners, who are strongly opposed to slavery, should have regarded it with interest, and greeted it with pleasure and hope. Under the circumstances, it was an act of courage, and not undeserving of admiration.

Yet there was less real courage in the actors generally than appeared to on-lookers from abroad, for comparatively few of those who voted for Mr. Lincoln, believed any real danger was to be apprehended. The Southern politicians threatened loudly, every body knew; but not many, if any, in the Republican party believed their threats were in earnest, or were any thing more than a part of the machinery usually put in operation before elections. The Northern politicians opposed to the Republican party assured us that this time the South were in downright earnest; and that if the Republicans should dare elect their candidate, there

would surely be separation or civil war, or perhaps both ; but we believed it only an ordinary trick of politicians to serve their own personal or party purposes, and we could hardly do otherwise, since we found them offering no word of rebuke to their Southern allies, and not one manly word in defence of the constitutional freedom of election. Their warnings we believed selfish, uncalled for, and we felt that, when addressed to Republicans, they were addressed to the wrong party. The tears they shed over the dangers to the Union, seemed to us only tears shed over their own probable displacement from power ; and history will forever throw on the Union-loving and Union-saving Democrats and their allies, who would save the Union by surrendering it, bound hand and foot, to slavery, the guilt of the rebellion, which their depravity and want of manhood, of true and enlightened patriotism, encouraged and well-nigh rendered successful. Yet certain it is that they whose votes elected Mr. Lincoln, did not generally believe either separation or civil war would follow his election. They believed the Democratic party, South as well as North, would acquiesce in the election, when it was over and the new Administration fairly inaugurated. This was in accordance with all past experience, and they had no special reason to believe the present election would prove an exception to the general rule.

How many of them would have voted for Mr. Lincoln if they had believed any serious attempt would be made to put the threats loudly vociferated by politicians into execution, or if they had clearly foreseen the course since taken, it is not possible to determine. It can never be known, and, perhaps, it is better that it should not be known. The architect sometimes builds better than he knows. But this is certain, that many prominent Republicans, when they saw the wolf had really come, that Southern threats were not mere bullying, but did mean something, showed the white feather, and were prepared to avert the coming storm by new and larger concessions to slavery, and to purchase peace at the expense of throwing away the fruits of the victory they had just won after a hard-fought battle. The Republican party were saved from a disgraceful compromise, not, perhaps, so much by their own virtue, as by the madness of the Southern politicians, who, disgusted with their Democratic allies of the Free States, and resolved on separation and reconstruction, or, if you will, on separation

alone, would listen to no compromise, and declared that they would not come back into the Union, even if left at liberty to prescribe their own terms. Their madness, rather than our virtue, saved us at the critical moment, and left us no alternative, but to consent peaceably to separation, or to fight for the Union, and crush out secession by force of arms. The merit of the Republicans is that they had the virtue, the manliness, the patriotism, to choose the latter alternative.

We ourselves voted for Mr. Lincoln, because we felt that it had become necessary for the country to commence the work of breaking and annihilating the political power of slavery, which had almost from the origin of the Government dominated in the Administration. The domination of the slave interest was corrupting our politics both North and South, was blackening our reputation in the eyes of the civilized world, and undermining the public and private morals of the people. We did not believe secession or civil war, though threatened, would follow, and, even if we had so believed, should still have voted for Mr. Lincoln all the same. We should only have felt it so much the more necessary to do so. We stated in some remarks to our fellow-citizens, urging them to support the Republican party, that we wished the power of the slave interest broken, and that, if civil war should follow, we would welcome and meet it as the sons of the heroes of the Revolution should meet it. We wished the question, which was sure sooner or later to come up, to be met and disposed of in our day, so that we might, when called to our own final account, know whether we left our children a heritage of freedom or not. There are, we said, greater evils for a nation than civil war. The loss of liberty is greater, the loss of public and private virtue is greater, and greater by far is the loss of that patriotism that counts it sweet to die for one's country, or that heroism which dares do or suffer any thing and every thing in defence of the just and noble cause. We did not believe the South would secede, openly rebel, but, if they did, if they chose to fight, we were for meeting them, and giving them fight for fight to their hearts' content. Whether the majority of Republicans at that time could have said as much, may be doubted, but their purposes and ours were the same, and they have for the most part shown no deficiency of pluck when they found themselves forced to meet the stern realities of war.

We confess, however, that in voting with the Republican party, we were not moved by any special regard for the negroes held in bondage. We were, as a matter of course, opposed to slavery, and wished there were no slaves and no negroes in the country. The system was bad, detestable, abominable, but we of the non-slaveholding States were not responsible for it. It was a local matter, and its disposition a matter for the States that authorized it, with which we had no civil or political right to interfere. Our motive was not to abolish slavery where it had a legal, or *quasi*-legal existence, but to restrain and finally abolish the political power of the slave interest, by sternly forbidding its expansion into new territory, and the admission of any additional Slave States into the Union. We opposed the extension of slavery, not on abolition principles, not for the sake of slavery itself, but for the sake of emancipating and purifying American politics, because we found the interest created by slavery stronger in Federal politics than any other one interest in the country, and able by its combinations and alliances to carry our Presidential elections, and to shape the policy of the Federal Government, in a sense necessarily antagonistical to the general interests of the immense majority of the people of the United States. We found it dominant, and laboring, not without success, to render its domination complete and perpetual. It had the feeble Administration of Mr. Buchanan on its side; it had got an opinion of the Supreme Court in its favor; it had fifteen States out of thirty-three, the majority of voters in three or four, and large minorities in all of the other States, pledged to its support, and we felt bound to do all we could constitutionally to overthrow it. It was not liberty for the black race so much as for the white race, that we wished to secure. It was not the abolition of negro-slavery, but the redemption and preservation of the glorious Republic inherited from our fathers, that moved us. We did not propose to interfere with slavery where it had a recognized legal existence, and were prepared to adhere strictly to the so-called "Compromises of the Constitution," and to pay the slaveholders their pound of flesh cut from the region nearest the heart. It was only the *political* power of slavery we sought to eliminate. So was it with us personally, and so, we presume, was it with the great majority of those who voted in 1860 for the Republican candidates. The Republican party were denounced at the North as well as at the

South by the Bell and Everett men, and by both wings of the Democratic party as an abolition party; but an abolition party they were not, and had no thought of becoming.

But there is a logic in events, and men who adopt the principles of a movement are carried farther than they foresee or are prepared for in the outset. All great movements have their law, and must and will on to their legitimate conclusion. The developments and events since the Presidential election, have carried us far beyond the point we had then reached, and have made evident, what should have been evident to us from the first, that it is impossible to annihilate the political power of the slave interest, without annihilating that interest itself, and that it is impossible to annihilate that interest without the complete emancipation of the slaves, and their recognition as free population. We have seen three or four Slave States nominally in the Union, and having, comparatively speaking, only a small number of slaves, for over a year embarrassing the action of the Government, preventing much necessary legislation, paralyzing the Administration, impeding its military operations, and rendering useless the most costly sacrifices. For six weeks after the inauguration of the present Administration, the military defences of the country were neglected, forts and arsenals, the armory at Harper's Ferry, the navy yard and naval armaments at Gosport were left unprotected, lest the Border States should be irritated and secede, and there was even thought of abandoning on one and the same day Sumter, Pickens, and all the posts still held by the Union in the seceded States. Even after the war had commenced, and we had a powerful army in the field, it was pretended that its principal object was to defend the National Capital, while all thought of subjugating the rebellious States was officially disclaimed. Even Congress, at its extra session, passed almost unanimously, at least without serious debate, a resolution declaring that the war having been forced upon the United States by the rebels in the seceding States, would be prosecuted solely to the end of putting down the rebellion, without any intention of interfering with the property or institutions of those States. All this was done through the influence of the slave interest in the non-seceding slave States. That interest is hardly less controlling in Congress to-day than it was under the Administration of the feeble Buchanan. Maryland, Delaware, Western Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, have inherited the mantle of the more

Southern States, and succeeded to their power. Even now not a step can be taken without reckoning with the slave interest.

This fact alone suffices to show that there is no way of emancipating the Government from the slave power, but by treating slavery as abolished, but by destroying the property in slaves, and never suffering a slave interest again to grow up anywhere within the limits of the United States. This we can now do without any violation of constitutional law, or breach of constitutional duty, for the secession of the slaveholders has given the Federal Government jurisdiction over the whole subject. Slavery, if suffered to exist in any part of the Union at all, will compel all other interests to succumb to it, because it is antagonistical in its very essence to all other interests. If it exists in the Union at all, the interest it creates must be placed on a footing of equality with every other interest, and be counted as legitimate, and as sacred as the interest of freedom. If allowed equality, it will from its nature claim superiority, and dominate, because equality can be predicated only of things homogeneous, and there is no homogeneousness between liberty and slavery. The equality of the slave interest can in the nature of the case mean only the right of slavery to restrain and repress freedom, for the advance of freedom is the destruction of slavery. We can, then, secure an open field for freedom, and prevent the slave interest from dominating, only by abolishing it, and recognizing the slaves as free. The Republic to subsist and flourish must either be all free or all slave.

In the slaveholding States themselves the slave-owners are only a small minority, and yet this minority is the ruling class, and to the interests of slavery the interests of the non-slaveholding whites are sacrificed. The seven and a half millions of non-slaveholding whites are of the same race as ourselves—are, by nature, as hardy, as brave, as energetic, and as ingenious as we are, and yet, even their material prosperity, notwithstanding their more genial climate, and their richer and more productive soil, cannot compare with ours. The blight of slavery is on them, because all their interests must be sacrificed to the interests of the slaveholders. They have comparatively few schools, few private or public libraries, and in many parts of the South are below the level of the most degraded peasantry of Europe. We sympathize with these people, who are fitted

by nature, and by their favored climate and soil to stand in the foremost ranks of the free American people. Not a few of those brave Union troops who fought at Belmont, and conquered at Logan's Cross Roads, at Henry, and at Donelson, were either from this class or their descendants, and are only a sample of what the whole would be, if the curse of slavery were removed, and they lived in a land of freedom. Why shall these seven millions of free whites, of the same stock with ourselves, and by nature every way our equals, be sacrificed to the slaveholding oligarchy which rules them with a rod of iron, and prevents the development and growth of their innate genius and greatness? They, not the slaveholders, are the real people of the South, and, if united hand and heart with us of the North, would contribute their full share toward making the American people the greatest and noblest people on earth.

Now, to emancipate these non-slaveholding whites of the slaveholding States, who, as a population, dislike slavery far more than do the population of the non-slaveholding States, to emancipate national politics, and free labor both North and South, and to make the North and the South really one people, one in their system of labor, one in their institutions, culture, and affections, it is necessary to put an end to slavery, and to induce—not force—and aid, as fast and as far as practicable, the freed men of the African race to emigrate to some tropical region congenial to their constitution and temperament, where they may form a great cotton, rice, coffee, and tobacco-growing and exporting people by themselves, leaving the whole territory of the United States to the white race. This is what is necessary, and the assurance of the Government that it will adopt and carry out the policy of emancipation and settlement of the blacks in a congenial climate, beyond the limits of the United States, would make these seven millions, or seven millions and a half, of non-slaveholding whites its fast friends, and friends who would fight for it with a heartiness and zeal they have never manifested in fighting the battles of the slaveholders, for it is not slavery they would retain, but the Africanization of free American society they would avert. They hold no slaves; they resist all amalgamation with the negro race, leaving that to slave-owners and overseers; they believe the negro a man with the natural rights of man; they think him different from themselves—do not regard him as a white man; they wish him well; but they do not want negroes for neighbors, as-

sociates, fellow-citizens, or voters. They see and know well, if freed and remaining as laborers, they will do so only as a degraded class, and so long as a considerable portion of the labor of the country is performed by a socially degraded class, they understand perfectly well that labor will never rise from its degradation, and it be held honorable to labor. It is therefore they join the slaveholders against abolition; but if it could be made clear to them that free American society would not be Africanized, and that in a reasonable time the African element of the American population would be eliminated, there would be no more resolute, determined, and invincible abolitionists in the country. To accomplish, then, the destruction of the political power of slavery, and to make the American people really one people, complete emancipation and colonization are necessary.

This is the conclusion to which events, our own reflections, and the suggestions of others have brought us. But the greatest obstacle to the realization of the good aimed at, is in the Free, not in the slave states. The Abolitionists are opposed to the colonization feature of emancipation, as are also the political economists, and most of our old Democratic and pro-slavery politicians. The Abolitionists demand the abolition of slavery on the ground that slavery is unjust, a sin, and no people has the right to tolerate it. The slaves must be freed as an act of simple justice to them, and, when freed, they are freemen, and we have no more right to colonize them than we have to colonize any other class of freemen. They have the same right to live in the country that we who propose to colonize them have. Besides, if it is necessary to colonize, why not colonize their late masters, whom we can much better spare? The economists add that we need the labor of the blacks, and that to deport four millions of the laboring population, to say nothing of the expense of doing it, would derange the labor market, diminish production, and impoverish the country, almost to a ruinous extent. To the economists it may be conceded that the loss of labor would be great, and be a serious blow to production, if we suppose them all deported at once, and their places unsupplied from other sources. But the process of removal must, on any supposition, spread over a considerable space of time; and as their removal leaves a vacuum, white labor will rush in to fill it, and keep up the equilibrium between demand and supply. There would undoubtedly be for a time some derangement, some difficulty, and

some loss; but here, as everywhere else, supply would soon follow the demand, and the labor market of the world is generally overstocked with white laborers.

To the Abolitionists it may be replied that the question is not a question of colonizing the freed men of the African race for the interest or pleasure of their late masters. We make little of these late masters, and are quite willing, if thought best, that they should be deported to Africa, to become, if they wish, slave-drivers for their friend and ally the king of Dahomey. We demand nothing as a concession to their interests and feelings; we consult only the interests of the whole country, and the rights, feelings, and interests of the non-slaveholding whites in the Slave States, the seven millions or seven millions and a half, the real Southern people, who own no slaves, and are as much opposed to slavery as we are. We think it would be better, as well as easier, to colonize four millions of the African race, than to colonize those seven and a half millions of the white race.

The other objection of the Abolitionists cannot be so lightly dismissed. It professes to be founded in justice, and asserts that to deport the slaves after their freedom would be a violation of their liberty, and therefore an act of injustice. This is a grave objection, and should be gravely considered. If the Abolitionists are chargeable with having given too little weight to political interests, or political expediency, we who have opposed them are, perhaps, even more chargeable with having made too little account in our political calculations of justice, which overrides, and should override, all other considerations. It will not do for us, when settling up the past, and taking a fresh start for the future, to neglect the strict and stern demands of justice. We cannot hope to repair one sin by another, or an act of injustice by an act of injustice. This is certain. Let justice stand though the heavens fall; for justice is the basis of all institutions worth preserving, and the condition of all real prosperity, social or individual. To forget justice is to forget God; and all the nations that forget God shall perish, as all history proves.

We grant that slavery is not only a political wrong, not only an evil to the free whites, but an injustice to the slave himself, and must be abolished for his sake alone. We are willing on this point to sing our palinode, and frankly confess that we have never given to this feature in the slave question its due consideration. Many others are very likely in

The first of these was the discovery of gold in California in 1848. This discovery led to a great influx of people to California, and the state became a great center of population. The second was the discovery of gold in Colorado in 1859. This discovery led to a great influx of people to Colorado, and the state became a great center of population. The third was the discovery of gold in Nevada in 1859. This discovery led to a great influx of people to Nevada, and the state became a great center of population.

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of others—we mean not the slaveholders—are to be consulted, and care has to be taken that no injustice be done to other and innocent parties. It is always easier to do a wrong than it is to undo it. We are not at liberty to undo the wrong to the slave by doing a wrong to the free. It is just to abolish slavery against the will of their pretended owners, for their ownership being founded in injustice is invalid, save as against the community that authorized it; but to force upon the free non-slaveholding Southern society four millions of negroes, to take their place in that society against its will, on a footing of equality, or, in other words, to Africanize free non-slaveholding society against its consent, is not an act of justice, but may be an act of injustice. To do it strikes at the freedom of that society, and without repairing the injustice done to the slave; for the slaves, liberated by a stroke of the pen, and let loose in such a society, with which they could not amalgamate, would not and could not be really free. They cannot be free and equal members of a society that instinctively repels them, and can remember them only as having been slaves. They can, in the Southern States, with here and there an individual exception, be only slaves or pariahs, and to leave them pariahs is not to repair the injustice of slavery. Even not counting for the moment the invasion of the rights of the non-slaveholding people of the South by the infusion of four millions of blacks into their free society against their will, the government has the right to treat the negroes heretofore held as slaves, and would be bound to treat them, as wards so far and so long as necessary for their transition from slavery to freedom in the best practicable way for their own interest.

We hold the slaves in all the seceded States have been freed from their former owners, whose rebellion has annulled the only law by which they were held to service. The Federal government in succeeding to the defunct States cannot remand the slaves to their former condition, cannot hold them to service to the United States, nor sell them as vacated or confiscated property. It cannot treat them as property at all, but must treat them as persons, though persons under its authority, and for whose future *status* and welfare it is bound in justice to provide. They properly become wards of the United States, who have over them the authority, and owe them the duty, of guardians. They are to be regarded in law and even in justice as under age, as

not having as yet attained to their majority, and, if the United States as their guardian honestly believe that their colonization in a congenial climate and productive soil, where they may form a civil community and an independent sovereign state of their own race, they have the right, and it is their duty to colonize them, if practicable.

We know the answer of the Abolitionists. They say, you must immediately and at once recognize the slaves as freemen; and, when you have so recognized them, they stand on the same footing of equality with any other class of freemen. Being freed, to colonize or deport them without their choice and consent, would be to violate the very freedom you have recognized as theirs. When you recognize them as freemen, you recognize in them the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." You deny that right, when you deny to them the right to live, to be free, and to pursue their happiness, where it best pleases them. When you claim the right to deport them, except for crime, you make a distinction between them and white men, as unjust in principle as slavery itself. The Abolitionists demand not only the freedom of the slave as a man, the complete and unreserved recognition of his manhood, but the full and unreserved recognition of the equality of the negro race with the white race. They demand freedom for the slave in the name of the universal brotherhood of the human race, as a man and a brother, and therefore demand that this brotherhood be recognized, and the negro be placed on a footing of perfect equality with the white race in one and the same civil and political community; and therefore they hold that the forced colonization of the African race in a community by themselves is an act of injustice to the members of that race which no plea of expediency or utility can ever justify.

Let no man treat this answer of the Abolitionists with contempt. There is in it an homage paid to justice, which commands our reverence. We recognize the brotherhood of the human race, in the sense that all men of whatever temperament or complexion have had the same origin, have sprung from the same original pair, Adam and Eve. So far, as a Christian, a philosopher, a man, we have no doubt or misgiving. But there is the fact of human degeneracy, called by theologians original sin, which must be taken into the account. The fact of this degeneracy is evident to every one who will compare the ideal or typical man pre-

sented by his own reason and conscience, with the actual state of men as he finds them. This degeneracy, as sin, or considered in regard to its *culpa* or guilt, is the same in all men, for it was committed alike by all in Adam. But, taken as simple degeneracy, as a simple fact in man's natural history, it has various degrees, and from these various degrees spring what we call *races*, which are not properly distinct races, but simple varieties in one and the same race. The degeneracy is greater in some and less in others. Some have departed farther than others from the primitive type. Why, or wherefore, we have no space now to inquire. We restrict ourselves to the simple statement of the fact. The least degenerated variety is that commonly called the Caucasian; the most degenerated is the African.* The African is the lowest variety, and stands farthest removed from the true ideal or typical man. The Caucasian variety has suffered from original sin, has degenerated from the proper human type, but it has degenerated the least of any of the known varieties of the human family. Whether we consider the Caucasian man, physically, intellectually or

* We know the assertion in the text has been disputed by some Abolitionists, who seem to place the negro in proper humanity above the Caucasian; but they are led for the most part to do so, we apprehend, because the Caucasian has made his assumed superiority a reason, and, indeed, a full justification of his enslavement and oppression of the negro. This is abominable, and directly opposed to the Christian rule: "Let him that is greatest among you be your servant." It is the duty of the superior to protect the inferior, of the strong to help the weak, not to oppress them. But some have asserted it on the ground that the natural qualities and virtues of the negro approach nearer to the Christian type than those of the Caucasian; but this is in consequence of that false view of Christian worth, which has in our times, and especially in our country, originated what has been not inaptly called "Woman Worship," and which this war is likely to abolish, perhaps to supplant by an opposite idolatry, known as "Muscular Christianity." The tendency has for some time been strong to regard the soft, gentle, passive virtues as those best responding to the Christian type, and in these virtues it has been assumed the negro surpasses the Caucasian; but this comes from taking the femininity of our religion as superior to its masculinity. Woman is made the type *par excellence* of the Christian virtues, and the more feminine the man, the more of a Christian he is. But this is to forget that man is asexual [non-sexual] and sexual, while woman is all sexual, and that it is the asexual that responds to the Christian type. Woman is called an "angel" by poets, sentimentalists, and even grave divines, but woman is less angelical than man, for the angels are asexual, that is, have no sex, "neither marry nor are given in marriage," and man is asexual as well as sexual,—expressed by Madame de Staël, we think it is, when she says, "Love is an episode in the life of man, but it is the whole life of woman." To make the peculiar feminine virtues the superior, and therefore woman the head of the man, is not only to reverse all theology, all the ideas of mankind, nay, language itself, but it is to place the inchoate above the complete, the passive above the active, the potential above the actual, which were absurd and ridiculous in philosophy.

morally, he is the nearest approach to the integral man now to be found.

Between one variety and another there is an interval. This interval is greatest between the negro and the Caucasian, and between these it is too great to be leaped by a single bound. The two varieties do not easily amalgamate. Their amalgamation is in some sense unnatural and violent, and the amalgam is a deterioration. We know amalgamation is not contemplated by the Abolitionists generally; but how is it to be prevented? Do you propose to forbid it by law? By what right, if you deny all distinction in the case, and assert the black and white races are equal? Do you say that intermarriage between blacks and whites will not be sought; that white persons will prefer to marry white persons, and black persons will prefer to marry black persons? You may be right. We believe such will be the case. We believe that there is an instinctive aversion on both sides, but especially on the part of the white race, to such intermarriage. It is doubtful if a white man or white woman ever cohabits with a black of the other sex, unless moved to it by lust or some morbid affection; and we believe the black man prefers a black woman for his wife, or a black woman a black man for her husband. Intermarriage between the two races, we apprehend, strikes both as improper and undesirable, and is pretty sure not to take place to any considerable extent.

But in saying this, we say all; we settle the question that blacks and whites do not and cannot without more or less violence form one and the same community, and live together in one and the same society on the footing of equality. There can be no society between persons who have a mutually instinctive aversion to intermarriage; for marriage is the basis of the family, and the family is the basis of general society; when therefore the different races or varieties are separated by too broad an interval for the family union, it is clear that they cannot form one and the same society. They cannot live in one and the same civil and political society as equal, but one will be held superior and the other inferior. There is no real society or community where there is no intermarriage, and if they inhabit the same territory, the blacks and the whites, not intermarrying, cannot form one people. They will be two distinct peoples in one state, in which the stronger will predominate and oppress the weaker. This is inevitable and conclu-

sive against the notion of forming the liberated slaves of the negro-family into one people and society with the free-men of the white family.

The amalgamation of the two varieties, separated as they are by so great an interval, would be undesirable, even if it were less impracticable than it evidently is. Inter-marriage between them would deteriorate the superior variety without a compensating elevation of the inferior. The mulatto, if in some respects superior to the full-blooded negro, is, as a rule, in all respects inferior to the full-blooded white man. In all countries where the mingling of the two races has gone on to any considerable extent, we find a great deterioration in the white race, as may be seen in Spanish and Portuguese America. A marked deterioration would result in our Southern society, were intermarriages between them to become frequent. But excluding amalgamation, as, to most Americans at least, and especially to the non-slaveholding whites of the South, a thing too shocking to be quietly named, we can see only degradation and oppression for the black race so long as it inhabits the same territory with the white. They can never take their place as equal members in free-white American society; never form with free-white Americans one people; and as they are now in most, and soon would be, in all of the States, the minority, poor and uneducated, they would be not only a distinct, but an inferior people, and consequently an impassable barrier to the realization of that idea of right and equality, in contradistinction from mediæval privilege and inequality, on which our American order of civilization is founded.

We do not in this deny the negro to be a man. We recognize distinctly his manhood: we assert for him all the rights of man; and maintain for him all the civil and political rights we claim for ourselves, only not in one and the same civil and political society with white men, because so great is the interval between him and us, that he cannot enjoy the same political and civil rights except in a society of his own, where color will be no badge of an inferior caste. It is not that we ask less for the negro than the Abolitionists do, but that we ask more for him, and at the same time pay more attention to the tastes, habits, inclinations, and interests of free white American society. We recognize with the Abolitionists the original brotherhood of the human race, but we do not recognize the present equality of the black and white varieties, or admit that the two can

form in the present stage of their respective development society together. For the benefit of each, we wish them to live in free and independent separate communities.

We cannot admit that the Government in denying to the liberated slave the right to pursue his happiness where he pleases, necessarily infringes his liberty. No one has the right in all cases to pursue his own happiness where he pleases. No one can do it by living against my will on my farm, in my house, in my family, or by eating at my table. Every man's right is necessarily limited by every other man's right. The negro's right to live in free white society is limited by the right of free white society to exclude persons, not born in it, whom its members do not wish to associate with. Nor can we admit that the functions of government are merely negative, and that it can never take in any thing the initiative, and act as a positive providence. We are no admirers of the *paternal* governments of Europe, administered on the principle, "All for the people, nothing by the people;" we defend the largest individual liberty compatible with social order and social well-being; but individualism may be carried to a fatal extreme, so as to exclude all government, or so as to convert what is called government into a machine to be worked by individuals for their own private benefit, as was rapidly becoming the case with us before the breaking out of the present civil war. The Government has positive as well as negative functions, and may even restrain a man's freedom for his own benefit. It may found at the public expense, institutions of learning, universities, colleges, seminaries; it may encourage science and art, this or that special industry for the national independence or prosperity; it may found hospitals and asylums, and establish bureaus of beneficence. It may act, and should act as a general social providence. As the social providence it is the natural guardian of the weak and the friendless. It may, then, without assuming any illegitimate power or violating any individual freedom take the guardianship of the emancipated negro slaves, and exercise over them the control necessary to place them in a condition where their freedom can be practically secured, and their rights and interest protected. On this score we have no scruples, and believe the Government might forcibly remove them from its territory to another where they could be better off in a community by themselves, if it saw proper to do so.

But we wish it distinctly understood that we propose no resort to force, and therefore nothing that can be called *deportation*. We rely on voluntary emigration to effect the end we have in view, and to voluntary emigration no abolitionist can object. We want no forced emigration. We demand, first of all, the clear, distinct, and unconditional recognition of the negroes as persons entitled to freedom. We demand this immediately. Slavery everywhere in the United States must be outlawed. We demand this as a political necessity, and as an act of justice to the negro race. Slavery must cease. On this point we are, and, God helping us, will be, abolitionists so long as there is a single slave to be liberated.

Heretofore we have demanded the recognition of the slaves as free persons, on the ground of military necessity. Some pretend, since our late victories, that the plea of military necessity can no longer be urged. We do not concede it. The war is not yet ended. We have gained some important advantages over the rebels; but, if they have any of the characteristic pluck of the stock from which they have sprung, they will not acknowledge themselves beaten, and are not yet beaten, and will give us some hard fighting yet. We cannot say what a few weeks may bring forth, but at the time we are writing, the early part of March, the shouts of victory appear to us to be premature, and it is not impossible that we shall still find it, in order to secure a complete and final triumph, necessary to deprive the rebels of their slaves, and use the services of these slaves in such way as they can best contribute to the defence of the national integrity and life. But be this as it may; if events have weakened the plea of *military* necessity, they have strengthened the plea of *political* necessity. The total cessation of slavery in the United States is a political necessity. It is absolutely necessary to create union and harmony, to mould the people of the North and the people of the South into one homogeneous people, to consolidate and strengthen the nation, to develop its resources, to provide for the general defence, and to enable the American people to work out the great social and political problem committed to them by Providence for solution. It is, happily, a political necessity to which we can yield without violating any private rights, or disturbing any vested interests. Slavery in the adhering Border States can present no difficulty, when it is once abolished in the seceding States, and in the seceding

States it has now no longer any constitutional rights or legal existence in the way of Federal action. It existed there only by local law, and the local law, as we have shown in the foregoing article, has lost its force there; for State rebellion is State suicide. We can therefore yield to political necessity, without compromising private rights or private interests. The whole question of slavery in seceded States is now within the jurisdiction of the United States. The plea of justice to the slave, like the Irishman's plea, Justice to Ireland, always stands good, and never to be disregarded by statesmen, any more than by moralists. On each and all these grounds we demand the total extinction of slavery, and the recognition of all persons heretofore held to service in the seceded States by the laws thereof, as free persons, and as no longer held to service anywhere.

This is the first question, and with this question it would have been well to stop till after the war, and not have inopportunely complicated it with the question, What shall be done with the emancipated slaves? But this latter question has been raised, and we cannot now refuse to consider it, for on its solution depends in no small degree the practical answer that will be given to the question of emancipation itself. We are disposed to agree with President Lincoln, Postmaster-General Blair, and many distinguished Members of both Houses of Congress, that the best mode of dealing with the emancipated slaves is to colonize them outside of the United States, at the earliest reasonable moment. We do not for ourselves, however, make emancipation turn on colonization. We insist on emancipation for its own sake, colonization, or no colonization. We hold that the Government, as the necessary and natural guardian of the emancipated slaves, has the right to insist on their emigration, and that emigration and colonization after emancipation is best for both blacks and whites; but we are persuaded if Government will secure a territory suitable to their tastes, habits, and temperament, and facilitate their migration to it, the emancipated negroes will in a reasonable time, nearly all migrate to it of their own accord. We know the strong local attachment of the negro, and his little enterprising or adventurous disposition, but it must be borne in mind that the negroes have leaders of their own race, or with some mixture of white blood perhaps, who are men of ability, intelligence, and enterprise. These men can be nobody in a community where the white race predom-

inates, and therefore can easily be induced to emigrate and to lead their people with them. Many of these, wearing their life out in slavery, are not wholly unfitted by their genius and ability to lead forth the millions of their race to a new territory, and to found there and govern a state. Seeing that they and their people, if they remain in the United States, must remain there, in spite of all philanthropy can do, as slaves or as outcasts, pariahs, as we have said, they will feel for themselves, and without much difficulty make their people feel, that the best thing for them is to migrate to a country where they can live in a community of their own race, or where at least their own will be the dominant race. Such migration or exode will be the beginning of the uprising of their race. It will quicken a new spirit in them, and be the commencement of their return toward the type from which they have departed so far, and their recompense for the long ages of slavery and oppression they have endured from the white race.

Still we do not conceal from ourselves, the opposition of the other class mentioned at the North, not merely to colonization, but to emancipation under any form or on any condition, is the most formidable obstacle to justice to the slave to be encountered. We have been surprised to find how completely wedded to negro-slavery have become our old Democratic politicians, and how widely pro-slavery sentiments are cherished in the Free States. We had so long been living out of the political world, engrossed with our theological and philosophical studies, that we had taken little note of the changes in public opinion favorable to slavery, which had been effected during the last ten or fifteen years, and we find, very much to our regret, the North, as a whole, less abolition than the South. Our commercial cities had become almost completely Southernized in their views of slavery, and opposition to the existence of slavery, or even to its extension into new territory, has had very little influence with the merchants of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, and the interests of trade, far more than patriotism or loyalty, has moved them to support the Administration in suppressing the Rebellion. The Morrill tariff moved them more than the fall of Sumter. The commercial class in no country and in no age is remarkable for patriotism, and finds usually its country where its profits are largest, or best secured. It with us seeks to preserve the integrity of the Union, for if that should be

lost, they would lose a large portion of their trade. But for the same reason they are opposed to the abolition of slavery. The abolition of slavery, and the great changes it would effect in Southern society, would, at least for a time, seriously lessen the amount of business, and diminish its profits. They want the Union restored as speedily as possible, but at the same time they want slavery retained, so that buying and selling may go on as before, and hence as soon as they thought it likely that slavery might be interfered with, and their old customers at the South crippled in their resources, they became less willing to furnish the government with the means of carrying on the war.

But the politicians, to some extent, of all parties, but more especially of the old Democratic party, are the most inveterate enemies of the policy of emancipation, and from them we hear it proclaimed, over and over again, that the armies of the Union will throw down their arms, if the war were made, in any sense, a war of liberation. They keep up a continued howl against Abolitionists and Radicals, and would seem to regard slavery as more than the Union, as the corner-stone of the Republic, as the essential condition of its prosperity, and the very palladium of its safety. Remove slavery, and we should be obliged to sing, in our grief,

Ilium fuit.

These politicians had for some time a great advantage over us, in making it appear that they had the administration on their side, and that we, in opposing them, were deserting the very president we had helped to elect. Since the sixth of March last, this pretence has been taken from them, and the President, by his message to Congress on that day, shows that the administration is at least on the side of emancipation, and is prepared to initiate it, if, indeed, it be not prepared to go farther.

But the reason of the advocacy of slavery by those old politicians is no secret. If slavery goes, they lose their stock in trade, and their vocation is gone. The Democratic party was always a Southern party. It had its chief strength in the South, and its ablest and most important allies. Let slavery go, and that party is defunct. It can no longer rule the nation, and be henceforth remembered only as the party that, under the pretence of fidelity to the Constitution, has done its best to sacrifice the life of the nation. If slavery be abolished, it can never have the

South with it again. If the Union ceases to be the union of freedom and slavery, it can have no charms for it; for no class of people, than those who composed it, will be more utterly distrusted and despised by the South. They will, therefore, do all in their power to save the "patriarchal institution," and to rear once more their democracy on the slavery of the negro race, as its basis. But we trust they will fail, and the logic of the movement, represented by the Republican party, will carry the nation on, we had almost said, in spite of itself, to the final emancipation of itself from the political power of slavery, by the complete destruction of slavery as property. We think we have shown how this end can be obtained under the Constitution, without violating any Constitutional provision or existing law. If we have so done, the way is clear for the final obliteration from our soil of the curse of slavery.

ART. V.—*Protestantism and Infidelity: an Appeal to candid Americans*. By F. X. WENINGER, D. D., Missionary of the Society of Jesus. New York; Sadlier & Co. 1862. 16mo. pp. 329.

FATHER WENINGER, the distinguished Jesuit Missionary to the Germans, is, we believe, an Austrian by birth, and from a family of some note in his own country. He is a man of large views, and a warm heart, great ability, indomitable energy, and untiring zeal,—the very model of a Missionary. His whole soul appears to be in his work, and he seems to live only for his Master's glory in the salvation of souls. There is no counting the good he has done and is doing, a good the vast extent of which we shall never know till the final judgment. Not contented with travelling day and night, and preaching three or four times a day, and writing and publishing catechetical and other works in his own language, for the instruction or edification of our German population, he devotes no little time to preaching and preparing works in the English language, for the benefit of our English-speaking world, Catholic and non-Catholic. Some months ago, he published an excellent *Manual* or Doctrinal Catechism, admirably adapted to the wants of Catholics in this country, and now in the work before us he makes a direct appeal to our non-Catholic countrymen,

earnestly calling upon them to examine seriously the unhappy and destructive character of their heterodoxy.

The work is designed for popular reading, and is written in a clear, affectionate, popular style, adapted to the apprehension of readers of ordinary capacity and intelligence, but is written with ability, with adequate knowledge of the topics it treats, and cannot fail to interest and command the respect of all classes of readers, however enlightened or cultivated. It is addressed to our heterodox and unbelieving countrymen, as is indicated by its title, *Protestantism and Infidelity*; and we are pleased to see that it does not treat them either as totally destitute of Christian knowledge, or even Christian feelings. The heterodox are not Catholics, but they in some sense pertain to the Christian world and to the Church. They hold not the truth in its unity and catholicity; yet they hold more or less of it, and, for the most part, the same moral and spiritual appeals to conscience which move the Catholic move them, and even those among them who fancy they do not even believe in Christianity. There are great differences between them and us, but the points of resemblance are more numerous, and more important. Let a Catholic preach to a congregation of non-Catholics, very much as he would preach to a congregation of Catholics, in whom he wished to awaken a sense of the importance and necessity of religion as the condition of their salvation and sanctity, and they will listen to him as respectfully as would his Catholic auditory, and be moved by his preaching very much as they would be. Reason is the same, and the law of conscience is the same in both. This important fact Father Weninger fully recognizes, and adopts it as the law of his proceeding.

The author, though he has served principally as a missionary to an old Catholic people settled in the country, has, by his varied intercourse with non-Catholic Americans come to believe their conversion to the Catholic Church is not only possible, but comparatively easy, if missions were opened to them, and serious and earnest efforts were made to present them that faith in its simplicity, freed from those associations which have hitherto repelled rather than attracted them to it. He has learned to like the American people, and he believes that they only need to join the Catholic faith and worship to their order of civilization, to be the greatest and noblest people on earth. Nothing more grieves his heart than the very general neglect to open missions to

them, directly to recall them to unity and Catholicity. He cannot bear to look, under a Catholic point of view, on their spiritual destitution, and he leaves no stone unturned to induce the proper authorities to direct attention to their wants, and, instead of pushing them aside as heterodox and infidel, to send them missionaries who will present them the Church in her true and proper character. He judges the American people rightly, and does them no more than simple justice. In their order of civilization they are already the most catholic people on earth, and there are no people better predisposed to accept and conform to Catholic truth in religion than they are, when once it is presented to them, and so presented that they see that it is catholic and not simply sectarian.

The Catholic religion has never yet been rejected by the American people, for it has never yet been presented to them. What they regard as the Catholic religion is not that religion itself, but its accidents, or certain things that it has gathered around it in its passage through various nations and ages, and which not only they, but many Catholics themselves, confound with it. These things they reject, and are quite right in doing so, but, in rejecting them, they reject nothing catholic, for catholicity is only that which is believed everywhere and always, by all the faithful. What pertains to this or that age or nation, participates of time and place, is local and temporary in its character, and not catholic, and is no essential part of catholic truth, even when not repugnant to it. What the American people want is not the religion of Irishmen, Englishmen, or Germans, or the Catholic religion as these have developed, explained, modified or overlaid it, but the simple catholic truth which subsists in all ages and nations, and does and will outlive all the mutations of time and space. This and this alone is Catholic truth, this and this alone is Catholic religion, and this and this alone is what is necessary to present to the American people, and what has as yet never been distinctly presented to them. But this, they who are simply missionaries to the old Catholic people, do not present pure and simple; far less is it presented by an old Catholic laity from old and foreign Catholic countries. These always think the Gentile converts must be circumcised, and observe the Jewish law, and need a St. Paul to preach to them that the works of the law avail nothing, and to make known to them the freedom we have in Christ.

They who are especially missionaries to the Gentiles are the first to get rid of Judaism, and to understand that the observance of the Jewish law is no essential part of Christianity.

Every man has, if a living man, his special vocation, and they who are specially appointed to labor for a people already Catholic, are seldom those who can labor with the most zeal and success for the conversion of the heterodox and unbelievers. Indeed, in our country, the Bishops and Parish Priests could not specially devote themselves to those outside of the Catholic communion, however ardently they might desire to do so. They have no time to spare for that purpose. They must, first of all, attend to the spiritual wants of the faithful who have been committed to their charge, and this engrosses all their time and energy. Even Protestants do not rely on their "settled" ministry to bring us Catholics into their various sects, and send out missionaries supposed, but often erroneously supposed, to be specially adapted to the work of converting Romanists, who make that their special vocation. Now, every Catholic holds his Church to be the only true Catholic Church, holding and teaching the only true Catholic faith, without which no man is joined to Christ as his head, or is in the way of salvation, "for there is no other name than that of Jesus Christ given under Heaven among men whereby we can be saved." Every Catholic, then, must desire, in proportion to his charity, to convert all unbelievers and misbelievers, and to bring all men into the Church, and into union with Him who died to redeem us, and lives to save us, and glorify us in Heaven. He who should not so desire would be a bad Catholic, and prove that he lacked Christian charity, without which knowledge and faith, miracles and alms-deeds can avail one nothing. He is not to be branded as a zealot or a bigot because he burns with the ardent desire to make all men Catholics. His desire is the natural desire of every Catholic, and only proves the earnestness and sincerity of his faith, and his consistency as a man. This conduct can give no offence to those who are not of his religion, so long as he seeks their conversion only by fair and honorable means, only by arguments addressed to intelligence and the moral affections. The Catholic Church, if a living Church, must be progressive, and progressive by propagandism. This is a proof not of her illiberality, bigotry, and exclusiveness, but of her life, vigor, and love. Catholics in this country must desire and feel them-

selves bound to labor in the most practicable way for the conversion of the country, if they have any faith or confidence in their own religion. They must not merely rejoice when the stray sheep returns to the fold, but they must leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness who went not astray, and go forth into the mountains to seek and find the one sheep that was lost. The Son of Man came to seek and to save; he did not wait till he was sought, or give command to let the stray sheep go, and merely take care that no more go astray; and Christ is the Good Shepherd, and the model of the good pastor.

Nothing in fact produces a more unfavorable impression upon non-Catholics than the apparent indifference of our bishops and priests to their conversion, and their apparent earnestness only in guarding the remnants of the flock that remain. This guarding of the faithful should, of course, be attended to, but the conversion of unbelievers should not be neglected. The Good Shepherd commits to them the care of all his sheep; but all his sheep are not already in the fold. "Other sheep have I, not of this fold; them also must I bring in, that there may be one fold and one shepherd." These other sheep not in the fold must not be neglected, and when they whose business is to bring them in, only sit still and wait for them to come in, or only open the door and let them come in when they knock at it and beg for admission, are not faithful shepherds, and neither follow the example nor obey the injunctions of their Master. This lack of fidelity, of earnestness, and zeal, begets in the minds of non-Catholics a distrust of their faith, and that in turn begets a distrust of the value of the religion they profess. Those outside are frequently edified by the strong attachment manifested by simple faithful Catholics to the Church for themselves, but they would be led to esteem the Church more, if they saw her children equally attached to her for the sake of others.

If the Church is to live and take root in this country, she must prove that she has in her the vital energy of propaganda, and she must advance and extend herself by conversions, not by mere natural increase. As the bishops and priests charged with the care of the faithful population cannot personally attend to it, Father Weninger's plan of opening missions directly to the non-Catholic American people seems to us an excellent one, and deserving of all encouragement. Missionaries devoted especially to the

work of converting the American people, and having their heart in the work, whether native-born or foreign-born, will study the American institutions and character, learn the peculiarly American mind, ascertain its real disposition and wants, and present the Catholic truth in its purity and simplicity, stripped of all that is foreign or not necessary to it, that may have been associated with it by old Catholics. They will be embarrassed by none of the prejudices, habits, customs, and, we may say, superstitions of a foreign population, and, if we know any thing of our countrymen, they will meet with ample success, even though they should be men of no remarkable genius, ability, learning, or eloquence. Twelve fishermen from the Lake of Gensareth converted the world, and twelve honest, simple-minded, earnest, and faithful men can do it again, for they can have the same truth, the same Lord Jesus Christ as the medium of their power, and the same Holy Ghost to give them heroism and victory. The truth is as living and as present, the Word made flesh is as near, and the Holy Ghost as strong and as loving to-day, as on the day of Pentecost. Men only have changed.

We hope, then, we shall not be thought to go out of the proper sphere of a layman, if we second what we know to be Father Weninger's wishes, and respectfully urge upon the proper authorities the opening in some way of American missions, and the setting on foot of the measures necessary, we say not to convert, but to give the American people a fair opportunity of becoming converted if they choose. The time was never more favorable than now. The calamities of civil war, the distress in many parts of the country, and the manifest failure of many of our plans and hopes, have disposed the great body of the American people to thoughtfulness, shaken their confidence in most of the radicalisms in religion, politics, and morals, so ripe a few years ago, made them more ready to listen to the wisdom of past ages, and to be told that the true future must have its root in what has been, and be simply its evolution or development. And although Catholics have not done what they might, and should have done, to prove their sympathy with constitutional freedom and their loyalty to the United States, yet the readiness with which large numbers of them have volunteered to fight the battles of the country, and to aid in saving the life and integrity of the nation, has removed many prejudices from the minds of non-Catholic Americans, and rendered them less unwilling

to listen to the claims of our Church. They see and feel the necessity of a stronger conservative element than we have hitherto had, and an element, not like that of slavery repugnant to freedom, but a conservative element, which, while it favors order and stability, favors also the free development of thought, the evolution of truth, and the real and continuous progress of civilization; and we go not too far when we say many of them are beginning to ask themselves if this element may not, after all, be found in the old Catholic Church, presented in her purity and catholicity. Never has there been, and, if neglected, never will there be, at least for a long time to come, so favorable an opportunity for gaining a respectful hearing in this country for our religion.

In the work of presenting the Catholic cause to the favorable notice of those alien from our communion, we have few works popular in their character superior to this little volume, written out from the very heart and soul of its author, on "Protestantism and Infidelity." It should be distributed broadcast by the missionaries among non-Catholics, and though it will not take root in all of them, it will take root in some hearts, spring up, and bear fruit, it may be an hundred fold. We will not say that, in our judgment, it is the best book of the sort that could be written, but it is a good book, and should go along with the *Questions of the Soul* and the *Aspirations of Nature*, by Father Hecker, and the excellent volume of sermons recently published by the Paulists. The author begins by endeavoring to prove, in a clear and affectionate manner, that Protestantism is a Religion of Despair, because it fails to meet the wants and necessities of the human soul, and because it leads to Infidelity, which is only another name for despair itself, since it is the grave of faith and hope. Having arrived at this conclusion, he proceeds to present the Catholic religion as the religion of faith, hope, and love, to explain briefly its dogmas and sacraments, and to refute in few words the more frequent objections urged against them. The two parts of the book make together an excellent tract on the deficiencies and dangers of Protestantism, and the truth, completeness, excellence, and desirableness of the Catholic religion.

With regard to the position that Protestantism leads to Infidelity, understanding by the term *infidelity* the total rejection of the Christian religion as a revelation of the super-

intelligible, we remark that Protestantism is heterodox, and all heterodoxy holds truth, but not in its unity and catholicity. All truth is in its own nature one and catholic, and heterodoxy or error is not so much the total denial of all truth, as it is the failure to recognize and hold truth in its real and proper relations. It mutilates truth, and misplaces the truth it retains. As all truth is one and catholic, that is, one and universal truth, any error against it taken by itself, or as the logical point of departure, necessarily involves the denial of all truth, or the reversal of the whole order of truth. In this sense, if you take Protestantism on the side of its error, and complete it negatively, it leads necessarily to infidelity, or pure negation; while, on the other hand, if you take it on the side of the truth it retains, and complete it in a positive or affirmative sense, it leads to the one and catholic truth held by the Church and evolved in her life.

But while we say this, we must not forget that if in Protestant countries there are infidels who may trace their infidelity to Protestantism, there are also infidels in Catholic countries in nearly equal numbers, who have not derived their infidelity from that source. There are, in proportion to the population, very nearly as many unbelievers in Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, and Spanish and Portuguese America, as in Protestant Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. These unbelievers in Catholic countries have not been made so by Protestantism. We cannot deny their existence, and it would be unjust to make Protestantism responsible for their unbelief. Protestantism, by making the authority in revealed truth a dead Book, leads to infidelity, because the Book, having no living interpreter, necessarily confines those who rely on it alone to a dead past, and permits no continuous or living evolution of truth, to meet the ever-varying wants of human science and human culture. Catholics would favor the same result, if, in transferring the authority from the Book to the Church, they transferred it to a dead and not a living Church. It is not authority that is objected to on either side, for all know that as religion has its root and life in the superintelligible, it must depend on supernatural revelation, which can be received by the human mind only by faith, therefore only by authority. Everybody knows, also, that the revelation, when made, is and must be authoritative. Protestantism does not lead to infidelity, because it denies authority and asserts private

judgment, for it, as well as Catholicity, asserts authority, and Catholics must assert private judgment in understanding the words of the Church, as well as Protestants in interpreting the words of Scripture. In principle, on both of these points Catholics and Protestants are agreed, and both are catholic, for the principle of authority is alike asserted whether, in point of fact, you place authority in the Church or in the Book; and the liberty of private interpretation is alike asserted in principle when allowed as to the words of either.

The principle that leads to unbelief is neither the principle of authority nor the principle of private examination, or interpretation. All who recognize belief at all, as distinguished from science, admit the principle of authority; and all who recognize belief as an intellectual act, do, and must admit the principle of private judgment, for we must attach some meaning to the words we believe, and the meaning we attach is our private judgment of their sense. What leads to infidelity in most cases where it exists, is the assertion of *the authority of the past in a sense to interdict the future*, so as to prohibit the future continuous explication and application of the Christian Idea the Church is realizing, and to bind the believer back to a dead past. The Reformers did this when they denied the living authority of the Church, and transferred authority to the words of a Book, for the Book is of the past, not of the present, a dead, not a living Book. Their doctrine strictly adhered to would have interdicted the whole future. The founders of the Anglican establishment practically did the same, for though they did not absolutely or formally deny the authority of the Church, they denied her to be catholic in time, by binding her back to the first four General Councils, and to the words of a dead book. They bound her to the past, and interdicted the evolution of the future. The Catholic Church in herself can do no such thing, because she is Catholic in time as well as space, is an ever-present living Church, living by the indwelling presence of the Word made flesh, and the continuous evolution, explication, and application of her Divine-human or Theandric Idea. But Catholics who are orthodox as to the letter of the dogma, may and often do fall into an error of precisely the same sort, and transfer the authority which belongs only to the living, ever-present Church to the past Church, and making the authority of the past interdict the liberty of the present and the future. This, we apprehend, is the chief cause of unbelief in Ca-

tholic countries. There is little or no infidelity in Catholic nations so long as Catholics are progressive as well as conservative, and labor to advance as well as preserve.

All progress is by evolution, and must have its germs in the past, and be the evolution and continuation of that in the past that could not die or become itself past. This evolution or progress is a right of truth and of the human mind, because both have the right to live, and neither can live without it. When this evolution is denied in the name of religion, then it is forced to go on without religion, that is, out of unity and catholicity, and consequently as infidelity, and thus be an abnormal progress, tending more and more to become simply progress in destruction. This asserting of the authority of the past, so as to shut out the future, has, in modern times, been not uncommon among Catholics; and it is this, we apprehend, that has filled Italy and France, as well as other Catholic nations, with unbelievers. You may call it Protestantism, for it is identically the mother error of Protestantism, and therefore charge the infidelity of modern times in all nations to Protestantism, that is, a *protest* against unity and catholicity; but you have no right to charge it exclusively or chiefly to those who are recognized as Protestants. No people are more responsible for it than Catholics themselves, who fail to perceive and accept the catholicity of their own Church, and they have no right to exonerate themselves, and hold others alone responsible for it. It may be much more agreeable to our self-love to throw all the blame of their infidelity upon infidels themselves, or, at least, upon those outside of our communion; but, perhaps, it would be more in accordance with truth, as well as with Christian humility, to take a large share of it to ourselves. Our Lord addressed his severest reproaches, not to those outside of the Synagogue, but to those within, and occupying the chief seats in it. Doubtless all Catholics believe the Church is catholic, but they do not always practically regard her as catholic in time, and here is an error in practice they must correct before they can hope for much success in converting the heterodox.

Father Weninger's proofs of the Church are, for the most part, as they should be, clear and brief statements and expositions of her character and dogmas. For ourselves, we believe our long, labored scholastic proofs of the Church are of very little practical value. Indeed, we hardly accept the scholastic notion of proof at all. There is no intelligible

proposition that can, as an isolated proposition, ever be established by direct positive proof. It can be proved only by showing its harmony in relation to the general order of truth. You may prove facts, but not principles. Principles are given, not sought after or found. They are in the mind from the first. The world outside the Church accepts, and always has accepted, all catholic principles, and all who claim to be Christians admit, and always have admitted, the unity and catholicity of the Church, at least of the internal Church. The only serious controversy there is, or can be, is on the unity and catholicity of the external or visible Church, or external Church organism, for when once the unity and catholicity of that organism is conceded there are few that would not concede that it is the organism that has its centre at Rome, in the Roman Church. But in God's universe we must note three things: 1. The superintelligible, 2. The intelligible, and 3. The sensible. These three make up the cosmos. The sensible has its root in the intelligible, and the intelligible in the superintelligible. The superintelligible does not differ by nature from the intelligible, but is above our intelligence, and is known to us only analogically by supernatural revelation. We know naturally there is a superintelligible, but what it is, we know only by faith, by which it is rendered analogically intelligible to us. It expresses itself analogically in the intelligible, and the intelligible expresses itself in the sensible. The internal Church is the superintelligible and intelligible Church, of which the sensible or visible Church is the external expression. As the internal is one and catholic, so must the external be one and catholic, or it would not express the internal. The internal must express its own unity and catholicity in the external, and an external lacking unity and catholicity, could not have its root in internal unity and catholicity. The external copies the internal, for the internal produces it, is its immediate principle, and every thing generates or produces its like. Thus the Son, in the Mystery of the Trinity, is the exact image of the Father or generative principle, and thus creation is an external image of God, and copies in its progression his own Triunity, as we have shown in the second Article in the present number. The visible Church must, then, as the expression of the invisible, express and copy the unity and catholicity of the internal or Ideal Church.

Let the theologian explain this, and the preacher present

it to the understanding of the people, and the controversy is ended. Indeed, the belief in this is potential, or, rather, latent in all who have received the Christian faith at all, and been reared in the bosom of Christian civilization. The preacher has far less to do, by way of argument, to prove his Church, than he commonly supposes. Little more is necessary than that he and his hearers should come to a mutual understanding. If they understand him, and he asks no more than he is required to ask, he will find them ready to concede pretty much all he asks. Let him speak to them simply, address their plain common sense, and he will find in them all the elements of the faith he wishes them to accept.

It is so we view the question. We do not pretend every man will be converted, and practically yield to the truth, for conversion requires the concreative act of the will, and the will is free. Real conversion implies grace, for our Lord says, "No man can come unto me except the Father draw him." Salvation is of election, and, though salvation is possible to all, only the elect will be saved, and we pretend not to fathom the mystery of election. We are not speaking of conversion in the sense of the inward working of Divine grace on the heart, but of conversion as a purely intellectual act, as a simple conviction of the understanding. This conversion we believe is comparatively easy, and will invariably take place in every mind which really sees and grasps Catholic truth in its real character and relations. There may remain afterward the moving of the heart, the correction of evil habits, the overcoming of passion and prejudice, and all that; but the life of man is in truth, and when you have once got the truth into a man's understanding, you have inoculated him with the principle of life, and have made a beginning, done the initial work, and have a basis for your efforts at evolution and completion, or practical realization. After all, if we reach the understanding through the affections, we move the heart, that is, the will, through the understanding.

These reflections have been naturally suggested by the subject of Father Weninger's little book. That they are not in all respects complimentary to our Catholic population is very possible; but we know not that their value is at all lessened by that fact. We Catholics do not constitute a Mutual Admiration Society, nor a small private family, whose faults and peccadillos each member of the family

should consider himself bound to do his best to conceal. We belong to the Catholic Church, and are members of the great, the universal Christian community. Our Church is before the world, and we ourselves are before the world, and we cannot escape the world's judgment, if we would. To pass ourselves off for better than we are can avail nothing in the long run, and to attempt to leave the world to judge the Church by us, is an injustice to the Church herself. Thousands and thousands are prevented from even examining her claims, because they confound her with notions, opinions, and practices of Catholics, which she disapproves as much as they do. Shall we not for their sake, if not for our own, distinguish between her and ourselves, and show them, when such is the fact, that what they object to is no part of Catholicity? There are a multitude of traditions amongst Catholics, which are not Catholic; we do not quarrel with Catholics for retaining them and observing them, though only traditions of men; but we do insist that they shall not be thrown in the faces of non-Catholics, as something they must take and swallow, if they enter the Catholic communion.

"By their fruits shall ye know them," said our Lord to his disciples; by our fruits non-Catholics do and will judge our Church. We for one are not willing that we Catholics in this country should be taken as the criterion of Catholicity, even when we think ourselves good Catholics. We have amongst us excellent bishops, excellent priests, and amongst the laity individuals as good and as honest as the day is long, who adorn the religion they profess by well-ordered lives and godly conversation; but externally, as we come before the public, we are by no means an edifying people. Our political influence is not more healthful, is not wiser, is in no respect more beneficial to the country, than the political influence of non-Catholics. The worst governed cities in the Union are precisely those in which Catholics are the most influential in the elections, and have the most to do with municipal affairs. We furnish more than our share of the rowdies, the drunkards, and the vicious population of our larger cities. The majority of grog-sellers in this city of New York are Catholics, and the portions of the city where grog-selling, drunkenness, and filth most abound are those chiefly inhabited by Catholics, and we scarcely see the slightest effort made for a reformation. In ordinary life we do not find Catholics more honest, more truthful, more

conscientious than the non-Catholic community. There is much needing to be done before we in all things, except faith, really come up to the level as a people with the non-Catholic people of the country : and yet we are perpetually boasting, and our Catholic journals are continually glorifying the Catholic body, as if it had the infallibility and sanctity predicable only of the Ideal or internal Church. Non-Catholics hear our boasts, and see and know at least our vices and defects. What, then, must they think of the elevating and sanctifying influences of our religion ?

We have found the Catholic Church more than we expected ; we have found large masses of Catholics less than we had expected, and we say, frankly, with individual exceptions ; we have not found among them that intelligence, that moral culture, and that high-toned moral principle, that we expected to find. We read the catechism, and took it for granted that Catholics who went to Confession, and received Holy Communion, would be free from vulgar superstitions, and would be truthful, honest, no tale-bearers, no detractors, no drunkards, no quarrellers, no wife or husband beaters. We expected to find Catholics willing always to pay homage to truth and justice, liberal and tolerant in matters of opinion, rigid and uncompromising in matters of faith. We have found them, in but too many instances, the reverse. We have found people whose ancestors during fourteen hundred years, have been Catholics, who have yet to be taught the simplest principles and precepts of Christian morality, and who scarcely have any conception of duty, except going to Confession, and receiving Holy Communion. We have found those who seemed to think, if they escaped the censure of the priest, they need give themselves no further trouble. "As true as you are a living man," said a Catholic lady to us, "I had been baptized, and been confirmed, had been married, and been to Confession, and to Communion, and yet I never knew till after coming to this country, at the age of seventeen, that there was any God back of the priest who had any thing to do with the forgiveness of sins. The thought that in Confession the priest forgives sin only as the minister of God, and that it is really God who forgives, never came into my head, till I was so taught by an American priest." We could not doubt what the lady told us, strange as it might seem.

No people without intelligence and high moral culture can be an eminently moral people. There is a natural affin-

ity between ignorance and vice, and as a rule you will find that a generally uncultivated people will have only a few virtues, and those of the simpler sort, in which they have been the more specially instructed. Yet in moral culture and general intelligence the Catholic population are below the better class of non-Catholics. The motives from which they act are lower and more selfish. We have been accused of being in error, because the majority of Catholics did not agree with us, and gravely exhorted by men whose sacred character ought to have taught them better, to change our course, because by doing so we might be one of the most popular editors in the country—thus virtually making popularity the criterion of truth, and the test of merit. We have found views and opinions familiar to us from our youth up, and which we looked upon as mere commonplaces, treated as new, profound, and original. We have found our Catholic journals making a multitude of statements that a simple tyro ought to know are not true. We find them adducing as a proof of the catholicity of the Church, the assumed fact that Mass is everywhere said in one and the same language, and with the same rites and ceremonies, evidently supposing that Mass is everywhere said in Latin, and according to the Latin rite. They argue as if the celibacy of the clergy were a universal law of the Church, forgetful of the fact that the clergy of the Oriental rites, as the Greek, Armenian, &c., are allowed to retain the wives they had married before receiving Holy Orders. We have read in them that there were no heresies before Luther, and that before him all Christians were united in one and the same Communion!

Now these, and other things far more important, and which, not to scandalize the weak, we forbear to mention, we can easily account for, and to a great extent excuse. But their existence we cannot deny, and we insist that it is best for both Catholics and non-Catholics, that we frankly own them, and as frankly avow that they are faults, real faults. Catholics should not wait to have them pointed out by their enemies, but should themselves point them out as contrary to Catholicity, and seek in earnest to correct them. Many of the things which our non-Catholic countrymen find disedifying in Catholics may be merely national peculiarities, and no worse than our own national peculiarities, which we think nothing of, because familiar with them from infancy, perhaps not so bad; but still we should not identify them with Catholicity, nor be angry, when a pub-

licist writing to give non-Catholics a just view of Catholicity, points them out as no part of the Catholic religion, nor should we speak because we profess the Catholic religion, as if we were immaculate, and not guilty of many of the same things that we condemn in non-Catholics. Our profession will not avail us, unless we have something besides profession. Catholics as well as Protestants may be excluded from the kingdom of heaven. "Many will say unto me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name, and in thy name have cast out devils, and in thy name done many wonderful works? Then will I profess unto them, I never knew you: depart from me, ye that work iniquity." It is important, both for our own sake and the sake of those outside, that we avow distinctly that Catholics may both err and sin, and error and sin in them can receive no more favor than error and sin in others.

We continually speak of the necessity of our religion to the morals of the community, as a conservative element in society, and to wean men's affections from things of the earth. This is all very well, for in so speaking, we speak truly; but what sort of conviction will our true words even produce in non-Catholics, when they find no countries more torn by revolutions than Catholic countries, no people more greedy of gain, or more attached to the pomps and vanities of this world, than Catholics in the United States, or when they find them politically siding with those who push the democratic tendency of the country to its most dangerous extreme, and to a fearful extent opposed to the abolition of slavery, that black curse on our nation, at this moment threatening its life? A few of our pastors have spoken out against rebellion; the greater part have been silent. Where is the conservatism that stands quietly by with its arms folded across its breast, and sees the life of the nation destroyed by a wicked and unprovoked rebellion? Many Catholics we know have volunteered and are doing good service in our armies; but what pastor, bishop, or priest, has called upon them to do it as a Catholic duty? In thus volunteering they have done no more than other citizens, not Catholics, and no more than was their duty as citizens. We have heard more sympathy expressed by Catholics with the Southern rebellion than with the effort of the United States to suppress it. What are professions worth, if belied by our practice?

We could continue this line of remark much farther, but

it is unnecessary. We have said elsewhere that Catholics form a foreign colony in the country, and that the missions opened to them are not missions opened to the American people. The presentation of Catholicity to them or by them is not the presentation that will favorably affect the mass of our non-Catholic countrymen. What we ask of them is, that they shall not be the dog in the manger; that they shall not denounce as uncatholic every Catholic who attempts to separate our religion from the errors, vices, and superstitions of an old Catholic people, and present it in its real character, free from every thing, not essential to it, likely to repel them. We want the Catholic religion in its catholicity for our countrymen, not in a sectarian or national character. We want the Catholic dogma, the Catholic worship, the Catholic communion, but we want none of the Europeanism that has been associated with it, none of the arbitrary or despotic rule to which Catholics have been for so many ages subjected. We want Catholicity in its living reality, in its charity, and in its power, in its authority, and in its liberty, in its conservatism, and in its progress. We want the living Church of Christ, not the dry bones or worn out copy of the Mediæval Church. "Why seek ye the Lord among the dead? know ye not that he is risen, and dies no more?" Our quarrel with our friends is not with them as Catholics, but as non-Catholics. It is that they overlook or deny the catholicity of the Church in time, or her capacity to accept and bless, inspire and direct, inform and elevate the living civilization of our own age, and our own country.

We must always distinguish in the Church between the human and the Divine. On her Divine side the Church is infallible and holy, as is God himself. On her human side we must distinguish between the Idea and its practical realization. The Idea or Ideal of the Church is catholic, for it is Theandric, or man taken up into union with God. In her Ideal the Church is catholic, infallible, and holy, as is the Word made flesh. But she is only potentially catholic, infallible, and holy in her practical realization, of her Ideal in time and space. "We have received this treasure in earthen vessels." The Idea of regenerated mankind is fully realized, individuated, completed, fulfilled only in the Man Christ Jesus. All Christians are potentially Christ, but all have not attained to the full stature of perfect men in Him, and will not so attain till the final consummation. Even

St. Paul, who had been caught up to the third heavens, and heard things unutterable, counted himself not to have attained, but pressed onward toward the mark of his high calling in Christ Jesus. Viewed on this side Christians, taken collectively as the Church, or distributively as individuals, have not attained, have not identified their actual life with their Ideal, or realized their Theandric type. Hence it is that men—here it makes no difference whether we speak of the Clergy or the laity—may have the Catholic Ideal, may be irreproachable under the point of view of dogma, or doctrine, and yet be practically uncatholic, narrow-minded, and sectarian. The Church is in the world, and a world where nothing remains the same for two successive moments. She must meet this world as best she can, but while her principles in dealing with it can undergo no change, her practical methods and arrangements must needs change as it changes. These practical methods and arrangements depend on the practical wisdom and sagacity of the pastors under their chief, the Bishop of Rome, or successor of Peter in the Apostolic office. But they depend on the practical wisdom and sagacity of these as men, and as men who are *viatores*, still on the way, and in no practical sense infallible. The Church has authority in discipline, authority to rule and govern, but as we often say, she is not infallible in discipline or administration, that is to say, in that which does and must change with time and place, or the ever varying changes in the world with which she stands related. In discipline and government we owe her the filial obedience due from the child to the parent, from the loyal subject to legitimate authority; but we are not bound to believe that in these matters she cannot err, that popes and bishops and priests are all or any of them infallible, and commit no mistakes. They are wiser, if you will, but with human wisdom, not with divine wisdom. They are not specially inspired, are not specially enlightened in a supernatural manner, and have no more wisdom than even laymen of equal genius, opportunity, and study might attain to. The infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost, we assert for the Church, has relation to the Ideal, to the preservation of the Depositum, that is to say, to faith and morals, not to discipline and government, which are matters of prudence, and in regard to which the infallible assistance is not requisite in order to retain the Idea in its integrity.

In discipline and government the Church, then, may err,

and pursue a policy not always the wisest and best, and which, even if the wisest and best when adopted, becomes unwise and hurtful if continued after the reasons which originally led to its adoption have ceased to exist. The changes constantly going on in time and place require corresponding changes on the part of the Church, not in doctrine, not in principle, not in her dogma, but in her practical methods and arrangements for promoting the interests of Christ's kingdom on earth. When Catholics object to these changes, when they try their best to prevent them, and denounce as heterodox all who believe them necessary, they, as we say, deny the catholicity of the Church in time, seek to arrest her in her career, to bring to a full stop the explication and evolution, or practical realization of the Ideal, and to bind her back to the dead past. This denies the liberty and activity of the Church, and asserts her as a dead, not as a living Church. Now we may be wrong, but we are fully convinced that this is actually the case with a large number of Catholics, and especially with those who are invested with the government of ecclesiastical affairs, and give tone and direction to the public sentiment of the Catholic community. We believe there is amongst us an unwise and hurtful resistance to modern civilization, to modern liberty, to the freedom and activity of the mind. It is to this resistance, to the obstinate adherence to institutions and usages which have outlived their time, and were never useful save as means to an end, that creates the opposition our religion encounters, and prevents that reunion and harmony of all who profess to be Christians in the bosom of the Catholic communion, which all lovers of our Lord and aspirants to a share in his glory most ardently desire. We think the chief reason of the heterodoxy outside of the Church is to be found in the Church, or rather in those who are in the Church, and claim to be the only true, uncompromising Catholics.

Here, then, is the reason why we say so many things uncomplimentary to our Catholic brethren. We believe that Catholics are answerable for the present distracted state of Christendom, and that it is only through them the distractions and divisions, the schisms and the heresies, over which we all do and must grieve, can be healed. "Ye are the salt of the earth," said our Lord to his disciples. But the salt may lose its savor, and when it does, it is thenceforth good for nothing but to be cast out and trodden underfoot of

men. It is we Catholics who are in fault, and our fault is that we do not appreciate the treasure committed to our keeping, or that we fail to perceive and understand its value. We at best wrap the talent we have received in a clean napkin and bury it in the earth, instead of putting it out to increase. The old times have gone, and we cannot recall them if we would. The mediæval world has been rolled together as a scroll, and as a vestment it has been folded up. Its elements have been dissolved, and in vain would we collect them from the four winds of heaven, and seek to reconstruct it. We are in a new world, with new heavens, and a new earth. It is in this new world the great work of the Church has now to be carried on. Her work can go on in this new world as well as it ever went on in the old world; for she, though ancient, is never old.

We accept fully and unreservedly the Catholic faith, Catholic morals, Catholic authority, and will readily abandon any notion or opinion we may entertain that is uncatholic, or not consonant with Catholic faith and morals, the moment its error is made manifest to us; but we are not willing to take the opinions, the practice, or the sentiment of any community as the measure of Catholic truth and virtue, least of all as we find them in our own country. We deny that our Catholic population or the Church in this country, is either a full or fair expression of Catholic faith and morals. Catholicity is superior to us. We do not, therefore, hold ourselves exempt from faults, or imagine that our own short-comings may not be more sinful in the sight of God than are those of our Catholic brethren here or elsewhere; we do not set ourselves up as one having authority to judge or censure; we do not claim the right to go on our own way, demand reform, and labor for it without respect to the hierarchy and the established discipline of the Church. No reform of any value can be effected in a disorderly manner. We are no revolutionists in either Church or State. But we deny that we are bound to be satisfied with every thing the hierarchy does or approves, or that we have no right to call public attention to evils that we see, that we know exist, and cannot but deplore. The laity have a mission in the Church as well as the clergy, and the pretence that the laity must never form or express any opinion not favorable to the clergy, is alike injurious to the clergy and the laity. The laity have no right to usurp any sacerdotal or prelatical functions, but not therefore does it

follow that they must be in the hands of the clergy like clay in the hands of the potter.

We all say our religion is favorable alike to authority and to liberty. Let us prove it so by our example. We all say that it does not destroy but strengthens our manhood; let us prove it by showing ourselves in the full vigor and dignity of our manhood. We all say our religion purifies and elevates the understanding; let us prove it by showing ourselves clear-sighted men, by rising above vulgar prejudices, vulgar superstitions, into the serene and healthful atmosphere of truth and freedom. We all say that our religion is the grand civilizer of men and nations, the very basis and cement of society; let us prove it by showing ourselves in earnest to advance civilization, and ready to greet every progress, civilization here or elsewhere may make. It is of no use for us to talk simply of what the Church has done, or of what she may do. The practical question is always, What here and now is she doing? We know what the Church has done in the way of civilization. She has founded modern civilization itself. She has taken the rude, untamed Barbarians who overran the Roman empire, and made them the free, the great, the elevated, and refined nations of the modern world, far superior to the greatest and most renowned civilized nations of antiquity. She has given a new and nobler meaning to the word *virtue*—a new and more spiritual aim to human activity itself. This all the world knows, and nobody seriously disputes it. But the real question is not there. What is she doing for civilization here and now? Are not her most zealous and influential members now everywhere arrayed against the onward progress of modern civilization, and doing all in their power to arrest it, and throw the world back where it was before the outbreak of the French Revolution? Do they not do their best to repress every movement of humanity, and brand her irrepressible instincts as anti-catholic and satanic?

If modern civilization assumes an irreligious or anti-catholic direction, whose fault is it? Have we not begun by denouncing it, and have we not by rejecting it forced it to take the direction it takes, and which injures both it and religion? We can explain why Catholics, leading influential Catholics we mean, have taken their stand against modern civilization, and we are far from alleging or pretending that their motives have been bad, or not, in many re-

spects laudable; but we cannot deny the fact, nor its deplorable consequences. By their stand they have lost for the Church the control of the modern world, modern literature, art, and science, and prepared the way for the revival of Gentilism. Such, at least, is the sense in which we read modern history, and must we, such being our honest conviction, forbear to say so, and join our voice to swell the chorus of self-glorification? Our boasting is intolerable, it provokes denial on the part of every honest man who really knows something of the way in which things have been managed; and the denial occasions scandal. Catholics may glorify God as much as they please, but all attempts to glorify themselves are bad, and should be abandoned. We may show ourselves superior to others, if we can, but let it be by our deeds, not by our words. "Self-praise is dispraise," is a proverb that applies to nations and communities, as well as to individuals.

We say we accept heartily the Catholic authority, the Catholic faith, Catholic morality, Catholic discipline, without any equivocation or mental reservation; but we cannot insist that non-Catholics shall accept and embrace as Catholic any thing not strictly and rigidly Catholic. Nothing else will we ourselves be forced to accept or observe. We say not this because we have only a stingy or grudging faith, but because we insist on judging and being judged by the law. Our faith may be richer and more exuberant than our words. Perhaps we hold many things as pious beliefs, and cherish them for our own private edification or consolation, which, though not repugnant to faith, are yet not of faith. There are amongst Catholics a great many pleasing, pious, and tender private devotions, permitted, not commanded; we may adopt them as we see proper; we oppose them not, perhaps we love them, but we cannot urge them upon others as any essential part of Catholic worship. Open any of our thousand and one Prayer Books, and you will easily perceive to what we allude. We may for ourselves wear the scapular or the so-called miraculous medal in honor of Our Lady, as we would wear next our heart the picture of our mother, or of some dear friend; we may choose out among the canonized Saints some one to be our patron, and pay him special reverence and devotion; we may say our beads, repeat the prayers to the Sacred Heart of Jesus and to the Sacred Heart of Jesus and Mary, but all these are private devotions, left to our own choice, taste, or judg-

ment, and we object to them only when you attempt to prescribe them as obligatory, or as having a sort of sacramental virtue in themselves. In every living Catholic heart, faith and love will be exuberant, and push themselves out in a great variety of rich and delicate flowers, which we may call the "flowers of Catholic piety." These no man should touch with a rude hand, or expose to the rude gaze of a profane public. They are for the private soul, in her own private devotions, and let her enjoy them according to her own mood, her own taste, or her own judgment. These private devotions may often be attractive and consoling. Medals, beads, scapulars, and things of that sort, have their value from association and use, but no more inherent value than the praying machines of the Tartars. Their efficacy is never sacramental or *ex opere operato*. We may ourselves personally resort to them or not, according to our peculiar mood or temperament, but we will not permit our affection or non-affection for them to be made a test of our Catholic faith, or Catholic piety. We will not make them or receive them as a test in the case of others, or insist on their observance or non-observance by those we would bring into the Church. We will not make, and, as far as we have any influence, suffer to be made, the mistake of confounding the flowers either with the *root* or with the *fruits* of piety. We think it well that all should understand, that breaking the string of one's scapular, is not so grievous an offence as drunkenness or adultery, as lying and stealing, or as tale-bearing and detraction.

It is no answer to say that these abuses of good things are not common, and are only the result of ignorance, and that no Catholic properly instructed ever runs into them. We know not how common they may be; we only know that where faith is strong, and knowledge is weak, there is in all men a tendency to superstition, as where faith is weak and knowledge strong, or thought to be strong, there is a tendency to irreligion. Of the two, the tendency to superstition is the less dangerous, for we consider superstition a less evil than irreligion, a credulous faith less hurtful to the soul, than a sharp, carping, heartless skepticism. But both are hurtful; both are opposed to catholicity, which is dialectic, and tolerates no sophistical extremes. While, therefore, we upbraid non-Catholics with their irreligion, we should with equal fearlessness rebuke the superstition of Catholics. We should take care that all Catholics be well instructed in their relig-

ion ; and we protest against the sophism of concluding they are so instructed from the fact that they ought to be.

Here are, at greater length than we intended, our reasons for remarks assumed to be uncomplimentary to our Catholic brethren. We see our whole country overrun with heterodoxy, millions perishing for the lack of that faith we possess, and, as we believe, in a great measure through our faults, and precisely those faults which we most affectionately cherish, and which it is dangerous to designate and reprove, and seek to correct. We personally have no interest in exposing them. By doing it we only raise up enemies and alienate friends ; and yet somebody must do it, or the Church will never gain a foothold here, and be that blessing to the country we all say she will be, and we personally believe her destined to be. The faults, the greater or smaller, which we have without much order or fixed method touched upon, are scandals in the eyes of non-Catholic Americans, and lead them, though regarding Romanism as they call it, as the best religion for us, especially for the ignorant Irish, to turn up their noses in huge disdain, if we suggest it may possibly be the best religion also for them. It is easy to declaim against these non-Catholics and denounce them for their pride ; but we submit that it would be far better, far more Christian, to correct our faults, and let them see that such things, though existing among Catholics, are not held by Catholics to be catholic.

· ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *The Life, Times, and Correspondence of the Right Reverend Dr. Doyle, Bishop of Kildare and Leighlin.* By WILLIAM JOHN FITZPATRICK, J. P., Author of "The Life, Times, and Contemporaries of Lord Cloncurry," "Lady Morgan ; her Career, Literary and Personal," &c. Dublin : Duffy. 1861. 2 vols. 8vo.

WE intended to give in this number an extended notice of the *Life, Times, and Correspondence of Dr. Doyle*, the eminent Bishop of Kildare and Leighlin, but the gentleman on whom we relied for its preparation, has not been able to get it ready in season, and we must, therefore, for the present at least, content ourselves with a brief notice of Mr. Fitzpatrick's work, and its illustrious subject. As a biographer we cannot award Mr. Fitzpatrick the highest praise. He is too ambitious, and lacks naturalness and simplicity of style,

and spends too much time in preparing to approach his thought without reaching and expressing it. But he deserves praise for his industry, and evident honesty, and he must have been a very great bungler indeed to have produced a work giving any account at all of the Life and Labors of Dr. Doyle, which should not possess a high degree of interest for every reader who has any appreciation of distinguished abilities, high moral and religious worth, and pure, enlightened, and self-sacrificing patriotism.

We had heard Dr. Doyle spoken of as a Gallican, and had imbibed a prejudice against him. We had heard him highly praised, indeed, by some of his countrymen, but the Irish are accustomed to be so extravagant both in their praise and in their denunciation, that we usually take their praise or their condemnation with many grains of allowance, and we confess that we had formed rather an unfavorable opinion of his real merits. We had supposed him a political priest of the class of which the present Archbishop of Tuam is a favorable type, and we had no wish to form his acquaintance. But the work before us has disabused us, and has made it clear that our prejudices were unjust, that Dr. Doyle was no such man as we had supposed, that he was, on the contrary, a man of eminent ability, a wise and zealous pastor, a brave and true patriot, a profound and clear-sighted statesman,—a man to whom Ireland is more indebted than to any other Irishman we have ever heard of,—for St. Patrick, though the Apostle of Ireland, was not himself an Irishman. No one can read the volumes before us without feeling that he was a true man, high-minded, and honorable, free from all duplicity, all trickery, all littleness of any sort, and a man who devoted himself, heart and soul, alike to the interests of religion and civilization. He seems to us a man of a far higher order of mind than his celebrated contemporary, and far superior to Mr. O'Connell in real statesmanship. He had in him no element of the demagogue, and he, far more than O'Connell, should be called the Liberator of Ireland. It is impossible to read the Correspondence published in these volumes, without being struck with his practical good sense on every question he touched, and without perceiving that, if O'Connell was the prince of agitators, and could better move the mob, Dr. Doyle was the man who in the struggle for Catholic Emancipation, was the great man on the Catholic side, the man who had the weight with the government, and the confidence of the friends of Catholics outside of their communion, without whom Emancipation could never have been obtained. Far better would it have been for Ireland if she had continued to follow the Bishop of Kildare and Leighlin, in preference to Mr. O'Connell, who, whatever we may think of him, had in him a spice of the demagogue, and not seldom was willing to act on the principle that the end sanctifies the means. However, when we speak of Mr. O'Connell, the reader must take our remarks with caution, for,

we confess, he was never a favorite with us, and we grew up with many prejudices against him, which may, after all, turn out to be as unjust as those we had entertained against the Bishop of Kildare and Leighlin.

We do not find Dr. Doyle's statements in his examination before Parliament as objectionable as they had been represented to us. We find in him no ultra-gallicanism, and as far as his views are given by Mr. Fitzpatrick, we find in them nothing that we who claim to be a staunch ultra-montanist cannot accept, and we are happy to learn that his doctrine, contrary to what we had been told, has never received the slightest censure at Rome. Dr. Doyle is not the only Irishman whose orthodoxy has been wrongly called in question. This happened to the greatest Irishman we have ever read of, the great John Scotus Erigena, who flourished in the tenth century, as master of the School in the Palace, *Schola Palatii*, of Charles le Chauve, and who not being understood by his contemporaries, was accused of heterodoxy, abandoned by his former friend Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, and has remained under a cloud nearly a thousand years. Our own generation is just beginning to rehabilitate his character, and it is now admitted that he was orthodox, and not only the earliest, but the profoundest of the Schoolmen. After Scotus Erigena, the Bishop of Kildare and Leighlin, in his own line, is the greatest and noblest Irishman whose name has reached our ears. In saying this, we say much, for however Ireland may have had her bosom torn and mangled by her own sons, she has seldom, if ever, been deficient in men of genius, talent, and learning.

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2. *The Comprehensive History of the Southern Rebellion and the War for the Union. Embodying also Important State Papers, Congressional Proceedings, Reports, Remarkable Speeches, &c., &c.* By ORVILLE J. VICTOR. Vol. I. New York: Torrey. 1862. 8vo. pp. 519.

A NEW and revised edition of Vol. I. of this History we are informed will appear in a few days, Vol. II. in July, and Vol. III. in December next. The work is valuable as collecting in a body the materials for a proper appreciation of the History of the Great Southern Rebellion, and is prepared with commendable judgment and industry. One thing may be learned from this volume, that, if the Union is saved, we shall owe its salvation under God to those who are now stigmatized as *Radicals*, not by the men who were ready to purchase peace at any price. When a great cause is at stake, and parties really in earnest are pitted against each other, the least efficient class, nay, your most dangerous class, are your moderate men, your good men, it were better to say *goodies*, who come between them with miserable compromises. One year ago we

despaired of the Union, because we had seen it betrayed by Buchanan, and felt that our Republican leaders wanted the nerve to meet the issue. In all great controversies your *via media* men must go to the wall. In such controversies, these men generally denounce the men of principle, as distinguished from men of expediency, on either side as radicals, as intractables, as causing all the trouble. The Southern leaders were in dead earnest, and were to be met only by men in dead earnest. The Southern leaders were not to be humbugged. They saw that they could not remain in the Union on what they regarded as equal terms, unless slave property could be placed throughout the Union on the same footing with any other species of property, and this they knew the people of the Free States, however politicians might talk or palaver, would never suffer to be done, and therefore, said they, we must secede from the Union, and either force a reconstruction on the basis of slavery, or remain a separate people. The Radicals alone on our side were prepared to meet the issue, and tell them plainly and squarely, if you choose to remain in the Union, and obey the laws, well and good, if not, attempt secession, but you will get it only by fighting, and, if it comes to fighting, we give you fair warning, that there is an end of slavery within the limits of the United States. If the Radical policy had been clearly and distinctly announced when the threats of secession were first thrown out, there would have been no secession; or even when secession commenced, there would have been no civil war; and we tell our countrymen now, that the war will not end as long as there is a slave in the land. Let it be once made clear to the whole people, North and South, East and West, that there can be no more slavery, unless the South conquers and subdues the North, and the war will be ended in ninety days. So far we go with the Radicals as they who have principles, and the courage to stand by them; and, say what we will, a party based on principle, with a clear and well-defined policy, is stronger than any party based on mere expediency. Slavery must end. *Carthago est delenda.*

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3. *The Slavery Question Settled, Man-stealing, Legitimate Servitude, &c.* By HARMON KINGSBURY. New York: Gray. 1862. 12mo. pp. 36.
 4. *Southern Slavery and its Relations to Northern Industry: a Lecture delivered at the Catholic Institute, in Cincinnati, January 24, 1862.* By HENRY REED. Cincinnati: Enquirer Steam Presses. 1862. 8vo. pp. 36.

WE remark only upon the second of these two pamphlets on slavery, a subject which has already occupied a large space in the present number of the Review. We have no acquaintance with Mr. Reed, and only know of him that he was lately editor of the

Cincinnati Daily Commercial. This pamphlet proves him a man of some ability, an admirable sophist, and that it is almost a pity that he is not one of the slaves on a Southern plantation. There may be honest differences of opinion as to the constitutional power of the Federal Government, since the secession of the Slaveholding States, over the question of Slavery, and there may be honest differences of opinion as to the best manner of dealing with that question, but a man who, after the woe Slavery has brought upon our country, can contemplate its continuance with equanimity, or attempt to palliate it, we should be quite willing to see made a slave himself, at least for a time.

We do not find that homage yielded to high moral principle, to right, to justice, which it were natural to expect in a Lecture before a Catholic Institute. The lecturer appears to be a man of facts not principles, of expediency, not right, and who confounds the moral with the useful. At least this is the impression left on our own mind by a slight glance through his pages. He discusses Slavery not as in accordance with or as an outrage upon man's natural rights, but under the point of view of economy, in its relation to Northern industry, and attempts to show that the abolition of Slavery would ruin, at least for a long time to come, the industry and prosperity of the North. His *bête noir* is the Abolitionists. Poor man, we cannot help sympathizing with him, for we are pretty well convinced that the Abolitionists will yet carry the day, and make an end of Slavery. The author, however, endeavors to show that there is no difference of principle between slave labor and hired labor. We ourselves once gave utterance to a similar sentiment; but we beg pardon of God and of man for our folly, and will only say in extenuation of our folly, that when we gave utterance to the sentiment we were moved more by our sympathy with the working men of the North, and our hostility to the great mercantile and industrial system of the modern world, than we were by any wish to defend or palliate negro-slavery. At any rate, we pray that we may not be supposed to hold that opinion any longer.

5. *The Pulpit and Rostrum. Sermons, Orations, Popular Lectures, &c.* ANDREW J. GRAHAM and CHARLES B. COLLAR, Reporters. *Three unlike Speeches*, by William Lloyd Garrison, of Massachusetts, Garrett Davis, of Kentucky, Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia. *The Abolitionists and their Relations to the War. The War not for Emancipation. African Slavery, the Corner-Stone of the Southern Confederacy.* Serial. Nos. 26 and 27. New York: Barker.

THESE three speeches are well placed in juxtaposition. Mr. GARRISON is no favorite of ours, but he is an honest out-spoken man. He was almost the first among us to open the war for the Libera-

tion of the slave, and ever since 1830, he has labored incessantly and unflinchingly in the abolition cause, through no little obloquy and reproach. He deserves respect, if for nothing else, for the firmness with which he has stood by his principles, and the masterly courage and ability with which he has defended them. We are no abolitionist of his type, but we honor the man who can wed himself for life or death to a great and just cause, plead for the defenceless when there are none to help, and speak out for the dumb when all are silent. Say what you will, William Lloyd Garrison, the Newburyport printer, will live in history as one of the moral heroes of American history, when we, and men far greater than we, shall be forgotten.

6. *Ireland and America: a Letter to the O'Donoghue.* By AN AMERICAN CITIZEN. New York: O'Shea. 1862. 8vo. pp. 18.

WE know not the author of this letter to the O'Donoghue. He calls himself an American citizen; but he writes not as such a citizen should. We highly appreciate the sympathy of the O'Donoghue and his Irish friends with this country at the time when there was talk of war between Great Britain and the United States; but the policy of this letter, that of urging the Irish to support the United States in putting down the Southern rebellion as a means of gaining the support of the American people for the Irish in a movement for independence of the British Crown, is one we cannot approve, or let pass without animadversion. The Irish who are naturalized in this country are American citizens, with all the rights and all the duties of American citizens. They are as much bound as any other class of citizens to fight for the country, and to defend the Government, either against a foreign or a domestic enemy; the men originally of Irish, German, French, or Italian nationality, naturalized as citizens, who have volunteered in such large numbers in the Federal army, deserve the nation's gratitude, but only on the ground and to the same extent as native-born citizens who do the same. The nation contracts no exceptional debt to them, and owes them no more gratitude, than it owes others who have done equally well. All they can ask is to be treated according to their fidelity, their courage, their merits as American citizens. The nation honors and can know them in no other capacity. She places them, and can only place them on the footing of perfect equality with natural-born citizens.

As for Ireland herself, she is and must be for every American citizen a constituent part of the British Empire, and she is only a geographical division of that Empire. For the United States to aid or assist the Irish people in an effort to separate themselves from the British Empire, and to form a separate and independent State, would be precisely like aid and support given by Great

Britain to the Southern Rebels in their efforts to dissolve the Union and to form themselves into a separate and independent Republic. We have complained of Great Britain for having recognized the Rebels as belligerents, and for the sympathy she has shown them ; and are we to be urged to do to her, what we have disapproved in her, when done to us? She may have two measures, we can have but one.

The union, politically considered, is as close between Ireland and the United Kingdom, as the union between New York and the United States. We know, and can know as capable of having foreign relations, no such political entity as Ireland ; we know Ireland as a foreign state only through the crown of Great Britain, and we have no right to interfere in any contest between the Irish people and the British crown, unless in a case in which we are at war with Great Britain herself. However much we may sympathize with the Irish people, we cannot be expected now, or at any future time to make war with Great Britain for their sake ; to expect any thing of the sort would be preposterous. We can understand very well the feelings of Irishmen toward England, and we credit all that has been said of English oppression in Ireland ; but to the Government of this country, or to the people of the United States in their political capacity, the English and Irish are one people, and must, while there is peace between Great Britain and us, be treated as such, as we ourselves claim to be treated. The Irish who migrate hither and become naturalized Americans, are expected to retain their old likes and dislikes, their old sympathies and antipathies ; but they must retain them as individuals, in their private capacity, not foist them into American politics, or seek to impose them upon the American Government. That would be to mistake the real nature and bearing of the oath of abjuration they take on becoming American citizens. No naturalized Irishman has any right to continue after naturalization to regard Ireland as his country, or himself as free to labor for her especial interest as his own country. He has no country, but the country that has naturalized him. No doubt he may retain his affection for the land of his birth, and feel an interest in her prosperity he feels in that of no other ; but he has no right or obligations to her that any other American citizen has not. If he is not willing to adopt this doctrine, if he feels the ties that bind him personally and politically to his native land are too strong to be severed, he is not obliged to sever them ; but in such case he has no right to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and to make himself an American citizen. To suppose that he can in good faith take that oath when his design in becoming an American citizen is to be able to serve more effectually the cause of his native country is a great mistake, and a mistake into which a great many have fallen. A great many suppose it possible to be loyal citizens of two foreign countries at once, and that they can readily reconcile their duties as American citizens, with their interests and obliga-

tions as Irish patriots. It is a great mistake; no Irishman or other foreigner is forced to become an American citizen; to become so or not is a matter of his free choice; but to take upon him the duties of an American citizen without throwing off those of a foreign citizen, or with a view of better promoting his revolutionary or other plans for the land of his birth, is an abuse of the American naturalization laws, and a thing which no intelligent man can do with a good conscience.

If we were at war with Great Britain we might legitimately consult the views and feelings of Irishmen, and detach them from the support of the British Government, if we could, but we cannot lawfully do so in time of peace. The naturalized citizens who should urge our government to make war on England for the sake of Ireland, when not demanded by redress of wrongs done to American rights and interests, or when such war is not necessary for protecting American rights, interests, and honor, is disloyal to America. We say this, because we are assured that a large number of our fellow-citizens of Irish birth are and have been enrolled for the purpose of aiding in the work of separating Ireland from the British Empire, because the citizens of the same class have been urged to volunteer in the Federal forces, not for American but Irish interests, and because the Irish-American press is constantly laboring to involve the nation in a war with Great Britain, repeating constantly, "England's necessity is Ireland's opportunity." We think this indicates a lack of American loyalty, or, at least, that regard for American obligations and interests the country has the right to exact of all her citizens.

We have not been pleased with the conduct of Great Britain in our present difficulties, and we feel no special affection for her, but she has given us no legitimate cause of war; we wish to be at peace with her and with all nations. But when the stern necessity of a foreign war does come, as come it may, we shall be as little displeased to find it war with Great Britain as with any other foreign nation; but we believe it our duty as an American citizen to do all in our power to avert the necessity of such a war, to avoid giving any occasion for it, and to contemplate it only with sorrow. We do not want men to become citizens of our country, because they want the opportunity of settling old scores with her under our flag, nor do we think it wise or just on the part of any citizen, natural born or naturalized, to seek to keep up an angry and hostile feeling among the American people against England or any other country. It is not that we fear war, or regard war as the greatest calamity that can befall a nation. We are not a Quaker. We believe wars are inevitable here below, and we own we pay homage to the military virtues. When war comes, we would meet it with a brave heart, and determined resolution. But we would take care, never to have our nation in fault, or be obliged to fight without necessity, or without a good and just cause.

7. *The Recreations of a Country Parson.* Second Series. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1861. 8vo. pp. 430.

WE have written notice after notice of this very pleasant volume of Essays, and had them crowded out for want of room. If we have ever known the name of the author, we have forgotten it, but whoever he be, he is a charming writer. His style is c'aste and elegant, rich and ornate, yet simple and natural. He has a polished and cultivated mind, and rare power of thought and observation. We know no book of the sort better worth reading. The thoughts are in general just, and its sentiment and tone, sound and healthy.

8. *A Trip to Cuba.* By MRS. JULIA WARD HOWE. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1860. 8vo. pp. 251.

A LIGHT, gossipy work, but keen, sprightly, and charming, and not without a certain insight into the relations of things, and an earnestness and depth of reflection worthy of the serious consideration of the reader. Mrs. Howe speaks kindly of the Cubans, bears cheerful testimony to their amiable qualities, and agreeable manners. She evidently does not like the Catholic religion as she sees it exhibited among them, but she as evidently has seen only the outside of it, and has, if she will pardon us the expression, not learned to distinguish between the methexis and the mimesis, or rather has never penetrated beyond the mimetic bark, and seen the real significance of the forms passing before her eyes, bright and piercing as they are. Her mind is too free, too just, too impartial, and, we may say, too earnest, not to love our religion when once she clearly sees and fairly understands its real principles and character. We have read her book with much interest and pleasure, and with high esteem for the writer.

9. *Debt and Grace, as related to the Doctrine of a Future Life.* By C. F. HUDSON. New York: Rudd & Carleton. 1861. 12mo. pp. 489.
10. *The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus under the Constitution.* Philadelphia: Sherman & Son. 1862. 8vo. pp. 58.
11. *Are the Southern Privateersmen Pirates?* Letter to the Hon. Ira Harris, United States Senator. By CHARLES P. DALY, LL. D., First Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of the City of New York. New York: Kirker. 1862. 8vo. pp. 13.
12. *The Positivist Calendar; or, Transitional System of Public Commemoration instituted by Augustus Comte, Founder of the Positive Religion of Humanity.* With a brief Exposition of Religious Positivism; and an Appendix, containing, I. A Concordance of the Calendars; II. The Positivist Library, and III. Nar-

- rative of the Rise and Progress of Positivism. By HENRY EDGER, New York: Published by the Author. 1856. 12mo. pp. 104.
13. The Indissoluble Nature of the American Union, considered in Connection with the assumed Right of Secession. A Letter to Hon. Peter Cooper, New York. By NAHUM CAPEN. Boston: Whittemore & Co. 8vo. pp. 36.
14. Fountain Rock, Amy Weir, and other Metrical Pastimes. By GEORGE HAY RINGOLD. New York: Townsend & Co. 1860. 8vo. pp. 240.
15. The Lily of Mossdale: a Tale of 1832, the Year of Reform. By JAMES ROUTLEDGE. Chichester: Routledge & Co. 1861. 8vo. pp. 256.
16. Positive Facts without a Shadow of Doubt. By MICHAEL GEORGE DUIGNAN. New York: Printed for the Publisher. 1862. 8vo. pp. 1103.
17. The Issue in California. Letter of EUGENE CASSELY to T. T. Davenport, Esq., Chairman Democratic County Committee, Nevada County, California, August 27th, 1861. San Francisco: Robbins. 1860. 8vo. pp. 15.
18. The Meditations of St. Ignatius; or the "Spiritual Exercises" expounded. By Father LIBORIO SINISCALCHI, of the Society of Jesus. Translated from the Italian, and revised by A CATHOLIC CLERGYMAN. Philadelphia: Cunningham. 1862. 12mo. pp. 429.
19. Intellectual and Moral Culture in our Public Schools. By Rev. DAVID B. FORD, A. M., South Scituate, Mass. Reprinted from the Boston Review for July, 1861. Boston: Whittemore & Co. 1861. 8vo. pp. 15.
20. An Exposition of Modern Spiritualism, showing its Tendency to a total Annihilation of Christianity. With other Miscellaneous Remarks and Criticisms, in Support of the fundamental Principles of the Christian Religion. By SAMUEL POST, Locust Valley, Queens County, New York. New York: Egbert. 1861. 8vo. pp. 86.
21. Sanitary Commission, No. 40. A Report to the Secretary of War of the Operations of the Sanitary Commission, and upon the Sanitary Commission of the Volunteer Army, its Medical Staff, Hospitals, and Hospital Supplies. December 1861. Washington: McGill & Witherow. 1861. 8vo. pp. 107.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1862.

ART. I.—*Essays Theological, Philosophical, and Historical,
on the Reformation in the Sixteenth Century.*

THE Protestant Movement in the Sixteenth Century originated inside, not outside, of the Church. Luther and his associates, as well as the nations that embraced the Gospel as they expounded it, had all been baptized and brought up in the Catholic communion, taught the Catholic faith, and accustomed to the Catholic worship. Luther was a Catholic, an Augustinian monk, a priest, and a Doctor of Divinity. He had been noted for his piety, his earnestness, his zeal, his ability, and his learning, and, for aught that appears, the people who followed him, and received his words as those of a divinely commissioned teacher, were, prior to the movement, as well instructed in the Catholic faith, as devout, as sincere, as earnest, and as intelligent Catholics as the people of the several nations that continued to adhere to the Church. How, then, came Luther and his associate Reformers to break away from the Catholic communion? and how could they induce a full third part of the population of Europe to follow them into heresy and schism?

It may be said, and said truly, that in all, or nearly all, the countries where Protestantism became the established religion, it was established by the intervention of the civil power, by the civil suppression of the old religion, and the civil enactment of the new. But this, though for the most part true, only partially removes the difficulty. The civil

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power is wielded by the people, or by princes and magistrates who have the support of the people. The princes and magistrates of all the nations that became Protestant, and through whom Protestantism became the established religion, had themselves all been brought up in the Catholic faith, and had practised more or less devoutly the Catholic worship. How came these princes and magistrates to reject the Catholic religion, and how came enough of the Catholic population to reject it with them to enable them to suppress the old religion by authority, and establish the new by force? The German princes, the Swiss cantons, the kings of England, Denmark, and Sweden, and the nobles of Scotland, France, and Holland, could never have made any successful move for the new religion, if they had not been able to count on a portion at least of their clergy, their universities, and their people, for there is nothing before which power alone is more impotent than the religious convictions of a nation. If the more numerous, or, at least, the stronger and more influential portion of the population of the several states that separated from the Church had not been favorable to the change proposed, it could never have been carried into effect.

It may be said the Reformers and the princes and magistrates who espoused their cause were bad men, men impatient of the authority of the Church, greedy of Ecclesiastical property, and in love with license, and that they carried the people with them by flattering promises, and pandering to their baser passions. Nobody will seriously contend that the chiefs of the Reformation, whether cleric or laic, titled or untitled, were immaculate; but it will be difficult to prove that they were not, in the social and Christian virtues, on a level with the average of their contemporaries who adhered to the Catholic cause. Luther suffers not in this respect by a comparison with Bembo, Sadoletto, Wolsey, or even Leo X. Scandalous as were some of the courts of Germany, they were at least not more so than the courts of Venice, Florence, and Rome, and as much as we may say against the court of Henry VIII., it was even less corrupt and corrupting than that of Francis I. There is no evidence that the people of the Northern nations that embraced the new religion were in any respect inferior in morals, in honesty, in social and domestic virtue, to the Southern nations; and, if we except Spain, we may assert without much hesitation that they were the least corrupt part of

Christendom. They may have been less polished, less refined than the populations of France and Italy, but they were probably the best, the most sincere and honest, in fact the most really Catholic, and the least paganized portion of Christendom.

It does not appear that Luther, so long as he remained in Germany, surrounded only by honest, simple, and hearty German manners, ever meditated any reform in the Church, or any disturbance of the settled order of things. His first impulse in that direction seems to have been given by what he saw and experienced at Rome, whither he had been sent by his superiors on some affairs of his Order. It was not what he saw in Germany, but what he saw in his journey through Italy, and during his stay in the Capital of the Catholic world, near the tombs of the Apostles, that started his doubts, and quickened within him the spirit of the reformer. All the evidence in the case proves that he was moved in the beginning by an honest disgust of the abuses he everywhere encountered, and which were upheld, or, at least, not actively interfered with by the highest dignitaries of the Church, and by a sincere, earnest, and not un-Catholic desire to effect much-needed and loudly-called-for reforms. There is no reason to suppose that in the outset he was not moved by a sincere Christian spirit, an earnest love of truth, and an honest desire to advance the real interests of religion; and there is just as little reason to believe that if his motives had been properly appreciated by the Roman Court, and the great dignitaries of the Church, and that if he had found on the part of the Church, or the managers of her affairs, a disposition to reform abuses, and to return to the purity and simplicity of the Gospel, as was subsequently manifested by Pope Adrian VI., he would not have lived and died a faithful and obedient son of the Church.

The abuses in the Church at the beginning of the sixteenth century may not have been greater than at some previous epochs, but it is well known that they were great and scandalous. They were not abuses by princes or people alone, but they were abuses of administration, for which the authorities of the Church were themselves responsible. The wisest and holiest men in the Church saw them, grieved over them, and demanded their reform. It was a common saying, that the Church needed reform "in her head and in her members." The whole Church admitted, a few years after, in the Council of Trent, that the demand for reform was

not unjust, for that Council was called to reform abuses, no less than to condemn the doctrinal errors of the Innovators, and its labors in the cause of reformation went on *pari passu* with its labors for the suppression of heresy and the maintenance of orthodoxy. Viewed in its inception and the intention of its originators, the Protestant movement was an honest movement of reform, and found its development and completion, not in the establishment of schismatical and heretical Communions, but in the Doctrinal Definitions and Reformatory Decrees of the Holy Council of Trent. In all probability, if the Catholic authorities had had the wisdom to discover in the outset the real aim of the movement, and the real character of the Northern European nations, their downright and earnest spirit, so different from French levity and Italian astuteness, or diplomatic craft, and the courage and disinterestedness to acknowledge the justice of that movement, and to second it with their power and influence, it would have resulted in a much-needed and salutary reform, without any breach of Catholic unity, or even of Catholic discipline.

Yet the Church is the outward visible expression of the Word made flesh, the body of Christ, and infallible and holy. How then could abuses creep into her administration, and she ever become corrupt, and need reforming "in her head and in her members?" And how, if she could stand in need of reform, could her ministers, the Pope and Bishops, fail to discern the honest intent of good Catholics demanding reform, and instead of encouraging, even aiding them, denounce them as enemies of the Church, and by their opposition drive them into heresy and schism? It is impossible on any theory of the Reformation, in any degree historically sustainable, to throw the whole responsibility of that movement on the Reformers alone. On any hypothesis that can be reasonably adopted the chief responsibility does and must rest on the Catholic hierarchy, that is, on the external and visible authorities of the Church herself. How, if those authorities were in their external and visible character infallible and holy, could they have allowed the growth and continuance of a state of things like that which the Reformers assailed? and how could we throw on them the chief responsibility of the schismatical and heretical result of the movement in the Northern nations of Europe?

Here is a serious difficulty for the Catholic historian, if he is bound to maintain the sanctity and infallibility of the

Church in the universal and unqualified sense in which we are supposed by non-Catholics to hold them. If we held that every Catholic pastor from the Pope down is privileged with a special illumination of the Holy Ghost so as to never err in any matter of discipline or administration, and that no pastor ever neglects or improperly or imperfectly performs his pastoral functions, we should be obliged to maintain that no error or corruption could ever find its way into the Church, no portion of the Catholic people could ever be misinstructed or uninstructed, no error could ever go uncorrected, no abuse could ever be connived at, and the external Church would always be the exact and express image of the internal. There could, on this supposition, never, on the one hand be anything to reform, and on the other, never originate in the Church and among Catholics any movement like that of the sixteenth century. But sanctity and infallibility, in this sense and to this extent, we are not obliged to assert; and we know from history the external visible Church does not possess them, for she has never manifested them. All history proves that in administration, in the management of Ecclesiastical affairs, the pastors of the Church are not incapable of error, or incapable of conniving at abuses, and of neglecting to a greater or less extent the performance of the solemn and most pressing duties of their office. If the divine commission to teach carries with it the pledge of infallibility in teaching, as it undoubtedly does, the divine commission to govern carries with it no pledge of infallibility in governing, for all secular rulers govern by divine appointment, even when elevated to office by popular suffrage, since, as the Apostle says, *non est potestas nisi a Deo*. The Pope may be infallible in declaring the law, and yet not be infallible, though authoritative, in its application, for he may be misinformed as to the facts. The pastor may even know the true doctrine, and neglect to teach it. Men clothed with the prelacy and the sacerdotaly may abuse their trusts, or use their office for their own selfish ends. Judas was one of the Twelve, and he betrayed his Lord for thirty pieces of silver. Peter was the prince of the Apostles, the head of the Apostolic College, and yet he denied his Master, and basely declared with an oath that he knew him not. Holy men who seek to correct the evils of their times may be persecuted by the Pontiffs of the Church. Savonarola was burnt as a heretic and impostor by order of Alexander VI., perhaps because he set his whole soul at work to resist

the tide of heathen corruption that set in with the *Renaissance*, and because he refused the Sacraments to that modern pagan, Lorenzo the Magnificent. The fact is, save in dogma, save in what pertains to the Divine Idea,—faith and morals,—the infallibility and sanctity of the Church cannot be asserted, and are not claimed by the Church herself.

It has been established in our preliminary Essay that truth, therefore the Church, the true Church of God, is and must be one and catholic. There is, there never has been, there never can be but one true religion. Religion was in the beginning what it is now, and what it will be to the end of the world. Men could never have attained to union with God as their last end without Christ or the Regeneration, for cosmos can be completed or fulfilled only in palin-genesia. Whatever is true, whatever is just, whatever is good in any of the various religions which have obtained among the nations of the earth is either an anticipation or a reminiscence of Christianity, and is integral in the one catholic religion. The Church is catholic because she is universal, because she holds, teaches, and administers the one universal and immutable religion. The epithet *catholic* is not applied to her as a proper name, but as a simple appellative, expressive of her real character,—the unity and universality of the Idea she is realizing in time and space for eternity. All the principles of the Church are universal, both in their significance and in their application. They are, too, principles which are recognized by all religions, asserted in the universal beliefs of mankind. Free all religions of their negations, their abnormal accretions, and local colorings, reduce them to what in them is affirmative, invariable, and universal, and you have the principles of the catholic or universal religion held and taught by the Church. It is only because she holds and teaches them that she is or is called *Catholic*, that is, Universal. She is Universal, for she holds and teaches Universal Truth.

In their principles, all religions, the various heathen mythologies—the grosser as well as the more refined, not excepted—are Catholic, in some sense Christian, and their history is and must be included in the history of the Catholic Church, for in her is the type of which they are so many corruptions, and which in their upward motion they tend to recover. Truth is older than error, and the pure precedes the corrupt. Righteousness precedes sin; the normal is prior to the abnormal. God made man upright, but man

has departed from his original uprightness, and bent his form under inventions of his own. The various religions which prevail or have prevailed have their point of departure in the Catholic religion, and are various and diverse only by virtue of their various abortive attempts to realize it. Divest them of their errors, correct their symbolism, and reduce them to their type, and they are one and catholic, and therefore true and holy. In all religions, in all philosophies, in all thought, and in all speech, we find asserted, in some form, the essential Triad or the mystery of the Trinity. In all religions we find a more or less confused recognition of the Divine Progression asserted in Christian theology as the Generation of the Word and the Progression of the Holy Ghost, also of the creation of the world, and the Incarnation of the Son, as the medium of man's redemption and return to his Maker. Homer and Hesiod in their theogonies only misapprehend, misinterpret, or travesty Christian theology. The same may be said of the Hindus and Buddhists. Divest them of their inconsistencies, their absurdities, and take the basis of their theogonies and theologies, and you have the Christian Trinity, the creation of the world—the cosmos—and the Incarnation—the palingenesia—or the return of the universe to its Maker as its consummation. Plato speaks at times almost like a Christian Father, and more than one Christian author has called him the *divine* Plato.

St. Thomas, after St. Augustine and all the great Doctors and Fathers of the Church, maintains that there has been only one revelation, and that the whole Christian revelation was made, in substance, to our First Parents in the Garden. It must have been so made, for the revelation of the super-intelligible is essential to the conduct of human life, and the direction of man's intelligence and will to the attainment of his last end, or the fulfilment of the purpose of his Creator in his existence. The revelation was as necessary to Adam as it is to any one of his posterity. Moses organized the Jewish commonwealth and the Jewish priesthood, gave the law to the Jewish people, and prescribed the Jewish ritual; but he nowhere professes to institute a new religion, or to make a new revelation of the divine mysteries. The prophets foretell events, and reprove the backslidings of priests and people, but they only repeat and explain or apply the truth already revealed and known. Even our Lord himself reveals no new doctrine—no new faith, or new

moral principle. He came not to found a new faith, but to fulfil the promises made to the Fathers, to do the things necessary to perfect or complete what had been the faith from the beginning. None before him could be glorified, for the Palingenesia or Regeneration, before his Incarnation, existed only in promise and predestination; but before him faith was the same that it was after him—only before the Incarnation it was faith in Christ who was to come, while it is now faith in Christ who has come. The revelation of the truth, and of the principles of human conduct was from the beginning, and may, in some sense, be regarded as a continuous fact, but the acts or deeds which perfected it were performed only in the fulness of time. The Church existed from the beginning, identically the Church that now is, only it was Christian before the Advent of our Lord by Anticipation, as it is now by the Real Presence.

Errors are, therefore, no more inexplicable in regard to Christian truth since, than before the coming of Christ. The truth could be known and was known before as well as since his coming. The facility of knowing it may have been less, yet with due diligence it could be known, and was known, as we learn from the history of the patriarchs. St. John Chrysostom teaches that Abraham knew it, even in Chaldea, in the midst of the darkness and corruptions of Chaldean idolatry. Why, then, did the Gentile world mistake it, or overlay it with their abominable idolatries and superstitions? The notion that those idolatries and superstitions grew up and developed themselves, because the Gentiles had received no revelation, and were left to the blindness of nature, cannot be maintained. Superstition presupposes religion of which it is an abuse; idolatry is simply an abuse of symbolism. Men did not begin by worshipping the sun as a divinity. They at first worshipped the sun as the symbol or the emblem of the invisible, life-giving, and life-preserving God. They did not begin by adoring the idol or image made of wood, silver, or gold as the Numen, but as a symbol of the invisible and divine, and their worship of it was as innocent and as rational in its origin as the reverence with which we regard the crucifix, the picture of the Blessed Virgin, or the image of a canonized Saint. The error was in gradually confounding the symbol with the symbolized, the image with the imaged. The symbol at first presented, gradually obscured,

and finally absorbed the Idea, took the place of the Numen, and was worshipped as a god.

Polytheism does not precede Monotheism, or originate in ignorance of the unity of God. It has had in history two sources, one in the misapprehension of the Divine Progression asserted by Christian theology in the Generation of the Word and the Procession of the Holy Ghost, giving to that progression extrinsic terms, and thus explaining it in a pantheistic sense ; the other, the perversion of the true doctrine of saints and angels. The Greeks and Romans had their *Dii Majores* and their *Dii Minores*, their greater gods and their lesser gods. Their greater gods were their way of apprehending and expressing the Triune God of Revelation, and the unity and diversity of the Divine Essence. Their minor gods, their demons and heroes, were divided into two classes, the supernal and the infernal. The supernal originated in the true doctrine of angels and saints, misapprehended and misapplied. They never gave supreme worship to these, for they never confounded them with the supreme and eternal Divinity. The infernal gods answered to the fallen angels of Christian theology. They offered sacrifices, cruel and bloody sacrifices, to these indeed, yet not as to gods worthy to be loved and adored, but as to powerful and malignant spirits whom it was necessary to appease.

Pantheism itself, that mother error, and supreme sophism, is not the error of men to whom no revelation of the superintelligible has been vouchsafed. It grows out of the effort of the human mind to grasp, on the one hand, the Divine Progression asserted by Revelation, and, on the other, to explain the immanence of the cause in the effect. Confounding creation with generation, and the generation of the universe with the generation of the Word, leads logically to pantheism, for in the generation of the Word, the Generator and the Generated are one and identical. The world, if generated, must be one and identical with God as generator. This is pantheism. It is easy to derive polytheism, even the most disgusting forms of African fetichism, from pantheism; for pantheism confounds the universe as a whole and in all and every of its parts with God ; but it were impossible to derive pantheism from African fetichism. It is easy to descend from high to low, not so easy to ascend from low to high, and not inaptly may we say here with the Latin poet :

* * * Facilis descensus Avernî, * * *

Sed revocare gradum, superasque evadere ad auras,
Hoc opus, hic labor est.

Nothing has less historical or philosophical support than the theory, which finds many advocates among men who ought to be superior to it, that the human race commenced its career of development in the weakness and helplessness of infancy, without supernatural revelation of truth or the assistance of Divine grace, and has gradually worked its way by its own internal strength and energy up from the lowest form of African fetichism to the sublime monotheism of the Hebrew and the Christian. Men are, no doubt, progressive by religion, but through the weakness and limitation of their nature they have a constant tendency to corruption, to lose the unity of speech, therefore the unity of the Idea, and to fall into the grossest and lowest forms of error. What in the Gentile or heathen world of antiquity modern rationalists regard as germs of progress are, in reality, reminiscences, are fragments of the broken and scattered body of truth originally possessed in its unity and integrity.

Prior to the Advent of our Lord and the institution of the Christian Church the truth was revealed and known; but prior to his advent the Church lived and could live the life of the Word made flesh only by faith and hope. It had not the Real Presence, and was the Church not in possession, but in expectancy. It had priests, but they could offer only symbolic sacrifices—sacrifices which were only a shadow of the real sacrifice that has been offered on Calvary, and is continued on our altars. There was everywhere promise, but nowhere fulfilment, and the faithful died in hope, but without having obtained. All nations looked forward to and desired Him who was to come, and bring in the reality of the good things promised. But even under the Christian Church, though the real palingenesiac life may be lived, not merely believed in or hoped for, it is not and cannot be completed in this world. Its completion is glorification, that is to say, heaven, eternal beatitude by union with God. In this life we enter the way, are *viatores*, pilgrims, seeking a city whose builder and maker is God, in which, and in which alone, is our home. While we are on the way, are *viatores*, though in the palingenesia, and consequently under the order of grace, and blessed with an abundance of

grace which the faithful before Christ had not and could not have, for it as yet existed only in the predestination and promise of God, we retain our nature alike in its nobility and in its weakness, alike in its upward and in its downward tendencies. We have the same liberty of will, the same power to abuse the gifts of God, and to fall into error and sin. The Church herself as the visible expression of the Word made flesh, the Incarnate God, is holy, infallible, and indefectible, but the individual members of her communion are neither infallible nor impeccable. They may lose the infallible speech of the Church, lose the unity of language, fall into error, and fail in the sanctity of life, as did, though hardly to the same extent, individuals and nations before the Incarnation, or as do those still remaining outside of Christendom.

The Church as an outward, visible body is placed in the world, and is subject to all the accidents of time and space. She has the one and catholic truth, and is infallible in her speech, infallible in teaching and defining the infallible revelation she has received; but the men to whom she teaches it, and for whom she defines it, are fallible, and incapable of comprehending it in all its relations and in all its significance. God himself can enable a man to comprehend it fully, in all its length and breadth, in all its bearings and applications, only by taking him up into hypostatic union with himself, as human nature was taken up when the Word assumed flesh in the womb of the Virgin. Such comprehensive understanding belongs to men only in the glorified state. Divine inspiration itself does not give it; and the men whom God inspires to reveal his truth, the prophets and Apostles, utter more than they know, more than they understand. The word they utter is greater than their understanding. The spirit possesses them. The burden of the Lord is upon them. The humble Mary conceives by the Holy Ghost, and brings forth her Maker and her Lord. The Church herself here below comprehends not in the full sense either herself or the Word she expresses. Her infallibility is not in her human understanding, and she brings forth the truth only as she conceives by the Holy Ghost. She speaks infallibly only by virtue of the perpetual inspiration or assistance of the Holy Ghost who dwells in and speaks through her. Her pastors who are her organs, singly or collectively, assembled in council or dispersed in their dioceses, comprehend not all that is

symbolized by the words they speak, or contained in the doctrine they teach. Of the Church we may say:

Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.

Neither the *spiritus* nor the *mens* is human, or, though it moves and sustains the human, is comprehended by it. There is more in the word uttered than any of the human organs of its utterance know or understand. The word is greater than they, truer than their understanding. Hence it is that the infallible teacher addresses not an infallible understanding, and there is in this life no infallible human understanding, no universal and infallible comprehension, of the truth divinely revealed. As Dr. Newman would say, the human mind cannot take in the whole idea at one view, and we add, nor by a succession of views. When we have taken our highest, broadest, and most comprehensive view, there is always an infinity of truth above and beyond us. There is when we speak always more than we see. Take any doctrine of the Church, or the simplest proposition of faith, meditate it, and it swells out on all sides, rises and expands before the mind, into a universe of truth, and we are lost in its immensity, and can only fall down and adore in awe and silence.

Even when there is no misunderstanding or false understanding, the words in which the Church expresses the truth she is commissioned to teach may be very inadequately understood, and will mean more or less according to the capacity or culture and development of the particular mind addressed. Our Lord makes it the duty of every one who would be his disciple to take up his cross and follow him. But taking up the cross and following him will not mean the same thing to every mind, and under all circumstances. Our Lord says, "Whosoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him will the Son of Man be ashamed when he comes in the glory of his Father with the holy angels." To some these words mean simply being ashamed to profess one's self a Christian, or to make the sign of the cross before sitting down to meat with those who count the cross a reproach. To others they mean this and much more. To them it means being ashamed to espouse the cause of innocence, right, truth, justice, when it is unpopular, and brings its advocates into disrepute with the great, the respectable, the fashionable, or, in a democratic country, with the peo-

ple. There is no cross, there is no especial merit in professing one's self a Christian where all profess to be Christians, or in wearing the cross when it is a fashionable ornament. There is no cross in defending the popular truth, which everybody asserts, everybody holds, and nobody impugns. Christ is confessed before men, and his cross is borne by espousing the cause of the poor and friendless, in bringing up and standing by the neglected, the forgotten, the unpopular truth, the truth that impugns popular errors, reproves popular credulity, popular ignorance, popular superstition, and rebukes popular prejudices and fashionable vices. They who pounce upon the brave and generous spirit who defends the unpopular truth, insists on unfashionable virtues, labors to instruct and elevate the ignorant and neglected, weds himself to the cause of suffering humanity, pleads for the enslaved, the oppressed, and the downtrodden, and speaks out for those who are dumb and cannot speak for themselves, are among those who are ashamed of Christ, and of them, even though they fast four times a week and pray five times a day, will the Son of Man be ashamed when he comes in the glory of his Father with the holy angels.

The Church can teach the revelation she has received only through the medium of words, and all words are symbolic, and from the nature of the case can be interpreted only by the mind to which they are addressed. Words do not interpret themselves, and are significant only in the interpretation the mind to which they are addressed gives them. The revelation the Church has received is the revelation of the superintelligible, which, even when revealed, is only analogically intelligible. The Mysteries can be expressed only in words or symbols taken from the sensible and intelligible orders, which are below the superintelligible, and can express it only by way of analogy. All words are inadequate to the full expression of the Mysteries, because the human mind itself is inadequate to their comprehension. The Church says of the Word, the Son, that he is begotten, not made, *genitum non factum*, generated, not created. In this she seizes on an analogy in the intelligible, to give us some notion of the superintelligible. But if we take too literally the terms used, and assume that the analogy holds true throughout, we fall into the error of the Greek and Oriental theologians and mythologists, and introduce not the principle of sex, but sex itself into our conception of the Godhead, and pave the way for the assertion of male and

female or androgynous gods. We may then indite poems on the generation and birth of the gods, after the example of Hesiod and Homer. It is mistaking the analogy of generation, or pushing it too far, that has introduced the myths of male and female divinities, their amours, and their progeny. These myths all have a basis of truth, and originate in the effort of reason and imagination to bring within the sensible and intelligible order the supra-rational mysteries of the Generation of the Word and the Procession of the Holy Ghost. The Holy Ghost, under the name of Eros, Love, is made by turns the eldest and the youngest of the Gods. Regarded as proceeding from the Father and the Son, as the End or Consummation, he is the youngest; but as the idea of the end of the progression is first in the mind, and precedes the actualization, he may also, in the language of the mythologists, be called the first-born of the Gods.

In explaining as far as possible the Generation of the Word and the Procession of the Holy Ghost we use the term *progression* as expressing some analogy to the Mystery revealed. Yet the term is neither adequate nor, in all respects, exact. Properly progression is the reduction of the potential to the actual, and therefore is a term of the Chronotope, or of time and space. It consequently is not strictly applicable to God, in whom the potential and actual are coincident, or, rather, who is all actual, most pure act, and therefore excluding the potential as in need of actualization. The term is used only analogically, and the progression intended is not progression in time and space, but a mysterious progression immanent and eternal in the Divine Essence itself. The word *person* is applied also to each of the three terms of the Triad, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and yet this word in the sense used in the sensible and intelligible orders cannot be applied to any one of these mysterious and supra-rational relations. Taken in its ordinary sense, the term person could not be used, for it would, on the one hand, assert each relation as finite, and, on the other, simply Tritheism. If the relations in the Godhead were persons in the sense Peter, James, and John are persons, there would be three Gods, not one only God, and we should fall into the error of the polytheists, and not only divide, but anthropomorphize the Divinity. As a matter of fact, large numbers of honest, well intentioned Christians, no doubt, do in their own minds understand the Trinity

in a Tritheistic sense, as many in endeavoring to avoid Tritheism lose the Triad altogether. The terms used to express the superintelligible are all taken in an analogical sense, because the superintelligible is even by revelation apprehensible by us only through sensible and intelligible analogies.

The superintelligible is above our intelligence. We may know by reason that the superintelligible is, for reason is capable of asserting her own ignorance, and her own impotence. Above our highest reason there is the Unknown, and to us the Unknowable. In this superintelligible is the root of the intelligible, as in the intelligible is the root of the sensible. It comprises the essences of things, the very essence of God himself. In it is the mystery of existence, life, thought, our origin, medium, and end. We can know it only as supernaturally revealed; but even the supernatural revelation does not change its character, and bring it into the order of the intelligible. We know it, when revealed, only analogically, by the analogies reason detects between it and the intelligible. This analogical knowledge is what is called knowledge by faith, "the substance of things hoped for, and the conviction of things not seen,"—*argumentum non apparentium*. It must, in some sense, be known or intellectually apprehended, or faith would not and could not be an intellectual act, and it cannot be directly and immediately apprehended by and in itself, or faith would be indistinguishable from science. The apprehension which is not science, and yet is intellectual apprehension, is what we term knowledge by analogy, and it is through analogical apprehension that faith and science are brought together or united in our intellectual life.

We know that theologians in their analysis of the act of faith resolve it into the assent to the proposition *Deus est verax*, and hold that *Deus est verax*, God is true, is the ultimate object of faith. We believe what the Church teaches, because we believe the Church; we believe the Church, because we believe God; and we believe God, because he is true, *verax, prima veritas in essendo, et in dicendo*. But *Deus est verax*, or God is true, and can neither deceive nor be deceived is a rational truth, in the intelligible order, and a proposition of science, not simply of faith. Besides, to believe that God is true is not all that is required by faith. We must believe the words of God, or the things he reveals. Be it that we believe them because we believe

him, still we must believe them, and believe them we cannot unless they signify something to us, have some intelligible meaning for our intelligence. Words that have no intelligible meaning for us, are empty words, and in believing them we simply believe nothing at all. Let it be that the words of Scripture or the words of the Church are true and infallible, they are in themselves only sensible signs or symbols, and signify to me only the meaning I intelligibly give them. There must then be belief of the things revealed, and there can be none unless they, and not the mere words, are in some sense apprehended by our reason or intelligence. As the things revealed are mysteries or pertain to the superintelligible, they can be apprehended only by analogy, and consequently the words by which they are expressed or symbolized can be taken and interpreted only analogically. There is no help for this, because the things revealed and received by faith transcend our limited intelligence, and cannot be directly apprehended and understood.

The interpretation of the symbols, whether the written words of the Holy Scriptures, or the spoken words of the Church, is the work not of the infallible Teacher, but of the reason and intelligence of the reader or hearer. The Teacher furnishes the cypher, but the mind of the taught furnishes the key—the words meaning nothing unless addressed to intelligence, to a reasonable and reasoning mind. It is the mind of the believer that detects the analogies symbolized by the words of revelation. The Church cannot supply mind to the believer, furnish ideas and brains too. No doubt the human mind was originally constructed with a view to the apprehension of truth, and that there is between it and language a certain natural correspondence. Words are the sensible expression of intelligence, and human words have a relation to the mind analogous to the relation of the Divine Word to the Father; but only in the intelligible order. The human mind has no language which is for it the expression of the superintelligible, save by analogy; for it has no superintelligence. Words are not and cannot be to it direct and simple signs of the superintelligible. They are sensible, and naturally and by their own force symbolize only the intelligible, from which are borrowed the analogies which bring partially within our apprehension the superintelligible. Now these analogies even the strongest and best-educated minds may mistake, miscon-

ceive, or misuse, and thus fall into error. The Church with all her infallibility cannot prevent this, for she can only define the symbol, and prevent the loss of unity of speech. There is, then, always room in the Church for subjective error, which may with obstinate and indocile minds develop into heresy.

The Church is infallible in her definitions, but then her definitions must be understood and appropriated by minds that are fallible. She defines a dogma, and pronounces an anathema upon whoever denies it; but then the mind necessarily asks what it means. That no one can be saved out of the Church is, no doubt, clearly a Catholic doctrine. But does this mean that no one can be saved who is not joined to the external communion of the Church? Can one belong to the soul of the Church without being joined to her visible body? What is it to be in the Church? Some theologians give a strict and rigid sense to the words; others give them a very wide and accommodating sense. One concedes the possibility of salvation to none not in her external communion; others think all who desire the truth and walk uprightly according to the light they have, though out of her external communion, may hope for heaven. The Church in defining the Real Presence in the Eucharist uses and approves the use of the word *Transubstantiation*. But in what sense is the term to be taken? Is the word *substance* to be taken in the sense of the Greek term, ὑπόστασις? In the sense of οὐσία, or in the sense of *essence*? Does she mean that the substance of the bread and wine is changed into the substance of the body and blood of our Lord? Or does she mean that the substance of the elements leaving their natural properties and appearances is removed, consumed, or annihilated, and the intelligible body of Christ substituted in its place? These and many other questions must be asked and answered, especially questions as to the nature and essence of matter, and as to time and space, before we can say we understand the definition of the Church. Words, at first sight, may seem very plain and easy to be understood, that, subjected to the manipulations of the theologians, become very dark, obscure, and uncertain in their sense.

The Church, we are told, has defined the Immaculate Conception of Mary, the Mother of God, or that Mary was conceived without stain of original sin. Hence we are told that the Immaculate Conception is raised to the dignity of

a dogma of faith. But has the Church defined it to be a dogma of faith, or simply declared it to be a fact always believed, and to be believed by the Church? Are not all dogmas of faith catholic principles, that is, principles universally true and applicable? How can a simple individual fact be a principle, and a catholic principle? The fact we do not question, but of what is it the principle? What in the Catholic system of truth or of life originates in it, or depends upon it? It may be true, that is, a real fact, without being a dogma of faith; it may also be a dogma, a principle of faith; but we apprehend that it would be difficult with our present theological knowledge, or the received Catholic system, to see of what it is the principle, or that any thing in Catholic doctrine depends on it. The most we can say of it is that it was a special privilege to Mary personally, but without being an integral principle in the body of Catholic truth. Then, again, what is it the Holy Father has really defined in his late decree on the subject, in addition to what had always been conceded by those who were supposed to question the Immaculate Conception? It was always agreed on all hands that Mary was in the second instant, conceived, as she was born, without sin. The definition now promulgated says she was without sin in the first instant of conception. Does this first instant mean any thing different from the second instant of St. Thomas? Mary was of the race of Adam, and, as included in the race, sinned with all the rest of us in him. From that sin she no more than any one else could be redeemed, but by the merits of Jesus Christ. Concede that his merits could be applied by way of anticipation of his Incarnation, passion, and death on the cross to her redemption, they could not be so applied prior to her conception, for prior to that moment there was no subject of their application. They could be applied only in the instant of her conception, or simultaneously with it. If this is what is meant by the first instant, it is precisely, as we understand it, the second instant, or *actus secundus* of St. Thomas, and nothing has been affirmed that had ever been denied. Again, does not the decree of the Holy Father touch a physiological question, and, by asserting that Mary was rendered immaculate in the first instant of her conception, imply that the soul, as well as the body, is generated, and that soul and body are united in the first instant of conception?

We might bring other instances, but these are sufficient

to show that after the definition of the Church, the mind asks, and must ask, What is defined, what is the meaning of the dogma? for unless we attach some meaning to the words used, the dogma is for us as if it were not, and nothing for us is defined. The determining of what the words mean, and the relation of their meaning to the whole body of catholic truth, is and must be, from the nature of the case, the work of the human mind itself, of private examination, or of private judgment; and, as the human mind is fallible, there may always be more or less of doubt, uncertainty, and error, even with the best informed and the best disposed. Hence St. Augustine says, "Err, I may, but a heretic I will not be." Err, the best of men may, but no one can be a heretic unless he chooses, for to be or not to be a heretic depends on one's own will.

We know that St. Paul is sometimes quoted to prove that doubt itself is sinful, for he says, "He that doubteth is damned." Doubteth what? Whether it is lawful or not to eat meat sacrificed to idols. For he who does a thing of the lawfulness of which he doubts, goes against his conscience, and sins. But doubt in intellectual matters is not necessarily sinful. In fact, the first proper human act, or first act of reflection is a doubt, and till a doubt arises in the mind there is no act of reflection, no examination, and consequently no development or progress of intelligence. It is not till we pass from doubt to affirmation or denial in a sense hostile to truth that our doubts cease to be innocent, and we are culpable. Yet all heresy originates in the innocent doubt, and hence in its origin, its intellectual origin, it is not sinful, but the result of a proper awakening and exercise of the mind. It becomes culpable heresy when it proceeds to deny the truth, to affirm the contrary, and persist with a blind obstinacy in so doing. For then it is not truth that is desired, sought, and loved, but one's own opinion. Then the man is a heretic because he prefers his own opinion to truth, or places his judgment above the judgment of God, in reality makes himself God.

Undoubtedly, what all the pastors of the Church throughout the world, and in all times hold in common, or agree in teaching, is Catholic doctrine, and infallible truth; but the pastors taken singly may err through ignorance as to many and even important points of faith and morals. No one man knows the whole truth, in all its principles, relations, and consequences. With the best intentions in the world

the wisest and most learned may on some points fail to seize the exact truth, may misapprehend and mistake it. St. Augustine wrote a whole book of *Retractions*; Pope John XXII. questioned in his sermons, or, at least, proposed for discussion, the doctrine that the saints enjoy the beatific vision immediately after this life, before the resurrection of the body; and Pope Clement VII. repeatedly stated that he was not informed on the legal question raised by Henry VIII., in his demand that his marriage with Katharine of Aragon should be declared null. All pastors are not learned men, or profound and erudite theologians; and many who pass for learned, have learned only a form of words which they repeat without much thought of their real meaning, or any serious attempt to study their meaning in its relation to the principles of Catholicity, or with the whole body of revealed truth, regarded in its unity and integrity, as the living expression of the Word made flesh.

The pastors of the Church, taken singly, provincially, or nationally, are not incapable of neglecting to a greater or less extent the integrity and purity of doctrine, or of suffering the faith to be in part mixed up with local traditions, or national reminiscences, or to receive a one-sided development and practical realization. We should always remember the sacred calling of the clergy, and speak of them with veneration even for the sake of their office, but it cannot be denied that they are not always vigilant in the discharge of their pastoral duties. Few heresies, if any, have ever been originated by laymen. We can recall the name of no heresiarch who was not a priest or, at least, a religious. Arius was a presbyter, Nestorius was an Archbishop, Luther was a presbyter and a monk, Calvin belonged to the *clerici*, Cranmer was a priest and an Archbishop, Lamennais, Hermes, and, if you call him an heresiarch, Gioberti, were all priests. The pastors, often through their own incapacity, their peculiar notions, their indolence, their employment at court, or their devotion to their own interests or the interests of their relations, suffer the people to remain generation after generation with the *minimum* of religious instruction, as we may see even now with the poor people of Mexico, Central and South America. They, also, are often compelled to suffer them so to remain by the barbarism, revolutions, invasions, conquests, and disorders of their respective times and countries.

Then again, times change. Many interpretations and applications of truth, which when first made are just and salutary, become through subsequent changes inadequate, false, and hurtful; and yet so many interests, so many vested rights, and so many habits and customs have grown up under them, and demand their continuance, that it is exceedingly difficult to make the necessary modifications, sometimes impossible to do it, without creating greater evils than those to be redressed. What was useful grows into an abuse by the changes time and events introduce, and becomes a greater abuse by its longer continuance; yet it becomes so complicated with other things, with perhaps the whole framework of society, that the Ecclesiastical authorities may well hesitate to lay the axe at its root, and to attempt a reform which they might find themselves in the end unable to effect. Always will there be a class who profit by the abuses, or by arrangements which have outlived their day, and these will always be disposed rather to retain than to correct them, while those who suffer from them are usually the unprivileged and the weaker party, who are impotent to redress them. Having been accustomed to suffer, and never having known any thing better, they are not always aware that they are bad, and are often the first to resist changes from which they themselves would be the chief gainers. In our own day the Monastic Orders are recommended on the ground of the relief they formerly afforded the poor. A single convent, we are told, fed every morning at its gate eighteen hundred poor persons. That certainly was well, when there were within reach of a single convent so many persons in need of being so fed. But might it not be still better to effect those political, social, and economical changes that would prevent the growth of so numerous a population able to keep soul and body together only as fed at the convent gate?

All education proceeds and must proceed on the supposition, that things are fixed and are to remain as they are. The teachers do not and cannot prepare their pupils in advance for changes which may or may not take place. The hierarchy have not any special gift of prophecy, and cannot be expected to foresee all that may come. They must labor for the place and the hour, and shape their conduct to things as they find them. They must labor for to-day, and leave to-morrow to take care of itself. "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof." The Church of the Catacombs

adapted herself to her condition at the time, and instruction and education were then naturally directed to the wants and duties of a persecuted and socially unrecognized Church. This world was not for Christians. They had no hand in and no responsibility for its government. For them the end of the world had come, and they naturally, inevitably gave to the ascetic or purely religious side of Catholicity a disproportionate development. When the Church emerged from the Catacombs, received liberty, and a legal *status* in the Empire, the faithful found themselves unprepared for the work necessary to reform the civilization of the Græco-Roman world, and to save it from destruction. Catholicity on the side of civilization had remained undeveloped, and Christianity found herself unable to heal the disorders of the state. Even under the Christian emperors it was nearly as null as under the Pagan emperors, when obliged to seek refuge in the Catacombs. Constantine made the despotism of the Empire more complete than it had been under any of his predecessors; Theodosius favored rather than checked, the despotic tendency of the state; Honorius was orthodox, but it was his only virtue; and the conquest of Rome by Alaric the Goth, was, perhaps, the first step in advance toward a better political and social order. As a rule, sincere, earnest, pious, and devout Catholics meddled even under the Christian emperors prior to the downfall of Western Rome very little in political or state affairs, and the courtiers were persons of loose morals or suspected orthodoxy.

After the Roman emperors came the Barbarians, free from many of the vices of the *Bas Empire*, bold, courageous, energetic, with a strong sense of individuality and personal freedom, but ignorant, uncultivated, impatient of restraint, and for the most part heathens or heretics. For the first time the Church had to commence the work of Christianizing society, or civilizing states and nations. Naturally she drew upon her reminiscences of Græco-Roman civilization, and followed as far as practicable the order of civilization she had known for four hundred years, more especially as nearly all her pastors, prelates, and simple priests, with the vast majority of her laity belonged to the old Roman population. The first effort was to Romanize, as they were converted, the Barbarian conquerors. This met with the most success in Gaul, especially in the kingdom of Neustria; but the result was most unhappy, for the Neus-

trians exhibited the vices of both the Gallo-Romans and the Barbarians, without the virtues of either. Gradually, however, as the Austrasian Franks became the ruling people in Gaul and Germany, the effort to convert the Barbarians into Romans ceased, and the free spirit, the love of liberty of the Germanic family were accepted, and what we call the Middle Ages were instituted. What rules in the Middle Ages is feudalism, neither exclusively of Barbarian nor of Roman origin, but formed by a mixture and modification of elements derived from both sources, with several elements supplied by the Church herself. Feudalism knows nothing of what in our times is called the Rights of Man, and nowhere recognizes the broad principle of human equality. It was founded on inequality and privilege, and rested on vested or chartered rights. There were estates, but hardly a state. There were the king, the nobility, the commons, and the Church, all with their vested or corporate rights.

In the feudal constitution of Europe, the Church was recognized as a divine institution and authoritative in all matters of faith and worship, but she had her place, so to speak, as a chartered corporation, and her temporal rights rested on the same basis with those of the king, the nobility, the municipalities, or chartered cities. Her prelates, her bishops, and mitred abbots, were for the most part princes and barons, received homage and service from their vassals, and did homage and service to their liege lord for their fiefs. The Holy See, though never suzerain of the kingdom of France or of Germany, was suzerain or feudal sovereign at one time of nearly all the rest of Europe, with the exception of the Byzantine Empire. Having temporal rights and possessions held and regulated by the feudal law, the Church in her temporal interests became mixed up with the whole feudal order, and to no inconsiderable extent dependent on its continuance and strict observance by all classes of the feudal society for the free and full exercise of her spiritual rights, or unimpeded discharge of her spiritual functions.

The Church did not create or establish feudalism; it grew up and was developed from the political and social elements introduced by the German conquerors, mingling with other political and social elements retained from the overthrown Græco-Roman world. The Church introduced directly or indirectly, as far as she could, the principles of Christian

morality, manifested more especially in their effects on slavery. The Church never did and never could recognize what is called chattel slavery, the slavery recognized by the Roman law. For her the slave was a *person*; he might under certain conditions be held to service, but he was a *person* with moral rights and moral duties, free in his soul, and responsible for his conduct to his God, in like manner as his master. She insisted for the slave on the rights and obligations of Christian marriage, therefore of the Christian family, and consequently of a domicile or home. This of itself transformed chattel slavery into serfage or villanage, and prepared the way for the transformation of the serf or villein into the free peasant. She modified what had been the *jus gentium*, or universal law of nations, that captives taken in war may be reduced to chattel slaves, and taught that, though they may be held to ransom, they cannot, if Christians, be reduced to slavery. She also insisted on the humane and Christian treatment of bondmen, and enacted that the bondman receiving Orders became a freeman, not only because he then became as it were a bondman of Christ, but because the freedom of the *clerici* from human bondage was one of her recognized corporate rights as a legal corporation in the feudal society. She thus, as far as the social and political order permitted, recognized and asserted the principle affirmed by the Civil Law, that all men are born free, and can be deprived of their liberty only as a penalty for crime.

Feudalism rested, it has been said, solely on vested as distinguished from natural rights. The state was an estate, alienable or transmissible as any other estate. The feudal sovereign was a proprietor, not the representative of the majesty of the state, as was the Roman Emperor. This is as true of the German Emperors as of any other of the feudal sovereigns of Europe. Indeed, in the beginning the Emperor was not *emperor* of Germany, or of the Germans or Franks. The Imperial title and dignity conferred by St. Leo III. on Charlemagne, King of the Franks and Lombards, and Patrician of Rome, were Roman, conferred by the acknowledged sovereign of Rome, and without significance outside of the Roman state. Save in Rome, of which the Pope was sovereign, the Emperor was simply a feudal king; for the Pope did not erect, and never had or claimed the power to erect, the dominions of Charlemagne into an Empire, to re-establish the Roman Empire of the West, and

to transfer it from the Romans to the Franks, or, rather, the Germans. He gave the Imperial title and dignity to the Patrician of Rome, so far, and only so far, as related to his own temporal dominions. The title and dignity were Roman, received from the acknowledged sovereign of Rome, in consideration of the aid and protection afforded and to be afforded the Holy See, and the Roman sovereign in the temporal government of his subjects in Rome and the Roman States. Thus Charlemagne assumes the title of Defender of the Holy See and Coadjutor of the Pope in his temporal government. This explains the oath of Charlemagne, wherefore the Pope had the right to elect and crown the Emperor, and wherefore the Emperor could ordinarily be crowned only in the city of Rome.

The Emperors subsequently were not satisfied with being only emperors in Rome, and feudal sovereigns elsewhere. Hence arose the fearful struggles between the Popes and Emperors which fill so many pages of mediæval history. The Suabian sovereigns, or emperors of the Hohenstaufen family, pretended that St. Leo III., in crowning Charlemagne, or Karl der Grosse, as emperor, restored the Roman Empire of the West, and transferred it to the Germans,—a recognition of authority in the Pope over temporal matters greater than any Pope has ever claimed. They called their dominions the Holy Roman Empire, took the title of Kaiser, and claimed to be the legitimate successors of Augustus Cæsar. This was to strike a deadly blow at the feudal constitution of Europe, and to change entirely the basis of European sovereignty. It would, if admitted, have materially affected the relations of the Church with secular society, deprived her of all her corporate rights, and placed her rights and interests as a corporation at the mercy of the emperor. She may have had originally no especial regard for the feudal constitution, and no special repugnance to the constitution of Imperial Rome, but now all her temporal interests were blended with the feudal order, and she used all her spiritual and secular power to maintain it, and to defeat the attempts of the German emperors to overthrow it and to re-establish for all Europe Imperial Rome prostrated by the Barbarian Conquest.

The Church had then become in her temporal interests and in her administration intimately connected with the feudal order, as she has since been with the monarchical order, which for the greater part of Europe supplanted it,

and necessarily arrayed against her all who wished to get rid of feudalism, as she now arrays against her a large portion of those who wish to get rid of monarchy. The Church and feudalism got the better of the Hohenstaufen; but the principle of Imperialism was not suppressed, or essentially weakened. It was adopted by every feudal sovereign in Europe; all of whom struggled to become representatives of the majesty of the states, instead of being simple proprietors, and each being among his nobles only *primus inter pares*. The struggle continued with varying success down to the sixteenth century, when the monarchical principle triumphed over the feudal, and political monarchy representing the state took the place of the proprietary monarchy representing only the personal and vested rights of the feudal chief. The feudal system had its good points, and also its bad points. It was never an order suited to a highly civilized state. It secured the personal liberty of the nobles, or barons, and of corporations in their corporate character, but afforded no protection to the unprivileged people as individuals, and no security for national unity and the national authority. The noble's liberty was guarded against his suzerain; he could protect his vassals and serfs from oppression by the lord paramount; but these had very little protection against his own tyranny and oppression. Each baron was a despot in regard to those under him, and often a bad neighbor to his equals. The castle halls may have been the scenes of noble hospitality and festive mirth, but the castle keep and donjon had many a tale of wrong, of violence, cruelty, and horror to tell. There are always oppression and wrong where there is no effectual restraint on the will or the passions of the ruler, whether he be king or kaiser, feudal baron or modern slaveholder. The world, religion, humanity, civilization has probably no reason to regret that the feudal ages have passed away, and that feudalism only lingers in a few benighted corners of Europe.

The changes attempted by the Hohenstaufen were directed against the feudal system, and against the Church only in the respect that she was one of the elements of that society, with her material interests intimately bound up with it, as before the Barbarian Conquest they had been with the Roman Empire. If society had been prepared for them, and they could have been effected with the consent or co-operation of the Church, they would, it may be,

have set the civilization of Europe forward some two or three centuries, for they would have anticipated by so much the great national monarchies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which, however out of date now, were unquestionably, in their day, a great advance on feudalism. In order to vindicate the Church, it is not necessary to suppose those great but unsuccessful emperors were moved by hostility to religion or to the legitimate authority of the Church. It may be conceded that they comprehended that the feudal order comported only with a semi-barbarous and transition state of society, and that they consulted the interests of civilization as well as their own personal ambition and love of power. Their attempts, no doubt, were premature, were too exclusively directed to the revival of the cæsarism of the Roman Empire, without a due regard to the new social elements introduced and the new interests created by the German conquerors, and would, if successful, have gone far to extinguish that sense of personal liberty and independence cherished by feudalism, and re-established Imperial despotism; yet with some modifications they were ultimately successful, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the king is a national sovereign, representing the majesty of the state, not a mere personal proprietor.

The Church had no hostility to this change in the character of European sovereignty, considered in itself, and her reminiscences favored it. Feudalism had not been of her creation, and had given her much trouble. But her political and social position were determined by it; she herself, in her external and transitory constitution, had, so to speak, become feudal. She was herself suzerain of several important kingdoms, and held kings and princes as her vassals; her prelates were almost everywhere, especially in Germany, princes and barons, joining to their spiritual a greater or less extended secular jurisdiction; her own rights as proprietor were secured by charters, and held by the same general tenure as the rights of all other members of the feudal society. No doubt she was acknowledged to be a divine society, and to hold certain rights immediately from God, yet the free exercise of those rights themselves as political and social rights depended on her chartered or vested rights as a corporation. She was, therefore, naturally placed on the side of the feudal order of society, for, practically considered, her own rights and interests and those of that society were inseparable, and must stand or

fall together. She had law, public and private, chartered and vested rights on her side, and could not yield without a struggle to the emperors. If the Pope himself could have foreseen all the consequences of the struggle, he could not have done otherwise than he did, for he had no power to force the prelacy wedded to feudalism to give up their possessions, and to aid him in destroying the very social and political constitution which made them feudal proprietors, lords, barons, and princes. The rights of the Church were held to be the rights of God, and the Pope as their trustee and guardian was bound to defend them by all the means at his disposal. Hence he engaged in the struggle, and placed the Church on the side of feudalism against the attempted revival of Roman Imperialism, and the constitution of proper national sovereignties.

In this struggle, which lasted under one form or another from Frederic Barbarossa to Charles V., we must find the germs, as to its political and social character, of the Protestant movement. In this struggle, complicated by the Papal residence at Avignon, and the great Western Schism, the Papacy lost much of its prestige, and by its increased expenses became burdensome. It had in the first instance been assailed by the Imperialists, but it began to be assailed at length by what at first had been its own party. It was in fact defeated by the party of national sovereignty, and compelled to enter into Concordats with the sovereign princes; and, at the epoch of Luther, the Church had virtually abandoned the cause of feudalism, and was making the best terms she could with monarchy in its modern and anti-feudal sense. If England, Denmark, and Sweden be excepted, the political character of the Protestant movement was that of feudality against Imperialism, therefore a retrograde, not an advance movement; and, directly contrary to modern pretensions, the party supporting the movement in Germany, Italy, France, Scotland, and Switzerland was the party of the past, not the party of the future, and the reformation demanded, as will hereafter be more distinctly shown, was a reformation by way of restoration, and not by way of progress.

The Ecclesiastical abuses which were so numerous and so much in need of correction in the sixteenth century were rendered such by the various changes which had taken place in public opinion and in secular society. The most that can be said against the Church in regard to them is

that she did not in all cases foresee the changes, and provide for them, and that she sometimes resisted them after resistance had become unavailing. Institutions, wise and good when adopted, become corrupt and corrupting when they outlive their day and their reason. Principles never grow old or obsolete; they never change, and are necessarily always the same; but the institutions intended to embody or realize them in the world of time and space, where all is in a state of perpetual flux and reflux, may grow old, become effete, or effective only for evil. They need change or modification to meet the new wants and the new conditions of things. The tendency of Churchmen is usually conservative, and they are, as a rule, slow in foreseeing, accepting, and conforming to these new conditions. They do not always see the necessity or the propriety of the changes attempted, and are not always quick to detect the precise moment when resistance to them has become useless, and they must be accepted as inevitable. But in this Churchmen do not especially differ from statesmen, and the evil can be prevented by no purely human foresight or purely human virtue.

The Church, any more than other governing bodies, never governs with a view to change. The clergy have seldom fully comprehended the doctrine of the continuous evolution of truth, or continuous progress in the explication and application of the Idea, except in the sphere of the individual life and conscience. They wish to give the institutions, which, though Ecclesiastical, are yet only human in their origin, the fixity and permanence which they rightfully affirm of Catholic truth. They are, consequently, often found behind their age or country, instead of being in advance of it, and inspiring and directing its progress. They fix their eye mainly on the individual, and labor for progress in the interior life, without paying much attention to the fact that the race is operative in the individual, and that all progress in the interior demands expression in an exterior progress. The interior life must develop itself in the exterior, and, if the exterior is fixed and rendered unchangeable, the growth of the interior is checked, stunted, and, perhaps, prevented altogether. They, again, are apt to forget that the spirit at work in society and often carrying it on in spite of itself, is invigorated by the Catholic Idea, and tends to the common destiny of the race. Not all that proceeds not from the hierarchy, or operates not under their immediate direction is anti-catholic or un-Catholic, and to be rejected or resisted

by the sincere, earnest, and orthodox Christian. The Word made flesh embraces the race as well as the individual, the human as well as the Divine.

But not all change is progress. Man proceeds from God and tends in his normal state to him. All progress is in the return to God as our final cause, the final cause of creation itself. But there is the fact of human degeneracy as well as of human progress to be taken into the account. Man has an ascending tendency, and also a descending tendency. Society, as the expression of the human, may tend to the ABOVE, or it may tend to the BELOW, *Infernus*. Changes may spring from or favor either of these two tendencies, and therefore there may be changes to be resisted as well as changes to be encouraged. A discrepancy between the Church and society may as well arise from her resisting abnormal changes, as from her slowness in approving and encouraging normal changes. The clergy may at times be right as well as wrong in resisting society, and in resolutely refusing to go with it. By their very office it is their duty to labor with all their zeal, energy, wisdom, and virtue, to conform society to the Christian type; and this renders it necessary for them to oppose society whenever and wherever it tends to deviate from that type, or to place obstacles in the way of its realization. Society is regressive as well as progressive, and the discrepancy between the Church and society may and not unfrequently does arise not from the opposition of the clergy to progress or their unwillingness to aid it, but from their efforts to stay the tide of degeneracy, or to arrest society in its downward tendency.

It is easy from these observations taken together to explain without impeaching the sanctity and infallibility of the Church in any sense she herself requires us to assert them, how it could happen that in the sixteenth century there were great Ecclesiastical reforms necessary, and how the Ecclesiastical authorities could fail to perceive and properly appreciate the motives of the Reformers, and by an unwise resistance drive them into heresy and schism. We can hold fast to our Catholic faith, we can retain our deep and burning love for the Church, the Spouse of Christ, and yet recognize a good motive and a Catholic thought in the outset at the bottom of the Protestant movement, for in the outset it was not Protestant. It was a movement in the Church, by Catholics, and it became Protestant only subsequently, after it had been expelled from the Church. How

it came to embrace its errors and to be thus expelled, will be the subject of future Essays. We have in this said enough to show that we may treat the movement as a historical movement, as a historical fact, and judge it as such without any fear of harming the Catholic cause. The Church has nothing to dread from facts, and her cause can never suffer from their free, fair, and full recognition and assertion.

ART. II.—*Le Père Lacordaire.* PAR LE COMTE DE MONTALEMBERT, l'un des Quarante de l'Académie Française. Paris : Douniol. 1862. 12mo. pp. 285.

M. DE MONTALEMBERT, in this small volume, has paid a most graceful, elegant, and well-deserved tribute to his lately deceased friend, the world-renowned *Père Lacordaire*, the reviver of the Order of Preachers in France. The volume is written with the grace and fervor which characterize all the works of its distinguished author, and with all the tenderness and pathos of the most true, confiding, and beautiful friendship. It was in early life, while yet a youth, fired with the generosity and enthusiasm of a noble soul, before any of its illusions have been dispelled, or its ardor damped by experience of the selfishness, the calculating prudence, the cold-hearted indifference, or the falsity of the world, that the author was brought into intimate relations with the *Abbé Lacordaire*, a few years his senior, and formed with him those ties of friendship, of sympathy, and a disinterested devotion to the same great and noble cause, which only death has been able to sever, and which not even death has severed, for they were ties formed in the Lord, binding them to each other, because binding them alike to Him who dies not, is immortal and eternal. No man knew, no man could know *Père Lacordaire* better, for no man did or could hold a more intimate communion with his soul, since no one did or could more closely sympathize with him, or better interpret him by his own love and aspirations. The volume is written from the heart, and is the author's own heart revealing the heart and soul of his friend. It is tender, affectionate, but appreciative and manly. The friendship between these two gifted souls was strong, robust, and

healthy—a friendship in which mind united with mind, as well as heart with heart. The volume is instructive; it is inspiring, and, in the present state of the Catholic mind, one of the best books that can be read and meditated, especially by our generous and noble-hearted young men, who wish for a great cause to espouse, and are not repelled by the prospect of labor and sacrifice.

We have seldom in these pages referred to *Père Lacordaire*, and we confess to having never been among his warm admirers. We heard him spoken lightly of by men whom we highly esteemed, and whose judgment on any subject we did not at the time permit ourselves to question, and not finding his published works fully sustaining the reputation he evidently had as an orator, we were led to regard him as much overrated by his friends, and never took the pains to make ourselves acquainted with his real worth. When we came into the Church the great danger to religion and society seemed to us to come from the side of revolutionism, or liberalism; and the democratic tendencies so apparent in *Père Lacordaire* made us distrust him, and look upon him as a man whose influence could not fail to be hurtful.

Our readers are well aware that we started our public career as a radical, an extreme liberal, with great faith in man, but with little faith in God. We accepted as they were given us, the democratic and humanitarian premises, furnished us by our age and country, and sought to carry them out theoretically and practically to their last logical consequences. Our first acceptance of Christianity, after our dark period of religious doubt and unbelief, was on its social or humanitarian side, and our effort after that acceptance was to combine religion and liberalism, and to find a principle on which we could reconcile stability and progress, conservatism and reform. For years, our great theme was the democracy of Christianity, and the progress of man on earth as the means of arriving at heaven, or of attaining to his final destiny. Gradually, as our view of Christianity became larger and more firm, we discovered that we were attempting to make "bricks without straw," that the system we had adopted was sheer humanism, and the interpretation we had given to the purpose and end of the Gospel was that given by the old carnal Jews to the promises and prophecies of the Messiah. We recoiled from the abyss we saw yawning before us, re-examined our premises in the light of a profounder philosophy and a higher theology,

and found, as we thought, both the necessity and the truth of the Catholic Church, and also the medium of reconciliation between her and our modern world. We consequently became a Catholic, and were received into the bosom of the Catholic Church.

When once in the Church, having accepted her as our teacher, and her pastors as our guides and directors, we thought it necessary to break with our whole past, and to think, speak, and write only as we should learn of her. We held in abeyance all our former thoughts and reasonings, and repressed all our previous aspirations and tendencies; we tried to make our mind as far as possible a *tabula rasa*, and to begin as a new-born babe to learn our Catholic faith and theology, accepting nothing not taught us, and accepting every thing that was taught us in her name, or that logically followed from what was taught us. Having experienced the need of authority, having suffered more than we care to repeat for the lack of some infallible teacher, we thought, and could think, only of asserting authority in season and out of season. We had had enough of speculation, enough of liberty without authority, enough of democracy and private judgment, and were deafened with the declamations which had been ringing in our ears from early childhood about "popular sovereignty," "the people," "the rights of the people," "the rights of man," "the nobility of reason," and the "deathless energies and godlike tendencies of human nature," and consequently when we found a man using any of these terms, speaking of "humanity," "the irrepressible instincts of the human race," the "greatness," "dignity," or "worth" of human nature, we at once suspected either his orthodoxy or his understanding. We had had an excess of liberty, and feared the evils that come from that side far more than those that come from the side of despotism. The former we knew by experience; the latter we had never so known.

We are now satisfied that, however natural our course, however much there was of edifying humility and docility in it, it was a mistake, the commission of which separated us much farther than was necessary from our own age and country, and lost us a large number of non-Catholic friends, whom we prejudiced both against ourselves and our Church, while we are losing a larger number of Catholic friends by our efforts to correct it, and to resume the work we should never have abandoned. It was our misfortune to be under

the necessity of assuming the position of a Catholic periodical writer while we were but imperfectly acquainted with Catholic theology, and before we had had time and opportunity to examine how far we could retain as a Catholic the philosophy of religion we had attained to before being received into the Church. We felt the inconvenience and awkwardness of such a position, and believed it—perhaps, were encouraged so to believe—the best and shortest way to throw overboard our whole past, and to preserve the memory of it only as a warning, and take not only Catholic faith, but Catholic theology as we learned it from books and professors. Thus we wrote on Holy Thursday, 1845 :

“ Our life begins with our birth into the Catholic Church. We say this, because we wish no one to be led astray by any of our former writings, all of which, prior to last October, unless it be the criticisms on Kant, some political essays, and the articles in our present Review on Social Reform and the Anglican Church, we would gladly cancel if we could. We have written and published much during the last twenty years ; but a small duodecimo volume would contain all that we would not blot, published prior to last October.”—*Quarterly Review*, April, 1845, p. 260.

There was in this an excess of self-abnegation, and an ungrateful denial of the value of the long discipline we had received from the merciful and paternal hand of Divine Providence. But we felt our incompetency to discuss from our own knowledge and personal convictions the great questions proper to be discussed in a Catholic Review, and we relied almost solely on others. We used our own logic and language, but we ventured to utter no thought of our own. We wrote the best we could from the premises given us, and as a matter of course adopted the views of the theological school in which we happened to be placed, and labored to give them their full and complete logical expression. It was our study even to obliterate ourselves, to suppress our own personality, and to let Catholicity as we received it speak through us, and establish its own conclusions. This very fact explains the air and tone of dogmatism the Review was charged with assuming on becoming Catholic ; and what was set down to pride, to an overweening confidence in our own judgment, was due to an excess of self-abnegation, and to an undue distrust of what may be called our own thoughts and personal convictions.

But as time went on, as our acquaintance with Catholic

theology extended, and as we found it necessary to meet objections which we could not find met in any of the theological works within our reach, and which we could not ourselves meet on the theological or philosophical systems our Catholic teachers had given us, we began to look deeper into the received Scholastic theology and philosophy, and, indeed, to think for ourselves, and to ask, if, after all, Catholicity might not be a personal conviction, and not merely a system of truth having no intrinsic relation to human reason, and resting solely on external authority. We soon discovered, or thought we discovered, that there was in reality no such disruption between the true Catholic life and the *intellectual* life we had attained to prior to our conversion, as we had too hastily assumed. Doubtless, there were many errors in what we had previously written, but we had always, even in the days of our greatest darkness, held great Catholic principles, and our errors were less errors of principle than errors of fact, and were the result in the main of defective knowledge, chiefly of historical information. Catholicity then rested for us, as it does yet, on external authority, but not on external authority alone. It became a personal conviction, and we attained to that intellectual freedom which we had from the first asserted the Church allows, demands, and secures. We thus recovered the broken link of our life, reunited our present life with our life prior to our conversion, and resumed, so to speak, our personal identity.

The process of this resumption of our own identity, especially in the sphere of philosophy, has been going on slowly, timidly, hesitatingly since January, 1850, and with more rapidity, steadiness, and firmness since our removal from Boston to this city, and may now be regarded as complete. We accept all in our writings before we became a Catholic that we had arrived at by the free and independent action of our own mind. What were really our own personal convictions then are our personal convictions now. Errors we then had, as errors we may now have, and may have as long as we live, but we dare maintain that we had true catholic principles, true catholic thoughts, catholic aspirations and tendencies, long before we had the happiness of being received into the Church, and permitted to feast on the Body and Blood of our Lord, though, no doubt, the reach of the principles was not always seen, and the thoughts were incomplete. We had not truth in all its

clearness and explicitness, but we had embraced it in its synthesis, and seen the process by which that synthesis is reached and verified. We were *not* mistaken as to the principle which conducted us to the Church of God, as we were afterward led to believe,—an error which has caused us so much trouble, and lost us so much time; and if we had known better how to interpret the analytic language of Scholastic theology, we should never have been induced to lay aside, or hold in abeyance, our original conviction.

In point of fact, the disruption we speak of was never so complete as it appeared, or as we ourselves supposed. We troubled ourselves little about the matter, because we early adopted the maxim that no man should be a slave to his own past. But no honest man can ever wholly unmake himself, or, if true to himself, ever become wholly another man. In our most ultra-liberal days, in our wildest radicalism, we always retained a conservative element, and recognized and asserted the necessity of authority; and in our most conservative epoch, when opposing with all our might revolutionists and revolutionism, and defending the legitimate authority in the state, we never defended autocracy, or absolutism of any sort. From 1843 to 1850, we opposed the ultra-democracy rapidly gaining a foothold in our own country, and the revolutionary and socialistic tendencies of European Liberalism, because we believed then, and believe now, that the dangers to religion and society were then on that side, and our rule of conduct is always to attack the danger where it is, not where it is not. But in January, 1850, we assured our friends that we had carried the work of combating liberalism far enough, and that we should soon have to combat the reaction against it, to prevent it from crushing out liberty, and establishing despotism. A writer in these pages, not the Editor, indeed exulted over the *coup d'état* of December, 1851, and defended it, but not with our approbation, and for seven long years we stood alone in this country, almost in the world, among Catholic publicists, in warning Catholics against any entangling alliance with the new-fangled cæsarism of Napoleon III. From the first we assured our Bishops and clergy that, though the new Emperor of the French might seek to use the Church, he would never consent to be her servant, or to allow her full freedom as a corporation in his dominions. They believed us not, and we were represented as sharing the spite and tendencies of a “disap-

pointed Tribune," as the illustrious Catholic Champion of Catholicity, Count de Montalembert was sneeringly called, against Louis Veuillot and Louis Napoleon. Unhappily time and events have vindicated the noble French Champion of Catholicity and liberty, and justified our warnings. They who, without reason, threw the Church at the feet of the "new Charlemagne" or the "new St. Louis," as the new emperor was called, are now in danger of going to the opposite extreme, and offering him an opposition equally without reason. France is not ripe for a republic, and better the Bonapartes, than the restored Bourbons, of either the elder or the younger branch. In all this there is evidence of the love of authority on the one hand, and of liberty on the other, and of a conviction of the necessity of reconciling with each other both liberty and authority. We waged no war for despotism, and none against liberty as such. If we opposed the alliance of the Church with democracy, we opposed with equal firmness her alliance with despotism. In 1838, before our conversion, we wrote, and can repeat now, with only slight modifications:

"But if the Church, both here and in Europe, does not desert the cause of Absolutism, and make common cause with the people, its doom is sealed. Its union with the cause of Liberty is the only thing which can save it. The party of the people, the democracy throughout the civilized world, is every day increasing in numbers and in power. It is already too strong to be defeated. Popes may issue their bulls against it; bishops may denounce it; priests may slander its apostles, as they did and do Jefferson, and appeal to the superstition of the multitude; kings and nobilities may collect their forces and bribe or dragoon; but in vain; IT IS TOO LATE. Democracy has become a power, and sweeps on resistless as one of the great agents of Nature. Absolute monarchs must be swept away before it. They will fail in their mad attempt to arrest the progress of the people, and to roll back the tide of civilization. They will be prostrated in the dust, and rise no more forever. Whoever or whatever leagues with them must take their fate. If the Altar be supported on the Throne, and the Church joined to the Palace, both must fall together. Would the Church could see this in time to avert the sad catastrophe. It is a melancholy thing to reflect on the ruin of that majestic temple which has stood so long, over which so many ages have passed, on which so many storms have beaten, and in which so many human hearts have found shelter, solitude, and heaven. It is melancholy to reflect on the condition of the people deprived of all forms of worship, and with no altar on which to offer the heart's incense to God the

Father. Yet assuredly churchless, altarless, with no form or shadow of worship will the people be, if the Church continue its league with Absolutism. The people have sworn deep in their hearts, that they will be free. They pursue freedom as a divinity, and freedom they will have,—with the Church if it may be, without the Church if it must be. God grant that they who profess to be his especial servants may be cured of their madness in season to save the Altar!"—*Boston Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1838, pp. 464, 465."

The Church is indefectible, and cannot fail, save with individuals and nations, and so far as the contrary is implied in expressions here used, the extract needs correction; but in all other respects it may be indorsed by the most rigidly orthodox Catholic. The Church, indeed, always remains, for the Idea she is realizing in time and space, the Word Incarnate whose life she lives, cannot fail, but she may yet fail with individuals and nations, as she often has failed. We have in reality been always the same man we were when we wrote these words, and we cannot, if we would, make ourselves over into another man. The true Catholic life can be lived only in an element of freedom. The innumerable martyrs in all ages prove it; for martyrdom is the strongest assertion of liberty, and protest against despotism and tyranny it is possible for man to make. It was the desire to be free, to live in free and open communion with God that in the primitive ages peopled the deserts of Thebais and Palestine with hermits and anchorets, and in later ages the monasteries and convents with monks and nuns. The Church herself can fulfil her mission only in an element of freedom, and wherever her interests become complicated with those of despotism, the love of liberty common to all men breaks away from her, and makes war against her as the accomplice of the despotism they would annihilate. The Church must not only be free herself, but she must, in order to flourish in the modern world, support liberty without, and allow it within. It is not that authority should be withdrawn, denied, resisted, or made little account of, but that it should not be asserted as alone sufficient, or the liberty and the necessity in cultivated minds of personal conviction cast aside as a matter of no consequence. Men in our day demand personal conviction,—to appropriate, to assimilate to themselves the truth which authority teaches, so that they may have in themselves as Catholics unity of thought and life, and speak from their own thoughts, convictions, and experience as living men, and not merely re-

peat a lesson learned by rote, and to which they attach no more meaning than the parrot does to her scream of "pretty pol." It is not, in speaking thus, that we value less the external authority of the Church than we did formerly, or that we are less indisposed to resist it, but that we value personal conviction more, and feel more deeply the necessity of incorporating the truth the Church teaches, into the life, the intellect, the soul, the very being of the believer,—of making it our own, an integral part of ourselves, so that when we speak freely, spontaneously, we shall give it expression. We would think, and speak what we think, without being obliged to stop and ask, whether or not some Father or Doctor has thought or said the same before us. We would have catholic truth as a part of ourselves, have it our reason, our conscience, our common sense, not merely something put on, and held on by a foreign hand.

In coming to this conclusion, in resuming the continuity of our own intellectual life, and thus becoming a Catholic from personal conviction as well as from submission to simple external authority, we cannot believe that we have become less Catholic; we think we have become more Catholic, and now for the first time really and understandingly a Catholic. Catholicity has now become a part of ourselves, and we no longer regard it as something taken up or put on, or separate it, or distinguish it in thought from the rest of our intellectual and moral life. In resuming the connecting link between our present and past life, we are only bringing up a phase of thought that at first we did not dare trust, or feared might turn out to be uncatholic, and are only divesting our Catholicity of all sectarian incrustations and mediæval accumulations not in harmony with what is true and good in our age. Dogmatically considered, the Catholicity that was taught us was orthodox, but the philosophy and the political and social ideas, in a word, the *civilization* given us along with it belonged to an age that has passed away, and impossible to be recalled. *Impossibile defunctos revocare.* We are in our labors, so strangely misunderstood and so cruelly denounced, only asserting ourselves a man of the nineteenth century, and doing our best to show the ground of real harmony between the Catholic Church and modern civilization. We had discovered this ground before we came into the Church, but for some time after we came in we did not dare confide in it. We were afraid to rely on our own convictions, and

unnecessarily broke with our age and our country. It was a blunder, innocent in its motives, and the result not of pride, but its opposite. Still it was a blunder, and has prevented us from serving the cause of Catholicity as effectually as we might have done, caused us to waste much strength, and to lose much time. But what has been has been, and cannot be helped, and there is no use in whining or whimpering over it. He who has sinned should confess his sin, and forsake it, and hasten to practise the virtue still within his reach. He who has blundered need not paralyze himself in useless regrets, but should, as soon as he discovers his blunder, correct it, and seek to avoid similar blunders in future. No man, not a downright fool, ever claims exemption from error, or pretends to be infallible. He who thinks will sometimes err, but it is better to err than never to think, and better is it now and then to fail than never to attempt. It is of far more importance what we are to day than what we were yesterday. We make no moan over our past. We simply explain it, and dismiss it. We are none the worse, but the wiser for it.

But with our present views, and from our present position, we are able to appreciate, to some extent, the character, and to recognize the services of such a man as *Père Lacordaire*. We have been his contemporary, really engaged, though in a different sphere, and under circumstances widely different from his, in the same great work to which he devoted his life, and can honor ourselves by claiming to have been in many respects his disciple, and to have pertained to his school. No man in this country watched with more interest the beginning of the great movement in France commenced in 1831, and of which he was the master-spirit, or has been more affected by it in his whole intellectual life and destiny, than we. It was that movement that more than any thing else brought us back to Christianity, inspired us with belief in the possibility of reconciling religion and modern society, and finally prepared us for the recognition and acceptance of the Church. We had, in appreciating that movement, overlooked the claims of *Père Lacordaire*, for we took him to be simply a disciple of the once distinguished and eminent Abbé de la Mennais. We learn now for the first time that *Père Lacordaire* was never his disciple, that he never shared his peculiar views either in philosophy or theology, but was really himself the master-mind of the movement in what

was sober, reasonable, just, and catholic in it. The movement; resulting in what M. Montalembert calls the Catholic *Renaissance*, as Lamennais understood it, was based on a false and mischievous system of philosophy, and, if it could have prevailed, it would have subverted the very foundations of our Catholic faith. On the one hand, it would have confounded Regeneration with Generation, or, on the other, resolved Humanity into Divinity, and proclaimed not only People-Prophet, and People-Priest, but with Mazzini, People-King, and People-God, as any one may collect from his *Paroles d'un Croyant*, the legitimate development of his system.

Lacordaire during his college days, like so many of his generation, was without faith in Christianity, a Deist, as they said then; but after having finished the study of his profession as a lawyer, while still young, he recovered his faith in the Gospel, and immediately entered the Seminary of St. Sulpice, and was ordained priest in 1827. From his conversion to Christianity he never for a moment up to the hour of his death wavered in his faith, or relaxed his labors in the cause of religion and civilization. His faith was sincere, firm, and orthodox, his zeal pure, enlightened, and disinterested, and his submission to the proper authorities of the Church was prompt and unreserved, though never blind or servile. He was bold, at times to the verge of imprudence, if not of rashness, a man of strong personal convictions, we may also say, of an intense individuality, who, having taken his ground, adhered to it with firmness and constancy, and shrunk from no obstacles, from no misapprehension or misrepresentation, no obloquy or reproach, in maintaining it. He had unbounded and unshakable confidence in truth, or, more strictly speaking, in God whose word is truth, and he never doubted that the truth would sustain him, and in the end crown his works with success. He was inherently a brave man, what we may call a manly man, the hero of the pulpit, and the champion of free speech, free education, free thought, and free discussion. In him was no guile, no cunning, no trickery, no artifice, no seeking to compass his ends by intrigue, by craft, by indirect means, or by crooked or zigzag paths. His soul was as open as the day, and his means were as straightforward and just as his ends were pure, lofty, and noble. He was simple, tender, affectionate, but one of the most intrepid of men in defence of truth, justice, liberty. He was a

bold, energetic, and vigorous writer, of remarkable facility, and, in modern times at least, unrivalled as a pulpit orator, and the echoes of his voice, which rang out so clear, so strong, so sympathetic, and so winning, in the old Cathedral of *Notre-Dame de Paris*, and throughout all France, have not yet died away, and will not for many generations to come.

In 1831, *Père*, then the *Abbé*, Lacordaire became associated with Lamennais and Count Montalembert not yet of age, in conducting that remarkable journal, the *Avenir*. In that journal he soon eclipsed, the illustrious Count tells us, the older and more distinguished *Abbé de la Mennais*. With his associates he set on foot a movement which has not been without its influence on the subsequent history of the world, and to which he remained true to the hour of his death. To understand that movement, and to appreciate the service it rendered for over twenty years to Catholicity in France, as well as in a large portion of the Catholic world, we must recur to what at the time was the state of Catholic minds, of the general opinion of Catholics in France and elsewhere. The violence of the old French Revolution, the infidelity of its chiefs, the persecution it inaugurated against Catholics, its legal suppression of the Catholic worship, and its murder, imprisonment, or deportation of Catholic priests, had, not unnaturally, turned the whole Catholic mind against republicanism, and linked the cause of the Church with that of monarchy; and the military despotism of Napoleon, his imprisonment of the Holy Father, and his efforts to subject the Church to his will, and to use her in forwarding his ambitious projects of conquest and universal dominion, had wedded the Catholic cause to that of the Bourbons, and the party of Legitimacy throughout Europe, represented by the so-called Holy Alliance. Catholics were almost universally in 1830 united with the party of repression, the party of absolutism, the *oscurantisti*, and opposed to all movements in favor of popular liberty. The word *liberty* itself was *suspect*, and he who spoke in its favor was looked upon as a bad Christian and a worse subject.

The revolution of 1830 came, and proved that the *oscurantisti* were not invincible, and that the Catholic cause, if not separated from that of the sovereigns, would fail. That revolution proved to all men who had eyes in their heads that the people were mightier than their sovereigns, at least

too powerful and too imbued with a sentiment of their strength, too earnest in their love of liberty, ever to become again the quiet, peaceable, and orderly subjects of a despotic rule. It was clear that the repressive policy of the sovereigns must fail, and the Catholic cause, if linked to that policy, must itself fail with it. The Church everywhere shared the prejudices and resentments of the people against their temporal sovereigns, and the more she preached to them submission, and the more she labored to reconcile them to the old *régime*, and to make them quiet, docile, and obedient subjects, the more embittered they became against her as the enemy of progress, as the accomplice of despotism and tyranny. In point of fact, the liberal party, the party of progress, the believers in modern civilization were estranged from her communion, were unbelieving, and were making war on her as the chief supporter of a political and social order they wished to make an end of once for all. In this state of feeling the Church could not discharge her mission of winning souls to Christ, or of rearing up the modern world in the Christian faith. She had become odious to the modern world, and impotent to govern or direct it.

Under the existing circumstances, what was to be done? Why had the thinking, active, energetic portion of the people in modern times become the enemies of the Church, and disbelievers in her dogmas? Evidently because they found, or thought they found, the Church on the side of the sovereigns against the people, and sustaining an order of things which they held to be hostile to intelligence, to progress, and the political and social interests of mankind, not because they had outgrown the Catholic faith, or had any grave objections to her dogmas or her worship in themselves considered. Their quarrel with the Church was political and social, not dogmatical, and what they opposed in her was not her assertion of the divine, but her real or apparent suppression of the human. To them she seemed to have forgotten that the Saviour was "perfect Man," as well as "perfect God." The true course was, then, for the Church to cease to make common cause with the people's masters, to sever her cause from that of the Holy Alliance, to accept liberty and bless it, to take up the cause of the people, hallow the irrepressible instincts of humanity, place herself at the head of the modern world, and aid and direct it in the great work of scientific, social, and political evolu-

tion. This was the thought of the *Avenir*, and of the men grouped with Lacordaire and Montalembert around the Abbé de la Mennais. It required the complete separation of Church and state, the Church to give up all pecuniary support from the state, and to throw herself on the voluntary contributions of the faithful. Her liberty was no longer to be secured by Concordats with the state, but by securing the liberty of the people, and obtaining a safeguard for her liberty in the general liberty of the citizen, whether Catholic or non-Catholic.

The change recommended would have deprived the Church as a spiritual commonwealth of all political power, of all power derived from the state, all political right of censorship, and of all *civil* power to enforce her sentences against heresy, error, or schism, and consequently would have abolished the whole of that system of mixed civil and ecclesiastical government which had grown up in the Middle Ages, and was continued to some extent in all Catholic Europe, and have placed the Church on precisely the footing on which she stands in the United States, where she is free in the freedom of the citizen, and powerful by her intellectual and moral influence. It would have placed the Church on the side of liberty, and made it the interest as well as the duty of all Churchmen to resist absolutism, and to sustain the freedom and equal rights of the citizen. It would have enabled the Church to resume her civilizing work, baptized modern civilization, and healed the schism between her and the modern world. The thought was grand and noble, and, what is more, was eminently Catholic. We well remember the enthusiasm and joyous hope with which we heard its enunciation, all Unitarian as we were, and Christian in a mystic sentiment and vague longing rather than in any well-defined thought or intellectual conviction. It was the first thing that attracted our regards toward the old Church, and gave us a glimpse of her grandeur, as a social institution. Unhappily we knew the movement only as the work of Lamennais, and when we learned his condemnation and excommunication, we hastily, rashly concluded that the old Church was dead, and her resuscitation no longer possible. We wept as a child over the death of his mother, made honorable mention of her memory, and followed away the Saint-Simonian dreamers, the fallen priest, and wasted a dozen years of our life in the vain endeavor to lay the foundation of a New Church.

We read with intense interest the description M. Montalembert gives of the enthusiasm of that noble youth, the true chivalry of France, that were grouped around the great thought, and threw the whole force of their souls, their pure zeal and disinterestedness into the Catholic movement. We read with a new confidence in divine grace and the dignity of human nature, his account of their labors, their sacrifices, their trials, and the obstacles they overcame, or could not at the time overcome; and we can in our own heart sympathize with that sorrow that must have oppressed them when their chief was condemned, when he fulfilled to the letter the predictions of his enemies, and their noble cause seemed to have failed, and failed forever. Men never feel but once in life what they must have then felt. But the brave Count Montalembert, and the equally brave and heroic Lacordaire never for a moment faltered, never for a moment "lost heart or hope," or deserted the cause so dear to them, or despaired of the Divine mercy for the Church and the world. To the hour of his death Lacordaire remained faithful to his first love, and amid a life of vicissitudes the noble Montalembert seems to have abated nothing of his youthful passion, and amidst the wreck of society, obloquy, reproach, the desertion of friends, the treachery of associates, the cowardice of those who should have stood by him, and bodily infirmity, has maintained his fidelity and his honor. His heart, if touched with sadness, if it has something of the unction of sorrow, is as young, as loving, as ardent, as enthusiastic as it was thirty years ago. All in all, the history of the movement is to us the brightest, the purest, the noblest, the most inspiring and consoling chapter in the history of Catholic France.

There were, as M. Montalembert admits, some imprudences, and some things premature to be noted. The logic of the individual leaps more rapidly the distance from the premises to the conclusion than that of the community. None of the Catholic nations of Europe were in 1831 prepared to accept at once so great changes as Lamennais and his friends proposed. The merit of all great changes is in their opportuneness, and the most desirable reforms are injurious rather than beneficial, if attempted out of season, or so as to cause too violent a shock to old prejudices, habits, and usages. To be useful, they must not be new creations, nor violent changes, but should grow out of the past, and be its natural evolution. Unhappily, this rule, so true, and so

just, is oftener abused by the conservative party, than forgotten or disregarded by the reform party. It is made the excuse for doing nothing, for opposing all reform, all progress, and is translated into the maxim, *quieta non movere*, make no disturbance, keep quiet, and leave things as they are. This abuse on the one side provokes a corresponding abuse on the other, and pushes the reform party to a violence that it would never otherwise have dreamed of; yet, better motion than stagnation, better even the storm than the long calm, in which not a ship can move, nor a sail flap, under which even the ocean rots. Better life than death. It was only when troubled that the waters of the pool of Bethsaida possessed a healing virtue. If no shock is ever given to men's prejudices, they can never be removed; if no strong hand be laid upon old habits and usages, and if no one is suddenly started from his sleep of the "Seven Sleepers," no progress can ever be made, and no old abuses ever be corrected. Somebody must take the lead, and for the moment be in advance of the multitude, whether learned or unlearned, and he who takes the lead will to the many seem imprudent, rash, violent, and a disturber of the peace and quiet of society or of the Church. For our part, separating what pertained to Lamennais personally, and taking the movement as represented by Lacordaire, we see nothing in it not true and good, and nothing really rash or premature as a subject of public discussion.

No doubt the great body of the French prelates and clergy were unprepared for the sweeping changes proposed, but the changes were desirable, and of the greatest importance to the interests of religion and society. The error on the part of the friends was not in proposing them, but in demanding that they should at once be practically adopted; in being too impatient; and in not allowing the well-disposed men, cleric or laic, trained in the old system, attached to the old *régime*, and not much disturbed by its defects, which had not disturbed their predecessors, sufficient time to examine the questions involved, and to form an enlightened judgment respecting them. Our young friends did not make sufficient allowance for the slowness with which the majority of minds act, and the difficulty the majority of men have in changing their point of view, or of letting any new ideas get into their heads. They did not consider the bulk of mankind, and especially of those who have the direction of affairs, are, for the most part, made

up of prejudices and habits, creatures of routine, who believe and act as they do only because so believed and acted their fathers and predecessors ; and therefore they were too unmeasured, too violent in their attacks upon the French prelacy, and could expect only denunciation in return. They, too, erred by seeking a decision at the time from Rome. Under the circumstances, in the actual state of public opinion, and with the relations of the Church with the state such as they still were, Rome, even if not opposed to the views of the *Avenir* party in themselves considered, if compelled to decide the question, must decide against them. But this forcing Rome to a decision was the work of Lamennais himself, against the advice and judgment of his best friends, and proves, we fear, that he was more intent on gaining a victory over his enemies, than of securing the triumph of the cause in which he had enlisted so many of the noble youth of France.

We have been told the movement was condemned by Pope Gregory XVI., in his famous *Encyclical*, dated at Rome, August 15th, 1832, but we cannot find that its principle was condemned, or that the movement itself was censured as un-catholic. It was censured as one the Church could not officially sanction at the time, one which demanded changes at the time impracticable, and incompatible with the existing relations and interests of the Church, and likely to favor the false notions of liberty, of the freedom of conscience and opinion, as well as the religious indifference, then so rife in the revolutionary European world. This did not necessarily touch the great principle for which Lacordaire contended, that, if we may so speak, of associating liberty with religion, and effecting a reconciliation between the Church and modern civilization. We know he held fast to that principle during his whole life, and did so with the full knowledge of Rome, and without the least censure. He held fast to it as a secular priest, as a monk, and as the reviver of the Dominican order in France. Our present Holy Father appears to have approved it, and to have acted on it in the beginning of his Pontificate. It will not, therefore, do to say it has been condemned, and that the Church has bound herself for all time to come to her old political alliances, interdicted modern civilization, and thus denied her own catholicity in time. The Church has not stultified herself.

Lamennais, we think, might have been saved, had the

French prelates treated him somewhat differently, and not have enlisted his pride and his vindictive temper on the side of his errors; and he certainly would not, as it was, have been lost, if he had had a less proud and arrogant disposition, a less intense personality, and had engaged with more disinterestedness in his movement. We have heard much of the wisdom, tact, and adroitness of the clergy, of their patience, forbearance, and tenderness, and not more than is true, when they deal individually with one who comes to them avowing himself a sinner. But we have not found them always all that is pretended, when they have to deal publicly with a man whom they suspect of erroneous tendencies. Such a man they seldom spare. They seem to suppose that they have a perfect right to denounce him, and to enlist public opinion against him. It is enough for them to say he errs, and to persuade others that he errs, without taking any pains in a liberal spirit, to convince him, without unnecessarily wounding his self-love. No doubt they are moved by zeal for the purity and integrity of faith, and a just horror of heresy; but there may be an indiscreet zeal, a zeal that overshoots itself. The opinions which we judge unsound we are free to combat, and ought, if important, to combat; but we should spare the man till we have good evidence that he is determined to persist in error.

In combating a man's opinion, it is never wise or kind to do it by alleging public opinion, or even external authority, against him. To enlist public opinion against my opinions, is not to prove me in the wrong, it is only to prove or to make me unpopular; and external authority should not be alleged till all the resources of reason are exhausted, for authority sometimes silences without convincing, and it is possible, too, that the man may have a way satisfactory to himself of reconciling his opinions with the decisions of authority. As far as we have read the controversy, very little to the purpose was alleged against Lamennais. His obvious meaning was often misapprehended; his own defences treated with wrath or superciliousness. We read the publications of the Bishop of Toulouse against him with great pain. The best things and least objectionable were said by Father Rozaven; but the good Father begins by assuming that he is right, and that his opponent has not a word to say, and does not permit him to say a word, in his own defence. This is not the best way of proceeding, for it gives a man no chance but to pros-

trate himself at your feet, and give you a personal triumph over him, or doggedly to close his mind and heart against even the truth. By such proceeding, if the man is not a heretic when you find him, he is very likely to be one when you leave him. You adopt it successfully against the multitude, not against an individual. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that Lamennais lacked true humility and the forgiving disposition of the Gospel.

But though Lamennais failed, the movement did not fail. Lacordaire, Montalembert, and their friends remained true to it. Its powerful and excellent influence was seen in the Revolutions of 1848. These revolutions nowhere, out of the Papal States, assumed an anti-Catholic character, and they gave to the Church in France and Germany a degree of freedom that she had never before enjoyed since the memory of man. Never since France became Catholic did French Catholics conduct themselves more like freemen, show more the qualities that best befit the patriot, the citizen, and never did the Church in France assume a nobler attitude, occupy a more independent position, speak with a freer, a more energetic, a more inspiring, or a more consoling voice, than under the Republic of 1848. She saved the country from anarchy, and French society from dissolution, by the prompt and frank acceptance of the Republic by the majority of her prelates and clergy, with the Archbishop of Paris at their head, and their ready and hearty espousal of the cause of liberty. Then we saw that *Père Lacordaire* and his noble band of *liberal* Catholics, as they were called, had not labored in vain. They had infused a confidence in political and civil liberty into the Catholic body, and had disarmed the honest and intelligent liberals of their former hostility to the Church, and made Catholics themselves feel that the liberty of the Church would receive its strongest guaranty in the freedom of the citizen.

We need not say that a lamentable change has since come over the Gallican Church. An exaggerated fear of Socialism, defeated on the 13th of June, 1848, a pusillanimous dread of seeing re-enacted the horrors of the Republic of 1792, of which there was really no serious danger, and a secret longing for the support and favors of the prince, the result of old habits, or of the reminiscences of old times, led her prelates with the majority of the parish priests to sacrifice her independence, to deliver her over bound hand and foot to Cæsar, in the fallacious hope of deriving greater advan-

tages to religion from power than from liberty. They thought it better for the Church to be a courtier, than a free citizen, and in consequence compelled her to serve as a slave, or to make herself a *frondeur*. We will not suffer ourselves to speak of their uncalled for surrender to power in the terms that best befit it. If, on the morrow of the Revolution of February, the noble attitude they assumed attracted the admiration and kindled the hopes of the world, their weakness, to use no harsher term, after the *coup d'état* of December, 1851, and before the Proclamation of the Empire in December, 1852, was fitted only to grieve the hearts of sincere Catholics who understood the position of things, and to excite the contempt and disgust of the liberally minded non-Catholics who had begun to turn with respect and affection towards the old Church. It was lamentable, and tended only to confirm the objections that had been so long and so confidently urged against us; it proved but too evidently that goodness is not always accompanied by wisdom, and that the simplicity of the dove may be possessed without the prudence of the serpent. The clergy, especially of the first order, throughout the world, taking their cue from the clergy of France, at least from those who by favoring power could speak, supposing very naturally that they were the best judges in the case, hailed the re-establishment of the Napoleonic Empire as the commencement of a golden age for the Church.

Our readers will bear us witness that we warned them against committing themselves in favor of the new *régime*; but they will also bear witness that we did so only at our peril. It was regarded as gross impudence on our part to presume to differ from the French clergy and their trusted organ, sustained even at Rome, the *Paris Univers*. Were not the bishops and clergy of France better judges of what was for the interests of the Church, than an American, or rather, a Yankee layman? And could he pretend to be more devoted to those interests than they whom the Holy Ghost had intrusted with their management? Does he, a Yankee convert, and a convert of recent date, presume not only to instruct old Catholics, those who have been Catholics from infancy, and have never followed Tom Paine, Fanny Wright, Saint-Simon, been infidels, socialists, Presbyterians, Universalists, Unitarians, or any thing of the sort, but even to teach our consecrated Bishops what is or is not for the interests of religion, and to arraign them as

not knowing or not performing their duty? Out upon his intolerable pride, his Yankee impudence! So, for seven long years we stood alone, in our own country, uttering our warnings in vain, and nothing we have said or done has had so much effect in impairing the confidence of Catholics in us as our opposition to the tendency among them to applaud the new-fangled *cæsarism* introduced by Louis Napoleon, defended by Louis Veuillot, and indorsed apparently by the French Episcopacy. We feel no gratification in finding events justifying our warnings, and it was with real pain we heard a noble-hearted Bishop say to us, a few weeks since, "You were right, and we were wrong." We could enjoy no personal triumph which had been gained only by events deeply injurious to the Catholic cause, dearer to us than our own reputation, far dearer to us than our own life.

Religion has been put back perhaps half a century or more by the abandonment of the cause of political liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of discussion, and publicity in France; but the glorious cause to which Lacordaire devoted his well-spent life is not lost. True he is gone, and his eloquent voice can no longer be heard in the French Churches, by thousands of French youth with palpitating hearts; but it is not wholly silent. It has at least left an echo, and his whole life, his heroic example will speak for him. Ozanam, that prince among erudites, the true scholar, the really learned man, the devout Christian, the founder with Lacordaire of the great and glorious Association of St. Vincent de Paul, and now spread through nearly all Christian lands, is gone, but he lives, speaks, and moves men's minds and hearts in his works. These are gone, yet not all are gone. Montalembert, De Falloux, the Bishop of Orleans, the learned and eloquent Dupanloup, and hosts of others whose names deserve honorable mention, yet remain, and are sure to leave a posterity. The army of Catholic progress has suffered losses, has received a temporary check, a defeat, if you will, but not annihilation, nor a rout. It is weakened for the moment, but not demoralized. New recruits will flock to fill its thinned ranks, and this New World will soon send her full contingent. Our own personal race is, no doubt, well nigh run, and we shall probably be placed on the retired list, as past service, if not dishonorably dismissed; but our country lives, and will live, in spite of the formidable rebellion that threatens her life, and rise to a position in the world's estimation she has

never yet held, and here Catholicity and political liberty will walk hand in hand together. Here sooner than elsewhere will the schism between the Church and modern civilization be healed, and it be possible for a man to be a Catholic without warring against the progress of the age, or laboring to restore a dead past. Our civil war will correct many notions, remove many doubts, and confirm confidence in the principle of free government. Our Bishops and our clergy will acquire it, and will break from the bonds which bind them to a political and social order which the triumph of the Loyalists in the Republic will forever render obsolete. Our young and educated Catholics will drink in a love for liberty with the love for religion, will feel themselves freemen as they bow low at the foot of the altar, assert in the same breath their manhood and their Christian docility, and with ever increasing numbers, courage, and discipline swell the Catholic army of progress. We have no fears or misgivings as to ultimate success.

But the great change we look for in the mutual relations of the Church and society, demanded by the progress of events, is not to be expected in a day. The old mixt civil and Ecclesiastical government of society is that under which most Catholics have been trained, that to which in old Catholic countries they are still habituated, and that which almost everywhere the regular official instruction they receive presents as the beau-ideal of Catholic organization. All see and know that that order has been violently shaken, that it has in many places been overthrown, and is menaced everywhere; but probably the majority regard this as a fact to be deplored, and still cherish the hope of one day restoring the relations which have been disturbed or broken. Many may suspect the change threatened cannot be successfully resisted, but, regarding it as an evil, think it their duty to resist it as long as they can,—to put off the evil day to the remotest future possible. They who think with us that the change is not only inevitable, but desirable, and that it will prove not only a change, but a progress, are only a minority, and those not at the head of Ecclesiastical affairs. The laity are much better prepared for it, and much more favorable to it, than the clergy; but it is not fitting that the laity should array themselves against the clergy, and in matters of this sort there is little good that can be accomplished without the co-operation of the hierarchy. The great evil, and that which delays the

change, is the attempts of the laity to accomplish it without this co-operation, and in spite of it. These attempts are impolitic, and even un-Catholic. They are in their nature revolutionary, and therefore always to be deprecated. If the clergy are not the whole Church, there is no Church without them, any more than there are children without parents. Much of the backwardness, slowness, or hesitancy of the clergy grows out of the impatience of the people, their disorderly demands, their revolutionary tendencies, creating in their minds the suspicion that the moving cause in the people is doubt of religion, and unwillingness to submit to its restraints, and to practise its precepts. The complete separation of Church and state, leaving the Church to find protection for her liberty in the general liberty secured to the citizen, we hold to be the only practicable solution of the problems of our age with equal advantage to civil and religious society; we believe that this solution is the one to which the whole progress of the world is tending; but we are not ourselves prepared to adopt it against the Church, or without the consent of the hierarchy.

What we claim for ourselves is the right to urge it, the right to discuss it, to show its utility, its desirableness, and its inevitableness; to convince if we can, even the hierarchy of its utility, and persuade them to consent to it. The right to do this much, we maintain, is the right of every Catholic, whether cleric or laic, simply holding himself bound in the sphere of action to obey the constituted authorities. I am bound to obey the Pontificate, and to venerate the Sacerdacy, both of which are from God, but I am not bound to take no thought for the interests of religion and society, or, in this country at least, to refrain from expressing my honest convictions, when they in no sense impugn Catholic dogma, or what is unchangeable in the constitution of the Church. There is a mission of genius, of intelligence in the Church, which is not necessarily restricted to the clergy, and may be committed to laymen, or to clergymen in a sense outside of their sacerdotal character, for the Church has a right to the service of the genius, the intelligence, the learning, the good-will, and the zeal of all her members, of laymen as well as of clergymen. We see nothing un-Catholic in this non-hierarchical mission, any more than there was under the Old Law in the mission of the prophets, which was distinct from that of the ordi-

nary priesthood, and, as we may say, extra-hierarchical. Indeed, in asserting it, we assert only what always has been and always will be. We claim no more for the laity than they have always done, except we claim publicity for what they do, or that what they do they do openly, before the whole world, not simply by private communication, by secret diplomacy, and sometimes by private intrigue. In discussion the layman, under responsibility, we hold, may take the initiative, and not await it from authority. He may open such questions as he deems important, and the business of authority is not to close his mouth, but to set him right, when and where he goes wrong. This is no more than princes and nobles have always been allowed, or assumed unrebuked the right to do, and princes and nobles are only laymen. What a crowned or a titled layman may do, a free American citizen, though uncrowned and untitled, may also do. I have as much right to make my suggestions, and offer my advice to the Bishops or to the Supreme Pontiff as had Charlemagne and St. Louis, or as has Louis Napoleon or Francis Joseph to offer theirs. Before the Church, if not before the state, all laymen are equal.

But this, though undeniably true, is so far removed from past usage, that to any but an inborn republican, it seems almost false, almost satanic, and it will need to be iterated and reiterated from many mouths and for a long time, before it will be generally accepted and practically conformed to. The memory of old systems and of the old relations between the temporal and the spiritual is too vivid for even Catholics who have not imbibed republican sentiments, and, as to that matter, for many who have imbibed them, to see in the assertion that the people, in relation to the Ecclesiastical society, stand on a footing of perfect equality with princes and nobles, kings and kaisers, nothing uncatholic or disrespectful to the hierarchy. All the old relations of Church and state presuppose the state to have for its basis not right and equality, but inequality and privilege. The greater part of our ascetic literature, or works designed especially for spiritual instruction and edification, presuppose monarchy tempered or not tempered with aristocracy, as the constitution of society, and are filled with allusions, illustrations, and comparisons that are neither apt nor edifying to a republican mind. The general tone of our theological literature, whether scholastic or popular, speculative or polemical, produces an impression on the

reader that the Church is confined to the government, and really consists only of the clergy, hierarchically organized under their chief, the Supreme Pontiff. The people seem to count for nothing in the Church, as formerly they counted for nothing in the state. He who ventures to assert that the clergy are only functionaries in the Church and for the Church, that the laity are an integral part of the Church, and not mere "hewers of wood and drawers of water" to the hierarchy, with neither voice nor souls of their own, is at once suspected of wishing to democratize the Church, of having Congregational predilections or reminiscences, if not of being animated by an unavowed hostility to the hierarchical constitution of the Church herself. It is hard to protest against an extreme in one direction, without being suspected of wishing to run to an extreme in another. Hence it is that they who propose changes or ask for changes demanded by the progress or changes in civilization are sure to be misunderstood, misrepresented, and suspected of disloyalty to Catholicity.

No man ever lived who could more effectually bear witness to the truth of what is here asserted than *Père Lacordaire*. He was sincere, earnest, and firm in his faith, simple and docile as a child, clear, distinct, and reverential in his expression, unbounded in his charity, full of tenderness of heart, gentle in his manners, eminent for his prudence, his sobriety, and for his earnestness, his singleness of purpose, and his disinterestedness, and yet he had his enemies, enemies who persevered in being his enemies during his life, who misunderstood him, misrepresented him, distrusted him as a Catholic, and did all in their power to lessen his influence, and defeat his purposes. How often have we heard him traduced, denounced as a Radical, a Jacobin, a Socialist, concealing the *bonnet rouge* under the friar's hood. Yet he persevered, held fast to his integrity, held fast to his honest convictions, and continued on in the line of duty marked out for him, unshaken and unruffled, calm and serene, till he laid him down gently, and slept his sleep of sweet peace in the Lord who so loved him, and whom he so tenderly loved and had so heroically served. His example is full of inspiration and consolation, and proves that God is as near us to-day as of old, and has not abandoned our age. Great souls may be born now as well as aforetime, and great and heroic deeds remain for the Christian to-day, not inferior to the greatest and most glorious per-

formed by our fathers. Not in vain did *Père Lacordaire* live, toil, suffer and die, and nothing better proves it than the touching words in the Albigenian *patois* uttered by a poor woman in the immense multitude that flocked to his obsequies at Sorèze: *Abion un rey, l'aben perdut*, "We had a king, we have lost him." No, my good woman, we have not lost him. He lives in his works; he lives in that free, manly spirit he quickened in the Catholic youth of France, in the souls he formed to take up his work, and carry it on to the glory of God, the honor of Jesus Christ, God made man, the redemption of souls, and the revival of Catholic society.

We know the weaknesses and miseries of human nature; we know that principles, dogmas of faith are immutable; we know the government of the Church is hierarchically constituted; and we recognize our duty to believe what God teaches us, and to obey those whom the Holy Ghost has commissioned to govern us; but we cannot persuade ourselves that He who for our sakes assumed our nature, made Himself man that man might become God, requires us to suppress our nature, or that He ever intended to exclude from his religion all exercise of reason, all the living convictions of our own minds, all the warm affections and gushing tenderness of our own hearts. "Whom God has joined together let no man put asunder." In our Redeemer and Lord the Divine nature and the human are joined together in one person forever, to be separated nevermore; and he who would separate them, that is, dissolve Christ, is not of God, but is antichrist. In the Incarnation, human nature, that nature which is equally the nature of all men, is elevated to be the nature of God, is, in the language of Pope St. Leo, "deificated," actually and completely so in the Son of Man, and potentially so in all men. How long shall we be in learning that this mystery of mysteries, in which the wisdom, the love, the mercy, and the creative power of God are, so to speak, exhausted, is not a mere isolated dogma, with no intimate relation to our practical and every-day life? In our religion there is the Divine, but the Divine with the human, and the human, but not the human without the Divine; and we are as untrue to it when we take the Divine without the human, as we are when we take the human without the Divine. The religion that neglects civilization is in principle as un-Catholic, as the civilization that neglects religion. He departs from the

Gospel who asserts the divine authority to the exclusion of human freedom, as he who asserts human freedom to the exclusion of the authority of God. The Jesuits rendered the cause of orthodoxy a valuable service in their defence of nature and human liberty against the Jansenists. They might render it a still further service by reforming our ascetic literature, and placing modern spiritual direction in harmony with the principles they in their controversy with the Jansenists so vigorously, heroically, and successfully defended.

The cause of religion has suffered deeply from the schism between it and civilization, we may say, between it and humanity. The friends of religion seem to be more oppressed with a sense of the weakness and degeneracy of human nature, than encouraged by a sense of its innate greatness and dignity. Our spiritual directors are afraid to place a generous confidence in nature, and think it necessary to keep it always in leading-strings. They do not, indeed, maintain that all our instincts are corrupt, and that every spontaneous motion of the soul is satanic. They admit that in themselves they are good, but fear the consequences of giving them a free and open field. They thus begin at the earliest moment to restrain, prune, trim, and train them to the stiffness, and artificiality of a French parterre. They render the heart and soul constrained and artificial, and consequently weak and helpless when the moral storm or tempest comes to sweep over them. We know that even what is good in our nature, if left to itself, runs wild, and that everywhere the garden of Nature needs the gardener to dress it. But in dressing it, he should not destroy it. He should follow the principle of all true landscape gardening, that of preserving the plan or the *idea* of nature, and only prune away the excesses or excrescences, which only obscure that idea, and hinder its free and full development. We have too much direction, and not enough of self-confidence and self-growth. We are too tenderly nursed, too carefully guarded, and, in a word, governed too much. We grow up in religion weak and timid, not strong and courageous. We are greenhouse plants, and fade and wilt away, when removed from the conservatory to the open air and light of heaven. We thrive only by artificial heat, and can bear the light only as it comes to us through glass cases. We yield ever so innocently to nature only with a feeling that we are doing wrong, or at least are falling into an imperfection. If we have looked with

a high degree of pleasure on a lovely landscape, a gorgeous sunset, or a master-piece of art, we feel, if we are striving after Christian perfection, that we should go and ask our director, if the pleasure was not a sin, or an imperfection. God forbid that we should in any respect undervalue, or lead others to undervalue spiritual direction, a thing which the wisest and best of our race need. It is not that we speak against direction, but against the want of self-reliance, of self-help, and the feeling that in nothing which belongs to religion can we think for ourselves, and follow our own honest convictions. We can confess only to the priest, we can have the Holy Sacrifice, and receive Holy Communion only from the hands of the priest; but we may have thought, good sense, understanding, knowledge of our religion by the exercise of our own faculties, and the assiduous study of the principles of our religion as taught in the Catechism, without running every moment to trouble our ghostly father with questions which every moderately instructed mind is capable of deciding for itself.

There is no doubt that all or nearly all Catholics in this country believe and firmly hold that the Catholic religion and republicanism in the state can coexist in perfect harmony. We do not recollect to have ever heard a single Catholic express a serious opinion to the contrary. But, we apprehend, very few amongst us are able to give a clear and distinct statement of the principle which harmonizes them. To one who denies it, they point to San Marino, the oldest republic in the world, to the Catholic Cantons of Switzerland, to the opinions of some Catholic Doctors, and to the general devotion of Catholics here to our Democratic institutions. This is all very well as far as it goes, but that is not far, and by no means reaches the heart of the question. It only proves that men who are Catholics do sometimes support republicanism, and are not condemned by the Church for so doing. But it does not show on what principle the Church and the republic are harmonized, and therefore gives no scientific solution of the problem. It is not seldom that Catholics act on one set of principles in their religion, and on a different, if not a contradictory, set of principles in their politics. It is not every man who brings his whole intellectual life into dialectic harmony, and we apprehend that the majority even of Catholics in our own country feel that there is more or less discrepancy between the principles of their religion and their political convictions, which they

get over by saying to themselves, either that religion has nothing to do with politics, or that politics have nothing to do with religion. If they thought much of the matter, and analyzed their own intellectual state, they would perceive that there is a schism in their intellectual life, and that in point of fact their religion tends to detach them from their politics, and their politics tend to detach them from their religion. Pious, devout Catholics with tender consciences keep clear of the political arena, and Catholics who engage deeply in politics soon become of little worth in the Church. This shows that they have not found or do not understand the principle which makes them both parts of one whole.

Republicanism should be taken in a liberal sense, as the government of law, not of men. Under a republic the obedience is not rendered to the man, but to the law he represents. Carry this principle into religion, and the Church and the republic are harmonized without a compromise on either side. Republicanism stands opposed not necessarily to monarchy, but to despotism, and the difference between the two is that in the despotism the man is obeyed as the living law, and in the republic as its minister or representative. Obedience to man is servility, is slavery, utterly subversive of all true manhood; obedience to law is, on the contrary, freedom, true liberty, and no more repugnant to true manliness than is obedience to God himself. The characteristic of republican freedom is not in the absence of obedience or even subjection, but in the absence of all obedience or subjection to men as such. This principle is as applicable in the Church as in the state. Undoubtedly in the Church obedience is and must be exacted, but not to men. The Pontificate and the Sacerdocy are Divine, inherent in the Word made flesh, and men are only their ministers, so to speak, their representatives. The priest when ordained receives the priesthood, which we must reverence and obey as sacred and Divine, but the man himself we reverence only for the sake of his office, as we reverence the fragile vase in which a precious treasure is deposited. No doubt great reverence and honor should be paid to the man for sake of the priest, and to avoid all disrespect to the sacred and Divine treasure of which he is the depositary, even in case he is personally unworthy; but our obedience is due only to the law of which he is the organ. Thus we show honor and respect in the state to the Governor or President, for the

sake of his office, or the high trusts with which he is invested ; but we owe him and pay him obedience only in his official capacity, as the minister of the law. The principle, therefore, is the same in the Church and in the state, and we are not obliged to leave our republican principles at the door, when we enter her temple.

Now what we want, and what we suppose *Père Lacordaire* wanted and labored to effect, is to bring the whole Catholic public up to this principle, and to harmonize in their conceptions, feelings, and habits, manliness and obedience, submission to authority with conscious freedom. He as well as we would wipe out the last vestiges of that old servility generated not by the obedience the Church exacts, but by the submission insisted on by political despotism, and which was transferred from the world of politics to the sacred sphere of religion. As long as the state remains despotic in its constitution, and the prince is not the representative of the majesty of the state, but the state itself, the living law, the people will remain servile in their dispositions, and will want the manliness, the energy to assert and maintain the freedom and independence of the Church. The Church will in her turn be affected, impeded in her operations, and shorn of her civilizing power by the same despotism that weighs upon the people, and be forced to speak only in the tones of consolation, to preach patience and resignation, and bid the poor suffering millions to be contented with what they suffer here, in view of the joys and glory of heaven hereafter, to which they may, if faithful, hope finally to attain. The people thus become before the Church what they are before the state. The remedy for the evil is only in crushing the despotism of the state, in instituting a free state, and creating free citizens. Hence it is that we maintain that the freedom of the Church is secure only in the freedom of the state. It is only in freeing the state that you can free men, and it is only free men that can yield a free, enlightened, and voluntary obedience, or have the strength, the energy, the courage to assert the freedom of the Church.

But till the faithful throw off their old servile habits, and understand their freedom and its conditions, they cannot be either good republicans or good Catholics. As long as they retain them, the practical influence of the clergy will for the most part be on the side of despotism, and unfavorable to the introduction of republicanism where it is not, or to

its preservation and development where it is. What is now most necessary to be done is, in our republican country, not to republicanize the Church, but to republicanize Catholics, and harmonize them in their religious character with their character as republicans in the state; and, in despotic states, to imbue them with a sincere love of liberty in the interest both of religion and civilization. This is the significance, as we understand it, of what Montalembert calls the Catholic *Renaissance* in France. Our own country presents a fair and open field for this *renaissance*, for the union of religion with civilization, and that new Catholic development which will restore to the Church the nations she has lost, give her back the leadership of human intelligence, and secure her the willing obedience and love of mankind.

It was to this end that the eloquent Dominican devoted his entire life, and set an example worthy of our imitation. Those who follow his example must expect to be misapprehended, misinterpreted, and opposed by men high in place, distinguished for their abilities, and worthy of respect for their many virtues. But let not this move them, or sadden their hearts. Above all, let them do justice to the motives and the real worth of those who oppose them, and never suppose because God has given them a special mission, or because under the operations of Divine Providence they have been led to see things not given to all to see, that they are necessarily intellectually or morally superior to their enemies. Let them do their work freely, faithfully, bravely, utter the truth they see, do the good they are called to do, but with love to all, without acrimony to any, and without attempting to forestall the judgments of Almighty God. They who differ from us may often deserve as much respect and affection as we, even though we are right and they wrong.

● ART. III.—*Catholic Principles of Civil Government. A Lecture*, by Rev. JAMES KEOGH, D. D., of Pittsburg, Pa. Cincinnati. 1862. 8vo. pp. 20.

DR. KEOGH, the able and loyal Editor of the *Pittsburg Catholic*, has in his popular Lecture before the Catholic

Institute of Cincinnati, given a very condensed, clear, explicit, and just statement of the Catholic principles of government as taught by the greatest and most approved Fathers and Doctors of the Church. To those familiar with the writings of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Bellarmin, and Suarez his statement contains indeed little that is new, but it presents their doctrine in a popular form, and applies it to the great struggles now raging between legitimate authority and revolutionism both at home and abroad. His Lecture, which we should be glad to see widely circulated, is timely, and brings out and enforces certain great principles of which the people, whether orthodox or heterodox, cannot be too frequently reminded, and with which they cannot be too thoroughly imbued,—principles which, if they had been more generally held and more generally understood, would have saved Europe from revolutionary terrorism, and our own country from the fearful evils of the civil war, with which she is now so sorely afflicted.

Men who pique themselves on being “practical men,” men of “plain common sense,” are apt to treat with contempt those of us who deal with principles, and labor to establish sound and just doctrines; but all experience proves that the people collectively as well as individually are logical, and sure, sooner or later, to draw from their premises their logical conclusion. If they start with a false theory of authority, they are certain to fetch up in despotism, and, if with a false theory of liberty, they are just as certain to fetch up in revolutionism, anarchy, or license. A false theory respecting the Divine origin of power has led nation after nation to submit to the misrule and oppression of despots, and a false theory as to popular sovereignty subjects all European society to the terror of revolutionism, and in this country leads to rebellion, secession, and civil war. The doctrine of popular sovereignty held and proclaimed by our American demagogues, and heretofore generally insisted on by the American press, both North and South, fully justifies Secession; and condemns the Federal government for its attempt to coerce the rebellious States into submission. If the people are sovereign, and government is nothing but an agency, created by them for carrying out their will, as modern demagoguery teaches, by what right do you deny the people of the Slaveholding States the right to secede from the Union, and to form a Southern confederacy, if such be their pleasure? Either the theory which you have

insisted on in the case of all foreign revolutions is untenable, and should be promptly disavowed, or you are wrong in attempting to enforce the laws of the Union over States that do not choose to obey them. If the Æmilian Provinces had the right to secede from the Papal authority, and annex themselves to Piedmont, why has not South Carolina the right to secede from the Union, and enter into the Southern Confederacy? Yet there are men, that hailed the secession of the Æmilian Provinces as a glorious assertion of freedom, who are now fighting against South Carolina, and willing to see her annihilated. There are men amongst us, men who applaud to the echo Garibaldi, that prince of freebooters, laud him as a patriot and a hero, who yet demand the capture and execution of Jefferson Davis as a traitor. It is said that even our government actually invited Garibaldi to accept a commission in our army, and there was at one time a report that he was to be its Commander-in-Chief,—he, a man not worthy to be named in the same breath with even Jefferson Davis, John B. Floyd, or Gideon Pillow!

It is of the last importance that we start with sound and just principles. It is absurd to claim the right to resist government, if it governs by divine right, or to undertake to suppress a rebellion, if the people are above law, and absolutely and persistently sovereign, as our demagogues assert. In either case the inconsistency is too great to be permanently successful. We ourselves support the Government, because we believe in government, and do not believe in the demagogical doctrine of popular sovereignty. We love both liberty and authority, and believe in the possibility of neither without the other. We opposed the European revolutions of 1848 and 1849; we opposed the revolution that re-established the Napoleonic dynasty in 1852, the revolutionary campaign of the French in Italy in 1859, and have opposed all the Italian revolutions for which it prepared the way, and which it stirred up. We condemned the secession of the Æmilian Provinces from the Papal authority, and the annexation of the Duchies to the Sard kingdom. We justified the attempt of the Sovereign of Rome to reduce his rebellious Provinces to submission, as we have justified the Emperor of Austria in his efforts to save his empire from dismemberment. We are perfectly consistent, therefore, in denying the right of Southern Secession, and in sustaining the Federal government in the use of force for coercing the

rebellious States into submission, and in putting forth its full strength to preserve the Union, and save the life and integrity of the nation. We should have been equally false to our country and to our principles had we not done so.

We may be told here in answer to our boast of consistency, that we, also, defended the cause of Italian unity, and recommended the union of all Italy under the sceptre of the house of Savoy. Be it so. We desired and desire Italian unity; we wish Italy to be a united and powerful state. We look upon a united Italy, embracing under a wise, just, and honorable constitutional government the whole Peninsula, as a desideratum in European politics. But we were never willing, and are not now willing, to see it effected by revolutionary or despotic violence. We never were willing to encourage secession or invasion as the means of effecting it, though, if effected by such means, we maintained, and still dare maintain, that, when effected, it would be wiser to accept it, as *un fait accompli*, acquiesce in it, and make the best terms possible with it, than to make unavailing attempts to restore the old order of things. This is all that can be said against us, and this much we can maintain in perfect consistency with our principles, even if it be an error of judgment.

Moreover, the reasons which make us wish the unity of Italy, lead us to oppose the disintegration of the American Union. This is the epoch of great states, great Powers, as they are called, and small states or Powers stand a poor chance of existence, and a still poorer chance of independence. The great Powers manage the politics of the world as suits themselves, or, as they can best agree among themselves. Since the Popes have ceased to be at the head of the political system of Europe, the division of Italy into a number of petty states has deprived her of political influence, and reduced her to a "geographical expression." We would see, if the thing be practicable (of which we have our doubts, as things go), a united, independent, constitutional Italy, as one of the great Powers of Europe. Such an Italy is necessary to keep up the equilibrium between Catholic and non-Catholic Europe, and to secure the balance of power in the Old World. We would preserve the American Union in order to preserve the American state as one of the great states or Powers of the world, and to insure to the New World her proper rank and political influence. We oppose the disintegration of the Union, because its disinte-

gration would reduce America to a mere geographical expression, and compel the people of this continent to follow the politics and submit to the will or caprice of the great Powers of the Old World. We want the United States to remain a great Power, so that it may compel respect to its rights and interests, and give weight to its views and wishes in the politics of the European States. We do not want to see our great Republic reduced to the rank of a second or third rate Power. Our political principles and our patriotism alike make us wish that it should, at least, preserve its rank and its power. So, under any and every point of view, we are consistent with ourselves in opposing Secession, and seeking to preserve the life and integrity of the Republic.

Secession itself is another illustration of the importance of theory. Secession is only a logical deduction from the theory of States Sovereignty, which has been favored to some extent almost from the formation of the Federal government, and in the North as well as in the South, and alternately by all parties. Patrick Henry, of Virginia, and Samuel Adams, of Massachusetts, opposed the Federal constitution on the ground that it created a National government, and they wanted only a Confederacy or Congress of sovereign States. Mr. Jefferson inclined to the view that the States retained their sovereignty even after the adoption of the Constitution. Such was the dominant view of the Anti-Federal party of 1798, which, under the name of Republican, came into power with Mr. Jefferson in 1801, and it has always been the doctrine, or at least the doctrinal tendency, of the so-called Democratic party. President Jackson opposed it when asserted and acted on by South Carolina, and favored it in the adjoining State of Georgia, whose nullification of a judgment of the Supreme Court was no less reprehensible than South Carolina's nullification of an act of Congress. The New-England States, excepting Vermont, all but ruined by the war forced on the country by the Southern and Middle States, resorted to it in 1812, and threatened to secede from the Union. The doctrine has been lurking in the American mind from the first, and the section that felt itself aggrieved has always more or less boldly assumed it. South Carolina did little more in 1831, than Massachusetts talked of doing in 1814. If we suppose that the States entered the Union as sovereigns, and that each remains after the Union a sovereign State, it will be hard to say that any State has not the inherent right to

secede, when she judges it for her interest to do so ; and equally hard to say, that, if she so judges and secedes, the remaining States have the right to use force to compel her to return to the Union. Moreover, if she remains a sovereign State, she can, by revoking her act of accession to the Union, absolve all her citizens from their allegiance to the United States, and require them to take the oath of allegiance to herself. You have no right to call the Seceders or the Confederates rebels, or to treat them as rebels or traitors, if you concede their doctrine of State sovereignty. In fact, there are few, if any, among them who regard themselves as traitors or rebels. In their view of the case, they are as loyal and as patriotic, as we are in ours.

Let no man mistake us. We are not justifying the Southern Rebellion. The whole country knows on which side we are, and that according to our ability and in our own narrow sphere no man has done or sacrificed more than we for the sake of the Union. We hold Secession to be rebellion, and the seceders in arms against the Union to be rebels ; but we can do so only on condition that we reject the theory of State sovereignty on which they act, and which has received too much countenance in all parts of the Union. The fact that a theory which justifies them, or would justify them if true, has been widely entertained, and entertained by men of eminence, whose loyalty and patriotism are not to be questioned, may have, and, perhaps, should have, some weight with us in moderating our personal feelings toward them, and even in mitigating the punishment we may deem it necessary to inflict on them when the Rebellion has been suppressed. But not for this do we state it. We state it for the purpose of indicating the danger of false theories, and to rebuke those self-complacent men who are so ready to denounce as vain "theorizers" and "abstractionists" those who call attention to first principles, and seek to establish a sound political philosophy. We have, not all of us, but large numbers of us, cherished two false principles, one in relation to government in general, and the other in relation to the Federal government in particular,—principles which we find in this hour of trial we cannot act on, without giving up all government, and suffering the Union to fall to pieces as a rope of sand. The blood and treasure which are so freely poured out by the loyal States in defence of the authority of the Government and the integrity of the nation, are the earnest and practical protest of a

great and free people against the demagogical interpretation of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, and the disintegrating doctrine of State sovereignty, and it is to be hoped that the war when it closes will have corrected both, the one as fatal to government itself, and the other as fatal to national unity and integrity.

We love our form of government ; we want no alterations in the Federal constitution, and very few in any of the several State constitutions. We are republican, heart and soul, and far more so than we were before the Rebellion broke out. We have had our confidence in popular government incalculably increased by the experience of the last twelve months. The strength and energy put forth by the United States, the mighty army we have been able, within a year, to collect, arm and equip, discipline and place in the field ; the large and efficient navy we have been able to create and place on our coasts and mighty rivers, the respectable efficiency and skill of our officers of both branches of the service, and the orderly behavior, patience, endurance, and bravery of both our land and naval forces, have, we confess, astonished us, made us proud of our country and proud of our countrymen. A people so long engaged in peaceful pursuits, so long in the enjoyment of peace as to have almost lost the tradition as well as the experience of war, without military organization, without armies, ships, arms, or stores, sending more than half a million of soldiers to the field, and creating, arming, and equipping an efficient navy of two or three hundred ships-of-war, in so brief a time, may well be called a great people. Blunders there may have been, arising from inexperience ; traitors there may have been in and out of office to embarrass our measures, and impede our operations ; and much narrow mindedness and inefficiency there may also have been ; but after all we have shown an aptitude, an energy, and strength, unsurpassed by any other people in the history of the world. No, this civil war, whether it terminate in a few months, or whether it linger for a dozen years, has forever settled the question in favor of free government, and rendered the old arguments against it obsolete. It has proved that, if the Republic had been united in a war against foreign enemies, it would have been invincible against all Europe, for we count as ours, as American, the skill, the energy, and the strength shown by the Rebels themselves.

Universal suffrage, which, we own, we had come to dis-

trust, has vindicated itself, and the people have proved that they are capable of self-government, and can dispense with both kings and nobles. Even our liberal naturalization laws, and our open hospitality to foreigners, which we with many others feared might prove dangerous to our American order of civilization, have been justified, and Know-Nothingism has lost its last advocate. In the war natural-born and naturalized citizens have fought with equal bravery and devotion side by side. German, Irish, French, Italian born citizens have proved themselves loyal Americans, have been not the last to rush in where blows fall thickest and fall heaviest, and have contributed their full share to the victories we have won, and to the glory of our arms. All are Americans by loyalty, by common suffering, by common hardships, by common dangers, and by common deeds. They who have mingled their blood on the same battle-field, in defence of the same noble cause, must henceforth be, and be treated, as brothers. The war has made or is making us one people, and has removed or is removing more than one of the old causes of division. No American can forget that chiefly to the sturdy Germans of the West we owe it that the great State of Missouri did not follow her sister Slave States into Secession, or that in the very darkest hour, when even stout hearts failed, the brave and impulsive Irish were foremost to volunteer in the armies of the Republic. No American can ever forget that full one-third of the forces that have won our victories, and saved the life and integrity of the nation were not born on American soil. Disloyal as have been many of those who belong to our own Church, and as absurd as are the prejudices of many of our brethren against New England, no loyal Protestant can ever forget that in the nation's struggle for life Catholics have sent to the field both in officers and men far more than their proportion. The proportion of Catholics in the army is probably more than double the proportion which Catholics bear to the whole population of the country. After this no sane American can ever countenance an anti-foreign, or an anti-Catholic party in politics. Foreign-born citizens have sealed their naturalization with their blood, and Catholics have vindicated their right to civil and political equality in every battle that has been fought, in every defeat that has been suffered, and in every victory that has been won. No blood has flowed more freely or in richer torrents than theirs, and the non-Catholic who forgets it is not worthy

the name of American, and should undergo the old Anglo-Saxon punishment of being branded *nidering*,—infamous.

We own, and are glad to own, that the war has corrected many of our own prejudices, and relieved many of our fears; it has given us full confidence in the strength and durability of our institutions. It has, also, corrected many errors the popular mind had imbibed, and exploded more than one popular fallacy. It has proved the necessity of upholding the legitimate authority of government, and therefore refuted the notion that government is a mere agency, with no power, in case of need, to coerce obedience. It has proved that in the freest states loyalty and obedience to law are as necessary, and as indispensable as in monarchical states. It has refuted the popular theories of revolutionists so rife in our times, and proved the necessity of conservative principles, and respect for established authority. Happily the war came in season to arrest our wild radicalism, before the heart of our people had become wholly corrupt, and before they had become as base as the theories of their demagogues. The rebellion has shown, also, that the Union can be saved only by rejecting the interpretation of the Constitution that makes the United States a mere Congress of sovereigns, and by adopting and adhering to the doctrine that assumes them to be a nation, a real state, one and indivisible. The people in the loyal States have acted right in the present struggle, but they have done so only in opposition to opinions and theories which had gained great credit in all sections of the country. The doctrines that there is a sacred right of revolution, and that a State cannot be coerced, gave the Rebellion every advantage under the imbecile Buchanan, enabled it to mature itself without resistance, and to make openly all the preparations supposed to be necessary to secure its success, and paralyzed for months the activity and strength of the present Administration. Even stanch Republicans shook before these doctrines, and many of our ablest statesmen and truest patriots feared to grapple with the danger, and talked of "compromise," some even thought we must let the Seceding States go. It was doubtful how far the Administration could count on the support of the Free States themselves in an attempt to put down the Rebellion by force of arms. If patriotism had not triumphed over theory, and if the people had not felt it more urgent to maintain the integrity of the nation than to carry out the speculations of their demagogues, the Administration would

have been unable to collect force enough to defend for a single day the National Capital. The danger was far greater than has been told, and, perhaps, than ever will be told. The Rebellion is crushed, or is sure to be crushed, if no foreign Power intervenes, because the Northern Democratic leaders rose above their doctrines, and refused to fulfil the expectations of their Southern brethren, who counted on them as friends and allies. The Rebellion has proved that the doctrines we refer to are, as far as they go, incompatible with the stability of government, and especially with the maintenance of the life and integrity of the nation, and therefore that they are false and dangerous, and to be abandoned in speculation as we have been forced to abandon them in practice. The war, we hope, will have the effect to conform our theories to the practice which all loyal men now see to be just and necessary; and which the people have so generously and heroically adopted.

The principles of government which are as necessary under a republican as under any other form of government, are well stated by Dr. Keogh in the Lecture before us, from which we make an extract which we commend to our readers.

"We must start from the principle always laid down by the Church, that the power of all civil governments comes from God. St. Paul teaches this great truth in a manner not to be mistaken. He enjoins on the Romans (Rom. xiii. 1, 2 :) to be subject to the higher powers, for, he says, 'There is no power but from God: and the powers that be, are ordained of God.' Therefore, he infers, 'he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation.' Here, then, we have one great principle: that civil power comes from God; that its just enactments bind in conscience, forasmuch as the transgression thereof is resistance to God, which purchaseth damnation. But, it may be asked, if this be true, how can we maintain the popular assertion, that governments derive their power from the consent of the governed? We are taught, now-a-days, that the people are the source of all power; how, then, can it be said that there is no power but from God? It is not so hard as it might appear, at first sight, to reconcile these two assertions. Catholic theologians commonly teach that the governing power is not communicated directly to the person or persons who wield it, but that God gives it directly to the people, or the whole community, and that they transmit it to the ruler of their choice. For, in every community, it is necessary that there be a power to govern, a principle of unity to bind the different elements together; otherwise, instead of a well-organized state, we would have a disorderly mob.

We cannot imagine a well-disciplined army without a commander, nor a well-regulated community without a governor. Now, God desires that men should form into civil society, for this conduces to their temporal well-being. Commerce, the arts, education even, and science, could never have reached their present perfection, had men lived separated from one another, each family by itself, with no bond to unite them in a community, where their interests would be the same, and their energies and labors would be employed for their mutual good. And, as he who desires the end, must desire also the means necessary to attain that end, God, desiring that civil society exist, must desire also that there be a principle of unity, without which, exist it cannot. This principle of unity is, as I have said, the governing power. God ordinarily leaves the selection of the person or persons who are to exercise this power, to those who are to be governed. For his own chosen people, for a time, He selected the rulers himself. But this was an exceptional case. The form of government, and the persons who are to wield the power, are left to be determined by the consent of the governed. Divine Providence may so shape events as to bring about or permit the elevation of a certain person or dynasty, but God never manifests His holy will in a more direct manner. The people, then, are not the original source of power. It comes originally from God. He, allowing to the people the selection of their rulers, gives to them the power that is necessary for civil government; they choose the person, or persons, who are to be the depository of this power, and, by this very act, they hand it over to them.

"But they cannot recall it at pleasure; for every thing done from on high, is done for good, not for evil—for improvement, not for destruction. Now, to leave to the governed the power to overthrow a government at will, would be to throw open the door to confusion and anarchy. Than this, nothing could be more contrary to the designs of God in establishing civil society. He meant that this society should bring happiness and prosperity to the human race, and this end it can never attain, unless it be regulated by a fixed, permanent government. Some forms allow, of course, of more changes in regard to persons than others. The monarchical is the least mutable, as the death, or the resignation, or the deposition of the reigning monarch is the only cause for a change. The democratic form is the most subject to changes, for its very essence requires that most of the officers of government retain power only for a time, and then surrender it to those whom the voice of the people may have called to succeed them. But, even in this case, all has to be done according to legally established form. Take the example of the Constitution under which we live. Although not purely democratic, it exemplifies what I wish to say. The President duly elected must be obeyed by all, whether, before election, they were his opponents or friends; during his term of office he can ex-

ercise his constitutional powers, no matter how unpopular his administration may be. If he violate the laws, he can be impeached and tried, but only by the proper tribunal, and after certain forms. So, in the legislative branch, an act passed by both Houses of Congress, and approved by the President, if not unconstitutional, forms part of the law of the land, even though, were it to be submitted to the popular vote, a majority of the people might be found against it. The Constitution itself prescribes the manner which is to be followed, in order to change its provisions, and changes introduced in any other manner would be null and void. Thus, you see, that even in the freest form of government, there is no such a thing as the possibility of a legal change of existing laws, or even of removing legally appointed officers, by the mere manifestation of the popular will. All government, it is very true, rests originally on the consent of the governed; this consent, as it was freely given, could have been freely withheld; but, once given, it cannot be withdrawn without most serious cause, and, if withdrawn without such cause, its effects yet remain, and the government founded on it is as legitimate as it was on the day on which it was formed. All this is equally true of other forms of government which, necessarily, allow of less change. To sum up, then, God, approving of civil society, delegates to the original founders thereof the power necessary to organize and to govern it; they choose the form of government, and the persons to whom they intrust the governing power; at that moment commences the distinction between the governing and the governed, a distinction which cannot be changed, modified, or abolished, at the mere *fiat* of the popular will. I may add, that it has often been the case, that the civil power has been usurped by some person without the consent of the people. But, if he remain in peaceful possession of power, and the people gradually acquiesce in obedience to his rule, it is manifest that they thus consent to the form of government which has been imposed on them. If this state of things last for a sufficient length of time to give them a fair opportunity of protesting against the usurpation, and they fail to do so, and if the rights of no third party be infringed on, their implied consent supplies the original defect in the title of the usurper; he becomes a legitimate ruler; and his government shares all the prerogatives of legitimate power."

Dr. Keogh well distinguishes here between the *power*, and the *person* or *persons* invested with it. The power comes from God, for, as says the Apostle, *non est potestas, nisi a Deo*; but being from God, it is necessarily a trust, not an absolute, inherent right. Here is the real distinction between legitimate authority and cæsarism, liberty and despotism. The prejudice against the divine origin of power grows out of the failure to make this distinction, and

of assuming that the assertion of the power, or authority, as from God, means that God has given to certain individuals or certain families, the indefeasible right to govern, an inalienable and inamissible right, which cannot, whatever the character of the ruler or the intolerable tyranny of his government, be resisted without impiety, and rebellion against God,—the doctrine known in history as the “divine right of kings and passive obedience.” This doctrine makes the prince the living law, according to the maxim of the old Roman jurist, *Quod placuit principi, id legis habet vigorem*. This is what we call cæsarism, and oppose as despotism, which is destructive alike of the best interests of society and the true dignity of man. It lies at the basis of the old Roman Imperialism, under which the Emperor was the living law and worshipped as a divinity. Even the Christian and orthodox Emperor Theodosius was addressed by his subjects as “Your Eternity.” This doctrine was revived in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in England lost the Stuarts their throne, and in France provoked the old French Revolution, while it reduced Spain from the foremost Power of Europe to a third rate state, and Italy to “a geographical expression.” No sane man, who knows aught of liberty, can for one moment countenance the divine origin of government in the sense of this doctrine.

To get rid of “the divine right of kings and passive obedience,” the friends of freedom went to the opposite extreme, asserted the *popular* origin of power, and made the people in their own native right and might the living law. These made the people Cæsar, the popular will the law, and asserted as a maxim, *Vox populi, vox Dei*, or *Quod placuit populo, id legis habet vigorem*, and therefore in principle as absolute a despotism as that asserted by the cæsarists they warred against. This is the condemnation of modern philosophical democracy, as defended by Mazzini and his friends, who do not hesitate to clothe the people with all the attributes claimed by the old Imperialists for the Emperor, and to say not only “people-prince,” “people-king,” but “people-priest,” and “people-god.” It is in the name of this “people-divinity” that democratic revolutions in Europe, of late years, have been commenced, and of which Garibaldi is the soldier, as Mazzini is the prophet. Mazzini is the Mahomet and Garibaldi the Kaled of this new worship, a political imposture, for withstanding which any amount of abuse has been heaped on Pio Nono, Francis Joseph, and the

young King of Naples. It is this political theory, called by us European democracy, and which, like all the vices of the Old World, has of late years found its way to our country, that we for nearly twenty years have been battling with our best ability, and holding up to our readers as wholly incompatible with American republicanism. American democracy, which, to avoid confusion, we call republicanism, has and can have no affinity with this European democracy, and can no more be reconciled with it than Christianity can be reconciled with demon-worship.

The true theory of the origin of government is dialectic, and harmonizes these two extremes. It is correctly stated by Dr. Keogh. The power, the right, or the authority is from God, who says "By me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things," but who shall be the depositary of the power, or exercise the trust, is a matter determinable by the people themselves. The power comes from God, but comes to the prince or government through the people. Since the power comes from God, it comes from a source above the people, and they neither individually nor collectively have any right to resist it, and are bound in conscience to respect and obey it. The law of God settles the authority or right of government, and the people settle the question who shall be governors, or who shall exercise the power. When the people have settled the form of the government, and have legally chosen their rulers, these rulers, within the limits and conditions fixed by the constitution, have the divine right to govern, do govern by authority of God, and the people individually and collectively are bound to obey them, not as the ministers of their will, but as ministers of the divine will; and therefore obedience is due them in conscience, and disobedience is not only a crime against society, but a sin against God. This principle gives authority and stability to government, for it gives it the right to wield the sword, to punish evil doers and to enforce obedience to its acts, while it denies all right of resistance, and binds all subjects in conscience to obedience. It also secures freedom by making the power a trust, and placing in the hands of the people the right to determine who shall and who shall not be vested with it.

The theory of "the divine right of kings and passive obedience," the cæsarist theory, as expounded by James I. of England, Louis XIV. of France, Philip II. of Spain, and the great Bossuet, does not deny that the monarch is

responsible to God for the use he may make of his power; or that God will punish him, here or hereafter, in his own person or in his descendants, for any injustice, tyranny, or oppression of which he may be guilty, but it denies that he is responsible to the nation or justiciable by the people. It, consequently, denies to the nation or the people all right of resistance, not simply to legitimate authority, but to tyranny and oppression, and leaves them without any right to demand, and, if necessary, to effect by force a redress of grievances. It, therefore, covers the oppressor with the ægis of religion, and renders oppression sacred and inviolable. The other theory, the European democratic theory, makes the persons invested with authority responsible indeed, but to the people alone, and asserts for the people the right to resist their rulers at any time, in any way, and for any reason they please. It divests government of all moral sanction, deprives obedience of all religious obligation, and makes civil obedience a mere question of expediency, and results necessarily in *mobocracy*, to use a barbarous term, anarchy, or the despotism of the majority. The dialectic theory we adopt makes rulers responsible to God, as all men are, and also to the nation, or to the people. To the people, because they receive their investiture from them, and to God, because the power with which they are clothed is from him, and remains his. What is essential to the existence and maintenance of government, the essential and necessary rights of authority under any and every form of government, are from God, held and exercised by divine right, independently of all popular conventions or popular will. These are the divine or natural rights of government in that it is government. The people may say who shall or shall not be intrusted with the exercise of these rights, but the rights themselves are determined by the very nature of civil society, and depend on the eternal reason or will of the Creator. No popular conventions, however called or constituted, can create them, or rightly abridge them. They rest on the same basis with the rights of man,—rights held from the Almighty in the very constitution of our manhood. All Americans hold the natural rights of man sacred and inviolable: the essential rights, we would say, the natural rights, of civil society should be held equally sacred and inviolable, for they are equally from God. Let our countrymen so hold, and they will hold what we assert in asserting that the power is from God.

What we wish here to assert is that the power is not conventional, nor of popular, nor indeed of human institution, and therefore that it can never be justly resisted by the people either collectively or individually, and that it has the right to command, and the right to use all the force necessary to maintain itself, to suppress all opposition and to make its commands obeyed, however large or small the party opposing it. Even in constituting the government the people have no right to deny it any of its essential or natural rights, or to restrict power beyond the limits of the divine charter. Any clause in the constitution doing this must be treated as null and void, as repugnant to natural right, to the necessary and essential authority of civil society. In other words, there is a higher law than the will of the people,—the original divine law of civil society. The government while obeying this law, without which it would not and could not be government, and keeping within the limits of its conventional restrictions, is legitimate, sacred, and inviolable, and cannot, as we have said, be resisted without crime against the state, and sin against God, since natural law is divine law. This, as we have said, secures the stability and authority of government, by limiting the power of the people over it, and denying the right of popular resistance to it so long as it simply discharges its legitimate functions and does not transgress its legitimate bounds. Yet it by no means demands passive obedience to the tyrant, or forbids popular resistance to wrong and oppression, or what was formerly understood by the right of revolution, for the oppressor or the tyrant forfeits to the people the power that comes from God.

In the modern sense, as now understood by European revolutionists, the right of revolution cannot be asserted, for it denies the right of government. Formerly the right of revolution meant simply the right to resist and overthrow tyranny. This right no lover of freedom can question. A government that abuses and persists in abusing its trusts, that plays the tyrant, that perverts power from the common good, or the good of the community, that makes it a burden and a curse instead of a common benefit, and obstinately persists in so doing, forfeits its rights, loses its authority, becomes a usurper, and therefore may be justly resisted, and made to give place to another, because in resisting it there is no resistance to the power that comes from God. The tyranny of the prince absolves the subject from his

allegiance. All that comes from God is dialectic, and his grants cannot contradict one another. His patent of the rights of man to the individual is in harmony with his patent of authority to civil society, and he can give no power of government to society incompatible with the rights he gives to the individual. When the individual uses the rights of man in a sense incompatible with the rights of authority, he errs, and society may set him right; so when the government uses its power in a sense incompatible with the rights of man, it transcends its authority, and may be corrected by the people. The right of revolution in this sense we assert. But the right of revolution seems to us, as popularly understood at present, to mean the right to overthrow any existing government even by violence and bloodshed whenever the people, or a portion of them numerous or strong enough to do it, choose to attempt it, simply for the sake of introducing another and as they believe a better political organization, although no act of tyranny or oppression can be alleged against it. In this sense we deny the right of revolution, as incompatible with the very idea of government.

One government may be more wisely constituted than another, and it often happens that the growth and prosperity of a nation demand grave changes in the constitutional law; but if the government is honestly administered according to the existing constitution, and its administrators take care to usurp no power, we deny the right of the people to seek even a desirable change by revolutionary violence. In such a case the remedy is reform, not revolution,—reform brought about by peaceful, not violent measures, by the co-operation of authority, secured by the force of public opinion. Dr. Keogh in his Lecture is right both as to the duty of obedience, and as to the right of resistance, though he would, perhaps, have expressed himself more clearly, if he had marked the distinction we have made between the former and the present sense of the word *revolution*. The right of resistance to tyranny is a sacred and divine right, as sacred and divine as the right of legitimate government itself; the right of revolution as the word is now used has no existence, and revolution is not and cannot be justifiable. With these remarks our readers will see the truth and justness of what he says:—

“It remains for us to consider the case when the civil authority comes into collision with the people. This may happen either

because subjects refuse to obey just laws, or because the government acts unjustly, tyrannically, in a manner and to an extent not to be borne with. I have already hinted what the civil ruler has a right to do in the first case. It is his duty to see that the laws are executed, and the sword—emblem of the punishing power, has been placed in his hands for this purpose. He can use force to put down resistance, but never unless in the cases, and after the manner prescribed by law, or pointed out by necessity. In some forms of government, more latitude is left to the ruler, than in others; but it is an obvious principle, that force should never be resorted to, unless in the last extremity. Here we always find the Church counseling moderation; abhorring herself the shedding of blood, she endeavors to prevent it as far as she can. She thus tamed the fierce dispositions of the men of the middle ages, and taught them that, whenever they can be successfully used, moral suasion and conciliation are preferable to physical force. But there are occasions, alas! where these are of no avail. Thus we have seen the Sovereign Pontiff obliged to use force to put down rebellion; indeed, this manner of keeping the peace is the only one that can be now adopted with effect, in many countries of Europe. At the present moment, we are similarly situated; all peaceful means having been exhausted, the strong arm of the nation has been put forth to crush rebellion. May God grant that victory may continue to perch on the nation's banner, and that a speedy and lasting peace may bring renewed and increased prosperity to our reunited country!

“But the case that presents most difficulty is where the arbitrary and tyrannical course of the civil power becomes so intolerable that its acts, to use the expression of St. Thomas, are no longer laws, but the perversion of law. The American Declaration of Independence lays down the principle that established governments are not to be overthrown for light or transient causes, but that they can be resisted if they become subversive of the ends for which they were established, which are the lives, the liberty, and the happiness of the people. This is the correct doctrine, and it is, moreover, expressed in very similar terms by St. Thomas. He says, that unless the oppression be too great, it is better to bear with it than to run the risk of the many evils of civil war, which may be worse than those that arose from the oppression itself. It is not lawful to proclaim a revolution for any light grievance; one or two bad laws will not justify the rushing into the danger of civil war. And, he remarks, that designing persons, under pretext of defending liberty, and expelling tyrants, get possession of power themselves, and become far more oppressive and tyrannical than the former rulers. He brings, as an example of this, an anecdote related by ancient historians of Dionysius of Syracuse, a tyrant whose name has been handed down to the execration of posterity. Whilst the citizens generally were praying for the death of the tyrant, an old woman

made it a point to pray publicly that his life might be prolonged. Dionysius asked her what motive impelled her to pray for him. She answered, 'When I was a young girl, we had a very tyrannical sovereign, and we all desired his speedy death. He was killed, and his successor turned out to be worse than he had been; I desired, all the more, the death of this second tyrant, and was glad when it took place; but in his stead we got you, who are worse than either of the other two; so I think it better to bear with you than to incur the terrible calamity of having a fourth worse than you.' It is the old fable of King Log and King Stork, and the moral is, that it is frequently better to bear with evils, than to seek violent measures of redress. St. Thomas, therefore, recommends Christian resignation under oppression, and condemns the assassination of unjust rulers, and any private, unauthorized uprising against the constituted authorities. He says, that whatever is done against a tyrant should be done by public authority; for, if the people had the right to appoint a ruler, they have a right also to deprive him of power, or to limit him in its exercise, if he make bad use of it. Nor is this breaking faith with the ruler; for he, by not acting faithfully in the use of his power, has deserved that the contract made with him by his subjects be no longer observed. But, he says, if there be no way of removing the tyrant, the people must fain recur to God, who is our helper in tribulations, and who holds in his hands the hearts of kings. He sometimes punishes the sins of people by allowing them to be ground down by a despotism against which they are powerless. Whilst then St. Thomas recommends Christian patience and forbearance, as well as human caution and prudence, he clearly teaches, that if all other means fail, the people have the right to take back either part or the whole of the power which they confided to the civil ruler, in case that it has been used tyrannically for their destruction. But he insists that this be done by the whole people, not by any one person, clique, or party, in their name. And here we may remark, how truly this condition was observed in the American Revolution. It was directed, from the beginning, by a Congress of representatives of the people, seconded and aided by the local provincial assemblies. The Congress appointed all civil and military officers, directed all operations of peace and war. Thus lawlessness was checked, order was preserved, the real will of the people was known and obeyed. Private ambition was made subservient to the public weal, the real interests of the country were furthered, and the world beheld a revolution conducted on principles of law and order. How different was this spectacle from the scenes of lawless violence, rapine, and murder, that have marked almost all the revolutions of the Old World, even that of England! Thus, by practical illustration, we can appreciate the high wisdom that dictated to the great Mediæval theologian the idea, that the only legitimate revolution is

one which rises against unbearable tyranny, is approved of by the whole people, and conducted by public authority.

"Suarez develops the same idea, following, as he always does, the lead of his great Master. But he dwells upon one point which I will present to you, leaving its obvious application to your own consideration. He defines sedition to be a war between two sections of the same commonwealth or state, or between the ruler and his subjects. He says war between two parts, or sections of the same state, the supreme authority being either destroyed or unable to interfere, is always unjust on the part of the aggressor, just on the part of the section that acts on the defensive. He assigns as the reason of this decision that there is no authority in one portion of a state which would enable it legitimately to wage war on another. In other words, the war making power is an attribute of sovereignty. But, he adds, the Supreme Governor can sometimes, if there be an urgent public necessity, confer on one section the power of making war on the other, but then it will not be a war between sections, but between the government and a refractory portion of the commonwealth. But what, he subjoins, if this refractory portion be really aggrieved, and cannot obtain redress of its wrongs from the government? He answers, that it cannot legally do more than private persons could. That is, if these wrongs amount to tyranny, revolution is lawful; otherwise, it is not. So far Suarez, whom I have translated almost literally. He then goes on to consider the case of a whole people against the government, and solves it in the same manner as St. Thomas. Thus, you see, how Catholic theologians admit, and, at the same time, restrict the right of revolution. I am not now speaking of a change of government in a peaceful and legal manner. Revolution involves an appeal to the last right that a people can exercise, that of resorting to arms to take back the power which they once confided to their rulers for their mutual good, for the benefit of all the members of society. It is allowable, when all legal means of redress have been exhausted, when oppression has reached such a point that the ends of civil government are no longer attained; and, even then, it must have the consent of the people, and be directed by public authority framed by them."

The chief embarrassment in regard to the civil war at present raging in our own country, grows, as we have already suggested, out of the loose notions which have been widely entertained with regard to the Federal Union, or the doubt some entertain, whether the people of the United States are really one political people, or a mere confederation of thirty-four independent and sovereign States. We, in our Review for last April, endeavored to dispose of this doubt, and lest our readers should have overlooked or forgotten what we then said, we repeat it here :

"The generic character of our system is that of a Federal Republic. We are a nation, one nation, and therefore have one national sovereignty, but the government is not a centralized or consolidated government. The government is formed by the Union, not league, of several individual or particular States, or civil and political communities, and in relation to one another separate and independent states. These States have each in their own sphere certain rights, which are not derived from the National government, or held as grants or concessions from it. In other words, all rights and power in the Republic, though held in subordination to the legitimate authority of the National government, do not emanate from it, and are not held subject to its pleasure. The National government recognizes and protects the rights of the States, but does not create, and cannot abrogate them. The matter is best explained by regarding the several States as holding before the Federal government a relation analogous to that held by individuals before civil society. Civil society derives its powers, *mediante* the people as individuals, from God, and hence its legitimacy. But the individual after the creation of civil society, as before its creation, has certain rights, called the rights of man, which he holds by a law antecedent to civil society, which it does not create, cannot revoke, and is bound to recognize and protect as sacred and inviolable, among which, according to the Declaration of American Independence, are 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' These rights I hold by the patent of my Creator, by the charter of my manhood. They are inalienable, and, so long as I do not forfeit them, the civil society of which I am a member, is bound to protect me in their peaceable enjoyment. I may hold them up before the State, and say, 'These are mine: touch them not.' But I may forfeit them by my misdeeds. I forfeit my right to life by murdering my fellow-man, and society may hang me. I forfeit my right to liberty by abusing it, and rendering it incompatible with the equal liberty of others. I forfeit my right to pursue my happiness, when I insist on pursuing it in a way destructive of the happiness of others, or in a manner dangerous to the existence or peace of society.

"The same may be said of the several States before the Federal government. The Federal government derives its powers from God, through the people as States, and therefore holds them legitimately. Each State has certain rights, which it holds by a law anterior to the Union, and independent of it. But the State may forfeit its rights, and even its existence as a State, because, though a State, and in its subordinate sphere a complete State, it is not a sovereign but a subordinate State. It is subordinate, because the United States are made by the Constitution the supreme government. Article VI. of the Constitution says: 'This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof;

and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.' No language can more clearly assert the constitutional supremacy of the United States, and therefore the subordinate character of each particular State. By making the United States the supreme government, and their Constitution and constitutional acts the supreme law of the land, the American people are made one civil and political people or community—not an aggregation of peoples—a sovereign nation whose sovereignty excludes all others, for sovereignty is and must be one and indivisible. But the powers of Government are, under our system, not concentrated in the same hands, but are divided and distributed among an indefinite number of autonomous though subordinate civil and political communities. These communities, so long as they keep within their sphere, are independent of the Federal Government, and may resist its invasion of their reserved or antecedent rights, as an individual, so long as he abuses none of his rights, may resist any encroachment on them by civil society."—*Quarterly Review*, pp. 208, 209.

The power in the case of the Federal government, as in that of all other governments, comes from God through the people, but through the people acting as political communities, not simply as population. These political communities or States are the successors or continuators of the English Colonies created by the British Crown, or under the sovereignty of Great Britain, and therefore, though political communities or bodies politic and corporate, and since the Revolution no longer colonies, they are not complete or sovereign States. The sovereignty previously in the British Crown or in the Mother Country was not assumed or exercised by the Colonies severally, and on becoming independent of Great Britain they did not each for itself succeed to her sovereignty, or to any more power than they had possessed as Colonies. That is, the Mother Country was succeeded not by the States severally, but by the *United States*. The United States as one political people took the place in the new order introduced by the Revolution previously held by the Mother Country, and therefore became in their unity the inheritor of her sovereignty. The Revolution simply transferred the sovereignty from Great Britain to the *United States*. Hence, under the old Confederation and even after the adoption of the Federal constitution, some of the States continued to act under the colonial charters granted by the British Crown. The States, have, as had the colonies, certain civil and political rights,

but never at any moment have they held or claimed the full rights of sovereignty. As colonies the sovereignty was in Great Britain or the British Crown; under the Confederation the sovereignty was claimed, possessed, and exercised not by the States separately, but by the United States, as it is under the Federal constitution.

We will not say that, if the several Anglo-American colonies had each in its individual capacity asserted and maintained its independence, it would not have become on its successful assertion of its independence a free sovereign state possessed of the full rights of sovereignty, and the Union formed between them been a Congress or League of Sovereigns, a Union of the nature of the Zollverein formed by the Northern States of Germany. But such was not the fact. The independence was declared by the United Colonies, which by this fact became United States. The articles of Confederation were drawn up by the United States, and the new political Power recognized and treated with by foreign nations, and finally acknowledged by Great Britain, was not thirteen independent powers or sovereignties, but one power, one national sovereignty, called the *United States* of America. The people of the United States have, therefore, always been and are one political people, and have never existed as separate, independent, and sovereign states. Under the Colonial *régime* the political unity was in the British crown; under the Confederation it was in the United States, and it is in the United States under the Federal constitution, and where is lodged the unity, there is lodged the sovereignty of a nation.

Nor will we say that there were in transferring the sovereignty from the British Crown to the United States no irregularities, no isolated acts incompatible with the doctrine we advocate. Revolutionary times are seldom remarkable for their order and regularity. But what is disorderly, irregular, or anomalous in those times establishes no precedent, and forms no rule of interpretation. With the exception of Vermont and Texas, not included in the original "Thirteen," no State in this Union has ever existed as an independent sovereign state. None of them has ever been recognized as a sovereign power by any foreign state, ever exercised the functions of a sovereign Power, ever entered into relations with foreign Powers, negotiated foreign treaties, or had the right to make war or peace. The supreme attributes of sovereignty they have never as a fact possessed,

exercised, or, until recently, claimed. Foreign nations have known and now know only the United States. All our foreign treaties are negotiated by and with the United States; the only flag floating from ships-of-war or commerce, known on the ocean, or in foreign ports is the United States flag; the United States make war and peace, enter into and discharge national obligations, acquire and hold national territory by purchase or conquest, and stand recognized and respected by all the nations of the earth as an independent, sovereign nation. None of the several States, excepting Vermont and Texas, have ever been so recognized, performed any of these functions, or sustained any of these relations; and the exception in the case of Vermont and Texas amounts to nothing, for in the Union they stand on the same footing with the original States. The States have never exercised the rights of sovereignty, and have remained political and independent communities only in the sense in which they were such communities when colonies under the Crown of Great Britain. They hold their civil and political rights now, as when they were colonies, in subordination to the national sovereign.

We know there were differences of opinion at the epoch of the formation of the Federal constitution, that some patriots wished to reserve a larger and others a smaller sphere of action to the States, and some wished, it is probable, to make the Union simply a Congress of Sovereigns. There are, no doubt, in the Constitution traces of these differences of opinions and wishes; but it is clear that the Convention of 1787 intended to frame, and regarded themselves as framing a Constitution of a National government, a constitution for one political people, and the few phrases or even provisions that smack of the States Sovereignty theory were inserted or suffered to remain so as to escape the danger of having the Constitution rejected by any one of the States. The Convention were content to secure the substance of nationality, without pushing the States Sovereignty men to the wall. They effected their object, though not without some ambiguity of language, and leaving a chance for cavillers and pettifoggers.

The fact that the Constitution was formed by a convention of the people as States, and that the Constitution was ratified by the States, or conventions of the people of the several States, has led even some who assert the national character of the Government to suppose the Constitution emanated

from the States severally, and not from the people of the United States, and that the American people became one political people only by virtue of the Constitution. This, we believe, was Mr. Webster's doctrine. But this is contradicted by the very preamble of the Constitution itself, which says, "We the people of the United States,"—not we the people of the several States,—“do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” The people of the United States are not created by the Constitution, for they precede it, and ordain and establish it. Our own former error on the subject grew out of supposing the States succeeded severally not only to the rights of the colonies under the British Crown, but to the sovereignty possessed by that Crown itself. This was a mistake. The sovereignty of the Crown did not fall to the States severally, but to the *United States*, and therefore after independence, as before, the States severally were subordinate, not sovereign political communities, and the people of the United States were one political people with a single national sovereign. This, if we are not mistaken, is substantially the doctrine held by John Quincy Adams, no mean authority in questions of this sort.

Art. X. of the Amendments has been adduced in defence of a doctrine opposite to the one we are defending. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Hence it has been argued that the powers of the United States are powers delegated to it by the States, and that all the powers of government not so delegated are reserved to the States severally, or to the people not of the United States, but of the several States. But this inference is not necessary, and the Amendment, though undoubtedly intended as a Constitutional guaranty of the reserved rights of the several States, says nothing in favor of State sovereignty. It asserts indeed that the Federal government is a government of delegated and limited powers, but it does not assert that the United States are created by State delegation, or that the political people called the United States have only delegated and limited powers. In the Amendment the term *United States* must be taken in the sense of the government created or perfected by the Constitution. The Federal government has only delegated powers, but the powers are delegated by the people of the *United*, not the *several States*. It is a

government of limited powers, because the people so willed, not because the powers of the people of the United States are limited by the rights of the people of the several States. The reservation, again, is to the States respectively, or to the people. But what people? The Article does not say, to the people of the States respectively, or the people of the States severally, and therefore we must understand them to be the people of the United States, the very people assembled in convention to constitute the national government.

There is nothing in our view of the unity and sovereignty of the people of the United States to interfere with the Federal element of our government. The States severally were never complete, that is, sovereign States, for, as we have seen, the British sovereignty over the colonies did not fall to the States severally, but to the States united, or, the United States. But the colonies, though created at different dates and differently constituted, had by royal grant, charter, or custom, certain political and civil rights, which they retained after independence. These rights rendered uniform in all the States, enlarged in some respects and abridged in others by the Federal constitution, are in their substance and in their tenure anterior to that Constitution, and are what we called the reserved rights of the States, that is to say, rights which the United States willed should be reserved and guaranteed to the States severally. These rights, even as colonial rights, were rights the sovereign was bound to treat as sacred and inviolable, and it was for his alleged violation of them his sovereignty was abjured, and independence declared. Even under the British Crown the colonies within the sphere of their rights were legally free and independent political communities. They remain so under the sovereignty of the United States, and the Federal government is bound to treat those rights as sacred and inviolable. They are recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution.

But we may remark that, after all, these rights were not original in the colonies as civil society, and could not be defended by them as their natural rights of government. They were rights held by them as British colonies and as British subjects, and were therefore of the nature of franchises, of chartered, or of vested rights. They were sacred and inviolable only so long as they who held them observed the conditions expressed or implied in the grant. They could be forfeited as all such rights may be forfeited, and

the king might issue his writ *quo warranto* against any one of the colonies, and, on evidence of forfeiture, revoke the charter, as in several cases was actually done. The United States holds substantially the relation to the several States held by the British Crown to the Anglo-American colonies. The rights of the several States are the rights of those colonies, and are held by them as American States and American citizens, not as original, independent, and sovereign States. As long as the express or implied conditions of their charter or tenure are complied with, they are sacred and inviolable, and within their sphere the States are independent of the National government, and of one another. But if they break these conditions, if they cease to be *American* States, and their people to be citizens of the United States, they forfeit their liberties, and the United States as sovereign has the right to revoke their charters, or annul their State constitutions, and enter upon their possession as upon any other forfeited estate. The State by its own act has lapsed, and the sovereign only resumes what is his own. Hence Mr. Sumner was right in declaring State Secession State Suicide, as we proved by a slightly different line of argument in our last Review.

The right of a State to resist the Federal government, in case it becomes tyrannical and oppressive, is precisely the right, neither greater nor less, of individuals to do the same, and what that is, has been already stated. So long as the Federal government keeps within its constitutional powers, it governs by divine right, and no State or individual has any moral or political right to resist it. If the free and fair exercise of its legitimate powers bears unequally upon different sections, changes or reforms may be sought, but only in a constitutional way, and by peaceful means. No violence, no insurrection, no rebellion, no armed resistance is lawful. The condemnation of the Southern Seceders is that they have resisted the Federal government in the exercise of its legitimate powers, without having a single act of tyranny or in contravention of the Constitution to allege against it. And they could not have such act without condemning themselves, for they have controlled the Federal administration, and shaped its policy for more than three-fourths of the time since the organization of the government. For the twenty-four years next preceding the present Administration they had everything pretty much their own way, and if any portion of the people had any right to complain,

it was not the people of the Slave States. No doubt the Abolitionists said and printed many things annoying to them, and some of the Free States passed laws not acceptable to them; but the people of the Free States had to complain of laws far more objectionable passed by them, and of numerous and gross outrages upon their citizens at the South, such as imprisonment, expulsion, lynching, tar-and-feathering, and hanging, for which no redress could be obtained. Yet the Federal government, while it suffered unrebuked Southern outrages upon Northern citizens, was never restrained by the Personal Liberty Laws, and executed its own laws faithfully as far as the North was concerned. The South really had no grievance to complain of from the Government, and the Seceding States have never had a shadow of excuse for their rebellion. If the Southern "chivalry" disliked being yoked with Northern "mudsills," they were free to seek a separation by peaceful and constitutional means, but not by rebellion and civil war.

Such are the corrections we think are demanded, not of our institutions, but of popular opinion. Let public opinion conform, on the one hand, to our institutions, and, on the other, to the loyal and conservative practice of the people who have volunteered to defend the Government, assert the majesty of law, and to save the life and integrity of the nation. We ask no more. These corrections, we trust, the Southern Rebellion and the civil war which has clothed with mourning almost every family in the Union will induce us to make. The minds and hearts of the people are now open to serious thought and to wise counsels. They are prepared to review the past, and to take a wise and fresh start for the future.

ART. IV.—*The Meditations of St. Ignatius, or the "Spiritual Exercises" expounded.* By Father LIBORIO SINISCALCHI, of the Society of Jesus. Translated from the Italian, and revised by A CATHOLIC CLERGYMAN. Philadelphia: Cunningham. 1862. 12mo. pp. 429.

WE received these excellent *Meditations of St. Ignatius*, by Padre Siniscalchi, at too late a moment to do more in our last Review than barely announce their publication, with-

out any remark on their merits or discussion, however brief, of the great subject they naturally suggest. They are translated from the Italian, but, perhaps, not translated into as pure and graceful English as they might have been. We have not seen them in Italian, but we have been told that the translation is far from being faithful, and frequently misinterprets the original. Be this as it may, and as unidiomatic and as ungraceful as is the English into which they are rendered, the work, even as it is, is a work of rare merit, full of noble thought, and rich and pious sentiment. Among books of the sort we know few better; and we are sure no serious minded person can read any one of the twenty-two *Meditations* it contains, without being both instructed and edified.

The *Meditations* are called *Meditations of St. Ignatius*, because they follow the method of St. Ignatius, the illustrious founder of the Society of Jesus, in his world-renowned *Exercises*, which are not only remarkable in themselves, but still more remarkable from the fact that the author when composing them was comparatively uneducated, without theological training, and almost a stranger to the ascetic literature of the Church. He had been a soldier, a man of the world, and was slowly recovering from a wound received in defending for his sovereign the city of Pampeluna against the French. He owed these *Exercises* to his meditations and communings with our Lord during the long inactivity to which he was forced by his wound, or, rather by the unskilfulness of his surgeons. They were the first-fruits of his conversion, and a foretaste of that eminent spiritual judgment and eminent sanctity to which he subsequently attained, and which have made him an object of veneration on our altars throughout the world. Some have gone so far as to suppose they were supernaturally inspired, as being above the natural capacity of a man so little instructed and so little cultivated as was Ignatius at the time of composing them; and that they were really inspired in some sense of the word there can be no doubt, though perhaps not in precisely the sense alleged, or in the sense of Holy Scripture, for they contain no original revelation of any of the great mysteries of our faith, and nothing that exceeds the natural faculties of a man who seriously and understandingly meditates the great truths of religion. Yet they were inspired by an ardent love of God, and a lively sense of his presence in the soul, and poured out from a heart holding constant

and intimate communion with Him who is the source and well-spring of all spiritual life. Their great merit is that they grew out of the real interior life and thought of the author, and were neither composed at the order of a superior, nor compiled from the writings of others. They are the genuine utterances of the author's own heart, and the faithful expression of his own interior life.

St. Ignatius is one of the greatest characters in history, and one of the most eminent Saints in the calendar. He was a real man, a heroic man, a Reality, as Carlyle would say, not an Unreality, a spectre, a sham, a make-believe. He was a man in downright earnest, who looked at the verities of things, who understood his duty, and did it. He was born great, with a rich and noble nature, and he did great things. He was a poet, in the sense of *maker*, with a true creative genius, and ranks with St. Dominic, St. Francis, St. Bernard, and St. Benedict, and as a monastic Founder and Legislator, inferior, perhaps, only to St. Benedict himself. We mean not that he was only naturally great, that he was what he was by the simple force of nature, or that to divine grace he owed nothing. Genius itself is a gift, but a gift that needs to be developed and invigorated by grace. Grace does not create nature, and is what schoolmen call a *habitus*, not a faculty. Grace may make very holy men out of men naturally feeble; but it does not supply the natural lack of brains, or make great Saints out of men not fitted by nature to be great. Grace develops, aids, and exalts nature, but it cannot make a great man out of one not born with the elements of greatness within him. It elevates, directs, and strengthens, but does not create nature. Hence the great Saints were all great men, men who even in their natural powers rose head and shoulders above their contemporaries. St. Peter was officially the superior of his colleagues, but in all other respects St. John and St. Paul tower far above him, and receive a far deeper homage from the mind and heart of Christendom. Grace does not supersede or disparage nature; nor does nature supersede or disparage grace; for it is by grace that nature is completed, fulfilled—elevated to or sustained in the Regeneration. The hierarchy of nature is not necessarily excluded from the hierarchy of grace, and they were all naturally great men whom St. Ignatius chose to be his companions.

The method of meditation adopted by St. Ignatius in his *Exercises* is that adopted by the Jesuit Fathers generally, and

through them by almost all modern spiritual directors and masters of the spiritual life. Nearly all the meditations published for the last two or three centuries to aid private meditation, or to serve as models for the faithful, at least so far as we are acquainted with them, are composed after his method. We do not suppose any Jesuit or any spiritual director would insist on that method as obligatory, or maintain that a meditation not made in accordance with it is no acceptable meditation at all. The method, we are told, is recommended not as obligatory, but as a help in preparing the mind and heart to meditate, and as a guide in meditating. We have no doubt that if a uniform method of meditation is to be prescribed for all minds, none better, more natural, more scientific, more edifying than that of St. Ignatius can be prescribed. But that it aids and assists one in meditating to cast his meditation in the Ignatian mould, we do not think is universally true; and, probably, when true, it is chiefly so in the case of those who have been long trained to it. Methods are, no doubt, good and useful in their place, but we have for ourselves always found it impossible to meditate after any prescribed method or formula. Every mind has its own peculiarities, its peculiar tendencies, attractions, associations, and laws of operation, and we weaken the mind, we chill the affections, distract the attention, and lose the choicest fruits of meditation, if we seek to suppress individuality, and to drill all minds and hearts to the same step and the same motions, like a company of soldiers. The object of spiritual direction, we need not say, is not to make men machines, or merely parts of one grand machine; but to bring the individual into free and living relation with God as his principle, medium, and end. There is, it seems to us, nothing in which the individual soul should be left more free, or abandoned more completely to its own spontaneous action, than meditation, its secret and personal intercourse with its God, its Redeemer and Saviour. The man should be instructed, as thoroughly instructed as possible, in the truths of religion, in the nature, end, and aim of prayer and meditation; but in the prayer and meditation as actual exercises, we think the soul should be left free to follow its own *attrait*, and not be distracted by feeling that it must observe any particular method, or conform to any particular formula.

We say nothing here that is not said, and frankly said, by all spiritual directors, and yet somehow or other we

poor laymen almost universally get the impression that a certain method is to be observed in our prayer, and a great many of us not being able to follow the method we find laid down in the books, either do not, or fancy we do not, pray or meditate at all. We know we ought to pray, but finding it impossible to pray according to rule, we are apt to give up praying or meditating, and to content ourselves with saying a few vocal prayers. Prayer is the Christian's breath of life, and it as natural to him to pray as it is to breathe. It is, therefore, a real damage to the growth of the spiritual life to suppose prayer is something foreign, formal, or artificial, that can be done only in a formal and artificial manner. Indeed, we are disposed sometimes to think that piety is weakened, and spiritual growth stunted by the very multiplicity of appliances for their nurture and progress. We have too many helps, and are the weaker Christians for it. We are overnursed, too tenderly cared for, and lack naturalness, health, and robustness. Christians in the earlier ages, who had fewer of these artificial appliances, who were necessarily thrown more on their own resources, and compelled to rely more on themselves, were stronger, healthier, and better than we are. They were better able to stand alone, and could be more safely trusted out of sight. They had more life and energy, more originality and spontaneity, and left on their times a more indelible mark of their existence. They conquered the world to Christianity; we fail to keep it Christian.

Nevertheless, here as well as everywhere else, we must take care not to forget that there is an equal, if not a greater danger to be avoided on the other side. While we are warring against artificiality and casting all pious thoughts and affections in one and the same mould, we must remember that even nature needs training, and if neglected it soon runs wild, and produces either no fruit at all, or crabbed and bitter fruit, not worth the gathering. Mankind are prone to extremes, and usually swing from one extreme to its opposite. It is seldom possible to correct one excess without provoking a contrary excess. Nature should be followed indeed, but not therefore should it be left uncultivated; it should be allowed to operate freely, spontaneously, but not lawlessly or wildly. The rules should be large and liberal, but it should not be left wholly without rules. It is, no doubt, difficult to hit the exact medium; but we may say generally that a soul rightly instructed in the mysteries

and dogmas of faith will, if serious, if really in earnest, hardly make its prayer ill or in an unacceptable manner, if it really prays or meditates at all. The great point not to be overlooked is, that though no particular method be obligatory, prayer or meditation itself is obligatory upon every soul that would live in communion with God, or advance in godliness. Dogmatic instruction in the case of all to the fullest extent practicable is always necessary, for ignorance is the mother of error and vice, of sin and iniquity, and no cultivation of the affections without a large and liberal cultivation of the intelligence will ever suffice to make a great Saint or an eminent Christian. But dogmatic instruction is not enough, for we may see and believe, and do not; behold clearly enough what is right, what is duty, and yet neglect it. There must always be spiritual edification as well as intellectual instruction. It is not enough that we intellectually apprehend the truth; we must, if we would grow in holiness, spiritually appropriate it, assimilate it to our own interior life, and this we can do only by assiduous prayer and meditation. A speculative knowledge of truth only may leave the soul lean and weak, for merely speculative knowledge affords her of itself little nourishment. Moreover, even our speculative knowledge itself suffers when the soul is not properly nurtured. All truth is learned by contemplation, not by discursion, which is useful only by way of explication or proof, and the success of contemplation depends on the state and attitude of the soul in regard to the objects to be contemplated. The mind cannot contemplate, unless it stands in presence of the object, and the soul is elevated to its plane, and opened to its reception.

Speculation, discursion, reasoning, are all good in their way and in their place, but not by them do we acquire truth. They serve to remove obstacles, to break down barriers, to strip off envelopes, and to place our intellectual acquisitions in their logical order, but we acquire a knowledge of truth itself only by standing face to face with it, and by calmly contemplating it, that is, by elevating the heart to it, and meditating on it. The mental act is intuitive, not discursive, for discursion requires truth for the basis of its operations, and cannot begin till the truth is apprehended. Hence it is that prayer and meditation are necessary conditions not simply of spiritual growth, but also of the acquisition of the highest order of intellectual

truth, and therefore of the highest order of intellectual greatness. This is true, even confining ourselves to prayer and meditation as a subjective exercise, without taking into view the objective graces that the exercise obtains from God. The mind is naturally fitted for truth, for truth in the intelligible order, but if it turns away from it, or will not look towards it, and consider it, it will not find it, but will remain in ignorance. The light shines and illumines all around us, but what avails it, if we shut our eyes, or refuse to open them to it? Meditation, from the point of view we are now considering it, is opening the eyes of the soul to the light that ever shines within and without it, and contemplating the divine objects it presents.

We are all too apt to forget that all truth is in and from God, whose word is truth, and that it is in him we live, and move, and have our being. It is seldom without a mental effort that we think of God as near to us, as all around and within us, and not as afar off, as a distant God, residing away, up above the sky, inaccessible to us poor grovelling mortals. Yet he is near us. We are, though we realize it not, in his immediate presence, and could not exist even for a moment if removed from it. Separation from God is death, annihilation. He is our Creator, and his act creating us is his act sustaining us. We continue to exist, because he ceases not to create us. Were he to suspend for one instant his creative act, we should not be living without God, but we should cease to exist, be annihilated, the nothing we were before he created us. So also in the Regeneration, regarded as our Redeemer, Saviour, and ultimate End, God is equally near, even nearer, if possible to us. The Son of Mary even takes up into himself our nature, and is the very life of our life, and it is because he lives that we live, because he has attained that we can attain, because he is God that we may become God. He is here, without, and within us, and separation from him were our death, our annihilation as Christians, or as heirs of immortality. Separation, no matter how slight, if separation it be, is hell, the second death. As Christians we live only as we are regenerated in Christ and sustained in him by his grace continually operative in us, and uniting us to him as the members to the head or the branches to the vine. To be dissevered from him is to be excluded from the Regeneration, to be and to be compelled to remain mere cosmic and therefore inchoate existences, out of the way of life, and

without any means of returning or attaining to God as our last end, our Supreme Good. God in whom are all things, from whom all things proceed, and to whom all things tend, is not, then, afar off; and to place ourselves consciously in his presence, and therefore in the immediate presence of all truth in its principle, we have only to elevate our hearts, and open our minds. His light, always shining, even in the darkness, though the darkness comprehendeth it not, will then inundate the soul, clear the vision, and fill and warm the heart. This elevating of the heart and opening of the eyes of the mind to the Divine Presence is what our spiritual writers call prayer or meditation, and hence all prayer is contemplative and unitive in its essence, and the distinction made by the masters of spiritual life is a distinction of degree, not of kind; and hence, too, prayer or meditation is at all times possible to the soul, if we will it, and may be carried on wherever we are, or whatever the work in which we may be engaged. The soul is always and everywhere able to pray, though it may not, owing to its own imperfections, be always and everywhere able to rise at once, by a single bound to what is called the prayer of union, the perfection of prayer.

But God not only creates us, but he creates us for himself, and he himself is our final cause as well as our first cause. He, again, is not only our beginning and end, but, what we are still more apt to forget, the medium of our life. We live from him and to him; we live also in him and by him. He is principle, medium, and end. The Father is principle, the Word is the medium, the Holy Ghost is the end or consummation. Hence the necessity of recognizing and accepting with a firm and unwavering faith the Mystery of the Trinity. We are created by the Word as medium, we are redeemed by the Word made flesh, and it is only by the Word made flesh that we receive the Holy Ghost, and are consummated in glory. It is only by God that we proceed from God, and by him that we tend to him as our last end. But we tend to him not fatally as the rivers run to the ocean, or as the lighting rives the oak. We tend to him not blindly or involuntarily, but freely, voluntarily, by an act of our own choice. We cannot tend to him without him,—“without me ye can do nothing,”—nor with him without the active concurrence of our own will, for our return to him must be *our* act,—an act not possible indeed without his grace, but still *our* act, a proper *actus humanus*, as say the theologians.

This must be so, for though creation and redemption are acts in which we do not and cannot concur, yet heaven or glorification is always in Scripture proposed as a reward, consequently as a reward of merit, and there can be no merit where there is no act. Undoubtedly, in crowning the Blest God does but crown his own gifts, and that it is only through his merits that we can merit; but his gifts are real gifts, and when given us are really ours, and his merits are the medium of ours, and enable us to merit, instead of rendering merit on our part impossible or unnecessary. His grace assists and completes without superseding or disparaging nature. But his grace or assistance, though proffered to all, is effectually given only to those who desire it. The song of the angels was, "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will." God is ever near and ready to help, but he helps not where the good will is wanting, because he created man free, and always deals with him as a free moral agent. He forces his help upon no one against his free will, and the grace that goes before and excites the will becomes aiding or assisting grace only in case the will opposes it not, and elects to concur with it. Man attains not to God as his end without grace, divine help, nor with it, without his own free co-operation.

There must, then, be in the Christian life, as in our Lord himself, a union of the human and the Divine. Always must man depend on divine assistance, and always must he act himself. Never must he sit down with the feeling or conviction that grace will do it all, and he need not trouble himself about it; nor with the feeling or conviction that he has no need of grace, that he is sufficient for himself, and has no need to depend on God as the medium of his salvation or glorification. He must have help, and he must himself act. His great study, then, must be, on the one hand, to secure the needed help, and, on the other, to remove all obstacles in himself to its reception, and to co-operate with it. Here is the reason of the necessity and utility of prayer or meditation, which removes the obstructions to grace, and places the soul in the proper attitude to receive it and to act,—to act with a clear mind and a firm will. So the advantages of meditation are twofold, objective and subjective,—in the grace received, and the state of the mind and affections produced.

The forms of speech we adopt, though perhaps unusual, are not unintentional. They are adopted not to express a

doctrine not recognized by all ascetic theologians, but to bring out in bolder relief, what many overlook, that the grace received is not, *ex parte Dei*, a special grace conferred on the praying soul, but is a stream from that fountain of grace which is in the Word made flesh, and which is always near the soul, ready to flow in the instant the soul opens the valves of her heart, or permits it to flow in and circulate through her veins. The grace exists always in all its plenitude, and near the soul of every one. Meditation simply opens the heart, and permits it to flow in, and the soul to appropriate or assimilate it. The grace is supernatural, but no special miracle is wrought on occasion of the prayer or meditation. The miracle is the one grand crowning miracle, the Incarnation, the very apex of the creative act of God. The grace already exists, is a living fountain open in the sacred side and heart of Jesus, and its flowing into the soul on occasion of meditation which tends to remove the obstructions the soul herself places in its way, is the effect not of a special or isolated act of God, but of the one continuous act by which he became Incarnate, and offers himself a perpetual sacrifice for us. We thus refute those who pretend that prayer has only a subjective value, and that it brings us nothing from without, from above, from God, on the ground that God is immutable, and all his acts are laws. God does not change, or work a special miracle in answer to prayer; yet not do we in prayer receive nothing from him that we should not have equally received without it. The light shines when our eyes are closed as it does when they are open, and, whether our eyes are open or closed, it changes not; and yet to say that we see by it precisely the same objects when we shut as when we open them, is not in accordance with most men's experience. Prayer has undoubtedly a subjective value, but it has also an objective value, as it opens the soul to receive a grace from God which otherwise it would not and could not receive.

We know there is, enveloped as we are in a world of sense, where all is individual, particular, without any sensible bond of unity, a real difficulty with many in bringing home to their understandings that what is only specially received is not specially created, or that what has no sensible existence has any existence at all. It is not true, as a class of sophists pretend, that this sensible world has no objective existence, is unreal, an illusion, or, at best, a mere picture painted on the retina of the eye. The sensible world, the

outward, visible world is a real world, but it is not all the world, is not the whole reality. It is real, but also symbolic, now concealing, now revealing a higher and more comprehensive reality, a real world above itself in which it has its principle and root. Our Lord had a real sensible body, he was the real Son of Mary, flesh of her flesh, and to the ordinary onlooker he was only the carpenter's son, a poor Jewish mechanic, in whom nothing remarkable was apparent. He had no form or comeliness that we should desire him; nay, he was despised and rejected of men. One day he took with him Peter, James, and John, and went up into a high mountain, and was there transfigured before them. "And his face did shine as the sun, and his garments were white as snow." Yet was there no change in him, and the glory beheld was not something borrowed, something anticipated, something created for the occasion. The transfiguration was only a partial withdrawal of the sensible veil which concealed from his disciples the glory inherent in him, and at all times really his. The natural properties of the bread and wine remain unchanged after consecration, but under them is the Real Presence, the Body and Blood of our Lord. The Sacrifice of the Mass in the sensible world is a special act of the priest offering simple bread and wine, and yet it is the one real Sacrifice made by our Lord of himself on Calvary. It is not simply a symbolic representation of that Sacrifice; it is not even its renewal or repetition in an unbloody manner, but is that identical Sacrifice itself, that one and the same universal and ever present sacrificial act. They who assert only one sacrifice made once for all, are right, but they who deny the reality of the Sacrifice of the Mass daily on our altars, place the real sacrifice and the whole sacrifice in its mimetic or sensible accidents, and see, conceive, believe nothing above them.

Not only this, but in all the great Mysteries of our religion there is more than the mind at first view takes in. Not on the side of the affections only does the soul suffer for the want of meditation. "As I meditated, the fire burned," the Prophet tells us; as we meditate, not only does the heart glow with love, but its view of truth enlarges, becomes clearer and more comprehensive, and it is this clearer and larger view of truth which kindles the fire, and intensifies the affections. Each monad, says Leibnitz in his *Monadology*, represents the entire universe from its own point of view, and, we may add, represents also from its point of

view the whole being, majesty, and glory of the Creator. Touch the sensible where you will, consider it, and it enlarges, grows under your meditation, expands into a universe, and on every point touches God. How much more the Mysteries, all of which are catholic or universal truths, that centre and become one truth in the creative act of God, or the manifestation of his infinite and eternal Word. The highest knowledge we ever attain to of our religion by cold reflection or the speculative action of the mind, though important, is comparatively low, and may be barren of results. We get thus, as it were, only the shell or hull of truth. It is only by meditation that we penetrate the hull, seize and appropriate the food within, attain to the highest reality of the Mystery, and, as it were, assimilate to our souls its life-giving truth. We thus penetrate to the very adytum of the temple of wisdom, hold personal intercourse with Wisdom itself, and become wise not by human wisdom, but by divine wisdom, in which is the origin and well-spring of all wisdom. We penetrate beyond the world of sense, the outward and visible, to the inward and invisible, and taste the infinite truth and glory of a higher and more real world, even the hidden verities of things. It is in fact only because we neglect meditation, because we turn away from the contemplation of the divine Mysteries that we understand so little of them, that they are so unfruitful to us, that we lose sight of the higher realities of things, become low and grovelling in our aspirations, are led to deny the supersensible world, and imagine that the horizon that bounds our vision is the boundary of the universe. Neglecting meditation, taking the mysteries as distinct, as isolated, or speculative facts, we become darkened in our understandings, we lose the relish of spiritual pleasures, become sensual men, believing only in a sensible world, and greedy only of sensible goods. Our philosophy and our morals no less than our piety suffer, are degraded and debased by neglect of meditation, the elevation of the soul to God, from whom all light emanates, and in whom is our life, our strength, our hope, our beatitude.

Objectively and subjectively, meditation is alike useful and necessary, and all experience bears witness that not only does the decline in one's piety and relish for spiritual things, but even his understanding of the truths of religion, the basis of all truth, date from his neglect of prayer or meditation. Prayer, in the sense taken by our spiritual

writers, is meditation, or the elevation of the soul to God, in whom we live, and move, and have our being. It is the elevation and opening of the soul to the Light, to the Source and Fountain of grace, or that objective assistance we need from God in order to return to him as our last end, our Supreme Beatitude. This assistance is real, objective, and Divine, as well as indispensable. It is more fully rendered, is greater in degree and strength in proportion to the earnestness, sincerity, and perseverance with which we seek it. The grace in itself is exhaustless, and is in regard to the soul limited only by the soul's preparation to receive it. The prayer or meditation, always possible, because the grace of prayer is given to all men, at all times, and in all places, is the subjective preparation of the soul to receive it, and the more frequent and thorough the preparation the more will the soul receive.

Man has no proper creative power, and when he needs a power greater than his own, he studies to avail himself of one or more of the great agents or forces of nature. He constructs his ships to float on the waters, and to be propelled by the winds, or by steam. He invents and constructs machinery, by which he augments his power a thousand or a million fold, but the force that propels his machine is not his own, is not created by him, but is made available to him by his machinery. So it is, in some sense, in the spiritual world. Man needs a more than cosmic power, more power from God than is given in his simple creation. That power through the Incarnation is provided for him, as the oceans and rivers, as the wind, the fire and the water for his navigation. He only needs to place himself in relation with it to avail himself of it. Prayer or meditation is the proper means of establishing this relation, and of receiving the Divine breath to swell our sails, and propel us onward to our destined port.

What may be done at any time will be done at no time, unless we set apart some particular time for it. We should, therefore, set apart some portion of each day as a special time for meditation. True we may and should pray at all times, even in our work, for *laborare est orare*, but if we do not have a special time for prayer, such is our imperfection, our indolence, our readiness to put off till to-morrow whatever it is not absolutely necessary to do to-day, that we are in danger of neglecting prayer altogether, and of depriving the soul of her daily food and supply of strength.

We have said nothing of Vocal Prayers, because they do not come within the subject we are treating, but, we apprehend, the principles we have laid down will apply to them as well as to Mental Prayer or meditation. There may be blessings our Heavenly Father is ready to grant to those who ask them, and which he will grant to no others, because to no others would they be blessings. God does not change in granting or withholding, because in the Divine constitution prayer is made the condition of bestowing them, the law of their concession.

ART. V.—*Indemnity for the Past and Security for the Future.* Speech of HON. CHARLES SUMNER, of Massachusetts, on his Bill for the Confiscation of Property and the Liberation of Slaves belonging to Rebels. In the Senate of the United States, May 19, 1862.

VERY few of us who call ourselves loyal men and patriots had at the outbreak of the great Southern Rebellion a perfectly clear and distinct perception of the constitutional principles on which it was to be suppressed. All were anxious for its speedy suppression, and that, too, in strict accordance with the Constitution, for, after saving the life and integrity of the Republic, our dearest wish was to save constitutional government; but our minds were not clear as to the principles on which it was to be done. To many it was evident that the peace powers of the Constitution were not adequate to the exigencies of the case, and to others it was not clear that the war power could be constitutionally invoked and exercised against our own citizens, even though in arms against the Government.

The Administration adopted in the outset the theory that the Rebellion is not civil war, and the Rebels are not enemies, but citizens criminally combined to obstruct the administration of justice, and to resist the execution of the laws. This is evident from the President's Inaugural Address, and his Proclamation calling out the militia. Congress itself at the Extra Session, unless its partial Confiscation Act be an exception, appears to have adopted the President's theory of the Rebellion, and we can call to mind no act of that Session incompatible with it. But on

this theory the Government is restricted to the peace provisions of the Constitution. The military forces are not an army operating against enemies, but a *posse comitatus* acting under the orders of the civil magistrate in aid of the civil authority, just as when called out to aid in suppressing a riot. On this theory, any and every assumption of war powers, or appeal to the rights of war would be manifestly unconstitutional, and unjustifiable on any recognized principles of law. Yet the Government, while apparently adopting this theory, which we call the peace theory, and assuming the country to be at peace, has blockaded the Southern ports, has made prizes, sent and received flags of truce, treated captured Rebels as prisoners of war, released them on parole, or exchanged them, and done various other things which imply a state of war, and which would be highly improper, in some respects criminal, if the Rebels are not enemies as well as criminal citizens.

The adoption of the peace theory by the Government as the constitutional theory, and many of its acts being defensible only on the war theory, have continued and increased the confusion in loyal minds, and at the same time given the Opposition in and out of Congress some show of reason in organizing themselves as a Constitutional party, and in professing to oppose the Government on strictly constitutional grounds. If the Government adopts and insists on the peace theory, many of its acts are undeniably open to the strictures of such men as Powell of Kentucky, Saulsbury of Delaware, Vallandigham of Ohio, and Diven of New York. On this theory the various Bills introduced into Congress, one of which has passed the House while we are writing, for confiscating the property of Rebels and emancipating their slaves, are, if regarded as penal statutes against the Rebels, of doubtful constitutionality. It may be plausibly argued, to say the least, that such measures are not within the purview of the peace powers of the Constitution, and, if defensible at all, are defensible only under the war power,—only on the supposition that the property and slaves in question, are the property and slaves of enemies.

The Constitution says expressly that, "The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture, except during the Life of the Person attainted." This, taken in an untechnical sense and as usually understood,

positively forbids Congress to pass any confiscation laws, as a penalty for treason, except during the life of the traitor. Confiscation of rebel property as a punishment for treason for a longer period than the life of the traitor, would, consequently, according to this interpretation, be manifestly unconstitutional, and the courts would be obliged to treat the Act of Congress authorizing it as null and void. So of emancipation. As a peace power neither Congress nor the President has any power over the emancipation question. Slavery does not exist under or by virtue of the Constitution of the United States. So far as it has any legal existence at all in the Union, it exists by the *jus proprium* of the several States, and all the Federal government has authority to do with it is, to see that the constitutional provision for the return of persons held to service escaping from one State to another is carried out. If the Rebel slaveholders are to be regarded not as enemies, but as simply criminal citizens, an Act emancipating their slaves would be undeniably in violation of the Constitution, a usurpation of power that no lover of the Constitution can for one moment permit. So far we are disposed to agree with those members of Congress who oppose, on constitutional grounds, both confiscation and emancipation.

Yet, we heartily approve a stringent Confiscation Act, and demand full and immediate emancipation at least of all the slaves claimed by Rebels. Both are necessary as a means of weakening the Rebels, obtaining indemnity for the past, and security for the future. We demand indemnity for the expenses incurred in suppressing the Rebellion. The Government has no right to exempt Rebel property, and compel the loyal men of the country not only to pour out their blood in its defence, but to bear the burden of the expense necessarily incurred, when there is within its reach Rebel property that can be seized as an indemnity. It would be paying a premium for treason, and imposing an almost insupportable tax on loyalty. The Rebels have confiscated some two hundred millions of debts due to the loyal men in the Loyal States, besides a large amount of property owned by Northern men in the seceding States. They have stolen or destroyed many millions of property owned by the United States, and compelled an expenditure by the Union of at least twelve hundred millions, to say nothing of indemnities to private citizens, especially loyal citizens of the rebellious States, which will be found in the end to be

nearly as much more. We protest against the whole burden of this immense expenditure falling on the Federal Treasury. The whole debt contracted, we hold, is a lien on Rebel property, and the property of the Rebels, as far as it will go, must be made to pay the cost of putting down their rebellion. We hold indeed, that all the property of the rebellious States, and all held under them, has lapsed to the United States by the rebellion of those States, for we hold, as our readers know, that State Rebellion is State Suicide, the death of the State, and, so far as it depended on the State, the dissolution of all civil society in its territory. But we demand, if Congress will not accept this doctrine, that it authorize the seizure of Rebel property as a just indemnity, as far as it will go, of the expenses of the Government and the losses by the Rebellion of loyal private citizens.

But we cannot make this demand under the peace powers of the Constitution, or on the Government theory of the Rebellion. We can make it only under the war power, as one of the rights of war, and therefore only on the ground that the country is not at peace, that the Rebellion is civil war, and that the Rebels are not only criminal citizens and punishable as such, but enemies against whom the Government has all the rights of war. We have against the Rebels all the civil rights determined by the Constitution, and, besides these, all the rights of war against foreign enemies; for all authorities agree that a rebellion assuming certain dimensions is civil war, and the laws of war apply to civil or domestic war in like manner as to a foreign war, or, in other words, that the government has against domestic enemies all the rights that it has against a foreign state with which it is at war. That is to say, it has all the rights of a belligerent in addition to its rights as a sovereign. This clears up the confusion we have referred to, as may be seen in Mr. Sumner's masterly Speech in the Senate on Confiscation, the title of which we have quoted at the head of this article. Mr. Sumner has drawn sharply the distinction between the peace powers of the Constitution and the war power, and shown what we can and what we cannot do under each of them. We have done nothing but state in our own way his positions, and we refer to his Speech for the authorities he cites in their support, and for the arguments by which he sustains them. In that Speech he proves himself to be as scrupulously attached to the Constitution as he is ardent and unreserved in his devotion to liberty.

He is not merely the warm-hearted philanthropist, the indefatigable advocate of negro emancipation, but also an able and profound constitutional lawyer.

The right of both confiscation and emancipation under the war power is undeniable. The laws of war allow the seizure and appropriation of enemy's property wherever it can be reached without invading the jurisdiction of a neutral power. They also authorize the demand of indemnity for expenses incurred in prosecuting the war, and security for the future. This demand may be complied with by the payment of a sum of money agreed on between the parties, by a concession of territory, or by the concession of certain commercial facilities, as may be stipulated in the treaty of peace. It is on the right to demand indemnity for the past and security for the future, that rests the validity of the title by conquest.

It is true, as Mr. Sumner remarks, that, in modern times the private property of citizens on land is respected, and the rights of war, except on sea, authorize only the seizure and appropriation of the public property of the enemy. This is because the government is held responsible, and because the citizens in their private character are not held to be enemies, or, if so, not by their own choice. This is a modification of the laws of war, which we owe to Christianity. Under the old *jus gentium* as recognized by Roman jurisprudence, all the property, both public and private, of the hostile nation fell to the conqueror. Hence Rome or the Roman emperor was regarded as the sole proprietor of all the land of the conquered Provinces, which, if it continued to be held by its former owners, was held by lease or payment of a stipulated rent or tribute. But this restriction of the war power does not apply in the case of rebels or domestic enemies, for they have no legal government, and are held to act individually, from choice, and therefore must be held individually responsible.

This is Mr. Sumner's doctrine, and in most cases of rebellion is unquestionable. But in our case the question might arise whether the Rebels are not states rather than individuals. The States have acted in their State capacity, and demanded the support of their citizens by virtue of their allegiance to the State. In such a case the demand for indemnity and security would be against the State, and not directly against the individual citizen. This view was taken and urged at some length in our pages last January, in the

article on *The Struggle of the Nation for Life*. But it was taken not so much to meet the present question, as to escape the difficulties we felt in adopting the peace theory of the Administration, on which we did not believe it possible to suppress the Rebellion. Our thought was, in case of success, to compel the States, as States, to meet the demand for indemnity and security. This, we think, could be defended if it should be denied that State Rebellion is State Suicide, and it would answer most of the purposes of a Confiscation Act. But we have since looked more closely into the question of State Sovereignty than we had previously done, and have come to the conclusion that the States are not and never were sovereign States either in law or in fact, that the American people are and always have been one political people, and that the undivided allegiance of the citizen is due to the United States, and to the United States alone. The State by rebellion forfeits all its rights, its very existence ceases to be a legal entity, and therefore the citizen is not bound by any of the acts or enactments of the pretended State after its rebellion. Hence he must be held individually responsible for his rebellion, and be accounted personally an enemy. In this case Mr. Sumner's doctrine applies, for the private property of rebels is enemy's property, and may be confiscated as such.

The right to confiscate enemy's property under the war power is indubitable; but the war power itself—is that a constitutional power? As against foreign enemies it is certainly constitutional, and equally so, if the doctrine we have asserted be sound, against domestic enemies. The war power is not, as some seem to suppose, a power above or outside of the Constitution. Every sovereign state has, by virtue of the sole fact that it is a sovereignty, the inherent and indefeasible right of self-defence, or of self-preservation, to demand redress for injuries inflicted, and to guard against injuries threatened. In this is founded the right of war, whence flows the war power. The war power is inherent in the United States as a free, independent, and sovereign state, and is by the political people of the United States expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress, as any one may see by reading Article I., Section 8. The Constitution recognizes the war power, and confers it on Congress. It is, then, a constitutional power, as constitutional as any of the peace powers. The war power is recognized and conferred by the Constitution, but the Constitu-

tion does not specify or determine the rights or laws of war. These are determined by the *jus gentium*, or international law, as recognized and enforced by universal jurisprudence, or the jurisprudence of all civilized or Christian states. The rights or laws of war, as recognized by international law, which is a part of the civil law of every nation, are constitutional, and Congress can, while the war is pending, as constitutionally exercise them as it can any other rights. The confiscation of rebel property, even if unauthorized, or forbidden under the peace powers of the Constitution, is then constitutional under the war power.

So much for the right while the war is pending to confiscate. The expediency of exercising the right or not exercising it, or of exercising it only with discrimination, or to a partial extent, is a question for the Government to determine. No government is obliged to exercise all its rights, or to push its rights to their extreme. The Rebels, while the civil war lasts, are enemies, as much, and as strictly so, as if they were foreigners; but we expect the Government to suppress the Rebellion, and the people of the seceding States to return, after a while, to their allegiance, and to demean themselves as our countrymen and fellow-citizens. It is the duty of the Government to use against them all the force and all the means authorized by the laws and usages of civilized warfare necessary to induce them to submit, and cease their opposition; but it is for the interest of the whole country that this should be done with as little injury to them as possible. It could be of no advantage to the loyal States, even if they were so disposed, which they are not, to reduce the great mass of the population of the seceding States to absolute pauperism, to deprive them of all capital, and entirely ruin their industry. It is the duty of the United States to save them, as far as it can, from completely ruining themselves. We do not think interest, humanity, or sound policy, can counsel extreme and indiscriminate confiscation. We, if the matter were left to us, would leave the mass of the people,—who have but small means, and who have been drawn into the Rebellion by their leaders rather than by their own malice,—when returning to their loyalty the undisturbed possession of their little properties. We would exempt them from the operation of the confiscation law.

But we would not spare the leaders and wealthy Secessionists, the members of the Confederate government, or of the

seceding State governments, those who have accepted office under them, and the commissioned officers of the Confederate army and navy. On all these we would let the confiscation law fall with its full force. It is due to patriotism and loyalty that it should do so. These should not escape with impunity. There will, of course, be no hanging, no capital punishment for treason. The time has gone by for that. If we intended to inflict on traitors the traitor's doom, we should have begun our hanging under Mr. Buchanan's administration, and Mr. Lincoln's government should have arrested and executed as traitors, the Commissioners sent by the so-called Confederates to Washington to negotiate the terms of a dissolution of the Union, instead of treating them, unofficially of course, as high-minded, honorable, and accomplished gentlemen. As much as we disapprove the mistimed leniency in the beginning, whether it sprang from policy or cowardice, we should still more disapprove any prosecutions, after the war is over, under the civil law for treason. The legal right to do it we of course maintain, but after the past we believe such prosecutions would be highly dishonorable, and that they would prove to be at best a useless and an impolitic vengeance. Yet some punishment the leaders and influential classes who favored the Rebellion should receive. But if the punishment extends to stripping them of all their property, and reducing them to the necessity of earning their bread by the sweat of their faces, it will probably be punishment enough.

The principle on which we defend the constitutionality of confiscation of enemy's property enables us to defend the emancipation of the enemy's slaves as a strictly constitutional measure. We hold, as we endeavored to prove in our last Review, that the slaves in all the rebellious States are already legally free. The suicide of those States of itself emancipated the slaves, and the Federal government has no authority to remand them to slavery. Strictly speaking, slavery does not exist in the United States, and never has existed in them since the adoption of the Federal constitution. The United States know only persons, whatever their race or complexion, and *persons*, though they may be bondmen, are not slaves. The people of the United States, when they formed and adopted the Federal constitution, abolished slavery, by recognizing and describing those who had been slaves as "*persons* held to service," and thus raising them, though they might be bondmen, from chattels to men. It

would be a nice question, whether the Constitution did not also abolish hereditary bondage. Hereditary bondage is founded on the legal fiction that the mother is a chattel, a thing, and that the offspring belongs to the master as the natural increase of property, which cannot be alleged if the mother is recognized as a person. If hereditary bondage has any legal existence in any of the States it must be by what lawyers call *jus proprium*, some special or express local statute, or custom having the force of law, not by the *jus gentium*. We apprehend, if we should inquire, that a great deal in regard to slavery alleged to be legal would be found to be in reality illegal, without even the shadow of a law, national or municipal, in its support. But be this as it may, it is undeniable that Congress under the war power, as a war measure, has the right to break the bond, and emancipate all the persons held to service by the Rebels, and, as to that matter, also all so held by loyal citizens, only in the latter case a fair compensation might be due. The complete and immediate emancipation of all the slaves or bondmen is thus within the constitutional power of Congress, as a war measure, though evidently not as a peace measure.

We have no doubt, as we maintained last October in our article on *Slavery and the War*, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, has the power to emancipate the slaves, when and where in his judgment it is a military necessity, or necessary to the military operations in hand. So, we think, has in his department any General having a departmental command, unless he has received positive instructions from his superior not to do it. The recent order of General Hunter freeing the slaves in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, comprised within his Military Department, was, we have no doubt, a valid order, and the persons previously held to service in those States are now legally free, as are the persons so held freed by General Fremont's Proclamation last autumn in the Department of the West. The President is bound by the legal acts of his Generals, unless he can show, as we presume he cannot, that they have disobeyed orders, or disregarded their instructions. If in these Departments the slaves were legally freed by the orders of the Generals, the President cannot remand them to slavery by any modification of the orders after they were once formally issued. Either the orders did not free the slaves, or those slaves are now legally free, whatever may have been the subsequent action of the

President. If the President disapproved of the policy of those orders, he should have instructed his Generals not to issue them. After they are issued it is too late to revoke them. A third party has then an interest.

But the power of the Commander-in-Chief to emancipate the slaves is confined to strict military necessity, and he can do it only as strictly necessary to his military operations. The Commander-in-Chief may believe, though it would be highly advantageous to the general prosecution of the war to emancipate the slaves, that it is not in a military point of view absolutely necessary, and, therefore, very properly refuse to proclaim emancipation. The power, therefore, though in certain supposable cases in the President, yet as it is included in the war power of the government, is more properly vested in Congress. It is a war power rather than a military power, and emancipation must be regarded as a war measure rather than as a military operation, or military expedient. The military can adopt it only as a measure necessary to its operations, but Congress can adopt it as a useful or advantageous war measure, a measure useful in prosecuting the war, in securing its ends, or in bringing it to a more speedy and successful issue.

Judge Trumbull, in his able speech on introducing a Bill into the Senate, at the opening of the Session, for confiscating the property and emancipating the slaves of Rebels, has dissipated the notion entertained by not a few, that the war power and the military power are one and the same, and that only the military can exercise the war power. He cleared up no little confusion by showing that the war power is the legitimate power of the government, and vested by the Constitution in Congress. The executive department, so to speak, of the war power, as of the other powers of the government, is committed to the President, who is made by the Constitution Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy; but the power to declare war, to vote supplies of men and money, and to determine the policy and purposes of the war is expressly vested in Congress, and the President acts simply in prosecuting it as the executive department of the government. It is not true to suppose that the war power comes into play only under martial law, and that under the war power the civil gives way to the military. Under our Constitution the civil government holds the war power, and it is by the authority of the civil government that the military operates, or has the right to

operate. The President, as the chief civil magistrate of the nation, watches over the general welfare, takes care of the Republic, and sees that the laws are executed,—and to this end he is made Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, or the whole land and naval forces of the Union. His military command is, therefore, subsidiary to his office as Chief Magistrate. The military is only an arm of the civil government, and can rightly move only by its will, for it is as chief civil magistrate that the President calls out the militia to repel an invasion, or to quell an insurrection ; or has the chief command of the land and naval forces.

It is of great importance to keep this always in mind. The civil authority under our system controls the military. The war power is not the prerogative of the military, but of the civil government, and the military operates under and not over it. Were it otherwise, we might become a military despotism, or, in time of war at least, the civil authority would be placed in abeyance, and only the military would rule. Such a case could occur legitimately only when the whole country was placed under martial law. We have not the fears that many of our countrymen have of military despotism, and have no jealousies, common to most civilians, of the army. As a people we have held both army and navy in too low esteem, and are now suffering from it. We have made light of military honors and military glory, and thought we were humane and patriotic in discouraging the cultivation of a military spirit in our young men. In all this we have been wrong. An unmilitary people is sure to become a corrupt and an unpatriotic people. We were personally never a supporter of Andrew Jackson, but we never sympathized in the opposition to him on the ground that he was a "military chieftain," or had proved himself an able and successful General. We said years ago, and we say now, that we would always, other things being equal, prefer a real military man for the Chief Magistrate of the Union, to a civilian. The military man is usually a better executive officer, and carries into office better formed habits both of obedience and command, more promptness, energy, and activity, and a better *coup d'œil* than a man taken from civil life. If we had a larger sprinkling, not of Militia Generals and Colonels, but of real military men, in Congress, we should find our legislation none the worse for it.

But the real danger to our institutions comes from the

tendency to devolve more and more of the duties of government on the President. He exercises in times of war extraordinary powers, and prudence requires that no more should be thrown upon him than properly belongs to his office. It is necessary to keep distinct and separate the several departments of government, as was intended by the Constitution, and for each department to take care to neglect none of its own functions, and to avoid encroaching upon those of either of the others. The habit of devolving upon the Executive duties which properly belong to Congress, or calling upon it to do what Congress itself can do, is fraught with danger, and may, if not checked, cause or permit the President to grow not into a Military Chieftain, but into a Civil Chieftain, which is a great deal worse. For these reasons we prefer that the war measure we insist on should be adopted by Congress rather than by the President, for as civil magistrate the President has no power to do more than recommend it to Congress, and as the head of the military power he can do it only in a military emergency. In any case it is more in accordance with the spirit of our institutions that it should be done by the civil than that it should be done by the military authority. Besides Congress has freer scope under the war power, and may take a larger and a more liberal view of what is called military necessity than the Commander-in-Chief can. It can decree emancipation as a useful war measure, though not in the strictest sense of the term absolutely necessary, and even though it be not morally impossible to suppress the Rebellion without decreeing it. It can do it whenever it regards it in the exercise of its best judgment a wise and prudent measure, and likely to be highly advantageous in prosecuting the war, or in obtaining the desired security for the future.

We assert the constitutional right of Congress under the war power to declare universal emancipation as a war measure. But as a war measure it is obvious that Congress can adopt it only while the war is pending. When the war is over and peace has returned, Congress has no longer any power over it, for we have seen that emancipation in the States does not come within the scope of the peace powers of the Federal government. Hence we have not regarded the proposition of the President, embodied in a Resolution adopted by Congress, to furnish pecuniary aid to those States that may choose to initiate emancipation, as so important as have some of our friends. The proposition is intended to be

either a peace measure or a war measure. As a war measure, we doubt its value, for we do not believe any of the States will adopt it, or that it will tend at all to make Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, one whit more loyal or less disloyal than they now are. Undoubtedly, if it would secure the hearty support of these States to the Union, or tend to detach Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, from the so-called Confederacy, it would be justifiable under the war power, and a prudent and advantageous war measure. But we anticipate from it neither of these effects, till the war is virtually over, and both its necessity and its utility as a war measure have passed away. The menace with which the President accompanied his proposition can be carried into effect only while the war continues; and unless the war continues much longer than it is now hoped, it will turn out to be only a *brutum fulmen*, intended rather to divert the pressure of foreign or domestic opponents of slavery, than to have any effect in actually promoting the cause of emancipation.

As a peace measure, the proposition strikes us as unconstitutional. We see nothing unconstitutional in compensating the slave-holders in the District of Columbia for the slaves emancipated by the Act of Congress, for there slavery existed by the authority of the United States. The United States had, iniquitously if you will, and as we certainly hold, recognized and sanctioned slavery in the District. It ought at once, no doubt, to free the slaves; but as citizens had acquired under its authority a property in the services of the slaves or persons held to service, it could not justly destroy that property without indemnification. You may say it owed a still greater indemnity to the slaves for the loss for so many years of their own services, and we shall not dispute you. But we hold that a state that has authorized slavery cannot justly abolish it without indemnifying the loyal owners of the property it has authorized for the loss they must sustain by its abolition. But we are aware of no clause in the Constitution that authorizes the Federal government to impose a tax on me for compensating the owners of slave property in the States, where it has never existed by authority of the United States. The government could tax me my proportion for buying up and shipping off to Hayti, San Domingo, Central America, or elsewhere, all the negroes in the country as a war measure, but not one cent for any thing of the sort as a peace measure, nor any other citizen. The tax or

the appropriation of money from the Treasury for such a purpose would be clearly illegal.

The President, we doubt not, is opposed to slavery, and would be glad to see it abolished; but he is, as he has declared, not in favor of immediate emancipation, and, we presume, favorable to emancipation at all only as it is coupled with colonization, or deportation of the liberated slaves beyond the limits of the territory of the Union. We are ourselves favorable to colonization, or rather to the voluntary emigration of the colored population to a territory where they will not have to struggle against the prejudices of race, as they must if they remain in the Union, and we look forward to such emigration as the final solution of the Negro Question; but we do not suffer ourselves to couple with the Negro Question the Slavery Question, which is a distinct question, and must be disposed of whether the other be or not. The Slavery Question is now up for solution, and cannot be much longer safely postponed. We have great respect for the Chief Magistrate of the Union; we have great confidence in his shrewdness and judgment, and would treat with grave consideration any opinions, wishes, or even prejudices of his, however unreasonable they might appear to ourselves; but we must confess that we have great difficulty in not losing our patience when we hear people talk about *gradual* emancipation. What kind of use will gradual emancipation be as a war measure? If you mean to adopt emancipation as a war measure, you must do it at once, and speedily; if you mean to recommend it only as a peace measure, to be carried out after the war is over, we see not what right you have to meddle with it.

The pretence that the negroes, if free, will not work, and cannot take care of themselves is, if you protect them against the oppression of the white men, all moonshine, and is every day refuted by what we see before our eyes. The negroes are far better able to take care of themselves, than are their white masters to take care of themselves, without them. Do you refer us to the free negroes at the North? We grant that as a general thing they do not get along very well. But why? Because prejudice against their race closes to them almost every avenue of success, shuts them out from the public schools, and confines them to a few, and those the least lucrative, branches of industry. They in some places may be farm laborers, they may be barbers, waiters in hotels and on steamboats, and servants

in private families, even common sailors; but they cannot get employment in factories or as mechanics, as masons, carpenters, joiners, cabinet-makers, blacksmiths, tailors, tanners, curriers, &c. Yet they do contrive to live, to bring up their families, and some of them acquire handsome properties. At the South, the free negroes, when suffered to live there, do much better. In the District of Columbia they are found to have done well, and we have ourselves seen free negroes in Louisiana that were intelligent and wealthy, who, aside from the question of color, would be accounted accomplished and respectable. Our own barber, a full-blooded negro, is a moral and upright man, and superior in intelligence, wealth, and real respectability, to half of the white men in this city.

We have never heard a respectable argument in favor of gradual emancipation. "Hope deferred makes the heart sick," and the very worst school possible in which to acquire the habits of freemen is slavery. What good purpose do you propose to answer by gradual emancipation that could not be answered equally, if not better, by immediate emancipation? Do you begin to talk of the horrors of San Domingo, and tell us the slaves liberated will turn upon and massacre their late masters, in revenge of past wrongs, or in the mere wantonness of cruelty? The "horrors of San Domingo" were not the consequence of freeing, but of refusing to free the negro slaves. Those slaves rose, not because they were free, but because they were not free,—to assert their freedom, and no doubt they did assert their freedom with fire and blood. But this is a fact that tells the other way. Do you fear the emancipated slaves will come North, and compete with the free white laborers? How will this fear be affected by immediate any more than by gradual emancipation? If they come North, they will leave a demand for labor at the South. Then let our white laborers migrate Southward to supply the demand occasioned by the migration of the negroes Northward. But this fear is idle; for if the negroes can be free in the South, few, if any, of them will come North. The negro is not a migratory animal, he has strong local attachments, attachments which not unfrequently overcome his love of freedom. His natural tendency is Southward, to the torrid zone, for the home of his race is within the tropics. If many come North now, it is to get away from slavery, to a region where they can feel they are freemen. There is, no doubt, need of an

apprenticeship to freedom, but not in slavery do men serve that apprenticeship.

The real difficulty and the only difficulty we see in the case, is in the inveterate prejudice of the American people against the negro race. If the slaves were of our race, our own kith and kin, we should hear little of *gradual* emancipation. The non-slaveholding whites in the Slaveholding States, who are now fighting with such madness and fury against the Union, detest slavery as much as we of the North do, but they cannot endure free negroes, and they believe that, if the two races are to occupy the same territory, the black race should be the slave of the white race. The President is a native of a Slave State, and it may be shares to a certain extent the feelings and prejudices of these non-slaveholding whites, as do a large portion of the population of all the Free States. We suppose he wishes gradual emancipation because he couples in his own mind emancipation and colonization, and colonization must in the nature of the case, whether forced or voluntary, go on gradually. In all we have seen of him, he would seem to be more anxious to provide for the removal of free negroes out of the country, than he is to free the slaves. We respect his motives; we respect his loyal intentions; and we readily concede that he may be right in his judgment, and we wrong in ours; but he will permit us to say that, as at present informed, we cannot sympathize with him in his opposition to immediate and his preference for gradual emancipation.

There is another view of the case which so religious a man as the President ought not to neglect. Slavery is an injustice, a sin in the state that authorizes it, and in our case becomes a national sin the moment the Government gets the constitutional power to abolish it, and neglects to exercise that power. The war was not and is not waged for the abolition of slavery, but the existence of the war gives to the Government the power to abolish it as a war measure. The manifest injustice of slavery and manifest justice of abolishing it should be allowed to have due weight with the Government, and predispose it to adopt emancipation as one of its war measures, if it can do so constitutionally. We have shown that it can do so. Then, we say, it is bound to do so, and, if it does not, it makes the sin of slavery a national sin, for which the whole nation is accountable. Now in this case the question of gradual emancipation is like the question of gradually breaking off from sin. The morality we have

learned is that sin is to be broken off from immediately, at once, without dallying or delaying a moment. We do not pretend that declaring the slaves free is a complete reparation of the wrongs of slavery, or that it is all that is due in justice to the slaves. But so much must be done and done at once, or the sin does not cease. We must do so much at once, and the rest afterwards as soon as we can, or we continue to sin.

Finally, if we insist on a preparation of negroes for freedom, the best preparation will be to call them out as loyal Unionists, discipline them, put arms into their hands, and let them fight for their own freedom. In no way can men be more readily or more thoroughly trained to freedom than in fighting for it as soldiers with arms in their hands. It makes men of them at once, for it puts them in the way of doing men's work. There is no better school of freedom possible than war for or in defence of freedom. Such a war calls out all the manhood one has in him, and makes him feel the value of freedom by the blood with which he consecrates it, and the costly sacrifices he makes to secure it. This will do infinitely more to elevate the long oppressed negro race, do infinitely more to prepare them to be freemen, than any thing possible while they continue in slavery. Look at it in what light we can, *gradual* emancipation strikes us as nonsensical and absurd. There is no good reason conceivable why gradual emancipation should be preferable to immediate emancipation, while the only power the Government has to emancipate at all is to emancipate immediately, not gradually; for gradual emancipation can never be adopted as a war measure, unless we contemplate making the war for the suppression of the Rebellion a "Thirty Years War."

Dismissing the question of gradual emancipation, and assuming that Congress has under the war power the right to emancipate the slaves, it may still be asked, is it expedient or politic to do it? It can be done constitutionally as a war measure, if Congress judges it expedient. Is it expedient? Some say let it alone, why bring constantly the "eternal nigger" upon the tapis? Do leave slavery to take care of itself. But in answer to these we add the Government has now power over the question; in a few months it may have none. The life and death of the Republic are suspended in the balance, and the solution we give and give now to the Slavery Question may turn the

scale, and save the life or seal the doom of the nation. It is not a question, therefore, to be postponed. The "eternal nigger," as you express it, will not down at the bidding, any more than would Banquo's Ghost. We cannot silence the Slave question, or stop its agitation. We were to do it with the Compromise measures of 1850, and, after that, with a Kansas-Nebraska Territorial Bill, and we have as the result the present civil war. There is a moral law in the universe stronger than legislative enactments, against which neither the devices of our politicians nor the strategy of our Generals can avail—neither armed hosts, nor newly invented artillery. They war in vain who war against OPINION. No despot, even though backed by a million of bayonets and ten thousand guns of the heaviest calibre and the most cunningly devised projectiles, can prevail against the laws of God, or against the moral convictions of mankind. You may as well attempt to silence the ceaseless agitation of the waves, to stop the ebb and flow of the ocean tides, or arrest the course of the viewless winds, as to stop in the American people the agitation of the Slavery Question, so long as there is a single negro slave left in the land. It is not the wild or silly fanaticism of your Abolition men or Abolition women, your Garrisons, your Philipeses, your Fosters, your Pillsburys, your Kellys, your Westons, or your Chapmans that convulse the nation, for these are powerless save in the idea they represent; it is God, the moral laws of the universe, the awakening power of justice, the very logic of your own Republic, that keeps up the agitation. You might as well point your artillery against the red lightnings of heaven, as against the spirit that moves and agitates the country on the Slavery Question. Silence, in any way you please the voices of those you call abolition fanatics, and you have done nothing to suppress agitation. Were these to hold their peace, the very stones would cry out. The spirit would pervade your camps, seize upon your soldiers, and turn the heads of your sedatest Generals. It can no more be confined or restrained than one of the elemental forces of nature. The time for it in God's Providence has come, and you have no alternative but to accept and obey it as freemen, as men who believe in God, who derive from him the courage to do justice, to lighten the load of the oppressed, and to let the bond go free.

It is said emancipation is inexpedient, because it would gravely offend Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and even

Delaware, and force them out of the Union into open rebellion. This objection has no weight with us. The Government has been sufficiently embarrassed already by its concessions to these States, and we shall consider it a cause of abundant thankfulness if its efforts to keep them in the Union do not involve irremediably the dismemberment of the Republic and the acknowledgment of the Independence of the Southern Confederacy. If these States are really loyal, the measure, as it affects them only in the market for the surplus produce of slaves, will not drive them out of the Union; if they are at heart disloyal, and willing to stay in the Union only on condition that it adopt no measure not approved by them, the sooner they openly secede the better. The Government is either strong enough to maintain itself against any domestic combination that can be formed against it, or it is not. If it is, they can be subdued along with the other Seceding States; if it is not, then let it perish, for it is not worth sustaining. A government that can govern only at the mercy or forbearance of a portion of its subjects, is no government at all. Its stability, its permanence, its consistency, its independence depends on its ability to assert and maintain itself according to its own constitution against any and every combination of domestic enemies that can possibly be armed for its destruction. We wish, also, these Border States, that seem to imagine that the nation owes them special gratitude and deference because they did not openly secede with the other slave States, to bear in mind that they stand in the Union on the footing of equality with the other States, and that their insolent pretensions to superiority or to dictate, under threats of making war on the government, its measures and policy, can no longer be tolerated. They have been saved once or twice by the arms of the States they insult, and if need be can be saved again, perhaps at some cost to themselves. The nation owes them no special debt of gratitude for not openly rebelling, which all except Delaware would have done, and perhaps even Delaware herself, had it not been for the presence of the Federal forces; and the fact that they hold a portion of their population in bondage entitles their judgment or their wishes to no special consideration. They are an integral part of the one American political people, and as much bound to fight for the Union as Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, or Pennsylvania. Let us have no more of their insolence in or out of Congress.

But emancipation will terribly irritate the Rebels, and render their future reconciliation impossible. Nonsense. They are already as irritated as they can be. You cannot increase their hatred or malignity. Human nature will bear no more than they already have, even with the assistance of Satan to boot. As for the Union men in the seceding States, save in a few localities, they do not exist. Our armies have not found them, and wherever they go in Rebeldom, meet only hatred, sullenness, or insult. Even the wounded Rebel prisoners in our hospitals, though unable to deny the care and tenderness with which they are treated, cannot conceal and do not attempt to conceal their bitter hatred of "Yankees." There need be no fear of irritating the Rebels, and the only way possible of conciliating them is to treat them as they treat their own negroes when spiteful or sulky, that is, to flog them, and flog them soundly. They will then begin to respect us, and finally come to love and honor us. The mass of the Southern people are not like us here at the North. We are addicted to mammon worship, no doubt, but we do at least recognize a moral power, and confess that we ought to worship God. The Southern people as a body worship only Force, and to gain their love and respect, you must prove that you are the better man, that you can whip them. Leniency, forbearance, conciliation are thrown away upon them, for they take them as evidence of weakness, of a craven or an overreaching spirit. The Government has from the first mistaken their character. It has been too lenient, too conciliatory, and, in endeavoring to conduct the war on humane principles, has been guilty of great inhumanity. Nothing would so much command the respect of the Rebels, and so dispose them to live hereafter in peace and friendship with us under one and the same government, as the immediate emancipation of the slaves. They know our principles require us to do it, and they despise us for not having the courage to act up to our principles. The measure would be a bold and manly one; it would strike them in their tenderest point, and they would think all the better of us for daring to adopt it.

But many of the officers and privates of our army would refuse to fight if the government were to free the slaves. Then let the officers resign, and the privates be discharged. Your army will be the better officered and the more efficient for the riddance. The duty of the soldier is to obey his superior, and very few officers in high or subordinate com-

mands would hesitate to fight and do their best, if they must do so or lose their commissions, and still fewer privates when refusal involved dismissal from the service. The Government cannot be controlled by subordinates. Let the Government prove that it is a government, especially in time of war, and there will be no difficulty. Would not pro-slavery Generals show as much submission as the noble Fremont showed when relieved of his command for sympathizing with freedom, or as has probably been shown by the brave Hunter, under the mistimed rebuke of the Commander-in-Chief? If not, the sooner they are relieved from their commands the better.

Finally, we are told the measure is inexpedient, because it would have no practical effect. It would not be recognized by the Rebel masters, the knowledge of it would be kept from the negroes, and they would be so carefully watched and guarded that they could take no advantage of it even if informed of its adoption. The knowledge of such a measure, if adopted, we apprehend, would in less than one fortnight find its way to every negro cabin in Rebeldom. As to its efficiency, it would have the effect of securing nearly four millions of people in the very heart of Rebeldom as stanch loyalists to the Union. This of itself would be worth more to us than an army of a hundred thousand well-appointed and well-disciplined troops. It would carry fear, distrust, consternation even to every Rebel home, and render it necessary to keep at home for domestic protection a large number of troops who now are free to go and swell the Rebel armies in the field. It would weaken greatly the forces which can now be placed in the field to operate against us. Besides, the negroes, knowing the success of the Federal arms would secure their freedom, would find a thousand ways not easy to point out of injuring the Rebel cause, and serving our own. Moreover, knowing that by coming within our lines they would find freedom and protection, they would in spite of the vigilance of their guards escape in large numbers, and be able to render valuable aid to the Union cause as laborers in camp and on intrenchments, and also as soldiers and sailors. The able-bodied among them could be easily organized and disciplined under white officers, and acclimated as they are, advantageously relieve our unacclimated Northern troops of garrison and guard duty on the Southern coasts during the sickly season. They might also be employed as com-

mon sailors on our fleets, and do us good service, as may be gathered from the brilliant and daring feat of the pilot Robert Small and his companions in taking the *Planter* out of Charleston under the guns of the forts, and delivering her over to the Union naval commander.

The war, let it never be forgotten, is not a war between the North and the South, between two sections of our common country, but between the United States and an armed rebellion, seeking the destruction of the Government. All sections are equally bound to support the United States in its efforts to suppress the rebellion, and preserve the unity and integrity of the national territory. The Government has no right to throw upon any one section the whole burden and expense of prosecuting the war, and is bound to make all sections, as far as in its power, contribute their respective quotas. It is bound to call on the loyal men of the South as well as on the loyal men of the North. It does a manifest injustice to the North, if it refuses to accept the service that four millions of the population of the Rebellious States could and would willingly lend it in suppressing the Rebellion. We demand, therefore, not as a matter of mere expediency, but as a matter of justice to the Free States who are so freely pouring out their blood and treasure to sustain the Union, that the Government avail itself of the aid of these four millions of loyal men, not as slaves, but as included in the population of States that are not contributing, and otherwise will not contribute their due share or any share at all to the public cause. These loyal men are an integral portion of the population of those States, and, though under the laws of those States held to service, are known to the United States only as persons. As such the United States has the right to call upon them to support the Government, and is bound to grant them in return for their loyalty, freedom and protection; and the loyal people of the other States have the right to insist on its being done.

But there is another reason that proves not only the expediency, or the right of emancipation, but its absolute necessity. It must be done as the only means of saving the integrity of the nation, or of escaping the shame and mortification of acknowledging the Independence of the Rebels. France and Great Britain, we cannot doubt, will not see their industrial classes suffering the severe distress they are now suffering for the want of the Southern staples, much longer without intervening in our domestic affairs, if the war is to

be protracted, or if it is to be conducted on the principles on which it has been hitherto conducted. In nearly all protracted struggles in modern times for dismemberment of States, the historical precedents are in favor of the intervention of foreign powers to secure the independence of the rebellions or revolutionary party. It was so in the case of Holland struggling for her independence of the Spanish crown; it was so in the case of the American Colonies struggling for independence of the crown of Great Britain, and the United States owe in no small degree their existence as an independent nation to the intervention of foreign Powers. The same may be said of the Spanish American Colonies, of Greece demanding independence of the Ottoman Empire, of Belgium demanding separation from Holland, and of Italy demanding her independence of Austria. The only notable exceptions that we can at this moment recall are Poland and Hungary, but neither of these was able to maintain a prolonged struggle. What reason have we to suppose that the Southern Rebels will form another exception?

The foreign Powers most interested in the conflict have, for over a year, refrained from all intervention, at the expense of great suffering to themselves, and it is no secret that they will not refrain much longer. Nothing can prevent their early effectual intervention in favor of the Rebels but immediate, great, and decisive victories by the Federal arms, or the emancipation of the negro slaves. We must show that the war is not merely one of subjugation on one side, and of independence on the other, or they will certainly intervene, if the war threatens to be a protracted struggle. We must bring it speedily to a close, or else be compelled to acknowledge the Independence of the Southern Confederacy with such boundaries as the intervening Powers shall please to prescribe, for we cannot hope, with the Southern Rebellion on our hands, to resist successfully the combined power of France and Great Britain, without allies either in the Old World or the New. The only certain way of averting the intervention, and saving the integrity of the Republic, is to emancipate the slaves, and enlist the moral sentiments and convictions of the civilized world on the side of the United States.

The Government knows the danger, and has sought to avert it, by the Resolution adopted by Congress proffering pecuniary aid to the States that would initiate emancipation,

and relaxing the blockade as to the ports of Beaufort, Port Royal, and New Orleans; but these have failed, for no State has yet accepted the proposition with regard to emancipation, and the Rebels have destroyed their cotton and tobacco instead of suffering them to come forward to market. The Government now hopes, we presume, to avert it by great and decisive victories at Richmond and Corinth. But at neither of these places shall we obtain a decisive victory, for at either place, the Rebels, if they cannot conquer our forces, can retreat, and protract the war indefinitely; and they undoubtedly will do so, for it is their true policy. They feel that we have thus far gained only barren victories, for they are well assured that if they can protract the war a few weeks longer, foreign intervention will come to their aid. One way, and one way only is open to us; one alternative yet remains, and that is to do what should have been done one year ago,—decree complete and immediate emancipation. It is the only means left us of escaping a shameful mutilation of the Republic. In the mean time the President hesitates, longs but fears to strike, and Congress wrangles, and lets the golden moment glide by. Terrible will be the responsibility of the Government, both executive and legislative, if the Rebellion succeeds. On them, not on the Rebels, will fall the blasting curse of outraged humanity.

But events hasten, and in all human probability, the fate of the nation will be decided, before we can issue from the press, and our words will have only an historic value. The cloud in the East rises, and will perhaps have risen and spread over the whole heavens before our words reach those for whom they are designed. All we can say is, that since the Rebellion broke out we have in our humble sphere endeavored to discharge the duties of a loyal citizen. We love our country, and as long as we have a country we shall continue to love her, and to hope for her. If let alone, the United States in a reasonable time can reduce the Rebels to submission, and maintain the integrity of the national territory. If they fail, it will not be republican institutions that have failed. They will have failed because our Northern men consented in the outset to form an unnatural union of freedom with slavery, and because our statesmen and Generals have been too anxious to preserve it. We, however, still hope, before we appear in print, Congress will have reconsidered its vote rejecting the Emancipation Bill, and have passed an Act freeing all the slaves of the Rebels.

ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *What and Where is the Church?* An article under this title, written by one for whom we have much esteem, has been placed in our hands for publication; but we are obliged to reject it, because we have adopted the rule of inserting no article in our pages for which we are not willing to be held responsible. We notice the article in this public way, because the writer calls himself a Brownsonian, and evidently fancies that his views mainly coincide with our own, and because it has occurred to us that possibly others entertaining similar views with himself may have fallen into the same mistake. It gives us no pleasure, but rather alarms us, to find young men calling themselves by our name, and claiming to be our followers. They are unjust both to themselves and to us. We are no leader of a sect, schism, school, or party. We belong, however unworthy, to the Catholic communion, and acknowledge no name but Christian and Catholic. We want no man to follow us any farther than we follow Christ, and we follow Christ no farther than we follow his Church.

No man who does not accept the Papal and hierarchical constitution of the Church as from God; no one who questions the infallibility of the Church in teaching, or her divine authority in governing; no one who denies or rejects any of the mysteries of faith, or any of the definitions of the Church; no one who rejects or counts as unessential to the Christian life the Sacramental System of the Church, the Real Presence, or the Sacrifice of the Mass; no one who embraces the Church only because she preceded the sects in time, because she has a more gorgeous ritual, or because he happens to have been brought up in her communion; no one who does not hold the Church in communion with the Apostolic See to be not only preferable to any of the sects, but the only true Church of God, out of whose communion salvation is impossible; no one who contends no creed is necessary, that men can be saved in all religions, pagan, Mahomedan, or heterodox, or, as to that matter, without any, is or can be a disciple of ours, or a Catholic in our understanding of the term.

We assure our friend that we cannot permit him to conclude, because we maintain that Catholics, as individuals, whether cleric or laic, are fallible, that we do not hold the Church to be infallible; because we refuse to recognize the private opinions of theologians as authoritative, and deny our obligation to obey uncanonical orders though issued even by our own Bishop, that we do not hold that the Church has divine authority to govern, and that we are free to obey or disobey her canons as we please; because we controvert many notions floating about among Catholics, that we are free to question doctrines which are and always have been held by

all the faithful to be of Catholic faith ; or because we recognize in the misbelieving and even the unbelieving the elements of Catholic truth, and seek to construct with them a bridge to facilitate their passage to the Church, where the truth subsists in its real relations, and in its unity and universality, that we reject all creeds, hold all religions to be alike good, and mean by *Catholicity* only a crude syncretism in which, weltering in wild chaos, are included all religions, all sects, all doctrines, all opinions, alike in their truth and in their error. We can permit nothing of the sort. Such conclusions are sophistical, and wholly unwarranted, and we cannot understand by what mental process they are or can be obtained from our premises.

We, certainly, defend doubt and examination, but doubt and examination of what ? We have never asserted the freedom of the mathematician to doubt the axioms and definitions of his science ; we have asserted only his right to understand, develop, and apply them. We have never asserted the right of the Catholic to doubt the teachings of the Church ; we have asserted only his right to doubt his own understanding and application of them. It is lawful to examine the question, What does the Church teach, and, also, What is her real meaning in what she teaches ? but after having ascertained her teaching and her real sense, it is not lawful, for it is not necessary, to examine whether it is true or not. When we know what mysteries and dogmas the Church proposes, and in what sense she proposes them, we do not ask, Are they true ? for we have already arrived at the ultimate, at the first principles of all truth, and can no more doubt them, even if we should try, than we can doubt the axioms and definitions of mathematics. This all who have paid any attention to the philosophy set forth in our pages know well must be our meaning, and we can hardly suppose it necessary to remind our friends that our particular assertions must always be interpreted in the light of our general philosophy.

We have called upon Catholics to be thinking men, to think freely, energetically, for themselves ; but we have done it as a Catholic, not as a rationalist, and are to be taken in a Catholic, not in a rationalistic sense. Any one competent to call himself a Brownsonian, or to open his mouth in judgment upon our views, knows perfectly well that we do not, and with the philosophy set forth in our pages we could not, mean by this to imply that one, without supernatural revelation or external instruction, can by thinking for himself, by the simple exercise of his own faculties, attain to all truth, or to all the truth necessary to salvation, or even to an intellectual position sufficiently elevated to make his own judgment the measure of what is or is not to be received as true in theology. We ask men to think in Catholicity, not out of it, by it and not without it. This is no unreasonable restriction, for the human mind thinks and can think only truth, and Catholicity is all the truth

there is, the whole truth, and the whole truth in its unity and universality. Error is the result of not thinking, not of thinking, and is the unknown quantity on which the mind sophistically judges without thinking it. Where the error begins, there the thought ends. Outside of Catholicity there is only falsehood, and therefore no truth to be thought. The truth those outside of the Church think is Catholic truth, identically the truth thought in the Church, and their error is not in not thinking truth, but in not thinking it adequately, in not thinking it in its real relations, and in its unity and universality. Those men who regard themselves as free, independent thinkers, because they detect some truth among the heterodox, which they had not noted in the Church, are mere children first attaining to the consciousness of the fact that they have thinking faculties. If they were real thinkers, they would know that in the Church is all the truth they discover in the heterodox, and infinitely more.

Yet, in urging Catholics to think, and to think for themselves, we have aimed not to supersede or undervalue authoritative teaching, always necessary, and without the truths derived from which no free, elevated, or vigorous thought is possible, but to stimulate Catholics to be active, not mere passive recipients of the truth the Church teaches them. The mysteries and dogmas avail nothing, if received passively, as the bottle receives the wine poured into it. Men profit by the faith only as they meditate it, understand it, and make it theirs,—an inward, personal conviction. We do not want Catholics to be content with a mere form of words they have got by heart, but to which they attach no clear or distinct meaning. We want them to grasp their faith intellectually, not in unrelated propositions only, but as a living and indissoluble whole, and in its real relations to every department of human life, intellectual, spiritual, moral, and social. We want them to receive, understand, and appropriate, or inwardly digest and assimilate the faith as food to their own intellectual life, so as to be healthy, robust, and vigorous men. We do not want them to cast aside the faith once delivered to the Saints, to depart from the doctrine or fail in their veneration of the great fathers and doctors of the Church, but to exercise their faculties on the faith as these fathers and doctors did theirs, and to be what they were.

We have, no doubt, found much fault with Catholics at home and abroad; we have not spared their faults, but we have done so as a Catholic and friend; not as a non-Catholic and enemy. Never have we found fault with them for being stanch and uncompromising Catholics, for their devotion to the Church, for their adherence to Catholic principles or really Catholic practices, for their horror of innovation in faith, or their resoluteness in adhering to rigid orthodoxy; we have found fault with them for confounding with Catholicity mere national customs and usages, for taking too

low and contracted views of their religion, for treating and defending their Church as a sect, for their weak and diluted doctrine, for their childish sentimental piety, for their indolence, their indifference, their neglect to study their religion in its relations to the modern world, and their slowness to discern the signs of the times, in consequence of which both religion and civilization grievously suffer. Whether in all this we have been right or wrong, just or unjust, we have been moved by our Catholic faith, our Catholic zeal, and our Catholic charity. It has been done from devotion, not hatred or indifference to the Catholic Church, our spiritual mother. We claim to be Catholic as was St. Athanasius, St. Basil, St. Ambrose, St. John Damascene, St. Anselm, St. Thomas, and as is Pius the Ninth, gloriously reigning; and our friends must suspect themselves either of misapprehending us, or of misapprehending the Catholic faith itself, if they do not find us so. It is, perhaps, no more unreasonable for them to suspect their own understandings, than it is to suspect ours.

2. *Our Flag. A Poem in four Cantos.* By T. H. UNDERWOOD, New York: Carleton. 1862. pp. 41.

MR. UNDERWOOD, the author of this admirable poem and harrowing narrative, tells us that he is a Southern man with Northern principles. We would rather say he is an American, with American principles, or, rather yet, a man with the principles and sentiments that become a man. His sentiments must commend themselves to every reader who has any appreciation of the rights and dignity of our common manhood. The poem regarded in a simple literary point of view, regarded as poetry, possesses high merit. The verse is harmonious, the language is terse, strong, vivid, and expressive. The descriptions are bold, graphic, and striking, deepening and carrying on the action. But the chief interest is in the story, in the story of horrors enacted under the protecting folds of "Our Flag," our national flag, which, if it has long waved

"O'er the land of the free, and the home of the brave,"

has equally long waved over the huts of the wronged, and the land of the slave. We cannot read this thrilling tale of the horrors of slavery, a tale which is "an ower true tale," without feeling our cheeks tingle with shame that such horrors could ever be enacted beneath its protecting folds. The poem relates how a slave, almost white, the son of his owner, Colonel Varney, of St. Louis, stung to madness and revenge by his wife whipped to death, and her mistress murdered by his master before his eyes, escapes, is hunted, caught, and finally tied to the liberty-tree, on which floats "Our Flag," and is burned to death.

"Right over this baptismal font of fire
Most haughtily the nation's colors wave!

The shoutings of the mob reach high—but higher
 The upward—leaping laughter of the slave—
 A laugh of joy! the soul's proud jubilee,
 As it goes up, through flames, to Heaven, FREE.

"Now upward springing from its human feast,
 The unabating, angry blaze assaults
 The towering staff, and like a growling beast
 Climbs up the wood, and on the banner vaults;
 Its fiery fangs the shiv'ring ensign clasp,
 And crisp and curl it in their envious grasp!

"They clutch it close, and hold it shriv'ling there:
 They fiercely pluck each glittering star away!
 Ah, God! a flag of fire floats on the air,
 Grows *red*, then *black*, and parting from its stay,
 An instant waves a pirate rag, and, lo!
 It falls to ashes on the mob below!

"'Tis emblematic of a nation's thrall,
 And of the doom that His good time will bide;
 In blood and fire shall her red fetters fall,
 And she arise, redeemed and purified.
 The conquering Right will leave to after time
 The giant CINDER of a giant CRIME."

We have no space for further extracts, but we commend the poem to all our readers, if such we have, who attribute the civil war now rending our Republic, to the Abolitionists, and are seeking to suppress the Rebellion without any shock to the "patriarchal" institution of slavery. If any one with the soul of a man within him can read it through without feeling on the one hand the Rebellion is a just judgment of God on the nation, or, on the other, without being ready to rush through fire and blood to wipe out the national disgrace of slavery, he can do more than we can, more than it seems to us possible for any one to do.

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3. *The Bridle of Vanity ; or, Knowledge, Progress, Liberty, and Equality, considered in their Verity, and in their Fallacy.* By REV. E. PUTNAM, Author of "An Exposition of the Apocalypse." Boston: Donahoe. 1862. 12mo. pp. 290.

THE first two Essays in this volume appeared some time since in this Review; the first part of the third was sent us, but not published. It has been since rewritten, and much improved. The volume as a whole is a remarkable volume, written with great repose and serenity of temper, and with great beauty and strength of expression. It is addressed not to the herd, whether educated or uneducated, whether rich or poor, but to sedate, serious, and cultivated minds, that have leisure and temper to think, and to think calmly, slowly, and profoundly. The whole book is thoughtful, well and deeply meditated, and well reasoned, perhaps because the

author is to a great extent detached from the world, and, while living in it, lives above it. There is a slight quaintness now and then in his style or expression that is far from displeasing, and an antique cast of thought that charms us away from the turmoil of the hour, and makes us feel that we are holding communion with a writer who lived and wrote some centuries back, although his topics are fresh and recent, topics especially of the day.

The great design of the author is, in the first place, to correct the too low estimate that many have of past times, especially of the Middle Ages, and, in the second place, to rebuke the over-estimate which many have of the present, and to silence the loud boasting of modern Liberty and Progress. All truths have, as Coleridge remarks, two poles, which are alternately elevated or depressed, and the aim of Mr. Putnam evidently is to bring up to its proper level the pole which is unduly depressed in our times, and by the spirit of modern society. He is not precisely one of the *oscurantisti*, but he has as strong a tendency to their dark side as is possible with his calm thought, clear vision, and genuine American nature. At first sight the reader would fancy him the direct opposite of our Review, the decided antagonist of the doctrine and policy we latterly at least so earnestly insist upon. Yet is there no essential disagreement between us. We as earnestly defend authority as he does, and he has at bottom as earnest a love of liberty as we have. He would be as loath to see the past restored as we should be, and appreciates the present, we have no doubt, as highly as we do. There was good in the past, there is evil in the present; there is much of error in the modern doctrine of Progress, there was no less in the old doctrine of Conservatism. Mr. Putnam calls our attention to what was good in the past, which we are in danger of leaving behind, and to errors and dangers in the present, against which it is necessary to be on our guard; we just now are more intent on pointing out what was evil in the past, and of inducing Catholics to recognize and accept what is good in the present.

Yet, aside from the special aim each has, there is no real difference between us. All life is in evolution, and there must be progress, if life continues. A perfectly stationary society is a dead society, and soon becomes a corrupt and putrid society. If society is living and active, its forms will be constantly changing, for nothing is permanent and unchangeable but principles. Nevertheless all real progress is simply an evolution or explication of the past. The germs of all in the modern world that is good, that is living, and will endure, were in the Middle Ages, and, except in developing and maturing those germs, we have made no progress. The error of the present is not in seeking or advocating progress, but in neglecting the real law of progress, and in attempting it by cutting loose from the past, as the error of the *oscurantisti* is in laboring to confine us to the past, and to interdict the future. The error of

the Liberals is not in loving or struggling for liberty, but in seeking to realize liberty without authority, which is simply license, as the error of the conservatives or absolutists is not in upholding authority, but in seeking to sustain it without liberty, which is despotism. Each is sophistical, for it permits no term or medium of dialectic harmony. True dialectics harmonizes the two, and gives us authority with liberty, and liberty with authority. Recommending these remarks to our readers, we commend to them Mr. Putnam's book, as one of the ablest and best books that has for a long time issued from the press.

4. *The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States.*

By JOHN CODMAN HURD, Counsellor at Law. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1858. 2 vols. 8vo.

WE have not found our eyes, though better than they were, sufficiently strong to enable us to read and master these two goodly volumes within the time we could devote to their study since receiving them. We hope to be able in our October number to review them at length, and to speak of them in some degree according to their merits. We can only say now that they are devoted to a great subject, which they treat with great fairness and candor, in a truly legal spirit, and with an exhaustive erudition. Mr. Hurd writes on the Law of Bondage as a jurist, and aims to establish what really is the law on the subject, not what it might be, nor what it ought to be. If we should find any fault with him, it is that he is too purely a legist, and does not give to ethical considerations their due place in the interpretation of the law, and in guiding the judgment of the judge. We hold that back of the *jus gentium* as recognized and applied by universal jurisprudence is the natural law, the law of nature, which the judge must recognize and conform to when not restricted by universal or particular jurisprudence, otherwise the *jus gentium* could never be ameliorated, and a wrong once tolerated by it could never be corrected unless by the *jus proprium*, by each nation for itself, or by convention.

To explain ourselves: Chattel slavery, though now sustained only by the *jus proprium*, or municipal law, was once sustainable, as to captives taken in war, by the *jus gentium*, as interpreted by Roman jurisprudence. But the Roman law expressly declares that under the law of nature all men are born free, or equal, and it is only as punishment for crime that the *jus gentium* allows slavery. Captives taken in war were regarded as criminals worthy of death, and they were called slaves, *servi*, because their captors saved their lives by commuting their punishment of death into that of perpetual servitude. Consequently in the *jus gentium* that sustained slavery there was always the recognition of the fact of the natural equality of all men. Slavery is sustained only as a penalty for some real or assumed offence. Now, we contend that this

original equality recognized by the *jus gentium* is always to be regarded by the judge as a presumption in favor of liberty, and the alleged slave must be declared free unless there is a law of the forum against it, or the fact of a forfeiture of liberty under the *jus gentium* is established. Mr. Hurd, perhaps, does not give the weight to this consideration that it deserves, as is the case with most jurists. They overlook the natural equality of all men asserted by the *jus gentium*, and that the *jus gentium* does not and never did sustain slavery save as a penalty. Hence St. Augustine, and all the great fathers of the Church we have consulted on the subject, always treat slavery as a penalty incurred either by the present generation of slaves or by their ancestors, and excuse or palliate it only on that ground. But our space is exhausted, and we can now only recommend Mr. Hurd's work as probably the fullest, ablest, and most learned, as well as the most fair, candid, and impartial work that has been written on the Law of Bondage in the United States or elsewhere, and one which must secure to the author a high and enviable rank as a jurist.

5. *Notes from the Diary of a Soldier.* By Count ANATOLE DE SEGUR. Boston: Donahoe. 1862. 12mo. pp. 274.

THIS is an excellent book for soldiers, and is very appropriately dedicated to the Catholic soldiers in our Army. It is translated from the French, and, though we have not seen the original, we should think admirably translated. It is translated into idiomatic and racy English, and reads like an original work, and not like a translation. The French army for many years has been in an admirable state of discipline, and we are told, speaking generally, that it is not a bad school of morals. The soldiers, after having served their term, return home improved in morals, as well as elevated in character and intelligence above those of their class that remained at home. This is as it should be; and such will be the case with our soldiers, we hope, should the war continue long enough to permit our volunteers to become real soldiers, not simply fighting citizens.

6. *Oration* by GEORGE BANCROFT, on the Twenty-second of February, 1862. New York: Barker. 1862.

THIS is an eloquent speech, as are all the speeches of the illustrious Historian of the United States; it is learned, able, and patriotic, as must be every production of the author; but we call attention to it more especially, because it bears unequivocal testimony that its author, long one of the most prominent and influential Democratic leaders of the country, is not afraid that harm may be done to the "divine institution" of negro-slavery. Mr. Bancroft prefers his country to slavery, and does not appear to apprehend

that she would be ruined, even if negro-slavery were to cease. He is another added to the list of prominent Democrats who did brave battle for Democracy under Jackson and Van Buren,—who have permitted themselves to see the cause of the present Rebellion, and who lack not the courage to attack it. He deserves all honor for his bold and manly words, and we hope they found an echo in the heart of the young men of New York.

The most discouraging and the most discreditable thing we have encountered is the horror which so many of our statesmen, politicians, and even officers of the army, have of touching slavery. One is at times led to think that the country itself regards slavery as something sacred, which it would be sacrilege to touch. This is not true of the country, but it is apparently true of not a few of our politicians, and perhaps of a certain number of the officers of the army and navy. The Government has allowed this fact to embarrass it from the first, and, if it continues to allow it to embarrass it much longer, it will do well to prepare to recognize the Independence of the Southern Confederacy. We understand the value of prudence and caution as well as other people do, but we tell our Government, though with all respect, that in revolutionary times true prudence is in boldness, audacity. Danton understood it when he declared the secret of the success of the Revolution to be in one word, three times repeated, *Paudace! Paudace! Paudace!* What ruins a government in dealing with rebels is timidity, hesitation, diplomacy, artifice, intrigue, cunning. Its success depends on its openness, frankness, promptness, and fearlessness. It must have the courage to strike, to strike at once, to strike hard, and to strike in the most vulnerable point. If it listens to the palaver or the forebodings of timid, cowardly, or lukewarm friends, it is lost. It must have no such friends. It must give no one a chance to be timid or lukewarm; it must by its own boldness, determination, and energy compel all not prepared to be rebels, to rally to its banner as the only possible way of not being crushed in its rapid and resistless march. The Union can be saved by no trickery, no craft, by no soft words, and no forbearance to injure the feelings of the precious souls that are bent on its destruction. There must be courage; there must be blows, hard blows, and blows well directed.

We grow almost impatient at the pitiable fears of the Government as to the reconciliation of the Rebels after they have been forced to surrender, and the still more pitiable attempts to conciliate conditional loyalists. Does it not know that its fears and its tenderness to these conditional Union men are carrying bereavement and mourning into every family in the loyal States, and only protracting instead of ending the war? Does it not know that the salvation of the nation depends on the unconditional Unionists? Does it not know that cautious Generals who only look out not to be defeated, and have not the courage to assume the risk of winning a victory, are much better in private life than at the head of

the army? If the government does not believe there is unconditional Union feeling enough in the country to save it, why does it prolong the struggle? if it does, why has it not the courage to throw itself on it, and end the war with a victory? There is patriotism enough, there is unconditional Union feeling, talent, force, courage, and generalship enough in the country to save it at half the expense now incurred, if you will appeal to them, give them fair play, and not hold them back by authority, for fear somebody's nerves may be shocked, or somebody's prejudices disturbed. It is only on these the Government can rely, and, if it refuses to rely on them, the reckoning to which it will be held will not be light. What if pro-slavery men kick; or pro-slavery Generals, Colonels, or Corporals threaten to leave the army? Let the former learn at once that, if they kick, it will be against the pricks, and the latter be assured that they are free to go, and the sooner they go, the better.

Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis
Tempus eget.

We beg the Government, both in its executive and legislative branches, to dilly-dally or palaver no longer, to work up its courage, to dare be *prudent*, and, above all, to dare to be just to those who love the Union, and are prepared to fight for it to the death against any and every foe. It is only by so doing that it will nerve the courage of the country, make it bear cheerfully its sacrifices, bring warm hearts and strong arms to its support, and be able to crush the Rebellion, and save the life and the integrity of the nation.

We are loyal, and annex no condition to our loyalty. We will stand by the Union to the last gasp, with or without emancipation; but the Government must throw itself on the unconditional loyalists of the country, or it will be forced, sooner or later to acknowledge the Independence of the Southern Confederacy. It will derive no strength from yielding to the counsels of conditional Union men and conservatives, or from efforts to conciliate their feelings, and to secure their co-operation. The strength of the Government is in the unconditional Union men, the men stigmatized as Radicals. We care not whether these are the actual majority, or only a minority; they are the *pars sanior*, and carry with them the strength of the country. They are the living men of the nation, for they have the sentiment of progress and of the future, and therefore are strong with the strength of humanity, and of humanity's God. Your conservatives are not living, but dead, for they are seeking only to preserve or restore a past which humanity has outgrown, and which has become an offence, a nuisance, like an unburied, putrefying corpse. The Government should place its reliance on the living, not on the dead, and it should know, too, that life finally swallows up even death in victory. Let it give a firm, unhesitating,

and courageous support to the unconditional Union men, and it will compel the conditional loyalists, the timid, feeble, palavering conservatives to fall into their ranks; it will fire these with their life and energy, with their courage and convictions, and lead them on with them to successful combat. Not a corporal's guard, not an omnibus load of them will linger behind. Does the Government need to be told that its strength is with the onward movement, and that an onward movement sweeps on with it the weak, the doubtful, the hesitating, and even those who would oppose it, and always gathers force by its progress?

The fault we find with the Government is, that it with one hand tries to hold back the radicals, and with the other tries to pull forward the conservatives, and so has no hand at liberty with which to deal rebellion its death blow. It can never succeed in this way. It can never pull or coax the conditional patriots forward. It must take no heed to them. It must leave the dead to bury their dead, and turn its whole attention to the living. The Union can be saved by no galvanic shocks to those who prefer slavery to the Union, or who cannot strike a blow at a secessionist in front, without kicking an abolitionist in the rear. These, if consulted or heeded, are only a let and a hindrance; if unheeded, they are only the dust raised by the onward march of the national forces. We complain of the Government that it lacks the courage to confide the destinies of the nation to the loyalty of the country, that it will not give that loyalty fair play, and will not permit it to avail itself of the legal means within its reach to save the nation. You cannot conduct a civil war any more than you can a foreign war on peace principles, or the peace powers of the Constitution. The President knows it, and assumes the war power in suspending the writ of *Habeas Corpus*, proclaiming martial law, appointing military governors, arresting and imprisoning persons under suspicion of disloyalty, instituting a censorship of the press, imprisoning editors, suppressing journals, and finally taking active military command of the army and navy, as a military chief, not as the first *civil* Magistrate of the nation, and on every hand invading what are the private rights of citizens in peace times. Why then does he hesitate to use the war power only in the case of slavery, and insist that whenever slavery, the greatest of all possible offences against both God and man, is in question, only the peace powers of the Constitution shall come into play? Does he suppose either God or man will smile on such readiness to grasp the full war power on the one hand, and such obstinate adherence to the peace power in time of war, on the other? The inconsistency is too great, too glaring, too hostile to liberty and the rights of man to escape observation and reprobation. If you have the war power, in the name of all that is sacred and good, use it against slavery in defence of liberty, not against liberty in defence of slavery; if you have it not, then forbear to use it anywhere.

We tell the Government that the loyal men of the Union have the right to the aid of the whole population of the country that are loyal, or, if the Government consented, would be loyal. Why not permit us to call to our aid the four millions of inhabitants of the Slave States themselves, anxious and burning to prove their loyalty? Why does the Government do all in its power to alienate them, and throw their whole force on the side of the Rebels? Does it despise their aid? They are one-third of the whole population of the Slave States, and on the side of the Rebellion strengthen it as much as any four millions of their population. On our side, in the very heart of Rebellom, they would neutralize four millions of the Rebel population, and thus reduce the effective force we have now to contend against from twelve millions to four. Yet the Government will neither appeal to them, nor suffer them to be appealed to. Does a Fremont try to convert them from enemies to friends? He is snubbed, traduced, and relieved of his command. Does a Hunter attempt it, and seek to some extent to make up for the reinforcements promised him, but not furnished? He, too, is snubbed, and, if he had any political aspirations or prospects, would, no doubt, be deprived of his command and laid upon the shelf.

Now, to a plain man like ourselves all this seems perfect madness, perfect infatuation, as well as most gross injustice to the real Union men of the country. When we couple with this the danger of a foreign intervention, if the war is likely to be protracted, and not likely to secure the emancipation of the slaves, we cannot understand by what motives or by what policy the Government,—the Administration and Congress—are influenced. Are we fighting to save the integrity of the nation? or are we fighting only to get in a position to dictate the terms of a final separation? The latter is undoubtedly the view of some officers of the army, who say the South cannot be subjugated. Is it the view of the Administration? We do not, we will not believe it, and we are sure it is not the view of the majority in either House of Congress. Then let both have the courage to adopt the policy necessary to save the Union.

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7. *The New American Cyclopædia: a Popular Dictionary of General Knowledge.* Edited by GEORGE RIPLEY and CHARLES A. DANA. Volume XIV. Reed—Spire. New York: Appleton & Co. 1862. 8vo. pp. 858.
 8. *A few Words on Catholic Education in Ceylon.* By the Rev. CHARLES BONJEAN, O. M. I., Missionary Apostolic. Madras. 1860. 8vo. pp. 59.
 9. *Denominational versus Common Mixed Schools, in a Series of Letters to the Ceylon "Examiner," with Additions,* by the Rev. CHARLES BONJEAN, O. M. I., Missionary Apostolic. Colombo. 1861. 8vo. pp. 201.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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OCTOBER, 1862.
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ART. I.—*Essays Theological, Philosophical, and Historical,
on the Reformation in the Sixteenth Century.*

It is a grave mistake to regard the great Movement in the Sixteenth Century as a Protestant movement, and the Reformation effected as a Protestant reformation. The Reformation was Catholic, not Protestant. It originated with Catholics, in a Catholic spirit, and for a Catholic purpose; it was inspired by Catholic faith, and undertaken with an earnest desire to advance the cause of religion and civilization. Its normal development was eminently Catholic, and found expression in the doctrinal definitions and reformatory decrees of the Council of Trent. Like every great movement its progress encountered numerous obstacles, which more or less obstructed its course, diverted a part of its current into an abnormal channel, and gave rise to various heterodox confessions and communions included under the general name of Protestantism; but its regular course was onward in a Catholic direction, resulting in the evolution and appropriation by the Church of Catholic Truth.

It is a grave mistake, also, to regard the Reformation as an untoward event, and detrimental to the Catholic cause. It was necessary for the continuance of the evolution of the Idea, the explication and appropriation of Catholic faith, and both religion and civilization have gained by it. The sixteenth century, rightly considered, is not a century Catholics should look back upon with shame or regret, and those among us who deplore it, and denounce it as an epoch of a lamentable interruption of Catholic progress and a sad fall-

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ing away from the faith, fail to comprehend it in its dialectic relations, and confound the spirit that quickeneth with the letter that killeth. Nothing was lost that deserved to live; no eclipse came over faith; no real progress was interrupted. Without the Reformation effected in that century, the promise of our Lord to be with his Church all days unto the consummation of the world, would have been broken, orthodoxy would have been lost, the infallible word have been corrupted, error and superstition would have resumed their old empire, Christianity been supplanted by Gentilism, and the Church have proved a failure. Such a deplorable result was not possible; it was not in accordance with the designs of Providence, nor with the attributes of God. It could not happen. The Idea, the very life of the Church, is Christ himself, the Word made flesh, and because He lives she also lives; because He cannot fail, she cannot fail. The Reformation was therefore both necessary and inevitable, and we may honor the age in which it came.

• The Protestant doctrines and sects, which took their rise in the movement, were not the Reformation, were not its normal results, and should never be taken as its characteristics. They were only its temporary accidents, and will disappear without leaving a trace behind them, when Catholics themselves learn to appreciate the Reformation itself, and to accept it as one of the glories of the Church. These doctrines derive their strength from our ignorance, and these sects their vitality from our defective comprehension of the catholicity of our own Church. They live and flourish because we are not ourselves truly Catholic. They are in our present condition even useful to us. They are the Philistines whom the Lord suffers to dwell in the land to prove us, to keep us active, watchful, on the alert, and to prevent us from falling into the dead and corrupt state into which we were rapidly falling before the Reformation. When we have no longer need of them they will disappear. That they are in some sense necessary to the Church is evident from the fact that all attempts to crush them by force have failed. The forces of Catholic Europe have never been able to bring back a single Protestant nation. Charles V. tried and failed; Philip II. tried and failed; Louis XIV. tried and failed; Napoleon tried and failed. All efforts by force, diplomacy, or controversy, fail, and must fail, till Catholics cease in any respect to rely on the civil arm, and gain sufficient confidence in truth to dare trust their

cause under God to reason and common sense. Not till then will these doctrines and sects disappear, or we fully comprehend the real significance of the Reformation, and reap all its fruits. When we have risen to the level of the Reformation, and have ceased to seek the continuance or revival of that old mediæval world which properly ended with it; when we learn that truth is always living, and cannot die; when we learn that force is impotent against thought, that the Church is a purely spiritual kingdom, and are willing to regard her as distinct and separate from the kingdoms of this world, and to meet the spiritual with the spiritual, Protestantism will go the way of ancient Gnosticism, Manichæanism, or Arianism. It will recede as we advance in the understanding and realization in life of our own faith.

The Reformation in its normal results was a progress in the evolution of the Idea, an advance in the explication and actualization in the Church and in society of the universal and immutable principles of the Catholic faith. The Idea is the Word-made-flesh, Christ, the God-man, of whom the Church is the expression in time and space. The work of the Church is to form Christ, the hope of glory, in the individual, and in society. The Idea is universal, infinite, and inexhaustible, but it is realizable by us in this life only in a finite and imperfect manner, and therefore only successively, or progressively. The end of man is the complete evolution and assimilation by divine assistance of the Idea, or perfect union in Christ with God,—or oneness with Christ, who is one with God. Man is destined to become, in Christ, God, as Christ himself is God. This is the end of his creation; that is to say, the union, without a loss of the distinction of nature, of the human with the divine, the finite with the infinite, the creature with the Creator, man with God. Progress is in going to this end, or, which is the same thing, the actualization, by the assistance of grace, of the possibilities of our nature. This actualization is successive, not instantaneous,—in time, not in eternity. Hence man is finite, and in time is subjected to the law of progress, and his true life, till reaching his end, is in the continuous progress in the evolution and assimilation to himself of the life of the Word made flesh. The progress is not of the Idea, not a progress of truth objectively considered, but a progress in its explication and assimilation by the human understanding; not in the actualization of its possibilities, for in itself is already pure act, but of our possibilities, the potentiality of

human nature. Man's possibilities are infinite, and hence he is progressive to the infinite; and as long as he remains below the infinite, if really living, he is and must be progressive.

It has been seen in a former essay that a reformation in the Church, and by the Church, may become necessary, and be effected without impugning either her sanctity or her infallibility, in any sense in which Catholic dogma requires either to be asserted. The Church in her Idea, through the indwelling Holy Ghost, is infallible and holy, but Catholics, as individuals, are both fallible and peccable. Infallibility and impeccability are the privilege of no individual in the Church, whatever his rank, dignity, or authority. Hence errors and abuses in the Catholic body, or the Church as the congregation of individuals, are possible, and not of unfrequent occurrence. It was never the design of our Lord in founding his Church to take away our human free will, or to supersede the exercise of our human understanding, and it is always possible for us, in or out of the Church, to abuse our free will and to misemploy our understanding. Man aspires to God, as inspired by him, and has an onward and upward tendency to him as his last end; but he has also a downward tendency, or tendency which bears him away or holds him back from God. Christianity accepts and assists the onward and upward tendency, and enables our nature to complete itself in union with the infinite. But she always and everywhere is resisted in this work by the contrary or downward tendency,—a negative rather than a positive tendency indeed, a *vis inertiae*, which has to be overcome before the soul can take unfettered her upward flight. Subject to these two opposing tendencies, man can never remain contented in perfect inaction, nor can he, whether in the Church or out of her, go on in a continuous career of progress without encountering obstacles all but insurmountable. The work of evolution and assimilation is always resisted by the downward tendency of our nature, and at times is apparently arrested by it. There is a pause, an apparent stand-still, till the individual and society concentrate their forces and make preparations for new and stronger efforts to sweep away the accumulated obstacles to progress, and resume the onward and upward course. Hence reformations are needed, and are effected.

The upward tendency of the soul is her aspiration to God, to life, to the plenitude of life, the plenitude of existence, to which she can attain only in Christ, in whom

dwells the fulness of the Godhead, and in whom the divine creative act is completed. Man was created for God, and God is his being, his supreme good, his beatitude. Created for God he aspires to him, and in the regeneration or palingenesiac life is progressive to him, and therefore is, since God is infinite, progressive to the infinite, or infinitely progressive. The modern rationalistic doctrine of progress is right in asserting that man is infinitely progressive; but is wrong in asserting that he is progressive without end, or without ever being able to reach the term of his progress, as well as in mistaking both the principle and the medium of his progressiveness. The progress asserted by the rationalist is really no progress at all. Progress is going towards an end, and where there is no end there is no progress. With the rationalist man is always *becoming*, never *becomes* God. He falls into this error by misinterpreting or rejecting the Incarnation. If he accepts the Incarnation, it is as an individual fact, not as a principle of life. Rejecting it as a principle of life, or not recognizing it at all, he is necessarily restricted to simple cosmic existence, in which he has and can have no end; for cosmos is and can be completed or fulfilled only in palingenesia. Cosmos is the procession by way of creation of existences from God, and palingenesia is their return through Christ, the Word made flesh, to God, or their fulfilment in attaining to their end or final cause. Palingenesia, or regeneration in Christ, depends on the Incarnation. Men become Christians by the birth of grace in Christ, as individuals are men by being born of Adam. All the elect are in Christ, the father of regenerated humanity, as all men were from the first in Adam, the father of cosmic humanity. As Christ is the second Adam, the complement of the first, as well as repairer of his fault, it follows that men have not their complement, therefore their end, in the first Adam, cosmic order, or the order of genesis.

Without regeneration in Christ, man remains purely cosmic, inchoate, initial, incomplete, unfulfilled. The possibilities or capacities of his nature are not only unactualized, but unactualizable. His life is without end or aim. He is a rainless cloud, blown hither and thither by the winds, a wandering star, a fig-tree that bears no fruit. Take from him all hope of entering the palingenesia and fulfilling his existence, and his life is death, and he is literally suffering the pangs of hell. This is the condition of all who are ex-

cluded from the regeneration, or are out of Christ. Hence it is that out of him there is no salvation, and that his is the only name given under heaven among men whereby we can be saved. Christianity saves us from the desolating doctrine of progress without end, not by denying all progress, but by accepting progress, giving it a term, and assisting us to reach it. In the regeneration men are not tantalized by a good which forever eludes their grasp, or which forever allures them on, and recedes in proportion as they advance. In and through Christ, man not only aspires to God, but attains to him, and without ceasing to be man, becomes one with him.

Satan did not lie to our first parents in assuring them that they should be gods, or as gods. In Christ men become Christ, and Christ is God. "When he shall appear we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." He has promised us that "we shall be made partakers of his divine nature." Man was from the first intended to become God. The deception of Satan was not there; it was in so telling the truth as to persuade our first parents that they were or could become God in the terrestrial paradise, or in their simple cosmic existence. This was persuading them that the possibilities of their nature were already actualized, and that they were already gods, without regeneration in Christ and glorification in the celestial paradise. Adam neither erred nor sinned in aspiring to be God, nor in believing that he could become God; but both erred and sinned in assuming that he was already God, and in acting on that assumption. This was the primal falsehood, the original sin, whence the degeneracy of the race, and all our errors, sins, and woes. It assumed the possible to be the actual, the earthly paradise to be the celestial, the initial to be the completion, genesis to be palingenesis, and the cosmic life to be the eternal life in God.

This original sin was not only the individual sin of Adam, but was the sin of the race, for the race was all in him. It has therefore descended upon all individuals born of him, for they all participate of the race. In all ages and nations it has adhered to human nature, and been the grand obstacle to human progress. It is a clog on all the efforts of the soul to rise, and is what we call the downward tendency, or degeneracy of the race. Its primal sophism is not that man may become God, but that man is God; not that in the regeneration he is progressive to the infinite, but that he is already in possession of the infinite, and therefore of his

supreme good. It originates all those terrible conflicts in the soul between the flesh and the spirit, between the spirit that aspires to God as its supreme good, and the flesh that grovels in the earth, the inferior nature that clings to the earthly, and relishes only sensual goods. It is the fruitful mother of the wars that rend society and devastate nations, and of those fearful battles waged at intervals between the past and the future, to keep the race back under institutions it has outgrown, and which cramp and confine it, or to conquer for it the power to advance, and to continue its march through the ages. Always, and everywhere, in the individual and society, in Church and state, is it present as the enemy of life and progress, obstructing the evolution of truth, the growth of holiness, and the actualization of Catholic faith.

The Christian spirit is the spirit of life, the spirit of progress, of development and growth. It says always with St. Paul, "I count not myself to have apprehended; but this one thing I do, forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching forth to those that are before, I press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus." The Apostle avoids the error of Adam, who counted himself to have comprehended, and of the modern rationalists who assert progress without end, or deny that the goal is attainable. He asserts progress, and progress that can reach its term, "the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus," that is, consummation in glory, or union with God. The original sin of Adam into which he was seduced by Satan, that man is God, which denies progress, and the error of the modern rationalist, that man is progressive without end, which also virtually denies it, are alike opposed to the Christian spirit, and incessantly combated by it. They are, after all, but two phases of one and the same thing. The former is the original sin of the conservatives, as they call themselves, the obscurantists, as they are called by their opponents. These assume, in principle, if not in form, that they have comprehended, and that any departure from them is a departure from God. Their convictions and their attainments are the measure of the true and the possible. They are God, or like God, from whom all must take the law, and learn the distinction between good and evil. The latter is the error of the rationalists, radicals, or revolutionists, for whom nothing is sacred, fixed, or stable. These hold that all things are in a perpetual flux; that

the universe rests on a movable foundation, and that God is a *becoming* [*das Werden*], continually growing, filling up the void in his being, and enlarging and strengthening his faculties. Man with them is mounted upon an everlasting treadmill, continually stepping, but never advancing. The first class mistake earth, the latter hell, for heaven. The Church asserts stability with progress, and progress with stability, conservatism with progress, and progress with conservatism, each in harmony with the other, and both in harmony with the dialectic law of the universe.

As truth avails us only in proportion as it is evolved and appropriated by the human understanding, the Church always asserts and aids progress both in the individual and in society, for Catholicity includes civilization as well as religion. The palingenesiac supposes the cosmic. The Christian idea is the Incarnation, the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures in one Divine Person. But the progress the Church proposes and aids is resisted by the two classes of errorists described, by those who resist all progress, and those who render it impossible by denying it all end. These, though never able to hinder progress altogether, are able often to obstruct or retard it. Hence reformations become necessary to remove the obstacles they interpose, and which are a barrier to further progress. The operations of these two classes of errorists, both born of original sin, and marking the downward tendency of our nature, generate errors and abuses in the Church, in spite of her divine wisdom, and her utmost vigilance. In the sixteenth century these abuses were great, but neither greater nor more numerous than they had been for at least three centuries before. The Reformation came then, because then the divine life of the Church had become more active and energetic, and she had acquired the freedom and strength necessary to correct them. The Church is always and everywhere a living and active force, and her power is always intrinsically the same. Obstructions dam up the stream, but diminish not the force or quantity of its waters. The waters accumulate silently behind them, and suddenly sweep them away, and clear their channel. It is no reproach to the Church that she meets with obstacles, but it is to her glory that she is able to surmount them, and continue on in her course. It is nothing against her that reformations, from time to time, become necessary, but it is a proof of her divinity that she is able to effect them.

In the sixteenth century the moment had come when the long-accumulating waters of life could break through the dams and dykes sin and error had erected against them. The long-desired reform had become possible, and in her Council of Trent the Church effected it, arrested the abnormal development, and opened the pathway for future progress. The reformation she effected was all that the times permitted, or that could then be prudently attempted. By the doctrinal definitions and reformatory decrees and canons of the Council, the Church secured her past evolutions without foreclosing the future. But it is not to be assumed that with that Council all reformation was brought to an end. The work of explication and appropriation of truth in the life of individuals and nations must go on to the end of the world, and always is there in both the same morbid tendency to be resisted, the same imperfection to be overcome. The same causes, in principle, that made the Reformation in the sixteenth century necessary, may hereafter render many others equally necessary. Indeed many earnest Catholics think that another in the Church, and by the Church, is already needed. There is even now an apparent pause in the works of the Church, and progress, as far as it goes on at all, seems to go on outside of her communion rather than within it, and many of her devout children are so afraid that she will sever herself from the past, that they do their best to shut her out from the future. It is the holiday of the *conservatives*. The party of the past in the Church, and the party of the future out of the Church, both sophistical and mischievous when operating separately, are debating the world between them, and a new council, not merely an informal assembly of prelates at Rome, having no promise of the assistance of the Holy Ghost in their deliberations and decisions, is, perhaps, not uncalled for.

But, though the Council of Trent stayed the progress of heterodoxy, and fixed the conditions of orthodox and legitimate development, it did not convert the heterodox or heal the schism. A large part of Europe remained and still remains separated from the Catholic communion, apparently lost to the Church. Yet, perhaps, not entirely lost, for even the heterodox in some sense pertain to the Catholic world. They are Catholics in their reminiscences and potentialities. They are for the most part, though not Catholics, Christians. They hold not Catholic truth in its unity, integrity and purity; yet they hold it, and under some of its aspects de-

velop it with an earnestness, a zeal, and a success which we do not always find among the orthodox. Moreover, the more glaring of the errors of Luther and Calvin are either explained away or openly rejected; the rationalism so rife a few years since in Germany and elsewhere has received a notable check from Protestant theologians themselves, and is now as prevalent in the so-called Catholic nations as in the non-Catholic. The higher class of heterodox theologians are nearly up to the theology of the Council of Trent. Old prejudices are much softened, heated passions on both sides have in a measure cooled down, and very few non-Catholics would now find any serious difficulty in accepting the Church were she presented to them free from all hitherto associated with her that is not Catholic.

Yet, though the movement was Catholic, and its normal results were collected and embodied by the Council of Trent, the question still remains, whence came its abnormal development, and why did not the Council put an end to Protestantism, and heal the schism which still continues? On one side the movement deviated from the Catholic line, and resulted in founding creeds and sects hostile to the Church, and which still with more or less fierceness seek her destruction. Whence this deviation? And why this continuance of Protestantism after the publication of the Acts of the Council of Trent? These are questions which require a deeper, a broader, a more generous answer than they usually receive from either Catholic or non-Catholic theologians. The immediate cause was, no doubt, the impatience of the reformers, the slowness, not to say reluctance, of the Church authorities in effecting the reforms acknowledged to be necessary, and the indiscreet zeal with which Catholic controversialists defended, not the faith, but opinions and practices, which had obtained in the Church, and were and are in no sense essential to Catholicity, and indeed improperly associated with it. The remote cause is, of course, in original sin, the downward tendency of human nature, or the degeneracy of the human race, common alike to Catholics and to non-Catholics, and in which originates the universal and persistent opposition to the evolution and appropriation of truth or the Idea. Yet, whatever may have been the cause, it must not be assumed to have been or to be all on one side. All the blame is not due either to Catholics or to non-Catholics. That morbidity, which we call original sin, though never a total corruption of nature, attaches to the

race, and is common, though in varying degrees, to all men, whether in or out of the Church. Catholics had not individually or socially realized completely in their life, moral, intellectual, or religious, the Catholic type; and they who became Protestants did not understand the great law of progress, and that truth is effective only as it is evolved and assimilated by the individual and by society. They did not understand the law of continuity, and labored for a restoration rather than a progress, for destruction rather than reformation. They concluded from the abuses against the use, and sought as the only means of guarding against them to make an end of the Church herself. They fell into the error of Adam, rejected the evolutions effected by the Church, closed, in theory, at least, the future to the human race, and sought to turn it back to the undeveloped Christianity of the first century.

There is in all men a strong tendency to conclude in religion against its divinity from the imperfections and vices of its human ministers. The clergy are men, and in all ages and nations have the infirmities of men. They never perfectly realize the sacerdotal type, for that type is Christ, the God-man, and therefore men conclude against the type itself, and say, let us have no priests at all. Nothing is more sophistical. If the clergy fall farther below their type than other men do below their respective types, still in learning, science and virtue they as a body rise far above the average of other men. The priesthood is from God, a heavenly treasure committed to earthen vessels, deposited, if you will, in fragile vases. The vase may be unworthy of the treasure, but the worth of the treasure depends not on that of the vase. Catholics are bad, it is said; therefore the Church is worthless. But if men are so bad with the Church, contemporary heathen nations can assure us that they would be infinitely worse without her. The morbid reformers, who became Protestants, were not above the sophistry of the vulgar. They drew general conclusions from particular facts; and assuming the soundness of their logic, fell into heresy and schism. They beheld, indeed, the truth under some of its aspects, but they saw not how they could hold in the Church the truth they saw, though neither the whole truth, nor the truth at all, in its Catholic relations, and they went out from the Church, and made war against her. A truer comprehension, either of their own doctrines or of Catholic faith itself, would have saved them from doing either, for they

had and have no positive, no affirmative doctrine or principle not reconcilable with the official teachings of the Church.

In answering the questions raised, care must also be taken not to ascribe too much to the personal virtues or the personal vices of individual actors. In either the normal or the abnormal development, in or out of the Church, the race always counts for much more than the individual. It will not, indeed, do to say, with the school of Hegel and Cousin, that individuals count for nothing, and that in history there are no individuals, but simply ideas, principles, causes, impersonalities. This were to exclude all influence of free will on historical events. Great men are not always the product of their age, as that school maintains; they are sometimes the creators of their age. The weak man bends to the circumstances of his times; the strong man bends them to his will, controls them, and makes them work out his purpose. What our people most want in their present crisis is the strong man, a great man, a great statesman, a great general, and the want may prove fatal to them. Not seldom do great men control events, and change the current of history. The condemnation of democracy is, that it tends to produce a low common level, and either produces no great man, or excludes him from all part in the management of public affairs. Had Pitt had a Wellington to place at the head of the armies he sent against revolutionary France, Napoleon Bonaparte would have never been heard of, save as a respectable marshal in the armies of the Bourbons; and if we had had a Jackson instead of a Buchanan at the head of our own government there had been no Southern rebellion. If Bohemond, instead of Godfrey, had commanded the first crusade, it is not improbable that the whole East would have been conquered and recovered to Christian civilization, for he would not have been restrained by his scruples from beginning the work by taking possession of Constantinople. But even individuals are great by their humanity rather than by their individuality. The individual participates in the race, and has in him something of all men. In this participation, not in his individuality, lies the secret of his greatness. They who partake in the highest degree of the race, have the largest humanity, the broadest and richest human nature, are the great men, the men of genius, called men of *genius* because they participate beyond the ordinary degree in the race, are born, not made.

Ideas, causes, principles, operate, indeed, through indi-

viduals, and individuals are real, not, as pantheism teaches, mere appearances, sense-shows, illusions. Nevertheless, individuals are not all the reality there is. Man does not subsist without men, but neither are there men without man. The race is not an empty word, nor a mere aggregation or collection of individuals. The individual, always excepting the first Adam and the second, is the individuation of a higher reality than himself. The strength and greatness of men is in their participation of this higher reality, in their human nature, their manhood, through which they touch and participate of God. Individuals die; the race survives—*non omnis moriar*—and the deeds of individuals enter into history only as they are done in the strength of humanity, and through humanity in the strength of humanity's God, in whose image and likeness man was created. It is then, and then only that they are *gestæ*, evolutions of the ideal, and fit to be recorded.

Personal virtues and vices are every thing to the individual, but they rarely, if ever, decide the great events of history. Alexander of Macedon was far the inferior in personal virtues of Godfrey of Bouillon, the leader of the first crusade; yet with ten thousand horse, and thirty-five thousand foot, he invaded and conquered Asia, Egypt, and Lybia, founded the great city of Alexandria, impressed something of the Hellenic character on all the nations he overran, and opened the way for his successors to found Greek states on the site of his conquests, which flourished ages after his death. Godfrey, at the head of ninety thousand horse, and, it is said, three hundred thousand foot, invaded Asia, established the petty, sickly Frank kingdom of Jerusalem, which soon disappeared, and left no trace of the Frank spirit. In personal virtues Godfrey was far the superior, in bravery and skill, as a military leader, the equal of Alexander, while the Frank chivalry he led were at least not inferior to the Macedonian Greeks. Whence the difference of results? Alexander invaded Asia as the representative of the masculine and superior civilization of the West, and carried with him the interests and force of humanity. Godfrey went on a pious pilgrimage to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the representative of a pious sentiment, indeed, but not of an idea essential either to religion or to civilization, for men can pray acceptably anywhere and everywhere. The recovery of the Holy Land was a pious thought, but not a cause for which men will, save in moments of

pious fervor, pour out their blood and treasure. The Pontiffs who encouraged the crusades, may have hoped to secure the East and restore it, or elevate it to the Christian order of civilization; but if they proposed any thing of the sort, even to themselves, they expected it only as an indirect and incidental result of their unloosing Europe upon Asia. It was not their direct, determined, and avowed object, and so they failed, and the crusades are to be recorded only in the psychological history of the race. Alexander represented a cause, and succeeded, for his cause was mightier than that opposed to him. He left his mark on all the East, and did much to prepare it for the reception, when they came, of the preachers of the Gospel. Godfrey represented a generous and holy sentiment, but no cause which stirred the heart of humanity, and his conquests were few, limited in extent, and short-lived. When Europe ceased to care for them, they were lost, and the East remained as unchristian in faith and civilization as it was before the invasion.

Against the school of Hegel and Cousin we must, no doubt, take care to maintain the free intervention in history of both Providence and human will, and the effects of either the historian cannot foresee or foretell. Yet the free intervention of Providence is the intervention of the Logos, and therefore logical, in accordance with the dialectic law of all creation. It is never arbitrary or capricious, for Providence is always and everywhere the action of Eternal Reason, of the Supreme Wisdom itself. Even the intervention of human free will, is the intervention of a rational soul, made in the image and likeness of God, and must be in some measure logical, and imitate the dialectic action of Providence. It can never interrupt the dialect designs of the Creator, or introduce any thing not embraced within them, since known to God are all things from the beginning, and nothing ever does or can take him by surprise. He can never be dependent on any creature for any portion of his knowledge. He is the adequate object of his own intellect. To him all is certain, fixed, complete, for to him there is no past, no future, and all is present. If we could behold his works as he beholds them, the philosophy of history would have the certainty and scientific character of mathematics, and all history could be written *a priori*, for it would be to us only the logical development of his creative act. It is owing solely to our limited faculties and still

more limited knowledge that it appears to us any thing else, or that we cannot so write it. Even now, availing ourselves of what we know from Revelation and reason of the Divine Plan in Creation and Incarnation, Redemption and Salvation, we can go far enough to comprehend that history has its law, and that every historical development, even the most abnormal, has its logical cause, and its logical side, and tends to the realization of a logical conclusion.

The rise and continuance of Protestantism, though not absolutely impersonal, are not explicable by the personal vices or the personal virtues either of its chief actors or of their chief opponents. Undoubtedly, the remote cause of both may be traced to that morbidity of the race which we call original sin, but that sin, save in Adam, is the sin of the race, not the actual sin of individuals, and affects the individual only as he participates or subsists by participating in the race, or as theologians say, human nature. Like all great historical events, Protestantism, whatever its personal consequences, was in its causes, to a great extent, impersonal, and historically considered, inevitable. It may, therefore, be investigated without personal wrath or bitterness. History is chiefly impersonal, and should be studied no more in a pessimist than in an optimist spirit. Individuals are active in it and without individuals there would be no history; but always is there something more than individuals in it,—something superior to them, and which controls them, instead of being controlled by them. It is in this something superior to individuals, and which, after Plato and some of the Greek fathers, may be called the *methexis*, the methexic element of history, that the historian must seek the higher law of individual action and of historical events. It is this, the direct participation of God through his creative act, that is chiefly to be regarded, and with this no reasonable man can quarrel, or be angry, for it is impersonal. As we may study history in a calm, serene spirit, without anger or passion, so we may relate facts without fear. Facts have their principle in the methexis, and are and will be facts, whatever pains we may take to disguise or to conceal them. They are equally facts whether we know and disclose them or not. The historian should never be deterred by fear of giving scandal. Even if the facts make against civil or ecclesiastical rulers, more injury, St. Gregory the Great tells us, results from attempts to hush them up, than from publishing them. The Holy

Scriptures are very frank in disclosing the errors and failings of the chosen people, and do not spare the most eminent of the Patriarchs, not even David, said to be "a man after God's own heart." Catholicity is the truth, and no facts, if facts, can contradict it, or imply its falsity. All facts are compatible with truth, and do and must work to a dialectic end. To publish them can do no harm, but must always do good, unless they are perverted, miscolored, mutilated, or presented in false relations, so that they cannot be seen and appreciated for what they really are.

There is nothing that need offend any Catholic in recognizing a logical side in Protestantism, or in assigning a logical cause to its rise and continuance. There must have been a reason why it arose, and why it has continued from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth. Under certain aspects, it must have been reasonable and just, and under those aspects, if we look not beyond them, and regard its other and broader relations, it was not, and is not indefensible. We understand not Protestantism till we have seen it in its dialectic relations, on its logical side, and from a position from which it appears to be true and just. The human mind, however diseased, cannot operate with pure falsehood, or seek pure evil, for both falsehood and evil are negative, and oppose to it no real object. The stand-point of the Protestant leaders was too low, and did not permit their eye to sweep the whole horizon of truth; but, assuming their position, they had good and valid reasons for what they attempted, though from the higher position of the Catholic, whence he takes in a broader field, and contemplates truth in its catholic relations, their reasons must be seen to be defective, insufficient, sophistical. But to understand, appreciate, and explain Protestantism, either in its rise or in its continuance, it is not enough to see it on its sophistical side, or in its errors, we must also see it on its dialectic side, and study it in relation to the sophistries it opposed, and the truth it sought to evolve and appropriate.

The Reformation was undertaken consciously, deliberately, intentionally, and with foresight of the end aimed at; but Protestantism was an unforeseen, unexpected, and unintended accident. It was neither foreseen nor designed. Luther, in the outset, as far as can be judged from his biography, had no schismatic or heretical thought or intention. He was, in the beginning, a pious monk, an exemplary priest, and a learned theologian. He started, it is fair to

presume, with the ardent desire and honest intention to correct abuses which he saw prevalent in the Church, and which were encouraged or connived at by the authorities themselves, and to bring out prominently certain elements of catholic truth not sufficiently insisted on by contemporary Catholics, whether cleric or laic. He had no thought of defying the Pope, breaking with the Church, and of founding a schismatical or an heretical confession. He was borne onward by the logic of events to an unforeseen, and, we may believe, a personally painful conclusion, aided, no doubt, or, if you prefer it, blinded, by the passions, excited by the controversies his course occasioned, and the resistance he encountered. Pride, self-love, were strong in him, but perhaps equally strong in many of his opponents. What we say of him may be said of the other prominent Protestant leaders, and generally, of the whole Protestant party.

The Council of Trent accomplished in the way of reform all that was practicable, at the time, under the law of continuity, but not all that was needed. The Council, in defining the faith and declaring Catholic dogmas, dealt with absolute truth, and was infallible by the assistance of the Holy Ghost, who dwells in the Church. But in its reformatory canons and decrees, it dealt with practical matters, and could only arrive at what under the circumstances was prudent. It had to treat rival pretensions, conflicting passions and interests, old usages and prescriptive rights, and could hope to succeed only by conciliation and compromise. The Fathers did the best they could, but, perhaps, not all they would, and very likely no member of the Council under this head was perfectly satisfied with its doings; and its reformatory and disciplinary decrees and canons are not yet, and never have been, universally received by Catholic nations. They bind only when and where promulgated, and there are countries in which all of them have never been promulgated.

Two tendencies were either favored or not effectively restrained by the Council;—the administrative tendency to centralism, and the ethnical tendency to render the Church Romanic. Ethnically considered, the Council was virtually Romanic, and represented effectively only the Romanic nations—the so-called Latin nations—of Europe. Rome and Italy preponderated. The East was in schism, and so were the Germanic nations of the North. Under the ethnical relation, the Council was not œcumenical, and represented

at best only the old Roman empire of the West, to which the Church since has in a great measure been restricted. The controlling influence in her administration has ever since been Romanic ; for, if Austria has at times influenced the Holy See, it has been as an Italian, rather than as a Germanic or Slavonic power. It is undeniable that the Church, since the Council of Trent, has been chiefly, though not exclusively, confined to the Latinized populations of Europe, and associated with the Romanic order of civilization. So true is this as a fact, and so generally is it recognized, that some Catholic and many non-Catholic authors represent the Catholic religion itself as the religion of the Celtic, as they call the Latin nations, and Protestantism as that of the Germanic race.

The Church herself, in her divine-human Idea, in her faith, and in her essential constitution, is Catholic, and therefore superior to all ethnical distinctions and relations ; but her members and her administration, her relations with civilization, are always more or less affected by the circumstances of time and place. Her external relations and appearance in the sixteenth century were widely different from what they were in the twelfth, and in the twelfth from what they were in the third or fourth. In the first period, after emerging from the catacombs, she was Roman and imperial ; in the middle ages, she was German and feudal ; in the sixteenth, she became Romanic and monarchical. Not that she is not Catholic, but that her hierarchy and members are men, and fail to conform her external character and relations to the universality of her interior life. Her members and her hierarchy even are more or less affected by the sentiments, passions, tendencies, and opinions of their age and nation. She is always Papal in her essential constitution, but in the earlier ages her administration was practically patriarchal and episcopal ; in the middle ages it was feudal, and the relations of the Pope and the bishops, and of the bishops and their clergy, were interpreted by the principles of feudal law ; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was monarchical and tended to centralism. In our own age, where there is strong tendency to liberalism, Catholics are not wanting who make her democratic, and the late distinguished Bishop England was accustomed to interpret her constitution by the aid of analogies borrowed from that of the United States. Men generally have a tendency to transfer their religious principles to their poli-

ties, and more especially their political principles to their religion.

The two tendencies, discernible even in the Council of Trent, have no doubt had a powerful influence in preventing the return of the Protestant nations to the Catholic communion, as they certainly had in originating the Protestant heresy and schism. This is indicated by the fact that the line of separation between Catholics and Protestants is very nearly ethnical and political. The war between them is primarily a war between Germanic and Romanic Europe—at bottom, the old war between Rome and Germany, which began before the Christian era—a phase of which is the interminable war between Celt and Saxon, so injurious to the Church even in our own country.

The origin of the war between Rome and Germany, in which for centuries the soldiers on either side were chiefly of Germanic descent, is not explained by the Roman historians, and cannot now be collected from the traditions of the Germans. But war there was, not precisely, as the terms are now understood, a war between civilization and barbarism, but rather between one order of civilization and another. For, though the Romans called the Germans barbarians, and they themselves accepted the name as one of honor, the Germans had at least a rudimentary civilization of a high order. For two hundred and fifty years imperial Rome carried on a war to subjugate and Romanize the Germanic tribes, but with only partial success. Those tribes, though occasionally worsted, and obliged to admit Roman garrisons at different points in their territory, retained their national life, and their old Teutonic spirit. At length, provoked to retaliation, they invaded the empire, and, after a struggle more or less fierce and violent, for two hundred and fifty years more, they overturned it, broke it to pieces, and seated Odoacer the Goth on the throne of the Cæsars, near the close of the fifth century of our era.

Prior to the downfall of the Roman empire in the West, the Church was ethnically Roman. She had taken a Roman character, adopted in substance the Roman order of civilization, and outside of the empire at least, was regarded as the Roman religion. Rome was the capital of her kingdom, the seat of her central authority, the residence of her Supreme Pontiff. Her ecclesiastics, pontiffs, bishops, prelates, priests, religious, and laity even, were almost exclusively subjects of the Roman Emperor. Their manners and

secular customs and usages were those of the several peoples under the imperial government, and the Roman law was made the civil basis of her canons and casuistry. Her patriarchates corresponded to the prefectures, and her sees to the dioceses of the empire, and her ecclesiastical courts and tribunals found their model and their modes of procedure in the Roman. Her bishops were associated by an imperial edict to the Roman magistracy, and were paid, directly or indirectly, from the imperial treasury, as servants of the state. The Apostles and their immediate successors, no doubt, carried the glad tidings of the New Law farther than the Roman eagles had ever penetrated, but from Constantine down to the epoch of the Conquest, the limits of the empire were very nearly the limits of Christendom. Catholic in Idea, and potentially Catholic in time and space, the Church, after her connection with the state, was, practically Roman, and had for her friends and enemies the friends and enemies of the empire, and could convert other nations only by Romanizing them.

This is nothing discreditable to the hierarchy; for, at that time, the larger part of the civilized world was included within the Roman empire, and the Roman, or Græco-Roman civilization was the most advanced, and the least repugnant to Christianity of any civilization then recognized. Catholicity embraces both religion and civilization, the individual soul and society, and can take root and flourish only with a civilized people. Missionaries may carry it to savages and barbarians, and it may convert them, and enable them to save their souls as individuals; but these missionaries themselves must be civilized, sent from a civilized people, and they can establish Catholicity among savage and barbarous tribes, and leave it reproductive and self-supporting, only as they civilize them. Nor will all orders of civilization serve their purpose. The Jewish repels them by its narrow and bigoted nationality. The Jews recognize in the Messiah only a Jewish prince, and understand not how one can be his follower without making himself a Jew. The first Christians held it necessary to be circumcised, and to keep the Law, and it required a miracle to convince Peter, the Prince of the Apostles, or at least to satisfy his brethren of Jewish extraction, that he might lawfully go and teach, baptize, and confirm Gentile converts, without imposing upon them the burden of the Jewish ceremonial law. The caste system, which is the basis of the Hindu civilization,

repels the equality and brotherhood of all men, preached by the Gospel, as was evinced in the case of the excellent but mistaken Father Nobili; and one can hardly be a Christian, and live in Chinese society, and be a good Chinese subject, as results from the final decision at Rome of the long controversy concerning the lawfulness of certain Chinese rites, at first tolerated by the good Jesuit Fathers. The Roman order of civilization, though imperfect, was cosmopolitan, was, in its *essential* elements, true civilization, and compatible with the faith and practice of Christians. Tertullian tells us that, in his time, the Christians filled the army, the court, the senate, and the magistracy; and though he may have exaggerated their numbers, it is evident that, setting aside the persecuting edicts of the emperors, a man could embrace Christianity, be a good Christian, and yet remain a Roman citizen. In a word, Christianity being the religion of civilization, could not have obtained its first establishment elsewhere than in the empire, and could nowhere else find a civilization that it could accept or use.

Nevertheless, the subversion of the Roman empire by the Barbarians of the North and East, was an advantage to the Church, and gave her freedom to develop her catholicity. It broke down the barriers that confined her practically to the Roman empire, and opened the way for other nations to enter her communion, and to come under the influence of her free spirit, and her beneficent action. It prevented the Church from becoming, if not in herself, at least in the world's estimation, indurated as the Church of a particular State, and as it were threw her doors open for the reception of all nations. The long contact of the Germanic tribes with the empire, and the mutual influence of each on the other, had in some measure Germanized the Romans, and Romanized the Germans—at least, the immediate conquerors themselves, who had long since left their old homestead, and partially bridged over the gulf between Rome and Germany proper, and rendered the transition from the one to the other less difficult and abrupt. The Germans, as has just been said, had, even before their relations with the empire, a civilization of their own, less developed, less polished, less refined than was the Roman, but fresher and more vigorous, at least, than was the Roman in the fourth and fifth centuries, and capable, when developed under the influence of Christianity, of surpassing it even

in its prime. The early civilization of the Germanic family is underrated, because little known to classical antiquity, and because the Germans were undeniably deficient in literary, artistic, and scientific culture; but they had their political organizations, their civil institutions, religion, laws, and manners, and the elements of moral and social progress. After Rome—we include Rome of the East as well as of the West—even at the beginning of our era, Germany was the country which interposed the fewest obstacles to the zealous labors of the Christian missionary. And after the people of the Roman empire, the Germanic nations were the first really converted to the Christian religion. The Slavonic nations were converted later, and the greater part of them only several centuries later.

By the conquest of the empire in the fifth century, Rome ceased in the political order to be the capital of the civilized world, and the Romans to be the ruling people. The Church, ethnically considered, lost, in great measure, her exclusively Roman character, and new races and nations entered her communion, and formed integral and influential parts of Christendom. Gradually the half Romanized Franks in Gaul, the still more Romanized Goths in Spain, and at length the un-Romanized Anglo-Saxons of England, were converted, and new blood was infused into the laity and the hierarchy, and men of Northern extraction began to impress something of their own character on the external life and administration of the Church. From these new accessions she obtained missionaries that could labor with success in the conversion of the Germanic family remaining outside of the old Roman empire. The Germans inhabiting their old homestead, and the Scandinavian kingdoms of the North, were converted by missionaries of their own lineage and language, chiefly from England. These accepted the Church as Christian and Catholic, and not as Roman; and it need excite no surprise that when she became, or appeared to them to be becoming, ethnically Romanic, they should have cooled in their ardor, and fallen into heresy and schism.

The hierarchy, having its chief seat in the city of Rome, and affected by its Roman reminiscences, has always been partial to the Roman order of civilization; but after the conversion of the Germanic nations, it submitted to Germanic influences, and became to a great extent Germanized. The Popes invoked the aid of the Franks to protect them

from the Arian Lombards, and the Iconoclastic emperors of the East. The Franks, under Pepin and his son Charlemagne, Karl der Grosse, or Charles the Great, king of the Franks and Lombards, responded to the call of the Pope, and afforded the protection solicited, beat back the Iconoclasts, and conquered the Lombards, and gave a portion of their conquest—the city and Duchy of Rome, and the Exarchate of Ravenna—to the Holy See, and recognized the Supreme Pontiff as a temporal sovereign. Hitherto the Popes, though they held large temporal possessions, and exercised as did all the bishops of the empire, by virtue of an imperial edict, certain civil functions, and, perhaps, in the disorders occasioned by the Barbarian invasion, from necessity, or charity, others not authorized by that edict, had never claimed or exercised the attributes of political sovereignty, and had always acknowledged themselves in temporals, the subjects of the Roman emperor, and when required, paid tribute as such. The Pope was first recognized as temporal sovereign, in 752, by Pepin, who had usurped the Frank crown; and his principality was enlarged and confirmed to him by Charlemagne, whom, in the year 800, St. Leo III. raised from the hereditary rank of Patrician of Rome, conferred on his father, Pepin, to the Imperial title and dignity, and made his coadjutor in the temporal government of his States, and on whom he imposed the duty of defending the Roman Church, or Holy See, against all her enemies, domestic and foreign, infidel and heretical. Charlemagne found his office no sinecure, for, the Pope's temporal subjects, as hostile to a papal sovereign then as they are now, frequently rose against him, and, but for the intervention and strong arm of the emperor, would more than once have deposed him. The Pope, from the very beginning of his reign as temporal prince, has been obliged to rely on a foreign power to support him against his own subjects. No people in Christendom, in fact, have ever been found willing to have a priest for their supreme temporal ruler. Every people, like the people of Israel, demands for its prince, “a man of war, to go in and out before them.” The Pope felt this, and it may be presumed, that it was the chief reason why he made Charlemagne his temporal coadjutor, and practically committed to him the temporal government of the Roman State. Practically, down to the accession of the Suabian emperors, the Pope was only a titular temporal sovereign; the effective government

was in the hands of his imperial coadjutor, who governed as sovereignly in Rome as in any part of the German empire; even going so far at times as to make and unmake Popes. In their absence, or inability or neglect to attend to the affairs of the Papal States, the government usually fell to some Italian Count or Marquis, or was usurped by one or another of the never-failing Italian factions.

But as the Franks subsided into Frenchmen, and became Romanic—as the people, whatever their ethnical origin, seated within the territory of the old Roman empire, especially in those parts where the old Roman population remained after the conquest in greatest numbers, vigor, and influence, yielded to the operation of Roman traditions, manners, customs, and language, which were still preserved in a modified form, especially by the Church, formed distinct and separate Romanic nations, without the national character and spirit of the original conquerors, the old war, the old antagonism between Rome and Germany was revived, and the battle raged anew that was to decide whether the world should be Roman or German. The Roman politicians and courtiers, filled with reminiscences of the greatness, majesty, and power of Rome, hoped to make her again the mistress of the world, and either through the emperor, or through the pontiff-king, to recover for her, and more than recover, her lost civil and political primacy. The Pope has, as Vicar of Jesus Christ, no direct civil or political power; but as Chief of the hierarchy, and Supreme Pastor and Governor of the Church, whose duty it is to feed and govern the flock committed to his charge, he has the right to take cognizance, under their moral and spiritual relations, of the acts of Christian sovereigns as well as of their subjects, and of their public acts no less than of their private acts, and to visit them, when their acts violate the law of God, with the censures prescribed by the canons. If, as in the Middle Ages, the civil law of Christian States recognizes the canon law as the law of the land, the canonical censures pronounced by the Pope must have civil effect, and the full force of judicial sentences pronounced by the civil courts themselves. The Pope could, then, not only excommunicate a sovereign, but could depose him, and absolve his subjects from their oath of fidelity. In a society organized on feudal principles, this gave the Pope an immense *indirect* temporal power, and placed him at the head of the political as well as of the religious world, by the simple virtue of his office

as Chief Pastor. Through his *direct* power as sovereign of Rome, and his *indirect* power as Supreme Pontiff, having his See in Rome, the courtiers and politicians might, without absolute madness, indulge the hope of securing for Rome both the spiritual and the temporal Primacy, rendering her more powerful than she was under the Cæsars, and of gaining for her a far more extended empire than she had governed before the irruptions of the Barbarians. The thought was not without a certain grandeur, but it was Roman, not Catholic, and could be carried out only by rendering society and the Church, ethnically and politically, Roman. It would have demanded through religion, which is no more Roman than it is German, what the Roman arms had failed, after three centuries of effort, to effect, and required the conquerors of Rome, in order to be good Christians, to make themselves Roman subjects. It would, if realized, have made the Church a Roman national Church, and closed her communion to all who would not first submit to be Romans.

But simultaneously with the rise of this Roman policy broke out the quarrel between the Popes and the Emperors, a quarrel which under one form or another continued till the sixteenth century. The Popes did not at first take the side of the Roman courtiers and politicians, and contrary to what a superficial observer would have expected, that side was first taken by the German emperors themselves. Imperial coadjutors of the Pope in the temporal government, and virtual emperors of Rome, possessing the old kingdom of Italy, and having a fair prospect of annexing to their dominions by inheritance or conquest, the whole Peninsula, the emperors regarded themselves as Roman and Italian, rather than as German. They called their empire the Roman Empire, and claimed to be the successors of the Roman Cæsars. Their theory obliterated the memory of the German conquest, and merely annexed Germany to the Roman Empire. A part of the Italians, known in history as the Ghibellines, favored the imperial theory, and were among the most ardent and determined of its supporters. Their aim was to make Rome, as the capital of Italy, the seat of universal empire. Dante, in his *Monarchia* develops and defends the imperial policy. There is one God, one Church, one earth, one Pope, and there should be, according to him, only one emperor for the government of the earth. The Pope should be supreme spiritual ruler,

the emperor supreme temporal ruler, dividing the governing authority of the world between them, and both residing at Rome as the seat of universal dominion. The Suabian emperors attempted a policy of this sort, and, perhaps, but for the Popes, would have succeeded in its realization, at least for the West. The Popes, if for no other reason, must resist it as incompatible with their own temporal sovereignty. Yet the policy was resisted *d'outrance* by the national heart of Germany, which had never succumbed to the Roman eagles. It would, as Roman and Italian, not as German, have restored the empire to Rome, and northern and central Germany, when the national spirit survived in all its force, could never be induced or forced to support it. Germans might favor it, but Germany would not; and in his long struggle with Henry III., more generally denominated Henry IV., king, but not emperor of the Germans, St. Gregory VII., or Hildebrand, found his chief support in the prince-bishops of Cologne and Hamburg, and in the dukes of Saxony and Bavaria. Germany had no objection to governing the world, but it must govern it as Germany, not as Rome or Italy. She would not for the empire of the world surrender her own nationality.

The Popes, though they opposed with all their power, direct and indirect, temporal and spiritual, the imperial policy, had, nevertheless themselves in some sense, laid the foundation for it. The emperors grounded their claim to be successors of Augustus Cæsar, on the alleged fact that St. Leo III., in elevating Charlemagne, king of the Franks and Lombards to the imperial dignity, had revived in favor of the Germans, the empire of the West. This pretension does not appear to be well founded, even supposing the Pope had authority in the premises; for the dominions of Charlemagne seldom if ever, during his life, in official or other documents now extant, were called an empire. He is called emperor, but not emperor of Rome, of Germany, of Gaul, of Francia, or Italy, or any other known or unknown country. But the act of St. Leo III. was by the emperors and their lawyers, especially after the accession of the Hohenstaufen, so interpreted. Certainly the Popes for a time resisted this interpretation; but it would seem that they subsequently let it pass, for the German empire called itself, down to the day of its extinction in 1806, apparently without reproach, "The Holy Roman Empire." The Sovereign Pontiff certainly did raise Charle-

magne to the imperial dignity in Rome, and associate him with himself in the temporal government of the Roman State. Charlemagne was the imperial coadjutor of the Pope in the temporal government of Rome, if not strictly emperor of Rome, and it was on this ground that the Pope claimed and held the right to elect and crown the emperor. But with the extinction in the direct line of Carlovigian and Saxon families, and the accession of the Suabian or Franconian emperors, it would seem that the imperial interpretation was generally accepted, and ultimately ceased to be resisted by the Popes. Even some facts in mediæval history would seem to indicate that, for a time at least, the emperors claimed a supremacy, not only in Germany, but in all Europe that had been included within the Roman empire. It is to be remarked, also, that while the Popes made no scruple after the elevation of Charlemagne to the imperial dignity in recognizing the sovereign of Constantinople as Emperor of the East, he never would recognize the imperial title in any other Western prince, before the closing years of the last century, when Pius VI. gave the title of emperor to the Russian Tsar. Perhaps, after all, St. Leo III. had in the elevation of Charlemagne, no such distinct, settled, or far-reaching policy as he is either praised or abused for, and that he acted chiefly in reference to the immediate and pressing wants of his times, leaving the future to Providence and the course of events.

So little is known of the actual circumstances of the age, that it is not easy to judge of the wisdom or the necessity of either the Frank policy in making the Popes sovereign princes, or of the Papal policy in making the Frank sovereigns emperors. But the political reasons which governed the Frank sovereigns, most likely, were to detach the Papacy from the East, and the governing motive of the Pope, probably, was to secure a protector and defender of the Holy See against the numerous enemies in arms against her. Western Christendom, in the eighth century, and the first half of the ninth, was in a critical condition. The Saracens had extended their empire over a large part of Asia, along the northern countries of Africa to the Western ocean, taken possession of the greater part of the Spanish peninsula, and were invading Southern Gaul and Italy; the Saxons, under their brave Duke Witikind, at the head of the unconverted Germans in Germany, aided by the Scandinavians of the North, and by the Slavonians and Tar-

tars from the East, were making their last desperate stand for Paganism against Christianity; and the Arian Lombards, the Iconoclastic Greeks, and the turbulent nobles, and disorderly populace in Italy, even in Rome itself, threatened not only the independence but the very existence of the Holy See. The Popes could nowhere find an armed champion of Christendom, but in the Austrasian Franks. He called, and they answered. Charles Martel defeated the Saracens at Chalons, and expelled them from Gaul: Pepin crossed the Alps, chastised the disorderly Italians, drove back the Iconoclasts, defeated and conquered the Lombards, and bound his brow with their iron crown; Charlemagne completed the work of his father Pepin, repulsed on the side of Sicily and Spain the renewed incursions of the Saracens, defeated the Saxon confederacy, again and again, and after an obstinate and sanguinary war, renewed at brief intervals for thirty years, annexed all of Germany that lay beyond the frontiers of the Roman empire, from the Lower Danube to the Baltic and the Northern ocean, to Christendom. Assailed by powerful enemies on all sides, it is not strange that the Popes did all in their power to gain and strengthen the Frank sovereigns, to reorganize the West, and to provide for its future security by elevating to the imperial dignity a prince so able and so willing as Charlemagne, to protect and defend it.

The Papal policy secured the West, but it prepared the loss of the East. The Eastern Emperors were not pleased to lose the Popes as subjects, and were still less pleased to see them sovereign princes, and claiming as their own cities and provinces, which they held belonged to their empire. They contended that the towns and provinces, originally a part of their empire, when wrested from the Lombards by the Franks, should have been restored them, instead of being given in full sovereignty to the Pope. Moreover, they regarded the elevation by the Pope of Charlemagne to the imperial dignity in Rome, and his virtual election and coronation as Emperor of the West, as an offence to their sovereignty, an unwarranted dismemberment of their own empire; for in the Roman theory, though divided as to administration between two Emperors, the one of the East and the other of the West, the Roman Empire itself was really one and indivisible. Each half of the Empire was Roman, and they could not brook the conversion of either into a Barbarian empire. The East was

willing to acknowledge the Primacy of the See of Rome so long as it remained Roman, and its Bishop owned himself a Roman subject. It would commune with a Roman, but not with a German Church. Its pride, also, revolted at submitting to the Pontiff when he became a temporal prince, a creation of the Barbarians, and so set its wits at work to find some plausible reasons for a schism, which in reality already existed. The Frank policy succeeded, and the Popes from their recognition as temporal sovereigns, were forced, whether they would or not, to bind themselves to the West, and to follow its fortunes.

The German Emperors in their effort to convert their empire into the Roman Empire, though favored by the Ghibellines in and out of Italy, were opposed by the Popes, the enemies of Imperial centralism, the friends of the Papal temporal sovereignty, and the Italian Guelfs, occasionally aided by the Venetians. The Imperial policy would, after all, not have revived the real Roman Empire, held and administered by a Romanic people, and was more likely, in the long run, to absorb Italy in Germany, than Germany in Italy. For this reason the Italian patriotic party opposed it. It was also opposed by the Romanic States generally, as fatal to their free development and independent existence. The war between the Popes and the Hohenstaufen was on one side a war for the conversion, and on the other to prevent the conversion of the German into the Roman Empire with the city of Rome for its capital. Other questions were, no doubt, involved, but this was at the bottom of the controversy. The Popes, though supported by a strong party among the German princes, and by the Italian Guelfs, were obliged to look for aid in their fearful struggle to the Romanic or Southern nations, and to pursue a policy which would tend to elevate them as a counterpoise to the Emperor and the Ghibelline princes. This, since the ecclesiastical policy necessarily followed the political policy, carried away not only the Pope as temporal sovereign, but the hierarchy itself in a Romanic direction.

The first attempt of the Popes to obtain a power in the South to balance the North, was the creation of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and investing under the suzerainty of the Holy See, the Norman Adventurer, Robert Guiscard, with its crown, intended to protect the Pope's temporal sovereignty against the German Emperors, no

less than against the Greeks and Saracens. The second step in the same direction was, after the kingdom had passed to the Hohenstaufen, in setting aside the unhappy Conradin, the son of Frederic II., and giving the crown to a French prince, Charles of Anjou. This was an alliance of the Italian Guelfs and the South of Europe against the North, for the protection of the Papal temporal sovereignty. It drew sharply the line between Rome and Germany, and made France, already the leading Romanic power, the foremost power of Europe. The final defeat of the Roman Imperial policy, with the death of Frederic II., threw the succeeding emperors, till the episode of Charles V., back on their purely German provinces for their chief support, and compelled them to adopt a more exclusively Germanic policy, while it raised up a formidable rival to them in the French, representing then as now Romanic Europe.

The institution of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope in the eighth century, necessarily forced upon the Sovereign Pontiffs the uniform policy of preventing the growth of any great power in the immediate neighborhood of their capital, and of playing off one great Power against another. The policy of the Roman Court has always opposed, therefore, the union of all Italy in a single Italian State, and also the possession of Northern and Southern Italy by one and the same non-Italian Power. This policy was dictated by the law of self-preservation. Italy united in a single Italian State, or as the possession of a single foreign power, the temporal principality of the Holy See could not be maintained. It would be absorbed, and the Popes reduced to their purely sacerdotal and pontifical functions. A weak power, as was the Papal State, must always study to have weak neighbors, and seek by diplomacy and the usual arts of state ministers, to prevent its neighbors from uniting, and forming a strong power able to overwhelm it. Assuming, as the Popes always did, and always do, that the independence of the Pontiff in his spiritual government of the Church, demands his maintenance as a sovereign prince, this policy must be regarded as necessary, wise, and just, decidedly for the interests both of religion and civilization. But it may be doubted if it has not been the indirect cause or occasion of the loss of the East and the North to the Church, and her present restriction to the Romanic nations of Europe. The Pope, no doubt; hoped, by the investiture of Charles of Anjou with the Crown of the Two

Sicilies, to provide effectually against the union of the Southern and Northern sections of the peninsula under the same sovereign, either native or foreign, and to raise up a power sufficiently strong to protect the Holy See against all danger from the Emperor. But he found in Charles and the French a more subtle and dangerous enemy than he had ever found in any of the Henrys and Frederics of Suabia. The Pope and his principality were, it is true, henceforth measurably secure against the Empire and the Ghibellines; but he was at the mercy of the French and the Guelfs, the latter of whom, cared even less for the Pope than did his old Imperial opponents, and supported him only as a means of transferring the hegemony from the North to the South of Europe, or of recovering the Empire for Rome and Italy. The advent of a French prince in Italy, was the most disastrous blow to the temporal power of the Papacy in the Middle Ages that has been or could be struck, and proves that the Popes in temporal matters are as fallible as other princes. It was indirectly the cause of the migration of the Popes from Rome to Avignon, a Papal possession within what was then the Neapolitan Kingdom, and the subjection of the Court of Rome for seventy years to French influence.

Charles of Anjou is one of the basest characters in history; and, if nearly all the history that is read out of Germany and Italy did not undergo a certain amount of French manipulation, so as to conform to French vanity, and make it redound to French glory, he would pass for the basest and most treacherous sovereign prince the Papacy has ever encountered. He became the acknowledged leader for Italy of the Guelf or Romanic party, and, as king of the Two Sicilies, with large possessions now included in the empire of France, Senator of Rome, and Papal Vicar of Tuscany, he used his great power and favorable position to force the Pope to administer the affairs of the Church solely in his interests. Never had the Popes been more obsequious to any temporal sovereign than they were to him, their vassal and creature. The liberal use they made of their spiritual censures to force him upon the people of Sicily, who detested him, as may be inferred from the famous "Sicilian Vespers," and who, after the failure of the heir of Frederic, preferred the government of a Spanish prince, is one of the greatest scandals in the whole history of the Roman pontiffs. Nicholas III. saw the mis-

take of his predecessor, and did what he could to repair it; but his successor turned back to Charles and undid his policy. Finally, Charles succeeded in filling the Papal throne with the founder of the Celestines, a holy man, it is true, but a man of marvellous ignorance and simplicity, who, during the short time he was Pope, acted as a mere puppet in the hands of the Neapolitan king. Happily, he had a conscience, and fully convinced of his utter incapacity to govern the Church, resigned the Papal crown, and was succeeded by Cardinal Gaëtano, under the name of Boniface VIII., one of the greatest men and ablest pontiffs that ever sat in the chair of Peter. He labored hard to rescue the Papacy from Neapolitan and French or Romanic influence, and to re-establish ethnical independence and impartiality; but it was too late. The force of events was too strong to be resisted. He became involved in grave difficulties with Philip the Fair, King of France, and his adherents among the Italian Guelfs, and was taken prisoner at Anagni, and grossly treated by Nogaret, the lieutenant of Philip. He died a few days after of grief and the harsh treatment he had received from the French and the false Colonna. His successor, Peter Roger, a Frenchman, succeeded him, under the name of Clement VI., removed the Papal residence from Rome to Avignon, and founded the line of Limousin Popes.

From the death of Boniface VIII., in 1303, to the outbreak of the great movement in the sixteenth century, the history of Europe, ecclesiastical and political, is little else than the struggle between the German group of nations and the Romanic—each for supremacy. The Church was necessarily involved in this struggle, because she was intimately connected in both groups of nations with the state, and her Supreme Pontiff was a sovereign prince, obliged to consult the independence and interests of his principality as well as those of the Church herself. The return of the Popes to Rome was effected by the temporary triumph of the Northern or Germanic influence; but it was followed by the schism of the Southern or Romanic nations, who would not hold communion with the Pope unless devoted specially to their interests, and under their control; and rather than submit to a Pope who would treat Germany with impartiality, they preferred to create a Pope of their own. The Abbé Christophe, in his learned History of the Papacy in the Fourteenth Century, very properly attributes the West-

ern, or more properly, the Southern Schism, to national prejudices and rivalries; but he takes too narrow a view, when he restricts these rivalries and jealousies to the French and Italians. They were properly the rivalries and jealousies of Germanic and Romanic Europe. Southern Italy went with France, and the part of Italy in which the influence or power of the emperor was greatest, was the most strenuous in its resistance to the schism. The Council of Constance, which healed the schism, was an effort at compromise, in which, as usual, the principal concessions were made by the North to the South. The emperor Sigismund was a real friend to peace and union, and did all that man could do to preserve the North and the South in the same Catholic communion. But he succeeded only in obtaining a shortlived truce. The South would be united to the North only on condition of governing it. The Romanic nations would rule or secede. In the schism they seceded; but France, weakened and almost reduced to an English province, by her internal divisions and wars with England, they consented to a reunion in the Council of Constance; yet France, recovering from the disasters of the English wars, and having gained over to her side the north of Italy, involved them anew in the struggle, and forced the Northern nations, in their turn, to secede, which left the Southern the only orthodox nations in the world, and made the Church Romanic. The whole world has called her since, not simply the *Catholic* Church, which is her official name, but the *Roman* Catholic Church, a term which would imply that she was Roman or Romanic, not Catholic.

The Emperor Charles V. might have delayed, perhaps have prevented the schism, if he had comprehended his times, and been equal to his position, as emperor of Germany, king of Spain, and sovereign of the Netherlands and the greater part of Italy. But he was only half German, and early lost the confidence of the Northern provinces, so deeply offended by the centralizing tendencies of his grandfather Maximilian I. During his whole reign, Charles acted as a Romanic rather than as a Germanic prince. His son, Philip II., by his absolutist tendencies, his gloomy bigotry, his cruel treatment of Protestants, and his efforts to use the Church as a stepping-stone to universal monarchy, lost him the Dutch Netherlands, and confirmed England and Northern Germany in their schism. The Emperor Ferdinand II. would have reduced the Protestant princes to

submission, and healed the schism between Northern and Southern Germany; but as that would have secured anew the hegemony of Europe to the Germanic family, France, as the chief Romanic power, threw, under the lead of that able but unscrupulous statesman, Cardinal Richelieu, her power and influence on the Protestant side against him, and forced the peace of Westphalia, which established a permanent division in the empire between the Catholic and the Protestant princes, and secured to Protestantism the real national heart of Germany. Louis XIV. attempted to renew the policy of Philip II., but, as he sought to restore the schismatic nations to the Church in the interest of France rather than of Catholicity, he necessarily failed. France has, from the beginning of her history—that is, from the accession of the Capetians, the proper beginning of French history—even down to our own times, been governed in her policy by ethnical or national considerations, and has favored or opposed the ecclesiastical policy of the Popes as it did or did not tend to secure her the hegemony among Catholic nations. At bottom, the old war, between Rome and Germany, that, with brief truces, has continued to rage, and still rages, and the war that ever since the Southern nations became separated from the Northern, has raged, and still rages between the Romanic and Germanic nations, is one and the same war, older than the conversion of either Rome or Germany to the Christian religion. Rome with her legions at first overran Germany, without being able to subjugate her free population; afterward, Germany sent forth her armed tribes, who overran and broke down the Roman empire, and seated themselves on its ruins. These gradually became Romanized, and renewed the old war of Rome against their un-Romanized German brethren. So far as the Church is concerned, these have gained the ascendancy, and made her, to-day, almost as exclusively Romanic as she was Roman before the conquest. They have succeeded in driving the North into schism, and now nations can hardly return, or be converted to the Church, without giving up their national character and making themselves Romanic.

The Protestant development, or northern secession, took its rise precisely at the epoch of the triumph of the Romanic party. The Romanic party had succeeded in getting the Popes and the ecclesiastical power on their side, and left the Germanic nations only the alternative either of submitting

to Romanic predominance or of seceding from the Church. Germany, despairing of using the Church in the protection or advancement of her ethnical sentiments and interests, seceded from the Holy See, and carried away with her the whole group of Germanic, Gothic, or Teutonic nations. Many Germans, indeed, remained firm in their adherence to the Church, and remain so still, and are among the best and most faithful Catholics we have, but the German nationality seceded, and became and continues Protestant. Ethnical considerations have at all times weighed more with both the Northern and the Southern nations of Europe, than theological or ecclesiastical interests. As long as Germany could retain her hegemony and be Catholic, she was warm and firm in her devotion to the Holy See, but when she could not, she seceded. The same must be said of the Romanic States. When the true Pope, after the return of the Popes from Avignon to Rome, ceased to be their creature, they raised up an anti-Pope, a Pope of their own, and obeyed or disobeyed him as they saw fit. The Church has never yet been strong enough to overcome every form of gentilism, to obliterate all ethnical prejudices, or even to exclude them entirely from her hierarchy any more than from her laity. The Roman, to-day, holds that the temporal government of the world belongs to his city. Gioberti, a priest, a theologian, and a philosopher, with no equal since Plato, maintains gravely, in his *Del Primato*, that the moral and civil primacy of the world belongs to the Italians, and it was for that reason that St. Peter established the seat of the Spiritual Primacy in Rome, the capital of Italy, and therefore of the universe. Even Americans, trained to the priesthood in the Roman colleges, imbibe a half-conviction that the spiritual primacy and the temporal, in some sense, belong to Rome, and look upon the Transalpine States, especially of the North, as barbarians, whom Rome has not yet civilized. With them, of European nations, Italy stands first, France second, Spain third, Great Britain fourth, and Germany last, notwithstanding Catholic Germany is almost the only part of the Catholic world where Catholic thought, to-day, is really living and active, where Catholic erudition, science, and philosophy are up to the level of the non-Catholic world. Whoever has studied history, not as it comes distilled through a Romanic alembic, knows that England was lost to the Church almost solely because the Head of the Church was an Italian and a foreigner, and be-

cause she would not be governed by his Lieutenant, the Spaniard. It was not because the Pope was Italian or Spanish by race, but because he was Italian or Spanish, or seemed to her to be so, in his policy, that made her rebel against him. She saw, or thought she saw, in the Pope, not simply the Apostolic Father of the Faithful, but a foreign potentate; whom she could not obey without sacrificing her English nationality and independence. So she will continue to feel, and believe, so long as the Pope remains an Italian sovereign, and consults the special interests and policy of Romanic Europe, or till she herself loses her Germanic character, and becomes Romanic in her ideas, manners, and institutions, which, through Celtic and Gallic influences, may one day happen, as would happen in the United States, an offshoot of England, were it not for the large influx of fresh emigrants from Germany, now much more numerous than those from Ireland.

The Romanic tendency has always been and is a tendency to centralism, for it starts not from the earlier and more liberal period of the Roman civilization, but from a later period, when that civilization had degenerated into Cæsarism, or Imperial despotism. The liberties, franchises, and personal independence and freedom of modern Europe, are of Germanic, not Romanic origin. The special tendency of the Romanic nations at the epoch of the Reformation was to absolute monarchy, or monarchical centralism. Louis XI. in France, Henry VII. in England, Maximilian I. in Germany, and Cardinal Ximenes in Spain, all had labored to reduce the old feudal nobility, to break up the estates, and to revive the old Imperial centralism, which made the Emperor the State. In their numerous revolutions against monarchy since, the Romanic nations cling to the idea of centralism,—and their great effort has been to substitute for monarchical or Imperial centralism, democratic centralism, equally despotic, and far more intolerable and crushing. The present Emperor of the French has attempted in the constitution of the French Empire to combine in one government both centralisms, the Imperial represented by himself, and the democratic represented by universal suffrage, but with what success time alone can determine. Neither centralism could ever succeed with the Germans for any great length of time. The Hohenstaufen attempted it, and failed, not only because opposed by the Pope and the Italian Guelfs, but because opposed by the Princes

of the really Germanic part of the Empire. The Emperor Maximilian attempted it, but was resisted and defeated, as was Charles V., by the obstinacy of the Northern Germans. The attempt of the Stuarts to introduce and establish it in England, lost them the crown of three kingdoms. But all Romanic Europe alternates from the one form to the other, though in the Spanish and Italian peninsulas there are now in progress experiments in behalf of constitutional monarchy, which may or may not prove successful. Perhaps it will meet the fate of our experiment to maintain a constitutional and limited democracy, which, prior to the breaking out of the present Rebellion, was fast becoming a centralized and unlimited democracy.

The Church, carried away in the ethnical or national struggles in the European Republic with the Romanic nations; naturally conformed in her administration to their centralizing tendency. After the virtual defeat of Feudalism and the victory won by centralized monarchy, in the latter half of the fifteenth century, the constitution of the Church was interpreted no longer according to feudal, but according to monarchical principles, and her administration became more and more centralized, and the Pope from Chief Pastor became the sovereign lord of the faithful, not in the feudal, but in the monarchical or Imperial sense. The Pope, as successor of St. Peter, the head of the Apostolic College, is by divine constitution the Chief Pastor of the Church, the superior and common bond of all the patriarchs, primates and bishops, possessing the supreme authority to feed and govern the whole Church. Though the Church is always and essentially Papal, yet, in the early ages, before the irruptions of the Barbarians and the downfall of the Roman Empire, her Papal constitution was less conspicuous, and she would have appeared to a stranger as Patriarchal and Episcopal, rather than as Papal. The Pope had *in radice* all the power he now exercises, but the administration was formerly less centralized than it is now. The great majority of causes were heard and disposed of by the Diocesans, Metropolitans, and Patriarchs, and only the greater causes went up to the Papal Court. The Bishops communed through their Metropolitan with the Patriarch, and through the Patriarch with the Pope, and the great body of the faithful hardly knew that there was any Pope superior to the Patriarch. It is only as the court of last resort that the Roman Court is heard of, and as such court only in matters which seldom

come immediately and directly home to the great body of the laity, or even of the Parochial Clergy. These seldom had any direct or immediate relations with the Supreme Pontiff. Pastors were chosen ordinarily by popular election, and confirmed by the Metropolitan or Patriarch without resort to Rome, perhaps without the transmission of their names to the Holy See. The Metropolitan administered through his suffragans the affairs of his province, the Patriarch the affairs of his patriarchate, unless in certain specified cases, without any resort to superior authority, though by virtue of that superior authority. Even after the downfall of the Roman Empire the same general order for some time remained. The patriarchs, metropolitans, prelates, chapters, or the Sovereign of the State filled the vacant Sees, without any direct interference of the Bishop of Rome. That at one time the Christian Sovereigns had the right, the delegated right, of appointing to vacant Sees and granting investiture, can hardly be successfully denied. There is a Papal constitution extant, forbidding the consecration of a Pope till the confirmation of his election by the Roman Emperor, and even so late as St. Gregory VII. the right of confirmation of the election of the Pope, elected by the people and clergy of Rome, seems to have been conceded to the German Emperors, and was frequently exercised. The right was, no doubt, a concession from the Pope, and revocable at his will, as was the right of appointment and investiture of Bishops. Either is mentioned here only to show that practically the Pope seldom directly intervened in the administration of the Church, save in the matters that came up to his court on appeal, and instructions and admonitions to the superior and inferior clergy as to their duty.

But when the great Eastern Patriarchates fell under the Mussulman power, or lapsed into heresy or schism, and no patriarchate was left standing, except that of the West, the administration became concentrated at Rome, and the business of the Roman See was immensely increased. As the centralizing tendency acquired force in the civil order, it became strengthened in the ecclesiastical, and without any real usurpation of power on the part of the Pope, the administration became virtually monarchical, till the Pope might say, *l'église, c'est moi*, as the monarch could say, *l'état, c'est moi*. All causes could be carried or summoned directly to Rome, where years might elapse before they could be heard. The expenses could hardly fail to be heavy, and

ruinous to all but the rich or parties patronized by the rich. It weighed heavily on ecclesiastics of every rank. The causes too, had to be heard and disposed of for the most part by men alien in nation, in language, in manners, customs, habits, to the nation of the parties in action, and rarely able to decide them on their merits. This evil was hardly relieved when causes were tried and decided by the Papal legate in the locality where they occurred, for the legate in later times was pretty sure to be a foreigner, in most cases an Italian. The metropolitans were gradually deprived of their primitive jurisdiction, and suffered to retain only a primacy of honor over their suffragans. The religious orders found their old freedom and independence interfered with; thought and action were subjected to the minutest and most stringent rules and supervision, and nothing was left to personal freedom and spontaneity. This result was not reached all at once, and the system was not fully developed till after the downfall of feudalism and the institution of modern monarchy, but for some time before there was a strong tendency to it.

This centralizing tendency, which, if carried out to its full logical extent, would make the Pope and Clergy the whole Church, and suffer the people to count for nothing, may be, in some degree, detected in the reformatory decrees of the Council of Trent, and certainly has been largely developed since. It is a Romanic tendency, and was one of the causes of the rise, and is a grave obstacle to the extinction, of Protestantism. It is very offensive to the Germanic group of nations, and operates unfavorably upon the development of thought and vigorous action among Catholics themselves. In the Church as in the state, it renders the soul feeble and sickly, like a plant without fresh air and sunshine. No doubt liberty has its disadvantages, but despotism has no advantages that have yet been discovered. Under it, whether in Church or state, the mind is confined to a space too strait for it; it wants elbow-room, wants courage, wants strength, and is paralyzed and afraid to move, lest it move in a wrong direction, and to attempt any thing good lest haply it end in doing something wrong. Positive characters are held in horror, and are rarely produced; and the chief study is not to obtain the reward of well doing, but to escape the penalty of evil-doing—not to do right, but to do nothing authority can blame or punish. It wraps the talent God gives in a clean napkin, and preserves

it safe buried in the earth, instead of putting it out to fructify and increase. All is prescribed, and nothing is ventured upon that is not prescribed. The religious orders, those light troops designed to be deployed as skirmishers, must have their general residing at Rome, commanding them with despotic authority, without the slightest real knowledge of the distant fields where they are to serve, or of the character of the enemy against whom he sends them. Pastors have little left to their discretion, and feeling themselves answerable in all to the central authority, attempt only to carry out what they suppose to be its policy—lose all propagandist zeal and energy, and suffer the Church in their country to be reduced to a few priests, old women, and children. Finding that the policy they adopt is not their own, and never exercising their own judgment on its propriety, they become a hundred-fold more despotic and intolerant in carrying it out than the central authority itself. The luckless Catholic who happens to be a living and thinking man, stands a far better chance at Rome than at Paris, London, Dublin, New York, Cincinnati, or Philadelphia.

The heterodox world see this; they see Catholics rolling along in the old ruts, worn deep by the wheels of time, and feel that, however great their natural ability, their learning, their science, they are allowed to display it only in dressing up and presenting old and dry formulas, which have lost all their significance for the world that is, and are repelled from us instead of being drawn to us. It is in vain we say it is not so, and protest that the Church favors freedom and largely develops the intellect. They reply: "We do not see it. Your Church places your living men, your Giobertis, your Rosminis, your Venturas, your Passaglias on the Index, and instead of stimulating she represses thought and expression." The modern centralism, with the universal supervision, by authority, of thought and expression, surpassing, it may almost be said, the despotism of an old Puritan congregation over its members, is perhaps congenial to and necessary for the Romanic nations, now almost the only Catholic nations, and who have never yet shown themselves able to use liberty without abusing it. It may operate well for them, since, if not bound, hand and foot, by external authority, very few of them would remain orthodox, or continue in the Catholic communion; but it does not operate well for the Northern or Germanic group of nations, who have a very different temperament, and require a very different discipline. It is

idle, humanly speaking, to expect to heal the schism by a policy which produced and continues it, and which permits the Germanic nations to become Catholic only by becoming Romanic. The Germans are not wholly averse to stringent political authority, though not partial to it, but they have an intense love of individual liberty and personal freedom. They would do as much as possible for and by themselves. Hence the Romanic policy, save with exceptional individuals, has never been, and never will be successful. It fails, and will fail to convert the heart of the Germanic nation. Germany was converted to the Church, but never was, and never will be, converted to Rome. If it is proposed to recover the Germanic group to the Church, a different line of policy must be adopted; the ecclesiastical administration, while it remains Papal, must be in a measure decentralized; the Pope and Clergy must, instead of being held to be the Church, be regarded as essential, divinely-appointed, and venerable functionaries in the Church; nationalities must be respected and suffered to remain; individuals must be allowed freer scope for generous thought and spontaneous action, and the government must be more pastoral, and govern less.

The Church herself, in spite of her restriction to the Romanic nations, is catholic, and neither Romanic nor Germanic. True, she is called, in modern times, even by some of her own children, Roman—the *Roman* Catholic Church—but *Roman* is no part of her official title, and, save as designating the locality of the Apostolic See, is grossly improper. She is the *Catholic*, not the *Roman* Church. The Roman Church is the particular church of Rome, of which Pius IX. is the archbishop. Rome, in the national or ethnical sense, has no more to do with the Church than has any other national capital. The primacy represented by the Pope, or possessed by him as the successor of St. Peter, belongs neither to Rome nor to Italy, and the Pope, if he chooses, is perfectly competent to transfer the Apostolic See to any other capital he may select. Nobody but a Frenchman, who regards Paris as the centre of the world, or a New Englander, who regards Boston as “the hub of the Universe,” would wish to see it transferred to any other locality, or would not regret its transference. But the Pope succeeds to the full Apostolic power, and can as well transfer his chair to some other locality as St. Peter could transfer it from Antioch to Rome. We know no law of

God that confines it to Rome, to Italy, or even to the European continent. The Pope may, as temporal sovereign, be confined to Italy and Rome, but nothing in the constitution of the Church compels her Chief Pastor to be sovereign of Rome, or of an Italian or any other state. We must divest ourselves of the notion that the Church by divine institution is Roman, and that to be in her communion we must be the subjects of a Roman or Italian prince, and learn that she is catholic, and independent of all nationalities, if we wish her to be universal—the church of all nations.

In tracing the rise and continuance of Protestantism to the ethnical struggle between Rome and Germany, or between the Romanic and Germanic groups of nations, no judgment is intended to be offered as to the struggle itself. Facts are left to speak for themselves. Things being as they were, and the Church placed as she was, it is not easy to say how she could have pursued any other policy than that she adopted, or how it was possible for her to avoid the results which have followed. The Romanic nations were not all wrong, nor the Germanic all right. Each group of nations wished to be supreme and control the Church, and each, when it could not use the Papacy for its own purposes, in turn seceded from it, and created a schism. The reader must not, however, suppose that Protestantism owes origin and continuance solely to the Romanic and centralizing tendencies of ecclesiastical administration. Other causes were operative—political, economical, commercial and industrial, and religious and theological. These other causes we hope before we die to be able to develop, and to enter into a complete and impartial investigation of the principles, doctrines, and observances of Protestantism, in relation to those of the Church, which would complete our original design; but experience proves that a work of such a character and extent cannot be prudently published piecemeal in the pages of a periodical. Consequently, no more of these Essays will appear in these pages, and if they should be completed they will be given to the world in a separate publication.

ART. II.—*Lettre de Mgr. l'Evêque d'Orléans au Clergé son Diocèse sur l'Esclavage.* Paris: Perisse Frères. 1862. 8vo. pp. 16.

THERE is no doubt that the majority of our Catholic population are strongly opposed to the Abolitionists, and regard them, very unjustly, however, as the real authors of the formidable rebellion now threatening our national life; but we should do them great injustice if we supposed them to be really in favor of negro slavery, or opposed on principle to emancipation. We think their hostility to the Abolitionists, since the breaking out of the civil war, very unwise, impolitic, uncalled for, and calculated to give aid and comfort to the enemies of the nation; but we also think it grows more out of their attachment to the Union, than out of any sympathy with slavery or with the rebels.

Various causes have conspired to render Catholics hostile to the Abolitionists. The majority of Catholics in this country were, not unnaturally, attached to the Democratic party. They were mostly from the oppressed classes in the mother country, and have naturally, on coming here, associated with the party that made the loudest professions of attachment to liberty and equality, and were, or appeared to be, the most liberal towards foreigners, and especially towards Catholics as naturalized citizens. Besides, the great body of the Catholics migrating to this country, were democrats before their migration, and, by a very innocent mistake, assumed that the Democratic party here represented their previously imbibed democratic views and convictions. The opposing party, whether called Federal, National Republican, or Whig, was always less lavish of its promises, both to Catholics and to foreigners, and in its policy, from the time of the elder Adams to our own day, has been apparently more Protestant and more Native American. These facts are sufficient to explain the general devotion of Catholics, especially Catholics of Irish birth or descent, to the Democratic party. As that party gradually became a Southern party, and strongly opposed to Abolitionism, it was only natural that the Catholics who, though not its leaders, formed a very large proportion of its rank and file, should adopt its views, and follow its policy.

Catholics, especially our Irish Catholics, are strong, not unfrequently intolerant partisans. They have been made

so by having been placed for three centuries under the necessity of defending their faith and nationality against Protestant England, seeking constantly to crush and annihilate both. Deprived, to a great extent, of education by the penal laws, and of their natural secular chiefs by apostasy or confiscation, they have had no means of defending themselves and protecting their faith and nationality, but by close party association and intolerance to their enemies, especially such as deserted, or showed symptoms of deserting their ranks. Individual freedom of thought and action were necessarily subordinated to the exigencies of their faith and politics, and they were trained to act as far as possible as a party, according to party tactics, and to carry their points by acting as a great party-machine, sweeping away every thing before it. To desert the party was to desert the Church and the national cause, and to prevent desertion they were obliged to treat desertion of party as an abandonment of religion and nationality. The deserter must be hooted, hunted down, rendered unable to live save by taking refuge in the ranks of the enemy. Hence we often find Irish Catholics who regard apostasy from the Democratic party as little less criminal than apostasy from the Church.

The leaders of the Democratic party, after the election to the Presidency of General Pierce, having adopted the Southern policy on the Slave question, the Democratic Catholics followed them and their Catholic brethren in the Southern states, and became strong and violent anti-abolitionists. They, also, became such by their prejudices against the Puritanism and Sabbath-worship, to which they supposed the Abolitionists in general to be addicted, and by the fact that the Abolitionists themselves coupled with their abolitionism various other *isms* peculiarly offensive to Catholics,—disunionism, woman's-rightsism, amalgamationism, free-love-ism, socialism, and, worse than all, Englishism, at least were charged with doing so. They were led by the Democratic press to regard the Abolitionists as miserable fanatics, the enemies alike of religion and civilization, and to believe that the peace and safety of the Union required their suppression. We can, then, easily explain their hostility to the Abolitionists without supposing them to be in the least attached to slavery or desirous of perpetuating a social condition always warred against by the Church.

We went as far in our hostility to the Abolitionists as

any of our Catholic brethren have gone. We regarded them as enemies to the Union of these States, and if not checked we thought them not unlikely to bring about secession or civil war. From 1838 to 1857 we were among their sturdiest opponents, and in our own sphere, we have done as much as any other man in the country to set Catholics against the abolition movement. Yet we know that all the time we were doing it we were an ingrained anti-slavery man, detesting slavery in every form, and desiring liberty for every man, whether white or black, yellow, red, or copper-colored. We have seen nothing to convince us that what we know was true of ourselves is not equally true of the majority of our Catholic brethren. The Union, or as we prefer to say, the *national* question with us always took, and still takes, precedence of the slavery question. We have always believed, and we believe to-day, that liberty and humanity are more interested in maintaining the national integrity and the Federal Constitution unimpaired, than they are in the abolition of negro slavery. So we have said and repeated any time during the last twenty years. Herein we have differed, differ still, and probably always shall differ from the Abolitionists. They place the slavery question before all others, and prefer a division of the Union to a union with slave-holding states. We have differed, still differ, and always shall differ with them on the question of negro equality. They demand the recognition of the negro not only as a man, and as a free man, but as the political and social equal of the white man. They are hardly willing to accept of emancipation unless coupled with negro equality, and we are hardly prepared to accept it if coupled with that equality. We recognize in the negro a man, and assert for him in their plenitude all the *natural* rights of man, but we do not believe him the equal of the white man, and we would not give him in society with white men equality in respect to those rights derived not immediately from his manhood, but mediately from political or civil society, and in this we express, we apprehend, the general sentiment of the Catholic population of this country.

But we have said the national question takes with us precedence of the slavery question. We would not endanger the peace or union of these States in order to abolish slavery; nor would we suffer the national integrity to be destroyed for the sake of preserving slavery. We hold

slavery, whether we speak of its abolition or its preservation, subordinate to the Union, or the national existence and welfare. When efforts either to abolish or to save slavery are incompatible with the preservation of the Union, we oppose them with all the zeal and energy we are master of. We opposed abolition, except by the action of the slaveholding States themselves, prior to the breaking out of the Rebellion, because we could not effect it without violating the Constitution, and endangering the integrity of the nation; we demand the abolition of slavery, now, because without it we do not believe it possible to suppress the Rebellion, vindicate the Constitution, re-establish over the rebellious states the Federal supremacy, and secure future peace and harmony between the North and the South. We believe emancipation is now both a military and a political necessity. Differing, as we have always differed, from the Abolitionists, in their theoretical views, we are, owing to the change of circumstances, practically with them on the single question of emancipation, and therefore deem it unwise and even dangerous to continue our old hostility to them. They are, at least, some of them, what we are not, conditional Union men. They are willing to accept the Union with emancipation, and we are willing to accept emancipation for the sake of the Union. They are conditional Union men, but unconditional Abolitionists. We are unconditional Union men, but conditional Abolitionists. We wish they were, like us, ready to accept the Union with or without slavery, but as we do not believe the Union possible with slavery, and as we want all the support for the Union we can get, we have no practical ground of quarrel with them, and can, up to a certain point, co-operate with them.

We do not like a late speech by Mr. Wendell Phillips. The spirit of that speech is: Let the Government proclaim emancipation and I will support it; let it refuse to do so and I will not support it, but perhaps oppose it. We say no such thing. We are as much dissatisfied with the policy of the administration on the slavery question, as strongly opposed to its half-way measures, and to its deference to Border-stateism, as he is or can be; but we must, in order to save the nation, sustain the Federal Government. Tell it plain truths, if you will, do all in your power to bring it up to your convictions, and to inspire it with wisdom and courage adequate to the wants of the country; but be loyal

to the national cause, which it is its duty to defend and promote.

The conditional loyalism of the extreme Abolitionists, consisting of a few hundreds, at most of a few thousands of individuals, may be censurable, but it is far less so than the conditional loyalism of the Border States, for liberty is more respectable than slavery, and a man can be more easily excused for insisting on conditions in favor of liberty than on conditions in favor of property. The least respectable species of property known to the laws of any state is property in slaves. Your Davises and Wickliffes of Kentucky are excellent Union men so long as the Union protects, your Phillipses and Garrisons so long as it will abolish, slavery; but as it is always more respectable to restore men to their liberty than it is to deprive them or to keep them deprived of it, save as a punishment for crime, we have a respect for the Abolitionists who would free the slaves at the expense of the Union, that we have not for the Border State men, who would sooner sacrifice the Union than let their slaves go free. Liberty is a right of all men, forfeitable only by crime, and all our natural instincts are in its favor, and revolt at slavery. Liberty is the principle and end of all our institutions, and the only real fault you can find with any man for asserting and defending liberty for all men, is in respect of the mode or means he adopts to secure it. He is right in principle and right in the end, and can be wrong only as to the means or medium. But slavery is always an abnormal condition, sometimes to be borne with for a season, as is a catarrh, a fever, a boil, rheumatism, or the gout, but never to be admired for its own sake, or regarded as an indication of moral and social health. It is always a moral, political, and social evil, and repelled by all that is free, generous, noble, or respectable in human nature. We confess, therefore, that we have a tolerance for the conditional loyalism of a Phillips which we have not and cannot have for a Wickliffe.

Moreover, the conditional loyalism of the Abolitionists is now, in the actual state of things, to say the least, perfectly harmless in practice, while that of the Border States joins hands with the Rebels, and is a grave obstacle to the suppression of the Rebellion, and the preservation of the national life and the integrity of the national territory. On the Border-states policy, which has been thus far that of the administration, all clear-headed statesmen see that it is im-

possible to save the Union. They see that it is necessary to make our election, either the Union and freedom, or slavery and no Union. The preservation of both is no longer a possibility. The Abolitionist loves the Union, but he hates slavery more, and in contending to-day for the abolition of slavery, he is not warring against the Union, but contending for a measure absolutely necessary to its preservation. His conditional loyalism, as things stand, is practically unconditional loyalism. Whatever may have been the cause of the Rebellion, it is now possible to suppress it, and guard against its recurrence only by appealing to the anti-slavery sentiment of the country, or to the American love of liberty. We need the sympathy and aid of humanity, and humanity will not aid us while we are seeking to perpetuate the grossest outrage upon her rights and dignity. The fault of the administration is, that it has not understood this; it has not felt the pulsations of the large human heart, or been aware that the strength of men is in the strength of man. In the most fearful national crisis it has conceived of nothing higher, nobler, stronger, than the tricks and combinations of second and third rate politicians. It has had no inspirations of genius, no sense of humanity, no understanding of the great moral laws of nations, no consciousness of the presence of God in human affairs. There has been as little genius in our administration as in our generals on the battle-field. In both we have had what democracy gives, common-place, respectable, laborious industry, honest intentions, but no statesman who comprehends the power of an idea, no general at the head of our army who comprehends the value of the dash, the enthusiasm, the *morale* of his troops. The abolition of slavery, as a military and political necessity, should have followed on the heels of the attack on Sumter, and been proclaimed in the President's first call for troops to put down the Rebellion. That abolition sooner or later must come, or the United States have ceased to exist, is now no longer a question. It is idle, therefore, to make war to-day on the Abolitionists, when, in order to save the Union, we must go practically as far as any of them insist on going.

Catholics have not been quicker than others, we confess, to see the altered circumstances of the country, which have entirely changed the position of the Abolition question. Ten years ago to demand of the Federal Government the abolition of slavery, was to endanger the peace and safety of the Union. To do it to-day, is to demand the means of

saving the Union and the national life. Here is the difference. This difference is not fully appreciated by Catholics any more than by a large number of non-Catholics. The Archbishop of New York, who we have good reason for believing, is a strong anti-slavery man, in his famous article against us last October, did not see it, nor did he see it in his efforts while abroad to manufacture public opinion in Europe against the immediate emancipation of American slaves, the purpose for which he was sent by his friend the Secretary of State, or at least one of the purposes. His article proves him nearly as short-sighted and as weak a statesman as Mr. Seward himself. He, in his article, writes as if the Rebellion had made no change in the bearing of the slavery question, as if it was necessary to continue to let off our double batteries on the one side against the Abolitionists of the North and on the other against the "fire-eaters" of the South, as the *New York Herald* has constantly done, and continues to do. There was a time when this was wise and just, when it was patriotic and statesmanlike; but it had ceased to be so when the business of the nation was not to ward off but to suppress rebellion. The course taken by his Grace of New York, and his organ, the *New York Herald*, had the effect of preventing Catholics from perceiving and appreciating the new and altered state of the question, and if the Union should be ultimately lost, few men in the country will have incurred a heavier responsibility for it than his Grace. No man has contributed more to keep up old party divisions, and to prevent the union of our people and government on a straightforward and decided policy, such as the crisis demanded. We doubt not his loyal intentions, but had he been decidedly disloyal, he could not have done us more harm. It is owing to the policy he has defended at home and abroad, that we are in our present condition, and that, at the time we are writing (September 3d), the Rebels are threatening our capital instead of our possessing theirs. We wish, therefore, that his Grace, while he insisted upon the people of his charge being loyal, and while he ordered, what he has not done, prayers for the success of our arms, he had judged it compatible with his duty to have refrained from interfering in the party strifes and political intrigues which have brought us to the brink of destruction. He has helped make confusion worse confounded, and done what was in him to place his Church and our poor Catholic people, on the question of slavery, in

a false position. Yet, could our Catholic population have been left to follow their Catholic instincts unwarped by politicians, and could they have been permitted to see that the abolition question had changed its bearing, and had become a question of saving, not of endangering the Union, they would have proved that they are Americans in their love of liberty, and in their detestation of slavery.

Even the Archbishop himself is opposed to slavery in the abstract, and declared himself so to M. Augustin Cochin in Paris, and he was a few years ago regarded by his friends here as a decided anti-slavery man, especially when his particular friends William H. Seward and Thurlow Weed were accounted anti-slavery men. His article against us we presume was inspired by those gentlemen, who persuaded him to adopt their policy of saving the Union by conciliating the party in arms against it, and by convincing them that we are determined to suppress the rebellion without disturbing the existing relation of master and slave—a policy which we should expect from such men as Weed and Seward, but which ought not to have been entertained a moment by the Archbishop of New York. It is the policy of narrow-minded and short-sighted politicians, not of a broad-minded and far-sighted statesman. There is nothing in it to command the respect of minds superior to common-place. Still we protest against regarding his Grace as in any sense a pro-slavery man. He may not be a statesman; he may not be able in political matters to rise above routine; he may not be always careful and exact in his expressions; but he is a Catholic prelate, a Christian, a man, and he must sympathize with freedom. Still more earnestly do we protest against its being concluded from any thing he has said or done, that Catholics, especially Irish Catholics, are in favor of or not opposed to negro slavery. We need but recollect the shout of universal indignation they raised against their favorite and countryman, John Mitchell, when he intimated his desire to own a plantation in Tennessee or Alabama, "well stocked with fat negroes." O'Connell, their representative man, refused to receive contributions to the Repeal Rent from Southern slaveholders, so strongly opposed was he in principle to slaveholding. It is the boast of the Irish that their nation was the first in the world to abolish slavery, and it would be absurd to suppose that a people that has been in a chronic rebellion of seven hundred years' standing in favor of liberty, can be otherwise

than opposed to slavery, and friendly to the oppressed everywhere.

The Catholic population of this country have been unfavorable to the agitation of slavery in the free States, because they have not believed the Federal government could emancipate the slaves without violating the Constitution. It has been their respect for the Constitution, not their love of slavery, that has made them anti-abolitionists. They are still opposed to the Abolitionists on the same ground. We must concede to them that in this they were right, and that the Federal government could not legally emancipate the slaves under the peace powers of the Constitution. But that Government has constitutionally both peace powers and war powers. Its war powers are as constitutional as its peace powers; and under its war powers, or Rights of War, *jura belli*, it has the right or the power to declare the slaves free. It can do it legally and constitutionally as a war measure. In asking the Government to do it now as a war measure, we ask no violation of the Constitution, and in no respect invade the sacredness of the rights of property it guaranties. Neither Congress nor the Administration could have done it before the civil war broke out, for the rights of war come into play only when war exists.

The mistake of our Catholic brethren, and of a large proportion of our countrymen generally, arises from their not distinguishing between the rights of peace and the rights of war, and not understanding that in a civil war the Government has against the rebels all the rights of a sovereign, and in addition all the rights of a belligerent. The sovereign loses by the rebellion none of his rights as sovereign, and is absolved by it, in relation to the rebels, of all duty of protection, whether of life, liberty, or property. Till they submit, they are out of his protection, and, in case the rebellion assumes the dimensions of a civil war, he has against them all the rights of war as recognized by the law of nations, *jus gentium*, that he would have were they a foreign enemy. When they have thrown down their arms and submitted, the sovereign has no longer the rights of war against them, but simply the rights of peace. Hence the punishment he can inflict on them after their submission, after the war is over, is determined by the peace powers, and not by the war powers of the Constitution. War no longer existing, only the peace powers can be lawfully exercised.

These distinctions are important, and if they had been clearly understood and appreciated in the beginning, we should have been spared the strange anomalies we have seen in both Congress and the Administration. The Administration seems to have had no lawyer in its service, capable of advising it, and has acted as if its war powers were controlled by its peace powers, and while waging war against the rebels it has required its generals to conduct it on peace principles. It need surprise no one that they have everywhere failed, and that after fifteen months of severe and bloody fighting, we are not so far advanced as we were in the commencement. The Administration has seemed to proceed on the supposition that while fighting the Rebels it owed them the protection it owed them in time of peace, and was as much bound to protect them as it is to protect loyal citizens. Congress, while it did not hesitate to raise armies, arm and equip them to shoot down rebels, hesitated about the right to confiscate their property, and a more complete stultification on the part of both Congress and the Executive than the confiscation bill actually passed cannot easily be imagined. The President refused to sign a bill confiscating the realty of the Rebels for any longer period than the natural life of the person attained, and yet signed a bill which confiscates absolutely and forever their personal property. The Constitution makes no distinction between the two classes of property. If it is unconstitutional to confiscate real property for a longer period than the traitor's natural life, it is equally unconstitutional to confiscate for a longer period his personal property. If it is not unconstitutional to confiscate forever the personal property, it cannot be to confiscate the real. The whole difficulty on the part both of Congress and the Administration grows out of the lack of clear views of the distinction between the rights of peace and the rights of war. If Congress in passing a law defining and punishing treason, is acting under the rights of peace, it is restricted in its action by the specific clauses in the Constitution; but in passing a confiscation act as a war measure, it is acting under the rights of war, and is restricted only by the law of nations, and its own judgment of what is expedient or inexpedient.

So of emancipation. Congress has no right to enact and the executive has no right to proclaim emancipation in any of the States held to be still existing as states, as a peace

measure, or under the rights of peace, for under the rights of peace neither has any jurisdiction in the case. Neither can touch it, save under the rights of war, as a war measure. But as a war measure neither is restricted by the peace powers of the Constitution, or is restricted at all, except by the *jus gentium* or law of nations, regulating civilized warfare. The Government is free to adopt the measure or not, as it judges expedient. It can, unquestionably, adopt it as a war measure, without any violation of the Constitution; for the Constitution itself confers on it all the rights of war recognized by the law of nations. Hence our Catholic brethren need have no constitutional scruples as to the emancipation of the slaves, as a war measure. While the civil war lasts, the Government, either the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, or Congress, or both, have the clear constitutional right to adopt the measure, and the slaves so freed would be recognized as free by the law of nations; for the law of nations recognizes manumission, and treats the manumitted as free; therefore, as legally emancipated.

Catholics, no doubt, have to some extent, been prejudiced against emancipation as a policy, by the misrepresentation which has obtained respecting the horrors of San Domingo, and the selfish apprehension that the freed negroes would come North and compete with them in the Northern labor market. This touches not the right of the Government to adopt emancipation, but the expediency of doing so. The horrors of San Domingo, we may remark in passing, were occasioned not by emancipating, but by refusing to emancipate the slaves. If the proclamation of emancipation should excite fears of a servile insurrection, it would not be a thing to alarm us, as it would only compel the rebels to keep at home, to protect their own wives and children; their houses and plantations, those forces which they are now able to employ in the field against the Government, and in cutting the throats of loyal citizens. This would be a reason for adopting, not for refusing to adopt the measure. We must not suffer our maudlin sentimentality to ruin our country, and cause the destruction of the nation. We should be much better pleased to see the rebel troops employed in protecting Southern homes, and Southern property, than in killing the flower of our youth, and carrying sorrow and bereavement into the bosom of every loyal family in the land. Our sympathies are with the loyal,

not with the disloyal, and we weep more for the family bereaved of a father, a son, or a brother, by a foul murder, than we do for the murderer about to expiate his crime on the gallows. Our modern sympathy with rogues and criminals; our misdirected humanity, and our mis-named philanthropy, are giving us over a prey to the spoiler. Let us learn to respect the experience of mankind. The fear that the freed negroes will come North as competitors in the market with white labor, is one Christian men should not indulge, and is also an unfounded fear. They come North now, because they cannot remain free at the South, but let the Southern States be free soil, and they will prefer to remain in those States, for the climate is more congenial to them, and they have strong local attachments. Besides, it is probable, when the war is over, if successful for the Union, provision will be made to facilitate the migration of the colored population to a still more southern region, outside of the United States, where there will be no prejudices of color, to keep them forever an inferior class.

These things, no doubt, have operated to make Catholics unfriendly to the policy of emancipation, but they do not prove that they are in favor of perpetuating negro slavery on this continent. The great body of the Catholics at the North, though by no means partial to the negro race, are anti-slavery in sentiment. For various reasons, given heretofore in these pages, they have more sympathy, or imagine they have more sympathy, with the Southern people, aside from their present rebellion, and criminal attitude toward the nation, than with the people of the North, especially of New England; but they are not pro-slavery men, and when they think seriously on the subject, wish that slavery should not be perpetuated. We have, in our intercourse with them, found very few Catholics in the Southern States even, who did not profess to us a dislike of slavery, and in Charleston, New Orleans, and St. Louis, we have expressed in public, strong anti-slavery sentiments to Catholic audiences, and been applauded to the echo for them. Catholics in the seceded States have, no doubt, been tainted with the political heresy of State sovereignty, and have therefore supposed that they owe a paramount allegiance to their State, and are bound to obey her when she secedes; but we have not found them, in general, favorable to slavery. They do not like Northern interference with what is called the peculiar "institution" of the South, but more because

a contravention of State sovereignty, than because hostile to slavery. There is, while we are writing, confined in Fort Warren, living on Government rations, a Southern Catholic gentleman, one of the most intimate and highly esteemed friends we ever had, and one of the most noble-minded and honorable men we have ever been acquainted with, who never owned a slave, and who has more than once assured us that he could never reconcile it to his feelings or to his conscience to be a slaveholder. He was disloyal to the Union, only because he held the doctrine of State sovereignty, and believed that the Union in using force to coerce a seceding State, outrages and denies that sovereignty. A more loyal man, according to his understanding of loyalty, never lived, and in opposing, in his capacity as lawyer, and member of the Legislature of his State, the action of the Federal government in its attempts to coerce a seceding State, he was, in his own mind, opposing simply usurpation, not legitimate authority. The Catholics in the Southern army are fighting not to perpetuate slavery, but to sustain State sovereignty. They are wrong, and yet the doctrine of State sovereignty is virtually insisted on by more than one of our Northern Governors, as strenuously as by them. The Federal government has to combat State sovereignty in the loyal, hardly less than in the disloyal States. Hence so many of its embarrassments.

The fact is, the political heresy of State sovereignty is not confined to the States in arms against the Government, and, save a few arbitrary acts, this war has been conducted by the Federal government as the agent of the States, rather than as the supreme government of the land. We have never accepted the true issue. We have accepted, at least acted on, State sovereignty principles, and have not dared to assert National principles. Our State governors have acted and are acting as much on State sovereignty principles as Pickens, Brown, Pettus, or Moore. Our Federal government has acted less as a supreme National government, than has the so-called Confederate government itself. Neither side is true to itself. We owe our embarrassments, and our reverses, to our failure to oppose National sovereignty to State sovereignty, and the rebels owe their successes to their disregard of the State sovereignty principle on which they justify their rebellion. Here is the reason why, as yet, neither side has gained a decisive victory. The real question at issue is not slavery or abolition, but, are the United States a nation, one political people,

possessing national sovereignty in its plentitude, or are they a mere aggregation of sovereign states? The emancipation of the slaves is, in our judgment, a necessary war measure which the Government should adopt without a moment's delay, but the real question is between National sovereignty and State sovereignty, and till that question is met squarely and fairly, there will be nothing settled. It is because this issue as not made up at first, because, while the Southern States asserted for itself each its own sovereignty, the Federal government failed to make a clear and distinct assertion of the National sovereignty, that our Confessors found themselves obliged to give absolution to their penitents, who, by a law of their State, took up arms against the Union. In the unsettled state of the controversy, they could do no less. Catholics were generally attached to the Democratic party, and that party has generally asserted State sovereignty. Our own writings have done not a little to accredit that doctrine among Catholics, for when we had the most influence with them, we held, defended, and labored to prove, that the sovereignty is not in the Nation, in the States united, but in the States severally. We maintained that heresy for years, and it was only when we saw some of its practical developments, that we began slowly to distrust and abandon it. Catholics generally adopted it, and many of them hold it still. Prior to the outbreak of the civil war, a Catholic newspaper published in Ohio was in favor of the South, and defended decidedly secession principles. After the war broke out, it professed to defend the Union, not indeed on National principles, but on State sovereignty principles. Ohio, it said, having declared for the Union, it was bound, as loyal to Ohio, to sustain the Federal cause.

No argument, for these reasons, can be deduced from the conduct of Catholics to prove that the Church is not opposed to slavery. Moreover, it is seldom safe to infer the doctrine or the spirit of the Church from the practice of Catholics. Nothing is more certain than that the Church condemns the African slave-trade, and did condemn it before the discovery of this continent by Columbus, when first carried on by the Portuguese. Yet Catholics were the first importers of slaves into this continent, and Catholics, or nominal Catholics, Portuguese, Spanish, or Hispano-Americans are still the principal slavers, and, save the United States, the only Christian countries in which slavery now exists are Catholic countries. All the Protestant States, and France, whose

government is neither Catholic nor Protestant, have abolished slavery in their colonies, and even schismatic Russia is freeing her serfs, while Spain, Portugal, and Brazil retain negro slavery. Yet it is in spite of the Church they do it, as it is in spite of the Church that Catholics continue in all countries practices their religion condemns.

The Church, it is true, does not teach with modern Abolitionism that slavery is always, everywhere, and under all circumstances, a sin in the individual slaveholder; for she gives absolution to the slaveholder, providing he accuses himself only of simple slaveholding, without demanding as its condition the manumission of his slaves. This proves that she does not regard slaveholding as necessarily a sin, or a sin *per se*, in every individual slaveholder. But it does not follow from this that she approves of slavery, that she does not oppose it, or that she does not regard it as a moral, political, and social wrong, which every individual, according to his lights and means, is bound to do all that he can to mitigate or abolish. Not every individual who participates in a social wrong, and even derives advantages from it, is necessarily a sinner, for often his participation may be a social necessity, and may be innocent on his part, because he sees and intends no wrong in it. Despotism is a great moral, political, and social wrong, but not therefore is every man living under a despotism a sinner, who derives advantages from it, or who does not engage in efforts to overthrow it—efforts which might be fruitless, or which might result in more evil than good. Every man who reduces or aids in reducing a freeman to slavery, is a sinner; but a man who has inherited slaves from his parents or his ancestors, may retain them in bondage without sin, although it is probable that ordinarily he does *not*. Such is the doctrine of the Church as we collect it from her practice and the teaching of her Moral Theologians.

But the Church does not and cannot tolerate what is called chattel slavery—the slavery recognized and sustained by the laws of the Southern States, for she regards as a man, and treats as a person, the humblest African slave. She restricts the bondage to reasonable or moderate bodily service, asserting at all times, in all places, and under all circumstances, the moral freedom of the bondman. The bondman is for her a man, a moral being, with a conscience of his own, which the master may not under any pretence whatever invade. She places the bondman and the master

under one and the same moral and spiritual law ; and makes each alike accountable for his own deeds before the Divine Tribunal. She denies with all her divine energy that man has or can have dominion or property in man, and therefore that one man can have any right to exact the bodily service of another, save in consideration of benefits conferred. God, St. Augustine teaches, and in this gives the real doctrine of the Church, gave to man dominion over the irrational creation, but not over the rational. Hence the first governors of mankind, he says, were called pastors, not lords, *pastores non domini*. One may owe service to another, as the son owes service to his father, and even the wife to her husband ; but this does not imply that one is the lord of another, that is, his owner or proprietor. "The relation of master and slave," said Mr. Calhoun to us, in one of his long conversations with us in 1840-'41, "is indefensible. We never call our people our *slaves*, but speak of them as our *people*. The relation between them and us is that of guardian and ward. We are their guardians, and they are our wards, and we defend the relation on the ground that they are virtually minors, and incapable of acting or providing for themselves." We cite his words, because he so far agrees with the Church, that he repudiates the doctrine that one man can be the lord, owner, or proprietor of another, and concedes that the master owes to the servant an equivalent for the services he exacts. In calling the slave a ward, he plainly concedes that he is a *person*, and therefore logically entitled to all the rights essential to personality.

The Church always insists on Christian marriage for the slave, and in doing so asserts that he is a person, not a thing, a moral agent, not a simple chattel ; for according to her, marriage is a sacrament, and none but persons endowed with free will can be its recipients. Marriage, she teaches, is also a contract, a free voluntary contract, and therefore none but persons capable of contracting can enter into the marriage relation, and the common doctrine of her theologians is, that the *contrahentes* or contracting parties are the minister of the sacrament of matrimony, and none but persons can be the ministers of a sacrament. Certainly, the Church holds bondmen are capable of Christian marriage, and she treats infidelity to the marriage relation in slaves precisely as she does in freemen. In treating the bond as capable of Christian marriage, she asserts them to be persons, therefore capable of family, and hence of a domi-

cile, all of which is incompatible with chattel slavery. Hence we find chattel slavery, after the introduction of Christianity, gradually disappearing from all Christianized Europe. The doctrine of the Church necessarily, where it was received, if it did not at once free the slave, converted him from a thing to a person, from a chattel slave to a vassal or serf; whence in time, he became a free peasant, or freeman.

The Church is therefore necessarily opposed to slavery as it exists in our Southern States, for, notwithstanding the fine theory of wardship developed by Mr. Calhoun, slavery in them all is chattel slavery. Legally the slaves are things, property, not persons, at least as to all civil relations, though in criminal relations the law, by an inconsistency that operates to his disadvantage and to the advantage of the master, the slave is treated as a person, and held to be capable of crime. The law recognizes no Christian marriage between slaves, no family of slaves, or rights of family, and the masters seldom respect in them the relation of husband and wife or parent and child. He claims to own both the male and the female, and he regards their offspring as he does the increase of his flocks and herds. The man and woman are regarded as united only temporarily, or so long as it may suit the convenience or pleasure of their owners, and they themselves usually consider their union only as transitory. Hence our missionaries do not treat it as marriage, except when the parties are Catholics, and have been married by a Catholic priest. To a Catholic mind the state in which the slaves are living is far more revolting than the violent rending asunder of family ties; for it is a state incompatible with the practical observance of Christian morality. The almost universal concubinage which takes the place of marriage among the slaves is a thing the Church does not and cannot tolerate; and were Christian marriage introduced and legally recognized among them, it would instantly relieve Southern slavery of one of its greatest horrors, put an end to its chattel character, and convert it into serfage or villanage, and make the slaves *ad scripti glebæ*, fixed to the realty—the first step in the progress from slavery to freedom. Their moral and personal rights, with the rights of family, would soon follow, and the opportunity for improvement and gradual elevation in the social scale, in some measure, be secured. Villanage may co-exist with Christian marriage, chattel slavery cannot.

The Fathers of the Church usually treat slavery as a penalty, as a punishment for crime or sin, not as his Grace of New York and a learned writer in his "official organ" maintain, as a penalty for original sin, for original sin is the sin of the race, and all men have alike incurred its penalty, the free as well as the bond. Remotely, slavery may no doubt be traced to original sin, as may all social evils; but the Fathers of the Church do not mean that, when they assert the penal and therefore expiatory character of slavery. They have in mind the *jus gentium* or law of nations as asserted by Roman jurisprudence. The law of nations as enforced by the Roman courts, recognized the lawfulness of the slavery of captives taken in a just war, and treated it as a commutation of the punishment of death which they had incurred. "Jure enim naturali omnes homines ab initio liberi nascebuntur," say the *Institutes* of Justinian. "Servitus autem est constitutio juris gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subjectis. Servi autem ex eo appellati sunt, quod Imperatores captivos vendere, ac per hoc *servare* nec occidere solent." The law of nations, as originally interpreted, allowed the sovereign to put to death the subjects of a foreign prince taken captive in a just war. This rested on the principle that the entire nation against which a prince, may lawfully wage war, has forfeited its existence, and the prince may lawfully slay any of its subjects that he can get hold of. We see traces not a few of this in the Old Testament. But, if the conqueror could lawfully destroy the nation, or put the captives taken in war to death, he could of course, spare their lives and inflict on them the milder punishment of selling them into slavery; and hence slavery would in some sense be an act of mercy, inasmuch as it *saved* them from the extreme penalty incurred, as the Roman jurists asserted. It was in this way that slavery was introduced, and on this ground it was recognized by the law of nations, though confessedly contrary to nature, the natural law, or the natural freedom with which all men were originally born.

It will be seen from this that slavery, as a constitution of the law of nations, is justified only on the ground that it is a penalty—a punishment for crime. The citizens or subjects of a state or nation were considered as *solidaire* with the state itself, and answerable jointly and severally for its offences. This idea of slavery as a penalty for sin, the sin of the slaves themselves, of their nation, or of their forefathers, is that recognized by the Christian Fathers. They,

therefore, exhort the slaves to bear their servitude patiently, and to make it, as they may, a means of expiating their sin, and of promoting their own sanctity and final glorification in Christ. Slavery or servitude, as a penalty for crime, the only slavery we ever find countenanced, in principle, by the law of nations, or the Fathers, the Church has never, to our knowledge, condemned; and it is not condemned even by our extreme Abolitionists. It is condemned by nobody, except certain theorists, who condemn all punishment, and deny that man can be justly compelled to expiate any offence of which he may have been guilty. The Fathers and Doctors of the Church have never, to our knowledge, approved or favored involuntary servitude, except as a penalty or an expiation. But through the influence of Christian principles, developed and applied first by the Church and then by Christian society, the law of nations which justified slavery, the slavery of captives, has been greatly modified. That law centuries since has ceased to permit captives taken in war to be either put to death or to be reduced to slavery. Prisoners taken in war might, late in the middle ages, indeed, be held to ransom, but in all Christian nations they are now required to be set at liberty on the return of peace, and the victorious prince seeks indemnification for his wrongs and expenses from the nation through its government, not from subjects or citizens individually. This change in the law of nations, which sweeps away every vestige of the slavery known to that law in Roman jurisprudence, is due to the Church, and therefore we have the right to say that she is opposed to slavery.

The children of slaves were held to be slaves on the ground that their parents had lost their personality, were chattels, simply property, and their increase, like the increase of any other kind of property, was the property of the master. This, in ancient times, was less remarked than it would be in modern times, because the ancients indulged less in slave breeding than the moderns, reared comparatively few slaves, and relied chiefly on fresh captives taken in war to keep up the supply of the slave market. But the Church, wherever she gained a footing and acquired a predominating influence, exerted herself to put an end to the practice of punishing the innocent offspring for the real or supposed crimes and offences of the parents. She did it by treating the bond as *persons*, not as *things*, and insisting on the right of Christian marriage, which, as we have said, logi-

cally implies the right of family and domicile. The prelates of the Church, far less the common people, do not always see or suspect at once all the consequences which follow from the principles they assert, when teaching or accepting Christianity, and thus often tolerate or find excuses for continuing practices the Church, when her principles are fully developed and carried out, decidedly condemns. Some of them have not much logical capacity to boast of, for not every prelate is a great man, though filling a great office; some of them are indolent, and are quite willing to let things go on as they found them, and spare themselves the labor and trouble of reforming them; some see clearly enough what is needed, but they see also so many difficulties in the way of effecting it, or are so persuaded that society is not ripe for it, that they are appalled by the magnitude of the work to be done, and shrink from undertaking it; some see, undertake, and by their rashness, imprudence, or want of judgment or tact, only make bad worse; so it is that centuries elapse before evils, confessed to be evils, are redressed. It is only when God sends a man of genius, who may or may not pertain to the hierarchy, as he sent prophets under the old Dispensation, that much real advance is ever effected in the practical development and application of Catholic principles. Yet from time to time He does send the man of genius, and, though ill-received at first, and looked upon as a restless agitator, as a disturber of the peace, and a seditious fellow, he gradually succeeds in making his voice heard. His words are listened to, and his rich and living thoughts enter into the heart of his age, and become the patrimony of his race. Then the old is changed, the new development is installed, the world advances, and ameliorations long demanded are effected.

We know the principles of the Church, and we are not confined to the applications made of them by our predecessors. We, in our age, have understanding and logic as well as they had in theirs. We can, having those principles, judge for ourselves as well as they could for themselves. Any one who knows and understands the principles of the Church, knows that she is and must be opposed to slavery, and in favor of freedom for all men, whatever their complexion or the condition in which they were born. She asserts the unity of the race, and that by nature all men are free and equal. She treats the negro as a man, and a man with all the rights and properties of an individual

of the human race. For her the negro is of the race of Adam, created by the same God, redeemed by the same Incarnate Saviour, and destined to the same heaven as the white man. She makes no difference as to their moral and spiritual rights between white men and black men. She has for both the same baptismal, marriage, and burial service, the same doctrine and morality, the same sacraments, the same worship, the same communion, the same promises, the same duties, the same privileges, the same hopes. She takes her Levites and consecrates her Priests from both, as she finds them qualified. In this very country of ours, so full of prejudices against the negro, men with large admixture of negro blood, born of slave mothers, are now ministering at her altars, and St. Augustine, the greatest of the Latin fathers, was certainly an African, and some maintain a negro. We have ourselves received Holy Communion with a negro next on either side of us. She sends out her missionaries to Africa to convert the negroes to her faith, and recently some of her consecrated priests visited the Court of Dahomey, and were favorably received by the king, who granted them permission to convert his subjects. Some of the most pious and devoted Catholics we have ever known, were full-blooded negroes. Certain it is, then, that the Church holds that negroes, equally with the whites, may share in the Regeneration or Palingenesia, and then that they share equally in Genesis, and are, by origin, of the same race, for they could not share in the former without sharing in the latter. Our Lord redeems us, sanctifies and glorifies us, by assuming our nature, and the nature he assumed was taken from the white variety. The Blessed Virgin was a white woman, not a black woman. Our Lord, in assuming her nature, could not have assumed the nature of the negro, unless the black and the white have only one and the same identical nature, and, therefore, do and must pertain to one and the same identical race. If the negro were not of the same race, how could he have shared in Adam's sin, since this was the sin of the race, not the sin of the individual? If he does not participate, through identity of race, in the sin of Adam, in original sin, what, in his case, is the use or meaning of baptism?

There is here no need of argument. The moment it is seen that the Church holds the negro child over the baptismal font, pours on his head the baptismal waters, and introduces him into the Regeneration, it is seen that she holds

him to be a man, sprung from the race of Adam, sharing its infirmities, its wants, its privileges, its hopes, its glories. If he were of a different race, to baptize him would be as unmeaning, would be as great a profanation, as to baptize a horse, an ox, or a cannon. It is, then, certain that the Church teaches that the negro is a man, and therefore as a man the equal of any other man. To enslave him, then, is just as great an offence in her eyes, as it is to enslave a white man. This narrows the question down to the simple rights of man, eliminates from it all considerations of color, and puts the negro and the white in the same category. Now, does the Church teach that one man has the right to enslave another? that the equal has the right to enslave his equal, or that an equal can be the lord and proprietor of his equal? She can do no such thing, for if $A = A$ she cannot say while conceding it, that A is *plus* A or *minus* A . The negro may have departed farther from the primitive type than has the white man, but that has nothing to do with his rights as a man. In the view of the Church, however widely he may have departed, he is a man still. My neighbor may be inferior to me in capacity, in physical strength, in external comeliness, in learning, in intellectual culture and attainments, even in morality, but that does not prevent him from having the same *natural* rights as a man that I have. One man may have certain acquired rights, certain social and political rights, that another has not, and the two may be unequal in property, in social position and influence, in political franchises, power, or trust, but if both are equally men, both have equal natural rights—what we in this country call the rights of man—and among which the American people have solemnly declared are “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

The Church evidently agrees with the law of nations, as interpreted by Roman jurisprudence, that all men are originally born free, that servitude is against nature, and that a man can be deprived of his liberty only in punishment for crime. On this point there is no question, and no need of citing authorities. The Church accepts the natural law, and by the natural law man equals man the world over. The proposition that all men are born equal, is as self-evident as the formula $A = A$. The differences between man and man are accidental, not essential. If then, by nature, man equals man, then by nature, or the law of nature, no man has or can have dominion of man, and no man

is the property or the subject of another. Slavery or servitude is, then, as the Roman law declares it, "*Constitutio juris gentium* CONTRA NATUREM." Hence, under the Civil Law, as under the Common Law, the presumption is always in favor of liberty, and no one is obliged to prove himself a free man. The law treats him as free until he is proved to be not free. The claimant must prove the man he claims is a slave before he can take him.

If all men are born free and equal, one man can be the slave of another only by some sin or crime that forfeits his natural freedom. This is what we understand the Church to teach; and if she taught any thing else she would stultify herself, which it were blasphemy to suppose. The Church teaches more than natural reason can comprehend—truths which transcend reason, and pertain to an order above reason; but she teaches nothing in contravention of reason, and nothing which, so far as it is addressed to our understanding, is not reasonable. There is no discrepancy as there is no separation between faith and reason, and hence Melchior Cano, in his *Locis Theologicis*, makes reason one of the topics or sources whence we may ascertain what it is the Church teaches. The Church undoubtedly does teach that natural liberty may be lost by sin, and that involuntary servitude for crime is defensible. But this is the full extent she goes. She does not teach that it is right to reduce captives taken in war to servitude, for the law of nations which formerly authorized it, has been modified under her influence, and she prohibits the African slave-trade, which she could hardly do if she held it to be lawful to reduce captives to slavery, for most of the slaves brought from Africa are captives taken in war. We have disposed of the question of color, which in her eyes is neither a sin nor a crime; and besides, if to be black were a sufficient reason for reduction to slavery, why should she prohibit the "nefarious traffic," as she calls it, "in blacks?" It is evident from her interdiction under severe pains and penalties of all traffic in blacks, that she does not consider either the complexion, or the peculiarities, moral and physical, of the negro family, such an offence against God or society, as to warrant the reduction of negroes to slavery. Nor does she consider the fact, that men, white men or black men, are infidels, pagans, Obi worshippers, a good reason for making them slaves; for if she did, she would place no interdict on the importation of Africans as slaves into the American states or colonies, since

they are nearly all infidels and idolaters. Catholics have sometimes pretended, in order to gratify their revenge or feed their cupidity, that infidel, and especially Moorish and negro captives may be sold into slavery, if they refuse to be baptized. Charlemagne so held, if we may judge from his practice in the case of the conquered Saxons in the ninth century; but his treatment of them has remained a blot on his memory, and the Church has never approved of it, or countenanced in others any thing of the sort. She asserts for infidels, pagans, Jews, Mahometans, all the natural rights of man—the same natural rights that she does for Christians or Catholics; for she does not hold that grace abrogates the natural law. Her doctrine is, that grace supposes nature, that the supernatural accepts and completes the natural, but does not supersede it. Hence non-Christian princes retain their natural right to the allegiance of their Christian subjects. Faith, moreover, is voluntary, and must, if accepted at all, be freely accepted, and in no case coerced.

The fact that the parents are slaves, is not with the Church a sufficient reason for enslaving the children, for she denies in the outset the principle on which hereditary bondage rests for its only defence, namely: the parents are chattels, not persons; she does not permit the proverb, "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge." She does not allow the children to be punished for the crimes of their fathers. Her doctrine is, that each man must answer for himself, and be rewarded or punished in this world as in the next, according to his own deeds, and not according to the deeds of another. As she always treats the slave as a moral person, and claims for him the right of Christian marriage, therefore of family, she necessarily recognizes the personality of the offspring, and the offspring as owing service to the owner of the parents only so far as they are indebted to him for benefits which he has conferred upon them, such as care, nursing, food and clothing, in their infancy and childhood, before being able, by their labor, to earn their own living. Beyond, they own their own labor; own, indeed, themselves. Hereditary bondage the Church may, in given times and places, find it necessary to tolerate, as Moses tolerated divorce, on account of the intractableness of the people, but she never approves it; never teaches that it is just, and always labors to mitigate it, and ceases not in her efforts till she brings society up to its abolition. No doubt children suffer for the crimes and faults of their pa-

rents even to the third and fourth generations, and it is in the order of Providence that it should be so, as the Archbishop of New York justly maintains in his article against us; but the enslavement of the offspring for the sin and offences of the parents, is not included in this order, is not a natural and inevitable consequence of the sins of the father. It is clear, that if, as we have seen, slavery is lawful only as a penalty for crime, the children, however much they may accidentally suffer from the slavery of their parents, can no more than could the parents themselves be reduced to slavery, except for their own crimes.

But, furthermore, the Church does not confine herself to a merely passive opposition to slavery. She holds and teaches the great principles of Catholic civilization. No doubt, many Catholic writers confine themselves exclusively to the purely ascetic relations of man, and forget that Catholicity if catholic, that is, universal, embraces both time and eternity, the natural and the supernatural, nature and grace, religion and civilization, the relation of man to his Maker and his relations to his neighbor and to society. To labor for the highest order of civilization is as much man's duty as to labor to save his soul; and his duties to society are no less sacred than his duties to God;—indeed his duties to his God include his duties to society, and those cannot be discharged without discharging these. No man is faithful to God who is faithless to society. No man can love God and hate his brother, for if he loves not his brother whom he hath seen, how shall he love God whom he hath not seen? The Catholic, if true to the letter and the spirit of his Church, is never indifferent to any political or social wrong or evil, and is always in earnest to ameliorate the social as well as the individual condition of his fellow-men. The duty insisted on by the Church of alms-deeds, is not fulfilled by throwing a penny to a beggar, or dealing out to him a bowl of soup at the convent gate; but it demands that each one, in his degree and according to his ability, should work earnestly and perseveringly for the amelioration of the condition of all men both individually and socially, for time and eternity. "Do good to all men as you have opportunity." Our Lord condemns, and the Church as his spouse condemns the sluggard, the merely negative character, who though he does no positive harm, does no positive good. He condemns the lukewarm, and requires people to be either hot or cold. He declares the servant who wraps the talent he re-

ceives in a clean napkin and buries it in the earth, and preserves and restores it entire to his Lord on his coming to reckon with his servants, a wicked and slothful servant, and dooms him to outer darkness, not because he had wasted his talent, but because he had not put it out to the usurers so that he could "receive his own with increase." He demands positive characters, earnest, energetic characters, who have positive virtues, and work to promote a positive good. The admonition to the children of Israel was, "Cease to do evil, learn to do well."

Hence the Church is never content with simply disapproving of slavery, with simply letting it alone, or doing nothing to uphold it. She regards it as a wrong, as an outrage upon manhood, a crime against civilization, a sin against God, and therefore requires on the part of all her children an active opposition to it. She knows that where it is wide-spread and deep-rooted in a community it cannot be abolished by simple individual action, and therefore does not impose, under pain of sin, the obligation upon each individual slaveholder to manumit instantly all his slaves, although she applauds him when he does so, honors him for his virtue and his sacrifice; she knows that the wrong is social rather than individual, and must be redressed by the social or collective action of the slaveholding community; but she does require each and every individual to do what he can as a member of the community, to bring it up to the point, and to induce it to take the action necessary for redressing. Every evil she opposes she requires her children individually and socially to oppose, and to do their best to remove. This is a point which Catholics too often overlook. Because the Church does not make the immediate emancipation of his slaves by the individual slaveholder a condition *sine qua non* of absolution in every instance, they are apt to conclude that she is not opposed to slavery, and that they are not required by their religion to make any active efforts for its abolition. So they do nothing, and let the evil continue, and grow till it brings on a social convulsion. Know they not that sloth is one of the seven deadly sins, and that the slothful servant who buried his talent in the earth, was cast into outer darkness? Whatever the Church does not approve, she actively opposes, and whatever she actively opposes she requires her children to exert themselves actively, wisely, no doubt, but actively and energetically to remove.

Hence, the Church, though tolerating, to a certain extent and under certain conditions, the holding of slaves, is always actively an emancipationist, and requires her children to be the same, as the illustrious Bishop of Orleans amply proves in the admirable Letter to the Clergy of his Diocese, now before us. Not having any political power or means of social action in the United States, he can only express his sentiments, and call on his clergy to pray for the emancipation of our slaves. Pope Pius IX., gloriously reigning, has just shown the view of the subject taken by the Chief Pastor of the Church, for he has just conferred a knightship on M. Augustin Cochin, expressly for his recent admirable work on the Abolition of Slavery, heretofore noticed in this Review, while we are not aware that he has publicly honored our illustrious Archbishop for his attack on the abolitionists or his mistaken defence of slavery and the slave-trade.

The Church is certainly anti-slavery and abolitionist, for she has abolished slavery in all the States of Europe, none of which now recognize slavery, save in some of their American colonies. But unquestionably, she does not proceed rashly in her work of abolition, or translate ordinarily by a single bound the individual from a slave to a free man. She looks to the preservation of society, to its well-being, as well as to the liberation and well-being of the slave. This is wise and just, for social changes should as far as possible be effected without social shocks or convulsions. We should, if we were dealing with the question as a peace measure in time of peace, and in a country whose government has by its constitution supreme jurisdiction of it at all times and under all circumstances, be ourselves opposed to instantaneous and complete emancipation. We would proceed gradually, securing to the slave—first his moral rights as a person, his right of Christian marriage, therefore the right of family and domicile. We would convert the slave into a serf, and in due time the serf into a free peasant. But we are not now dealing with abolition as a peace measure, in time of peace, but as a war measure, in time of war, which makes all the difference in the world. And as a war measure, to be of any avail, it must be immediate, sudden, and complete. It is not as a moral, economical, or social question we are now to consider it; but as a military question. As a peace question we have always agreed and should now agree with the great majority of the Catholic population of this country, but as a war measure we are obliged to con-

sider it under its military aspects only, and to deal with it according to the exigencies of the war.

The hesitancy in Catholic or in non-Catholic minds about adopting the emancipation policy does not spring, we apprehend, from any love of slavery, or any lack of hostility to its perpetuation on the free soil of America; but from not distinguishing sharply between emancipation as a peace measure adopted for the sake of emancipation, and emancipation as a war measure adopted not for the sake of emancipation, but for the sake of the nation, as a means of weakening the power of the rebels, and enlisting on the side of the nation, struggling to save its integrity and life, the moral aid or the sympathy of all Christian and civilized nations. It is the confusion of the two questions, which obtains in most minds, that disturbs the judgment of nearly the whole American people. This confusion is in great danger of proving, if it has not already proved fatal to us. Some among us want the war a war of abolition; others, and a much larger number, imagine that if the liberation of the slaves be decreed, it will be a war of abolition, and in an abolition war our armies will not fight, unless on the *other* side. Both of these parties, in our judgment, are wrong. This is and should be no war for abolition. Slavery *per se* enters into it, and should enter, for nothing. The war is to save the life of the nation and the integrity of the national territory, and to vindicate the supremacy of the national government. The abolition of slavery we demand not as an end, but as a means of prosecuting this war to a successful issue. On the slavery question, as a peace question, we presume we agree substantially with Generals Halleck, McClellan, Burnside, and the great majority of the officers of the regular army, as well as with the President, Secretary of State, and the Postmaster-General. There are insuperable constitutional objections to it as a peace measure, and we yield to no man in our respect for the constitution; but as a war measure there is no more Constitutional objection to it than there is to firing upon the enemy's troops drawn up in line of battle, in capturing or sinking a rebel man-of-war, or in taking possession of a rebel town or village. We demand the measure as a means of prosecuting the war with success, as a means of damaging the enemy, and forcing him into submission. The very purpose of war is to damage the enemy, to inflict on him the greatest possible damage allowed by civilized warfare,

in the shortest possible time, and with the least possible damage to ourselves. As a war measure, both abolitionists and anti-abolitionists may demand or sustain it without any compromise of their principles or surrender of their respective convictions. The abolitionist wants emancipation for its own sake, because he regards it as always a sin; we waive the ethical question, and demand it as a means of saving our national existence. As we both demand emancipation, as a fact, we are both agreed on the practical question, which is enough for both, and there is no occasion for any quarrel between us. They need not quarrel with us, because we do not demand it for the reason they do, nor we with them, because they do not demand it solely for the reason we do. We want the nation saved, not the triumph of our speculative opinions or those of anybody else, and believe it far more important to gain a victory over the Rebels, than it is to gain one over the abolitionists, or anti-abolitionists. We do not agree with Messrs. Phillips and Garrison, but as they do not, in this crisis, demand any thing incompatible with the successful prosecution of the war, nay, as what they demand, in so far as it has any practical bearing, is, in our judgment, absolutely necessary to its successful prosecution, we cannot see any propriety or utility in quarrelling with them or denouncing them for their speculative opinions. We might as well quarrel with and refuse to sustain the administration, because the President and Secretaries are Protestants.

We say the same of the colonization or migration policy insisted on with so much earnestness by the President. As a peace measure, if the country were at peace, or if the country had leisure to attend to any thing but its own self-preservation, we should give it, if undertaken in a proper spirit, and by capable and trustworthy managers, our hearty support. But the measure is not a war measure, nor to be undertaken while we have a war of the magnitude of the present war on our hands. We regret that either Congress or the Administration should have raised the question pending the civil war. The civil war itself is alone quite as much as they have the capacity to manage, and they had done better to confine their energies and the resources of the country to the suppression of the Rebellion, and securing our national existence, than to raise questions which can receive no practical solution till the return of peace. It is a misfortune, perhaps, fatal to the nation, that we have never been able to make

the Administration understand and bring home to itself that we are really at war, and a war which leaves the country leisure for nothing else, a war of such formidable dimensions that its successful prosecution demands all our time, all our thoughts, all our energies, and all our resources. Our jaunty Secretary of State, a feeble copy of the present English Prime Minister, appears to have had either no serious intention of saving the integrity of the national territory, or no comprehension of the magnitude of the task of doing it. He seems to have regarded the Southern rebellion as a mere bagatelle, that could be suppressed by a diplomatic dispatch, a political juggle, or, that, if let alone, would suppress itself; at any rate a matter that could be taken care of without any interruption of the ordinary pursuits, or the ordinary credit, trade, and industry of the country; while our honest and well intentioned President, bewildered by a mass of petty difficulties, legal technicalities, and contradictory objections, has hardly known what to do, or been able to take a single firm resolution. Between them they have suffered the national cause to languish, the national armies to undergo defeat after defeat, disaster after disaster, till the nation stands on the verge of the precipice, waiting only another kick from the Rebels to be plunged into the gulf below. It is high time to attend to saving the nation, and to leave in abeyance all other questions.

If the nation is lost, as there is serious danger that it will be, under the sort of civil and military management we have thus far had, and if present divisions, distractions, confusion of ideas, and party spirit, which render us impotent before the enemy, are to continue much longer, all the questions we now agitate will become alike indifferent. It matters little who administers the government, if so be it is well administered; but as yet, it must be confessed, the Administration has not refuted the charge of executive incapacity so often brought in past years against our old old Whig leaders. For ourselves we are neither Whig nor Democrat; we know, and will know, so long as the nation is in danger, no party but the party of the country, and the whole country; but we demand in the name of the nation and of free institutions, the exhibition of a capacity on the part of the Administration, civil and military, which it has not yet shown—a capacity in some measure equal to the present national crisis, or else that its chief incumbents patriotically retire and give place, before it is too late, to others, who have not only the

wish or the honest intention, but the ability to wipe out from the nation its present disgrace, and preserve its unity and life. Thus far our civil and military administration has proved a miserable failure, and the nation can hardly afford it time to make new experiments.

Our loyalty is known and unquestionable, but our patience is well nigh exhausted. Three months ago we wrote, "We are proud of our countrymen;" we are still proud of our countrymen, but we are pained to see them sacrificed to no purpose, and mortified at the disgrace brought upon our nation by administrative imbecility, and blundering, incompetent generalship. The United States cut at this moment a most sorry figure before the world. We may be sent to Fort Lafayette for saying it, but we tell the Administration, and we do so with the most loyal intentions, as well as with sorrow of heart, that it will ere long find itself there or in a Southern dungeon, if it does not speedily exhibit a capacity it has not yet given any evidence of possessing, instantly retrieve its past blunders, and prove itself able to use the national resources for the vindication of the national majesty. "The capital is safe;" "The army is safe;" "All is quiet on the Potomac," the stereotyped telegraphic dispatch, with scarcely a variation for so many months, and now resumed again, is a confession of civil and military administrative imbecility, or, what we dare not think, of disloyalty, and cannot any longer be read with patience. The nation must not be lost through tenderness to individuals, civil or military, in high or low places. We have given the Administration and its generalship, a generous confidence, and a fair trial, and they have failed, miserably failed, and all the world knows it. If they are prepared to do no better—if they are able to do no better, it is time for them to stand aside, and let the really Ableman, if such we have, take the helm, and rescue the ship from the breakers. Red tape will not save the nation. Confidence in the Administration, or in its generals, cannot be preserved, unless they do something to inspire it. The Administration has lost the confidence of the nation in its capacity to conduct this war to a successful issue, and it will not regain it by any attempt to suppress the public expression of the fact. Restrictions on the press, the attempt to silence the voice of criticism, will only make matters worse, and increase the growing distrust—will only create the suspicion that it seeks to cover up its imbecility by its tyranny.

But enough, and too much of this; "Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh." When we touch upon our national disasters, we know not how to restrain ourselves. We have been deceived. We were promised a victory at Corinth, at Yorktown, at Richmond, on the Rapahannoc, at Bull Run, before Washington, and we have met only defeat, disastrous and shameful defeat. Our men whenever permitted have fought like heroes, and we have strewn the soil of Rebeldom with the dead or wounded bodies of the fairest, noblest, bravest of our sons, and all to no purpose. We demand of the Administration and military authorities an account for the dead and wounded, and of our captive heroes; we demand an account for the loss of the brave and indomitable Lyon; for that type of the true soldier, Charles F. Smith; for the noble-hearted, experienced, and accomplished and heroic Kearney; for that true military genius, Isaac Stevens, whose like we shall not soon see again, and whose untimely loss shrouds a nation in mourning, and presages disaster and ruin to the national cause. We lay their loss to the account of the Administration, and do not and cannot accept our jaunty Secretary of State's assurance that "the war is to be ended in ninety days," as an adequate atonement. Our heart is full of sorrow; our country is on the verge of destruction, and there is no man able to help us. But our chief purpose in this article is not to find fault with the Administration, but to vindicate our Catholic brethren from the suspicion of being pro-slavery, to point out the real position of the Church on the slavery question, and to convince our Catholic brethren that while the war lasts we have no occasion to quarrel with the Abolitionists. The emancipation of negro slaves, as a war measure, is strictly constitutional, and may be adopted without violating, in any respect whatever, either the letter or the spirit of the Constitution, or requiring us to change any conviction we have ever expressed.

Slavery, if respected by the Federal Government, is, as the events of the war have proved, an element of strength to the rebellious States. The four millions of slaves, with the soil, climate, and simple industry of the South, are equal to twelve millions of our industrial population at the North, with our less genial climate, less productive soil, and more various and more complicated industry, and far larger consumption. It requires in the Free States at least twelve millions to provide for our industrial wants, to feed and clothe

our population, and to subsist our armies. This leaves us as a military population, from which to draw our troops, able-bodied men for our armies, only about seven millions; and the rebellious States, after deducting the four millions required for their industry and subsistence, have a population of just about the same number. Hence they are able to place in the field and subsist as large armies as the Federal government can, and the only advantage the Government has over them is in its navy, and its command of the sea. The notion that we could starve by a blockade the South into submission could have been entertained only by those who were profoundly ignorant of Southern resources. In that kind of wealth which gives military strength, the Southern states were and are wealthier than the Northern states, for their wealth is agricultural, and ours in great part is commercial and manufacturing wealth, which is necessarily deranged and depreciated by war. The war and blockade have deprived the South of luxuries, but of hardly a single necessary of life, and the stories told of the distress, of the privations of the Southern people, especially of the Southern soldiers, are only so many silly fictions. As long as Southern land remains, and they have four millions of blacks to till it, the Southern states can produce in abundance all the necessities of life within themselves, and subsist their armies and their whole population, and far easier than we can ours. The superiority of military strength, therefore, is not so decidedly on our side as we have pretended, perhaps believed, and we can place it on our side at all, only by detaching from the rebel cause that which sustains it, the Southern laboring population. If we could deprive it of the support of its four millions of laboring population, nearly all productive laborers, and consuming in return hardly a tithe of what is consumed by our laboring population, we should almost annihilate their whole military strength, or at least so reduce it as to render it unable to offer any effective resistance. The laboring population of the South can be detached from the Rebellion, or rendered a source of weakness rather than of strength to the Rebels, for they are mostly slaves desirous of being free, if we will declare their freedom, and enable them to understand that their freedom is bound up with our success, or that our success will make them freemen. Here is wherefore emancipation as a war measure, is important and even necessary. We do not want the negroes for soldiers to fight in our armies, for we

can call out more white men than we can arm; but we want them to sustain the Rebellion no longer by their labor. The measure will not be so advantageous to the Federal cause now as it would have been had it been earlier adopted, but it would give it a decided preponderance even now, if speedily adopted. It would so diminish the supplies or so augment the fears of the Rebels, that they would be obliged to keep some hundreds of thousands of the men now in arms against us at home to protect their families and plantations, and to raise supplies for their armies and their non-producing population.

What we now urge upon our Catholic brethren is the manifest impolicy of warring against emancipation as a war measure. They are deceived as to the strength and resources both of the loyal and of the disloyal States, as has been and probably is the Administration itself, if it has dealt and is dealing honestly with the country. The wealth and resources of the South in time of peace are far inferior to those of the North, and the Administration has apparently proceeded on the supposition that they are equally inferior in time of war. But such is not the fact. Organized for peace, for trade, commerce, and manufactures, the North finds war rapidly diminishing its resources and depreciating its wealth. War disturbs its commerce, disturbs its manufacturing industry, depreciates the value of its wares and its rents, cuts off its trade, and renders it really poor, while nominally rich. Why else have we heard the earnest call for a national bankrupt law? On the other hand, the South, chiefly agricultural, and producing within itself all the necessaries of life, is far less disturbed by war in its wealth, and in its industrial and economical relations. Our Catholic as well as our non-Catholic countrymen have not taken this difference between the two sections into the account, and have not seen that a long war, while it would ruin the North if separated from the South, would upon the whole even strengthen the South, separated from the trading community of the North, and secure its triumph. We have supposed that we might give the Rebels every advantage, touch them only at arm's length, and still easily crush them. All this is a mistake. We said a year ago, that it would require all our strength and resources to cope successfully with the Southern rebellion. We knew the South and its agricultural, mechanical, and military resources, and we knew it would be more than a match for us, unless

we should take every advantage allowed by the rights of war. We were not believed by the government, nor by our own Catholic community. Catholics may naturally have presumed the Administration understood the matter much better than we, and had intentions at least equally loyal. The government and press adopted a system of boasting, spoke contemptuously of Southern resources, Southern skill, and Southern bravery, and even of Southern troops, who were accused of "skedaddling," whenever they made a skilful retreat, or a wise evacuation, or a brilliant strategic movement. The government and the government press have misled us. We now know its calculations were unfounded, and its representations false. The policy or want of policy we have hitherto pursued has left us beaten, the Rebels victorious at all points, and from the defensive boldly taking the offensive; and we may soon hear as a piece of gratifying news, "Cincinnati is safe," "Philadelphia can be defended," "New York is in no immediate danger," "Preparations are made to give the Rebels a warm reception should they venture to attack Boston."

The Republic is really in danger, and, if overthrown, no class of the American population will suffer more than Catholics. Under our free institutions Catholics are gradually taking, in a legitimate way, possession of the country. They already fill the lower strata of American society, constitute, in the Free States, our principal laboring class—the real basis of national strength, wealth, and prosperity, and are slowly but surely working their way up to the highest social level. Let the nation fail, or let the Union be reconstructed "on slavery as its corner-stone," and their brilliant prospects are blasted, their glorious national career ended, all hope of making this a Catholic country, or of keeping it a free country must be abandoned. Protestantism has proved its impotence to sustain a free state, and sees itself obliged, in order to escape anarchy, to resort to monarchy, to aristocracy, or to slavery, as its social and political basis. If the South, the truly Protestant section, triumphs, Catholicity will have henceforth little room for expansion on American soil, for the industry of the country will be carried on chiefly by slaves or an inferior caste.

We earnestly beseech our Catholic brethren to review the question, and see if they have not been mistaken in their policy, if real regard for our common country, and our holy

religion, dearer to them and to us, than all other interests, do not imperiously demand emancipation as a war measure, as a means of securing victory to the National cause. We are Catholic as well as they, and yield to none of them in the sincerity and earnestness of our faith, or in the heartiness of our devotion to the Church. If they are opposed to the abolitionists, let them bear in mind that no man has opposed them longer or more strenuously than we have done, and if we oppose them not now, or write not against them, it is not because we have changed our convictions or our opinion. We stand, on the question of slavery, where we have stood ever since 1838. Not we have changed, but the question itself has changed. Why have you, my brethren, opposed the abolitionists? Because you loved and wished to perpetuate slavery? No. It were a foul slander on you to say it. But because you loved the Union, and believed the agitation of the slavery question likely to endanger its power, and even existence. This was the fact with us, and with you, and with the great body of the Democratic party at the North. Why do we demand emancipation now? For the very reason that before the Rebellion we opposed it; because we love the Union more than slavery, as we loved it more than emancipation, and because emancipation is now necessary to save the Union, and prevent the destruction of the nation. When emancipation could not be demanded without endangering the Union, we and you opposed it; now that it is demanded to save the Union, and is perfectly constitutional as a war measure, we urge it, and why should not you? To do so implies no inconsistency or change of opinion on your part. To be consistent with yourselves, to be faithful to that love of the Union which made you oppose, you must now, in the altered state of the question, demand emancipation.

It is true the greater part of our bishops and clergy, in the beginning believed that emancipation would not need be resorted to, but his Grace of New York, while apparently opposing us, confesses that, if in the progress of the war emancipation should become a military necessity, it could and should be adopted. Well, it is clearly now a military necessity, and let us not shrink from adopting it. We say, *emancipation*, we say not arming the negroes and placing them in the army on a footing of equality with our white soldiers. That is not a military necessity, and would be unwise and impolitic, as grossly offensive to the deep-rooted prejudices

of our countrymen against negro equality. We say nothing in favor of negro political or social equality, to which we have always been personally opposed. It will be time enough to settle the political and social *status* of the negro, when the war is over. All we demand now is the full and complete emancipation from bondage of the whole negro race within our limits, at once and without delay, leaving the question of compensation to loyal slaveholders, if any such there are, to be adjusted after the return of peace. This we demand as legal, constitutional, because a military necessity, and authorized by the rights of war, and the Government will, in our judgment, be unfaithful to its trusts, if it hesitates any longer to adopt it.

ART. III.—*Message of the President of the United States and accompanying Documents from the Department of State.* Washington: Government Printing Office, 1861. 8vo. pp. 440.

WHILE from the outbreak of the present civil war we have not hesitated to discuss freely the great questions it involves, and to urge boldly and earnestly the policy on which we have believed it should be conducted, we have taken scrupulous care not to discredit the administration or to impair the confidence of the public in its wisdom and loyal intentions. Mr. Lincoln was not our choice as a candidate for the presidency, but as he was nominated, we gave him our vote, and have aimed to give him a firm and independent support. In the trying times introduced by the defection and rebellion of the Slave States, we have felt it the duty of every loyal citizen to stand by the government as the only means of standing by the country. We have suppressed our doubts, our fears, our misgivings, and scrupulously refrained from every public expression likely in the least degree to embarrass the administration either in prosecuting the war, or in dealing with foreign nations, and as far as a man in our humble sphere could, labored to strengthen, invigorate, and encourage the Administration. We have so labored, and it is with great regret that we find ourselves compelled in this moment of its greatest embarrassment, to speak to the country plainly and energetically of its faults and shortcomings.

We have reached a stage in the conduct of our civil and military affairs, when disguise or suppression of the truth is no longer permissible; when the paramount interests of the nation make it the duty of every loyal citizen to canvass freely, but respectfully, the acts and policy of the Administration, and summon it to answer for itself at the bar of enlightened public opinion. Forbearance to criticise the Administration were, as we view the matter, now treachery to the country, which is more than any administration. No good citizen can now with a good conscience, as it seems to us, see the administration conducting the country to the verge of destruction, and leaving the national life to be extinguished, and remain silent, or refrain from advertising the nation of its danger. To do so, would be a manifest dereliction of public duty. We know the exigencies of war; we understand the plea of military necessity; and we fully recognize that war does and must impose numerous restrictions on individual liberty, on freedom of speech and discussion, which should never be tolerated in a free country in time of peace. We would ourselves, if in our power, silence every voice not beyond all question loyal to the national cause. Whether the Union is to be preserved or not, whether the government has the right or not to coerce rebellious States into submission, or whether the government shall or shall not be sustained in its efforts to crush out rebellion, are not open questions, and are not now questions that it is lawful to raise. The nation has authoritatively answered them, and its answer is final in public for the good citizen. Ordinarily, as long as an administration shows the disposition and the capacity to conduct the affairs of the nation, civil or military, with a reasonable measure of success, we should refrain from all unfavorable criticism on even its temporary and minor blunders or failures—for perfection is to be looked for in nothing human. But criticisms, even in time of war, demanded by the public interest, and intended not to hinder, but to forward the work of national salvation, are allowable, and must be tolerated by the public authorities, and will be, if they have any loyal or patriotic intentions. It is useless now to cry out against the danger of impairing confidence in the Administration. There is in the country no confidence in the Administration to be impaired. The people have confided in it, trusted it, even against their better judgment, and lavished at its call, men and money, blood and treasure, with an unheard of

profusion; and now while the nation is on the verge of bankruptcy, and bereavement and mourning have been carried into almost every family in the land, and we find that the Administration has nothing to show for it but dilapidated armies, raw recruits, and the victorious armies of the rebellion bringing home war, pillage, rapine, and murder to our own Northern homes and firesides, are we to refuse to state the fact and demand an account of it? Tell us not to trust it longer, to give it more time, that it is just *agoing* to retrieve the past, and speedily suppress the Rebellion. We have been told this any time for the last year, and any time for the last year the Administration has been just *agoing* to change its policy, just *agoing* to suppress the Rebellion, but alas! it moves not at all, or it moves only to defeat and disaster.

We arraign not the army; we will not complain of Halleck, McClellan, or even Pope, till we know what orders have been given them by the Administration, or the state policy by which they have been required to govern themselves. We are friends of the army, and we have been ever since we could remember, and we have more than once defended it against civilian censure. We make no invidious distinction between the regular army and the volunteer army. There are in both branches of the army as much bravery and as good fighting qualities as the world ever saw, and as able and as skilful generalship as any nation need desire. Its failures we attribute not to incompetent generalship, but to the policy of the Administration. The army is now our only hope, and if the country is to be saved it will save it. Nor do we agree in casting the blame of our military miscarriages, if miscarriages they are to be called, on the Secretary of War, whom we know to be a man of large views, loyal intentions, and no mean Administrative ability; for he has had no influence in shaping the policy of the Administration, and but little in the conduct of the war. He is only one of the President's clerks, and is overruled in his judgment, whenever there is a question of any importance to be decided. He opposed with all his might General McClellan's movement upon the Peninsula, and was overruled by the President, who, against his own judgment and convictions, consented to it. The policy of the Administration, as far as policy it has, or has had, was determined before Mr. Stanton became a member of Mr. Lincoln's cabinet. The Secretary of the Treasury, we presume, assented to the

policy originally agreed upon, but he is understood to have demanded a different policy since. He has, however, confined himself principally to his own department, and has exerted but little influence outside of it on the Administration. Mr. Blair is now not counted, and the Attorney-General does not count for much. The chief responsibility rests on the Secretary of State and the President himself. The President as the executive head of the Government and Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, is officially the Administration, and alone responsible for its policy. But the previous position of the Secretary of State, as a Whig leader, and as the recognized chief of the Republican party, his well-known character, and his presumed influence with the President, either personally or through his friends and political managers, have elevated him in the public estimation to a share, and to the chief share in the Presidential responsibility. It is the general belief of those best informed on the subject, that the Secretary of State has, directly or indirectly, on all questions of importance, a controlling influence, and that he in reality shapes the policy of the Administration. This may not be true to the extent alleged, and it is hardly respectful to the President to assume that it is; but a large share of responsibility undoubtedly belongs to the Secretary of State—as large a share as in our remarks we shall attribute to him.

Of Mr. Seward, the Secretary of State, we speak with great reluctance, and with some reserve, for we may not be as unprejudiced and impartial as we could wish. We have never been personally attached to him, and have nearly always been politically opposed to him ever since he entered public life as a National Republican and Anti-Mason, under the auspices of Mr. Thurlow Weed, whom we remember as the manufacturer of a “good-enough Morgan till after the election.” We never sympathized with him in his national Republicanism, although we supported Mr. Adams in opposition to General Jackson, in his political Anti-Masonry, in his Whiggism, or even in *his* sort of Republicanism. We have never regarded him as a statesman, and have looked upon him merely as a clever and successful politician. Clever he must have been, or he could never have built up so wide a reputation on so narrow a foundation as he received from nature: successful, too, he must have been, for he has been Governor of the State of New York, United States Senator, and is now Secretary of State

in Mr. Lincoln's administration. He is a fine rhetorician, a superb phrase-monger, almost equal to Lamartine, though far from being that Frenchman's equal as an elocutionist.

Like all wily politicians who rely on their adroitness and dexterity for carrying their points, the Secretary lacks nerve, back-bone, high courage, and firm and generous resolve. His facultiess avail him least when the danger he tries to meet is greatest. And, perhaps, no man could have been selected less fitted by constitution and temperament, to meet such a national crisis as has been brought on by Southern secession. When the public expected from him, in the winter of 1860-61, in his place in the Senate, a speech that should defy or overwhelm the Southern disorganizers, and give strength and courage to all loyal hearts, he amused us with an elaborately written essay, worthy of a clever sophomore, on the beauties and grandeur of the Union, and the impossibility of dissolving it, although he knew, or ought to have known, that it was already dissolved, and the question before him was on its restoration. He quailed before the Masons, the Slidels, the Toombses, and the Wigfalls, and evidently showed the white feather. By a sort of common consent of the country, he had been looked upon as the representative man of the Republican party, and we read at the time, in his poltroonery, in his weakness, his trembling before the enemy, the disasters and failures which have since followed the national cause, and gave expression to our despondency in this Review, for April 1861. If we have hoped since, it has been because we discovered a spirit and a patriotism in the people, and a generous forgetfulness of party distinctions on the part of many of the old Democratic leaders, especially among those who had the most strenuously opposed abolitionism, and been the most favorable to the South, that we had not looked for. We trusted that the accession of these would give courage to the Administration, and strengthen its back-bone. But we have seen all along in Mr. Seward's weakness and moral cowardice, a grave danger to the national cause, which is not yet averted.

Mr. Seward had been a leading anti-slavery man, had given utterance to "the irrepressible conflict" doctrine, and been amongst the most energetic against slavery, of any of our stump orators, in the campaign that resulted in the election of a Republican President. In Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New York, he showed no lack of courage, was

as bold as a lion, and hurled, at a distance, defiance in the very teeth of the Southern disunionists; in Washington, confronted with them in the Senate of the United States, his courage oozed out at his fingers'-ends, and he was as tame and as meek as a pet lamb. It is no secret that, before the incoming of the present Administration, he was the chief, if not the sole originator, aided, as a matter of course, by his familiar spirit, Mr. Weed, of that disastrous policy then adopted by several Republican leaders, of suffering South Carolina, Georgia, and the Gulf States to go in peace, and of amending the Constitution, so as to secure the loyalty of the Border States. He, the irrepressible-conflict man, with his own hand drew up and carried through both houses of Congress, by a two-thirds vote, an amendment of the Constitution, forbidding the Federal Government forever from interfering with slavery in States,—a measure which was quite uncalled for, since that is forbidden by the Constitution as it is; could do no good, and served only to demoralize the Republican party, and prove to the country that it was not composed of the right sort of stuff to vindicate the rights of the nation. He has since complained that he is called “a compromising man;” but he was the first and foremost to urge his party to compromise with the slave-power, and that, too, when, if he had the least grain of the sagacity that belongs to the statesman, he must have seen that any offer at compromise, under the circumstances, was to surrender, at least to imperil, the national cause and the existence of the government. The national cause, if maintained at all, could be maintained only by meeting promptly, on the very threshold, every attempt to dismember the national territory, or to set up within it a separate independent state. We have all blamed Mr. Buchanan for not crushing the secession movement in the outset; but Mr. Seward resisted secession not more firmly than did Mr. Buchanan. He yielded at the first summons, quailed before it, begged to compromise the matter, was ready to give up every distinctive principle he had ever contended for, and did what was in him to prove to the world that he and his party had not been contending for principle, and had been only using the anti-slavery sentiment of the country as a stepping-stone to place and power. He carried with him a large portion of the party he represented, and some men from whom better things had been expected.

To Mr. Seward's cowardly surrender to the South of the

national cause before the incoming of the present Administration, we may attribute the demoralization of parties, and the chief embarrassments loyal men have had to contend with in suppressing the Rebellion. He was placed, by an unfortunate concurrence of circumstances, in advance, as the leader of the national cause, and at the first summons ignominiously surrendered it, not from disloyalty, but from his never having comprehended the nature of the struggle, or from having regarded it as only an ordinary struggle of parties and politicians for power. He seems never to have been guided by any principle, or to have understood that there are principles which the statesman, the politician even, is not at liberty to surrender when demanded for party success. It seems necessary even yet to remind him that the nation is more than individuals, more than parties, and that when its honor and dignity, when its very life is at stake, no compromise is admissible. We should never have voted for Mr. Lincoln, if we had really believed his election would be followed by a civil war, for we had never embraced or defended the peculiar doctrines of his party; but having voted for him, and he having been constitutionally elected, we could under no circumstances have compromised with the opponents of his election till they had recognized him as their President, and submitted to his government. The honor and dignity of the nation, the honor and stability of constitutional government forbade it. After the inauguration of President Lincoln, and his appointment as Secretary of State, to soothe him for not having been nominated by the Republican party for president, instead of arresting as traitors the Commissioners of the Seceded States in open Rebellion against the Federal authority, Mr. Seward received them, unofficially of course, with all courtesy, as high-minded and honorable gentleman, and conferred at length with them on the matters of difference between them and the Federal Government, and, it is said, virtually agreed to a separation, and was in a fair way of adjusting the respective boundaries of the two republics, when the attack on Sumter came to interrupt their pleasant interviews, and their interesting negotiations.

Even the motive of that attack appears to have escaped him, and to have been understood neither by Mr. Seward nor by any other member of the Administration. It was done to secure the secession of the Border States, with which Mr. Seward was coquetting, with a distinct and

full understanding with the leading politicians in those States, pledged beforehand to secession. It was as certain in March 1861, to any one who understood any thing of the plans of the South that all the Slave States would secede, unless prevented by force, as it was in June of the same year when they had all virtually or formally seceded. The resolution to secede was fixed from the beginning, only the Border States could not secede without another pretext than that which had served South Carolina and the Gulf States. They could secede only in case of an attempt by the Federal government to coerce a State into submission. The attack on Sumter and the threatened invasion of Washington were made expressly to compel the government either to resort to coercion or to stand utterly disgraced at home and abroad. Not one of the Border States ever intended that its fate should be separated from that of its sister Slave States. They never proposed or accepted the offer of compromise in good faith, and Mr. Seward has from the first been fooled in all his relations with Southern statesmen or Southern politicians, and has sacrificed his principles and the honor of his party for a shadow. His negotiations even, though unofficial, were a surrender of the national cause, for to allow it to be even unofficially discussed was virtually to surrender it, and were grossly improper, unless the Administration contemplated either a separation or abdication in favor of the government of the Confederacy, for everybody knew at the time that the differences could not be settled by diplomats or by politicians. There was no middle ground on which the two parties could meet. There was then, as now, no alternative but the unconditional surrender either of the seceders or of the government. Without the one or the other, and neither could be expected, there was no peace solution of the controversy possible. But Mr. Seward could not perceive it, and wasted the first six months of the new administration, precious weeks too, in idle attempts to effect by diplomacy and political manipulation what every clear-sighted man in the country saw could be effected only by the arbitrament of arms. These precious weeks were not used to put the government in a condition to assert its rights. Nothing was done. The Secretary, jaunty, light-hearted, and full of hope, went on with his negotiations, and assured the country that all difficulties would soon be adjusted, peace be made, and "nobody be hurt;" yet we are told Mr. Seward is a sagacious and far-seeing

statesman. Did he or did the President honestly believe a peaceful solution practicable? Did either really intend to preserve the integrity of the national territory? Did either expect a resort to arms? The first neither with ordinary sense could seriously believe; if they did not seriously intend to save the integrity of the national territory, they can be excused of treachery only on the ground of their incapacity. If they expected a resort to arms how is their neglect of all preparations to be excused, and if they did not, they deserved to be impeached for their inability. We include the President through courtesy, and because he doubtless acquiesced in the policy, and is officially responsible for it; but the policy was evidently Mr. Seward's, for it was adopted and acted on by him in the Senate and by leaders of the Republican party before he became Secretary of State. If the President accepted it, we may reasonably presume that he did so, because Mr. Seward had proceeded so far in it before the Inauguration, that it was difficult if not impossible for the President, unaided by the leaders of the party that elected him, as he would have been, to adopt and carry out a new and entirely different policy. Mr. Seward had by his arrangement bound the President to his policy, before he was inaugurated. Had the President rejected it on assuming the administration, he would have been isolated from his party, and not known where to look for a friend or supporter.

It is true, if the President had been a different sort of man, from what he was and is, if he had fully comprehended the position of affairs, and had had the courage to look beyond party and thrown himself boldly on the country, and continued Dix, Holt, and Stanton, in the Departments they filled during the last weeks of Mr. Buchanan's administration, he might possibly have escaped the meshes of the policy Mr. Seward had so adroitly prepared for him; but this would have required the President to have been a man of genius, or a thoroughly trained, and a superior statesman, neither of which can his most partial friends claim for him. Mr. Lincoln is a man naturally of strong common sense, loyal and patriotic intentions, and in ordinary times would have made a decent President, and administered the government without discredit to himself or the country. He is intellectually superior to what he is commonly supposed, and all that is to be said to his prejudice is, that he is not equal to the demands of the country in

times which demand at the head of the government a statesmen of the first order. What marvel, then, that he felt himself obliged on his inauguration, to acquiesce in the policy Mr. Seward had induced the chiefs of his party to adopt? All the men, unless Mr. Blair be an exception, that the public opinion of his party required him to make members of his cabinet, had already, through Mr. Seward's management, as we maintain, committed themselves to the compromise and peace policy; and, if they did not intend to assent to a temporary dismemberment of the Union, did not contemplate the use of force against the seceded States. He was so placed that he could not make up his cabinet without accepting substantially Mr. Seward's policy. We therefore call the policy of the Administration "the Seward policy."

That the Seward policy was one of peace and compromise, if not of at least temporary dismemberment, we know from what came to the public at the time, and authentically from Mr. Seward himself, from an official letter written by him the 10th of April, 1861, to Mr. Adams, our newly-appointed Minister at the Court of St. James, and published among the documents accompanying the President's message for December of the same year. In that letter, written two days before the attack on Sumter, Mr. Seward professedly lays open by authority for the guidance of the minister himself the policy of the Administration. We find the policy to be the same in substance that he had urged in and out of the Senate before his accession to office. We recommend the careful perusal of this letter to all who look upon Mr. Seward, not as a mere politician, but as a statesman—a "philosophical statesman," as a member of the Administration, in apparent seriousness, called him a few weeks since, in our hearing. It will prove that he was wholly at fault in his view of the difficulties of the situation, and the means of removing them and preserving the national life. His political optimism breaks out in every sentence, and he sees nothing in the movements of "our misguided fellow-citizens" of the South that need alarm us for the safety of the Union. The Southern Confederacy contains in itself the seeds of its own dissolution, and the people after a little time will weary of it, and sigh to return to the Union, as the starving children of Israel in the wilderness sighed to return to "the flesh-pots of Egypt." We extract a few of the more notable passages of this remarkable document:

"One needs to be as conversant with our *federative system* as perhaps only American publicists can be to understand how effectually, in the first instance, such a revolutionary movement must demoralize the general government. *We are not only a nation, but we are States also. All public officers, as well as all citizens, owe not only allegiance to the Union, but allegiance also to the States in which they reside.* In the more discontented States the local magistrates and other officers cast off at once their federal allegiance, and conventions were held which assumed to absolve their citizens from the same obligation. Even federal judges, marshals, clerks, and revenue officers resigned their trusts. Intimidation deterred loyal persons from accepting the offices thus rendered vacant. So the most important faculties of the federal government in those States abruptly ceased. The resigning federal agents, if the expression may be used, *attorned* to the revolutionary authorities, and delivered up to them public funds and other property and possessions of large value. The federal government had, through a long series of years, been engaged in building strong fortifications, a navy-yard, arsenals, mints, treasuries, and other public edifices, not in any case for use against those States, but chiefly for their protection and convenience. These had been unsuspectingly left either altogether or imperfectly garrisoned or guarded, and they fell, with little resistance, into the hands of the revolutionary party. A general officer of the army gave up to them a large quantity of military stores and other property, disbanded the troops under his command, and sent them out of the territory of the disaffected States.

"It may be stated, perhaps without giving just offence, that the most popular motive in these discontents was an apprehension of designs, on the part of the incoming federal administration, hostile to the institution of domestic slavery in the States where it is tolerated by the local constitutions and laws. That institution, and the class which especially cherishes it, are not confined to the States which have revolted, but they exist in the eight other so-called slave States; and these, for that reason, sympathize profoundly with the revolutionary movement. Sympathies and apprehensions of this kind have, for an indefinite period, entered into the bases of political parties throughout the whole country, and thus considerable masses of persons, whose ultimate loyalty could not be doubted, were found, even in the free States, either justifying, excusing, or palliating the movement toward disunion in the seceding States. The party which was dominant in the federal government during the period of the last administration embraced, practically, and held in unreserved communion, all disunionists and sympathizers. It held the executive administration. The Secretaries of the Treasury, War, and the Interior were disunionists. The same party held a large majority of the Senate,

and nearly equally divided the House of Representatives. Disaffection lurked, if it did not openly avow itself, in every department and in every bureau, in every regiment and in every ship-of-war; in the post-office and in the custom-house, and in every legation and consulate from London to Calcutta. Of four thousand four hundred and seventy officers in the public service, civil and military, two thousand one hundred and fifty-four were representatives of States where the revolutionary movement was openly advocated and urged, even if not actually organized. Our system being so completely federative and representative, no provision had ever been made, perhaps none ever could have been made, to anticipate this strange and unprecedented disturbance. The people were shocked by successive and astounding developments of what the statute book distinctly pronounced to be sedition and treason, but the magistracy was demoralized and the laws were powerless. By degrees, however, a better sentiment revealed itself. The executive administration hesitatingly, in part, reformed itself. The capital was garrisoned; the new President came in unresisted, and soon constituted a new and purely loyal administration. They found the disunionists perseveringly engaged in raising armies and laying sieges around national fortifications situate within the territory of the disaffected States. The federal marine seemed to have been scattered everywhere except where its presence was necessary, and such of the military forces as were not in the remote States and Territories were held back from activity by vague and mysterious armistices which had been informally contracted by the late President, or under his authority, with a view to postpone conflict until impracticable concessions to disunion should be made by Congress, or at least until the waning term of his administration should reach its appointed end. Commissioners who had been sent by the new confederacy were already at the capital demanding recognition of its sovereignty and a partition of the national property and domain. The treasury, depleted by robbery and speculation, was exhausted, and the public credit was prostrate.

"It would be very unjust to the American people to suppose that this singular and unhappy condition of things indicated any extreme favor or toleration of the purpose of a permanent dissolution of the Union. On the contrary, disunion at the very first took on a specious form, and it afterwards made its way by ingenious and seductive devices. It inculcated that the Union is a purely voluntary connection, founded on the revocable assent of the several States; that secession, in the case of great popular discontent, would induce consultation and reconciliation, and so that revolution, instead of being war, is peace, and disunion, instead of being dissolution, is union. Though the ordinances of secession in the seceding States were carried through impetuously, without de-

liberation, and even by questionable majorities, yet it was plausibly urged that the citizens who had remained loyal to the Union might wisely acquiesce, so as ultimately to moderate and control the movement, and in any event that if war should ensue, it would become a war of sections, and not a social war, of all others, and especially in those States, the form of war most seriously to be deprecated. It being assumed that peaceful separation is in harmony with the Constitution, it was urged as a consequence that coercion would, therefore, be unlawful and tyrannical; and this principle was even pushed so far as to make the defensive retaining by the federal government of its position within the limits of the seceding States, or where it might seem to overawe or intimidate them, an act of such forbidden coercion. Thus it happened that for a long time, and in very extensive districts even, fidelity to the Union manifested itself by demanding a surrender of its powers and possessions, and compromises with or immunity toward those who were engaged in overthrowing it by armed force. Disunion under these circumstances rapidly matured. On the other hand, the country was bewildered. For the moment even loyal citizens fell naturally into the error of inquiring how the fearful state of things had come about, and who was responsible for it, thus inviting a continuance of the controversy out of which it had arisen, rather than rallying to the duty of arresting it. Disunion, sustained only by passion, made haste to attain its end. Union, on the contrary, required time, because it could only appeal to reason, and reason could not be heard until excitement should in some degree subside. *Military spirit is an element always ready for revolution.* It has a fuller development in the disaffected than in the loyal States. Thousands of men have already banded themselves as soldiers in the cause of disunion, while the defenders of the Union, before resorting to arms, everywhere wait to make sure that it cannot be otherwise preserved. Even this cautious and pacific, yet patriotic disposition has been misunderstood and perverted by faction to encourage disunion.

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"The President neither looks for nor apprehends any *actual* and *permanent* dismemberment of the American Union, especially by a *line of latitude*. The improvement of our many channels of intercourse, and the perfection of our scheme of internal exchanges, and the incorporation of both of them into a great system of foreign commerce, concurring with the gradual abatement of the force of the only existing cause of alienation, have carried us already beyond the danger of disunion in that form. The so-called Confederate States, therefore, in the opinion of the President, are attempting what will prove a physical impossibility. Necessarily they build the structure of their new government upon the same principle by which they seek to destroy the Union,

namely, the right of each individual member of the confederacy to withdraw from it at pleasure and in peace. A government thus constituted could neither attain the consolidation necessary for stability, nor guarantee any engagements it might make with creditors or other nations. The movement, therefore, in the opinion of the President, tends directly to anarchy in the seceding States, as similar movements in similar circumstances have already resulted in Spanish America, and especially in Mexico. He believes, nevertheless, that the citizens of those States, as well as the citizens of the other States, are too intelligent, considerate, and wise to follow the leaders to that disastrous end. *For these reasons he would not be disposed to reject a cardinal dogma of theirs, namely, that the federal government could not reduce the seceding States to obedience by conquest, even although he were disposed to question that proposition. But, in fact, the President willingly accepts it as true.* Only an imperial or despotic government could subjugate thoroughly disaffected and insurrectionary members of the State. This federal republican system of ours is of all forms of government the very one which is most unfitted for such a labor. Happily, however, this is only an imaginary defect. *The system has within itself adequate, peaceful, conservative, and recuperative forces.* Firmness on the part of the government in maintaining and preserving the public institutions and property, and in executing the laws where authority can be exercised *without waging war*, combined with such measures of justice, moderation, and forbearance as will disarm reasoning opposition, will be sufficient to secure the public safety until returning reflection, concurring with the fearful experience of social evils, the inevitable fruits of faction, shall bring the recusant members cheerfully back into the family, which, after all, must prove their best and happiest, as it undeniably is their most natural home. The Constitution of the United States provides for that return by authorizing Congress, on application to be made by a certain majority of the States, to assemble a national convention, in which the organic law can, if it be needful, be revised so as to remove all real obstacles to a reunion, so suitable to the habits of the people, and so eminently conducive to the common safety and welfare.

“Keeping that remedy steadily in view, the President, on the one hand, will not suffer the federal authority to fall into abeyance, nor will he, on the other, aggravate existing evils by *attempts at coercion* which must assume the form of direct war against any of the revolutionary States. If, while he is pursuing this course commended as it is by prudence as well as patriotism, the scourge of civil war for the first time in our history must fall upon our country during the term of his administration, that calamity will then have come through the agency, not of the government, but of those who shall have chosen to be its armed, open, and irreconci-

lable enemies; and he will not suffer himself to doubt that when the value of the imperilled Union shall be brought in that fearful manner home to the business and the bosoms of the American people, they will, with an unanimity that shall vindicate their wisdom and their virtue, rise up and save it."

* * * * *

"Nevertheless, all the world know what are the resources of the United States, and that they are practically unencumbered as well as inexhaustible. It would be easy, if it would not seem invidious, to show that whatever may be the full development of the disunion movement, those resources will not be seriously diminished, and that the revenues and credit of the Union, unsurpassed in any other country, are adequate to every emergency that can occur in our own. Nor will the political commotions which await us sensibly disturb the confidence of the people in the stability of the government. It has been necessary for us to learn, perhaps the instruction has not come too soon, that vicissitudes are incident to our system and our country, as they are to all others. The panic which that instruction naturally produced is nearly past. What has hitherto been most needful for the reinvigoration of authority is already occurring. The aiders, abettors, and sympathizers with disunion, partly by their own choice and partly through the exercise of the public will, are falling out from the civil departments of the government as well as from the army and the navy. The national legislature will no longer be a distracted council. Our representatives in foreign courts and ports will henceforth speak only the language of loyalty to their country, and of confidence in its institutions and its destiny."

This letter, we must bear in mind, was written for the private instruction of Mr. Adams, who is told that he is not expected to communicate it to the government to which he is accredited, and we may therefore conclude that it is a frank and truthful statement of the real views and policy of the Administration, at least up to last December, when the Secretary selected it for publication; it may or must be regarded as official and authentic. On the historical sketch of the rise and progress of the rebellion with which it sets out, we have little to say, except the Secretary shows in it that he fails to apprehend or appreciate its real cause. The real cause of the Rebellion had, no doubt, a close relation to slavery, so close, that if there had been no negro slavery in the land it would never have occurred; but, at bottom, the cause was not, as the Secretary supposes, the rancor of a defeated political party, but the increasing power of centralized Democracy at the North, and its alleged tendency

to substitute for constitutional government the arbitrary will or caprice of the majority for the time. The Southern statesmen, for there were statesmen, as we have learned there are generals, at the South, believed that this sort of democracy was becoming the political order in nearly all the non-slaveholding States, and they saw, or thought they saw, in the growth of the Republican party, hardly less democratic than the so-called Democratic party itself, and in the election of Mr. Lincoln, a sure indication that it might soon be transferred from the States to the nation, placing the whole republic at the mercy of an accidental majority, with no safeguards for the rights and liberties of minorities. Being themselves in a minority the moment parties should be determined by geographical lines, and having a peculiar institution to protect, hateful to Northern democracy, and condemned by the public sentiment of Christendom, they were naturally more alive to this, and more ready to resist it, than were the people and politicians of the Free States. The Southern States were constitutional, not democratic, and the real cause of the Rebellion, as it stood in their minds, is to be sought in the determination to sustain constitutionalism against democracy. They having become unable any longer, through ordinary political action, or through the ballot-box, to control the Northern Democracy, and determined never to be governed by it, thought they had no alternative left but to secede and cut themselves loose from it. This is the simple, truthful explanation of the Southern Rebellion, and the issue it wished submitted to the arbitrament of arms was not slave labor or free labor, but constitutionalism or democracy.

We have for ourselves, we grant, been always unwilling to meet the Rebellion on this issue, or as an issue between constitutionalism and centralized democracy. We are personally, and always have been, opposed to that democracy, and in favor of constitutionalism, and hence the reason why, till we saw the danger to American unity and nationality, we have always in our political sympathies been with the South rather than with the North. We defend, and always have defended, constitutionalism against democracy, and maintained that our system of government is not a pure democracy; but we prefer, first of all the nation, and demand the preservation of its unity and integrity. These gone, all is gone; but so long as the nation remains, and especially a nation constituted like ours, which provides constitution-

ally for the amendment of its government, we can correct through legal modes of action the political tendencies that are opposed to the national weal. We have opposed the Southern movement not as a movement against centralized democracy, but as a movement against American nationality, represented by the Federal government; and we regret that the Administration did not meet the controversy as one between national sovereignty and state sovereignty.

The next thing we take up in the Secretary's letter is the confession that our government is a "federative government." He calls it "our federative system." "True," he says, "we are a nation, but we are states also." If we are federative states, a federation, or confederation, how can we be politically a nation? There are and can be no federative bonds between different parts of one and the same nation. A federation is a league of different nations or sovereigns, who, bound together only by federative bonds, are not, and cannot be, politically one nation. Here the Secretary, on behalf of the Administration, concedes in the outset the fundamental principle of the secessionists, and gives up, if he did but know it, the right of the Federal government to coerce the seceding States into submission; for he will find in the record of the federation or compact no authority given by the contracting parties to coerce a seceding member. Secession may, indeed, be a breach of faith, but the Union provides no remedy. "All public officers, as well as all citizens, owe," says the Secretary, "not only allegiance to the Union, but allegiance also to the States in which they reside." If the sovereignty inheres in the States, as it must if the Union is a federation or league of sovereigns, "a federative system," the allegiance of the federal officer and of the citizen is due primarily to the State, and allegiance to the State must override that to the Union, and then secession is justifiable. But this double allegiance is an absurdity. No man can owe allegiance to two sovereigns at one and the same time, and allegiance is due only to the sovereign. If the State is sovereign, I owe it *allegiance*, and *obedience* to the Union, so long as it commands me to obey it, and no longer. If the Union is sovereign, or rather if the United States, as one political people, is sovereign, then I owe it allegiance, and only obedience, within the limits it allows, to the State in which I reside. If the first alternative is adopted, the Southerners in arms against the Union are not rebels, but loyal citizens,

for they are evidently acting under the authority of their respective States, whatever may be pretended to the contrary, and you can rightfully wage only a defensive war against them. If the latter alternative be accepted, the Federal government, as holding in trust the sovereignty of the nation, has not only the right, but is bound in duty to treat them as rebels, and to reduce them to their allegiance, if able, whether they act or do not act under State authority, whether they be individuals or States.

The Secretary should, as a good logician or as a sound statesman, have taken one ground or the other; but, unhappily, he has tried to take neither and to take both, and alternately asserts and denies both national sovereignty and state sovereignty. Thus (p. 71) he calls the people of the Southern states that had already seceded, "our misguided * * * fellow citizens." And again (p. 76), he says to Mr. Adams, "You will * * * remember that those States are now, as they always heretofore have been, and, notwithstanding their temporary self-delusion, they must continue to be, equal and honored members of this Federal Union; and that their citizens, throughout all political misunderstandings and alienations, still are and always must be our kindred and *countrymen*." If our countrymen and fellow-citizens, notwithstanding secession, the United States is one sovereign nation or political people; if the States, notwithstanding their secession, are still honored members of this Federal Union, the Union is no political sovereignty, and the States, by claiming and exercising sovereignty in seceding from it and arming against it, do nothing incompatible with it! Yet Mr. Seward is a great man, an able diplomatist, and a profound statesman—"a philosophic statesman." If the states are sovereign, the Union is not; if the Union, or the United States, is sovereign, the states are not. If the States are sovereign, and their citizens owe them allegiance, then the States that have seceded are no longer members—*honored* or dishonored—of "this federal Union;" nor are their citizens our fellow-citizens or countrymen, whether misguided or not misguided. If they are, then the sovereignty is in the United States, and there is no allegiance, though, while they remain in the Union and perform its constitutional functions, there may be obedience on the part of the citizen to the states. We owe no divided allegiance, for sovereignty is not divisible. Even under feudalism there was no divided allegiance, for allegiance, strictly speaking,

was always due only to the national sovereign, the real lord paramount, from whom all grants of fiefs to inferior lords emanated, and to whom they lapsed on forfeiture.

The Administration had but one of two grounds to take, either that of State sovereignty or that of National sovereignty. If it took that of State sovereignty, it would have been obliged, at best, to say with Mr. Buchanan, "Secession is wrong, but the Government has no right to coerce a State." If it meant to take a ground on which it could pronounce secession rebellion, and assert its right to suppress it by force of arms, it must have clearly and distinctly taken the ground of plenary national sovereignty—that the people of the United States are, always have been, and always intend to be one sovereign political people; and that the States that secede rebel against the sovereign, and cease to exist as states, for they have no longer any legitimate state authority. On no other ground could it justify a resort to arms to bring back the seceding States, and re-establish the authority of the Federal government over the whole Union. On any other ground, the war, if war there should be, though conducted by the Federal government, would not be a war between the National government and its rebellious subjects or provinces, but a war between states; in fact, simply a war between the Northern states and the Southern states—a war which on no legal principles could for a moment be justified. The Secretary of State seems to have had some suspicion of this, and, being himself half State sovereignty and half National sovereignty, or, rather, a little more state than national sovereignty, he ventures to propose only a half war; shrinks from open, decided, vigorous war, for the suppression of the Rebellion, and trusts for the rest to "the expectancy treatment," as we believe the doctors call it. It was neither to be war nor peace. Secession was neither to be accepted nor rejected, but a little of both. Thus he says: "The system"—our federal republican system—"has within itself adequate peaceful, conservative, recuperative forces. Firmness on the part of the government in maintaining and preserving the public institutions and property, and in executing the laws where authority can be exercised *without waging war*, combined with such measures of justice, moderation and forbearance as will disarm reasoning opposition, will be sufficient to secure the public safety until returning reflection, concurring with the fearful experience of social evils, the inevitable fruits of faction, shall bring the recusants

cheerfully back into the family which, after all, must prove their best and happiest, as it undeniably is their most natural home." The rhetoric of this passage is unexceptionable; but only think of a secretary of state writing such a sentence only two days before the attack on Sumter, and imagine his remarkable credulity, or still more remarkable—reticence. Nearly eighteen months have passed away since this was written, and we can now see, if we could not at the time, how weak and unsubstantial was the "expectant" policy (through Mr. Seward's influence) adopted by the Administration, and which up to this time it has apparently retained. It was to wait the effect of the peaceful and conservative forces of the constitution. The government was not to wage war, but to act simply on the defensive. In accordance with this policy, though the government has had, first and last, about thirteen hundred thousand men under arms, and an almost unlimited amount of credit, we may safely assert that, up to this time, it has not waged war, and as safely assert it has never for a moment intended to wage war against the Rebellion. The Administration never believed itself able, and never intended to suppress the insurrection by force of arms; and the troops it has called out and armed have been, we may safely assume, only to defend itself and to protect "the public institutions and property."

Do we go too far? Hear Mr. Seward again: "The President would not be disposed to reject a cardinal dogma of theirs (the Secessionists'), that the Federal Government could not reduce the seceding States to obedience by conquest, even although he were disposed to question that proposition. But in fact the President *willingly accepts it as true*. Only an imperial or a despotic government could subjugate thoroughly disaffected and insurrectionary members of a state." This explains all that has been hitherto mysterious in political sympathies, and in the conduct of the war. Every Northern press with Southern proclivities has been loud in praise of the President, and especially of the accomplished Secretary of State, and the men really in earnest to save the integrity of the national territory and to suppress the rebellion, have been cried down as Abolitionists, and enemies of the Administration. Every commanding officer in the army who has showed that he believed the government wished war to be waged in earnest, has been snubbed or relieved of his command, and one who better understood, or was more willing to conform to the policy of the govern-

ment, was put in his place. Rear-Admiral Stringham is placed on the retired list, because he was too active—too much in earnest—and did too much to suit the Administration. Frémont, whether a great general or not, was relieved not for military blunders or exceptionable financial operations, but because he showed himself disposed to take the war seriously, and not as a make-believe, or simple sham. By earnest national men, General Halleck has been censured for his military *fasco* at Corinth, but it is evident that he satisfied the Administration, for it has promoted him to the chief command of all the land forces of the republic. Great complaints have been made of General McClellan, for his failure to take Richmond, but he undoubtedly fulfilled the expectations of the Administration, for it has promoted him to the chief command under General Halleck, and made him substantially military dictator. Generals who make war in earnest and win victories, are not the Generals the Administration honors, because it is not waging war against the Rebellion, and is only protecting itself, “the public institutions and property.” The matter is plain. The Administration never intended and never believed itself able to put the Rebellion down by force of arms, and hence it does right to count the campaigns of its generals ending in defeat successful and victorious. Halleck we have no doubt would have captured Beauregard’s army, and McClellan Johnston’s and Jackson’s, and entered Richmond, if the Administration had seriously wished it; but to have done so, might have interfered with its policy, irritated our “misguided citizens” in the seceding States, and indicated the intention to “reduce them to obedience by conquest.”

We do not misrepresent the Administration, if we can believe its own official exposition of its policy, and trust the logic of its own official acts. It began by avowing that it could not, at least did not propose to reduce the seceding States to obedience by conquest, and that it did propose to do it “without waging war” against them, and up to this day it has not waged war against them. When, after the fall of Sumter, it called out the militia to the number of seventy-five thousand, it avowedly did it only to protect the national capital, and if it had proposed any thing more, it would have called out two hundred thousand instead of merely seventy-five thousand men. In the interview with the mayor of Baltimore, the governor of Maryland, and other commissioners, after the attack in Baltimore on the Massa-

chusetts Sixth, both the President and the Secretary of State assured them that the troops were called out solely to defend the national capital, not to invade Virginia or to make war on the seceding States. When Congress met, and resolved that the Rebellion must be put down by force, and voted five hundred thousand men, and five hundred millions of dollars for that purpose, nothing came of it. The Administration raised the men, spent the money, and made no attack, if we except that of Ball's Bluff. It is idle to throw on General McClellan the blame of lying before Washington for ten months doing nothing. If the administration had wished him to move during that time he would have moved, or it would have removed him. It was in accordance with the open avowed policy of the Administration, that he should not move or fight, unless attacked. The expeditions, partly land and partly naval, to the coast of North Carolina, South Carolina, to New Orleans, up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, and down the Mississippi, were political and commercial rather than military expeditions, designed on the one hand to open Southern ports to trade, so as to lessen the clamor of foreigners against the blockade, and on the other, to secure an outlet for cotton to feed our own manufactures, and by the presence of Union troops to enable the Union men to rally again under the old flag, and give to Mr. Seward an opportunity to verify the wisdom of his "expectant treatment" of the case. General Sherman, who had the command at Hilton Head, tells us that he was positively forbidden to make a lodgment on the mainland, or to attack either Charleston or Savannah; and General Burnside was never intrusted with a force sufficient to do more in North Carolina than to capture a few places, open a port, and guard the coast. The same may be said of General Butler. He may, by the aid of the navy, hold New Orleans a few weeks longer, but he can do little except issue orders and quarrel with the Secesh ladies of the city. The only serious fighting brought on by the Union forces, has been in Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee—in Missouri and Kentucky, to expel the Rebels from two states, assumed not to have seceded, and in Tennessee and North Alabama, as necessary to protect Kentucky, and therefore within the proper defensive warfare which the Administration was carrying on. If there has been any thing more, it has been to amuse and pacify the national party in the loyal States, and nothing has come of it. A little war the Administration has been

obliged to give us in order to satisfy the war party, but it has taken care that it should do the Rebels no serious harm.

We are bound to exonerate the army, and we insist that it must not be made the scape-goat of the sins of the Administration. We insist that our commanding generals shall not, till further evidence is furnished than any now before the public, be accused of incompetency, disloyalty, indifference, or neglect. We will not allow that we have not as good generals, as scientific, as accomplished, as brave, and as heroic as any the Rebels have. The fault is not in them; it is in the policy of the Administration, and which has been obstinately adhered to in spite of warnings, in spite of experience, till the national cause is well-nigh desperate, if not absolutely beyond hope. Those who do not like the manner in which the war has been conducted, and who are dissatisfied with its results thus far, should accuse the Administration, chiefly Mr. Seward, the chief author of the policy the Administration adopted in the outset, not the army, for the war has been conducted in strict logical accordance with that policy. It would have been incompatible with that policy, as with the theory of the government set forth by Mr. Seward, to have made a vigorous attack on the enemy, or for any general commanding to have followed up any advantage he might happen to gain and secure a real victory. We do not pretend that our generals have always received specific and minute directions from the Administration to conduct the war so as to have it fail, but we do say that the best generals in the world could not have conducted it in accordance with the policy of the government without failing. The good general is governed by the policy of the administration, and when that policy is incompatible with military success, succeed he cannot. The wisdom or unwisdom of the policy of the administration is no concern of his as a military man, and his simple business is to conform to it. The policy of the administration controls his military operations, even when he is not conscious of it, and affects his disposition and management of his forces before the battle, if not on the battle-field.

We do not deny that at a later day than the date of the letter we have referred to, the Administration accepted civil war, but we do deny that there is any evidence that it has ever contemplated ending the controversy by conquest, or the exertion of military force. The Secretary writes to Mr. Adams again, June 8, 1861:

"This government insists, as all the world might have known, that it must and would, under all circumstances, insist, on the integrity of the Union, as the chief element of national life. Since, after trials of every form of forbearance and conciliation, it has been rendered certain and apparent that this paramount and vital object can be saved only by our acceptance of civil war as an indispensable condition, that condition, with all its hazards and deplorable evils, has not been declined. The acceptance, however, is attended with a strong desire and fixed purpose that the war shall be as short and accompanied by as little suffering as possible." p. 100.

Here the Administration accepts, no doubt, the civil war, but under two mutually incompatible restrictions, "with a strong desire and a fixed purpose that the war shall be as short and accompanied with as *little suffering* as possible." To be a short war it is necessary that it should be as vigorous and accompanied with as much suffering to the enemy as is possible under the laws of civilized warfare. The very purpose of war is to inflict the greatest damage, and therefore the greatest suffering possible on the enemy in the shortest time possible, to compel him to submit. Wise nations never make war a suit in chancery. War means damage, means suffering, means killing and wounding, mangle by the most destructive engines that can be invented, and the more destructive it is, the greater the horrors and sufferings that accompany it, the sooner must it end. Mr. Seward's policy of conducting a war with the least possible amount of suffering *to the enemy*, which we take it is what he means, is the policy of a sentimental, and therefore of a cruel civilian, not of a soldier. Yet this policy explains the exceeding care taken by our commander in Virginia to do as little harm and afford as much protection to the Rebels as possible, unless when obliged to repel attacks. He has been blamed for that, but we may be sure that he was only carrying out the policy of the Administration, or as we say in this city, of "the ring."

Pacere subjectis, et debellare superbos,

is a maxim we understand, and are always prepared to act on. When an enemy has thrown down his arms and submitted, he is an enemy no longer; he is our friend and brother, and as such we clasp him to our bosom. But as long as he resists, as long as his arm is upraised against us, ours is upraised against him, to deal him, if possible, a blow that fells him to the ground. Mr. Seward's humanity has proved to be the

most terrible inhumanity towards our own army, and if a little of that indignation which he has had the dexterity to turn against the Secretary of War were turned against himself, no injustice would be done.

But in accepting the civil war forced upon it, nothing proves that the Administration has ever conducted the war with a view of ending the controversy by military success. Its theory of the national government is that of a federative or federal Union, a "Confederation," and its concession that allegiance is due to the State as well as to the nation, deprives it of all solid ground on which to defend its right to attempt it, while it expressly avows that it cannot do it, if it would, for our federal Republican system is "unfitted" for such a task. It is true Mr. Seward tells Mr. Adams that he will not be expected to promulgate these views, but we have the right to make use of them, since they are officially published to the world by himself. Besides, all the official acts of the government, its mode of conducting the war, its studious avoidance of seizing the strategic points in the enemy's country, and its careful forbearance to follow up any military advantage it happens to gain, all indicate that it relies on political manipulations in the last resort to effect a reconciliation. Mr. Seward appears from first to last to have looked upon the controversy as in its nature an ordinary struggle between two political parties for power or place, and to be settled as political controversies have usually been settled in our country, by conciliation, compromise and the returning patriotism and good sense of both parties. He does not appear to have as yet given up the conviction that there is a strong Union party in the seceding States, kept down by the intimidation and tyranny of a dominant faction, through which, when that faction is weakened or exhausted by the war, he can operate to re-establish the authority of the Union. No hope is or can be more fallacious. There is no Union party worth speaking of in a single seceded State, and it is doubtful, if there could be a free vote to-day in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, whether those states themselves would not secede by triumphant majorities. Certainly their sympathies are strongly with the Southern cause, and in not one of them is the loyal part able, unassisted, to hold the disloyal part in subjection. The Administration has all along acted on the unfounded assumption that the secessionists are only a faction. They are no faction in their States, but the people. The Southern people are substan-

tially a unit against us, and never at any moment, since the secession of South Carolina, was it possible by any political concessions or manipulations to keep them in the Union with the North, so long as the North adhered to its centralized democracy, or remained, so to speak, unsouthernized.

The Administration had, on coming into power, but one of two courses to take, either frankly to accept state sovereignty, and let the seceded States go in peace and form an independent nation, or confederation of sovereign states, for themselves and by themselves; or else to take with equal frankness, the ground of full national sovereignty, and to use all the forces at its command to coerce the rebellious States into submission. The former was asked by the South, the latter, with a few dissenters, was demanded by the North. Mr. Seward, by his timidity, his weakness, his lack of backbone, as well his cowardice, and his failure to comprehend the real nature of the controversy, had so involved the matter that Mr. Lincoln no doubt felt that he could venture safely to take neither alternative; and his Administration up to this day has been rendered disgraceful by a miserable attempt to ride astride of both. It has neither accepted State sovereignty nor national sovereignty, nor fully and frankly either peace or war; but a little of each, just enough to irritate both parties without satisfying either. It has not dared accept national sovereignty, with all its logical consequences and duties, for that might have irritated its imaginary Union friends at the South, all State sovereignty men, and interfered with its plans of future reconciliation; and it has not dared to deny it, for that would have brought down upon it, with a few individual exceptions, twenty millions of people in the loyal States. It has therefore neither preserved peace by consenting to an amicable adjustment of the secession question, nor has it preserved the honor and integrity of the Union by war prosecuted on war principles. It has sought to pacify the national party by raising large armies, and the State sovereignty party by conducting the war on peace principles. The result has been, as might have been expected, the squandering of the national resources, the loss of half a million of as fine troops as the world ever saw, the revival of political and partisan rivalries and animosities, a division of the people, the disaffection of the army, the personal jealousies and rivalries of its superior officers, and the advance of the enemy into the loyal States, with no organized forces to resist them. This at the time

we are writing, 9th of September, is the plain, unvarnished picture of what the Seward policy has brought us to in eighteen months, and yet at this date the President retains him in his cabinet, and refuses to change his ruinous policy.

There is no question of Mr. Seward's loyal intentions, and earnest and laborious efforts to compose our troubles, and to secure the national life and territory ; but the habits of his mind are such as to lead him to believe it hardly possible for any but himself to save us from destruction, to expect salvation from any thing but those political manipulations of which his friend Weed is master, or to desire it, unless the glory of it redounds to himself, and therefore not to be effected by energetic military operations. Indeed he is no friend of the military. Doubtless because he feels that he has none of the elements of the soldier in himself. He says, in the letter already quoted from so often, "Military spirit is an element always ready for revolution. It has fuller development in the disaffected than in the loyal States." That the military spirit has been more cultivated in the Southern than in the Northern states, is no doubt the fact, but that is because the Southern states, on this as on some other points, have observed the conditions of a free and living people better than have the Northern. No people that neglects or despises the military spirit is destined to a long life or a really glorious career. The military spirit is an essential element of national greatness. It has been the fault of the loyal States, especially of the Eastern and Middle sections, that they have, ever since the war of 1812, underrated and decried the military spirit, and neglected, to a fearful extent, military education and organization. The shopkeeper, the lawyer, the pettifogger, has been held in far higher honor than the soldier. To represent the military spirit as being "an element always ready for revolution," is to show a reckless contempt of experience and disregard of human nature. China has less of the military spirit than any other nation reckoned as civilized ; and in no country of which we have any knowledge have revolutions been so common or so disastrous during the last eighteen hundred years. Revolutions in modern times are pre-eminently the work of small lawyers, journalists, politicians, civilians all,—seldom if ever of the army. The spirit of the army is always conservative ; for the soldier is prepared to command by being first taught and habituated to obey. The army is an element of strength and stability, and the habits acquired by

thorough military training are precisely those our people have most lacked, and are most in need of to preserve and improve the heritage of freedom and law transmitted to them by our brave and heroic fathers. If we had had more of the military spirit among us, our politicians would have been less craven-hearted before the bold and arrogant men of the South, and commanded their respect instead of incurring their contempt. Had the military spirit been duly cultivated and honored in the free States, there never would have been any Southern secession or civil war between the Southern states and the United States. We repel with indignation, therefore, the groundless insinuation of the Secretary of State against the military spirit.

We know that the army has been blamed, and our military academy has been assailed, because a certain number of officers of the army, on the breaking out of the Rebellion resigned their commissions and took service with the secessionists. But out of over seven hundred commissioned officers, only one hundred and seventy-five, if we are rightly informed, have resigned in order to join the Rebels, and some of the best and most loyal officers now in the national army, were born in States that have seceded. The army has been the most loyal class of the United States, and the only class that has not separated by a "line of latitude." The officers who resigned, did so because their respective States seceded, and they felt themselves bound to do so by their state allegiance, asserted by state sovereignty—conceded, not denied at least, to a certain extent, by Mr. Seward; for he concedes that allegiance is due to the state, and nowhere affirms that in case of conflict, the allegiance due to the state must give way to that due to the Union. On state sovereignty principles, on which this war has thus far been conducted on both sides, Generals Lee and Beauregard are as irreproachable in their loyalty as Generals Halleck and McClellan, equally as high-minded and as honorable gentlemen, and equally as untarnished in their military character. We hold them to be traitors and foresworn, because we deny state sovereignty, and maintain that allegiance is due only to the United States. But Mr. Seward cannot do so; and it is observable that he does not so call them, and that he speaks of the States that have seceded as still "equal and honored members of our federal Union," and calls the people in arms against us our "misguided fellow-citizens." He, then, is the last man who

should reproach the army, or impeach the morality of the military academy at West Point. No higher-toned morality is taught in any college in our country than in that academy, and not one of them has trained and sent out a larger body of high-minded and accomplished gentlemen. There is no class of educated men, equally numerous, in our community that can surpass, if it can equal, the officers of our army in the highest qualities of the gentleman, in their liberal feelings, in their love of order, and in their devotion to sound, conservative, political principles. If the class had been larger, or if there had been more civilians with its spirit, we should not have seen our government plundered by greedy and unscrupulous contractors, coining money out of the blood of our soldiers and the tears of widows and orphans; and if we had duly cultivated the military spirit, instead of stimulating to the highest degree possible, a morbid sentimentality, always cruel, and destitute of honesty, our government would not be now paying monthly for about double the number of volunteers it has in its service. One of the good results we have hoped from the present war is, that it would quicken the military spirit among us, bring the army into repute, and substitute to some extent in the American mind, the sense of honor and the love of glory, for habits of political huxtering, and the sordid love of gain. Our hope for the country is, under God, in the army, and the infusion into the army of the true military spirit; we want the discipline, the habits of obedience, and of *command* to be acquired by us, with our social and political constitution, only in the army, in order to be a great people, to preserve our institutions and our liberties.

We have spoken in a foregoing article of our blundering generalship; and in a purely military point of view, we have had little else than blundering, from the famous boa constrictor, or anaconda strategy, down to the retreats of Pope before the rebels advancing on Washington. But we must remember that the war, from first to last, has been conducted not on military principles, but subordinated to the political and diplomatic policy of the Secretary of State, and as the Administration retains in command the very generals the public regard as the most unlucky and the least trustworthy, it is only fair to the army to suppose that the whole responsibility rests on the Administration itself, and that those very generals have acquitted themselves quite to its satisfaction, or at least to the satisfaction

of Mr. Seward, who, apparently, is afraid that, if the military should be successful, the glory of saving the national life would not redound to him, and make him our next President. Military success might take away his vocation, and put an end to the reign of pettifoggers and political tricksters, for which the capital of the Secretary's native State is somewhat noted, and perhaps, also, to the enormous profligacy and corruption which has for some years been gaining ground in the National Government, as well as in several of the State Governments, in which some of Mr. Seward's political friends, as well as enemies, are supposed to have had their full share.

It is possible that we do Mr. Seward injustice; but it is a fact that all the friends of the nation who believe the nation can be saved only by military success, and the earnest and vigorous prosecution of the war on war principles, have found from the first Mr. Seward and his policy in their way, and him and his policy sustained by all the presses and men of doubtful loyalty at the North. How is it that all the enemies of those who are unquestionably in earnest to save the nation by prompt, vigorous, and decisive measures, are the friends of the Administration, and especially of Mr. Seward? The fact is unquestionable and suspicious, if there is any truth in the old saying, "Birds of a feather flock together." We would not insinuate that Mr. Seward is precisely a man of their sort; but he evidently is the man in the Administration who comes nearest to representing their views and wishes. He, we presume, courts them, for he doubtless holds that at this moment to support him is to support the Administration, and to support the Administration is to support the national cause; but here is precisely where the doubt or distrust begins. The precise doubt or distrust is that support of him is support of the Administration, or that the support of an Administration controlled or controllable by him is support of the national cause. A large portion of the people, especially those the most earnest in defence of that cause, believe that he, by his timid, conciliatory, expectant policy, has endangered it, and made the Administration play into the hands of the enemy. Here is the difficulty, and till he clears it up, confidence not only in him but in the Administration itself is shaken, if not lost, and every move he makes only confirms the suspicions already entertained against him. As matters stand, we see no way in which he can, even with the best in-

tentions in the world, serve the national cause, but by a speedy and voluntary retirement to private life in that delightful town of Auburn, once our own as well as his loved home.

Mr. Seward owes much of the political consideration he has enjoyed to the position he early assumed on the negro question, and his enunciation from his place in the Senate of the "Higher Law" doctrine, and from the hustings of the "irrepressible conflict" theory, two utterances which have made him both notorious and famous; yet he has been the first to quail before the slave power, and we find him as late as the 28th of last May, in a letter to Earl Russell, published in the newspapers, and which we presume to be substantially authentic, urging the British Ministry to withdraw its recognition of the Rebels as belligerents, among other reasons, because it tends to prolong the war, and if the war be prolonged, it will disturb the institution of slavery, and perhaps add to the evils of the present war those "of a servile war." The wonderful aptness of such an argument addressed to the British government opposed to slavery the world over, as is nearly the whole English nation, a diplomat less sagacious than Mr. Seward would have failed to perceive. But that is not the point. It proves that Mr. Seward's policy is, and all along has been, to preserve slavery, and to prevent the war from operating its ruin. He knows, the President knows, that if we had begun the war by liberating the slaves, as under the rights of war we could have done, the sympathy of all Europe would have been with us, and neither England nor France would ever have thought of mediation, far less of intervention. Yet he prefers to hazard foreign intervention to touching the institution of negro slavery. He even sent his friends Thurlow Weed and the Archbishop of New York abroad, to change, if possible, European opinion on the subject of slavery, at least on the question of immediate emancipation, in this country; and so far as the Archbishop is concerned, not without some success. A well known abolitionist in France has written, it is said, a letter to the President, urging him not under any circumstances to suffer himself to be driven into the adoption of immediate emancipation. That letter was virtually dictated by Mr. Seward, through his representative the Archbishop of New York, and we have the proof in a letter from a distinguished French gentleman, a friend of the President's correspondent, urging us not to insist on immediate emancipation, and assuring us that he does so in con-

sequence of an interview with the Archbishop of New York. We know what was the sort of public opinion the Archbishop of New York labored while in Paris to manufacture, and nobody can doubt that it was the sort of public opinion Mr. Seward, who sent him, desired and approved.

We need not revive here the discussion of the slavery question. We know that the majority of Congress and a large portion of the American people believe that this war cannot be prosecuted to a successful issue without detaching, by proffering them freedom, the negro population, whose labor now sustains the Rebellion. Yet to any measure of this sort we have found Mr. Seward a wily but steady opponent, and it is not too much to attribute it to his influence that the law of the last session of Congress forever freeing the slaves of the Rebels, was not broader and more efficient, and has not yet, even such as it is, been brought to the knowledge of the persons concerned by the proclamation of the President. Congress at its last session passed an emancipation act; it was approved by the President, and is now the law of the land; but it is suffered to stand on the statute book a dead letter. According to that law, all slaves of rebels, or of persons giving aid and comfort to the Rebellion, escaping from such persons, and taking refuge within the lines of our army, "all slaves captured from such persons, or deserted by them, and coming under the control of the government, all found on or within any place occupied by the rebel forces, and afterward occupied by forces of the United States, shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude, and not again held as slaves." Is this law executed? Are the preliminary steps taken for its execution? Has the executive issued his proclamation, or a proclamation that sets forth in an intelligible manner, the emancipation features of the act passed by Congress, and approved by the President, July 17, 1862? Not at all, and half the people of the country are calling for an emancipation proclamation, in entire ignorance or forgetfulness of the fact that Congress has itself passed, and the President has approved an emancipation act, though a feeble one. It is true Congress did not fix the time when the President should issue his proclamation, but as we read the law, the emancipation section does not require the proclamation of the President as a condition of its going into effect. It is not conditioned on such proclamation, but is absolutely the law of the land, and the President, by his oath of office, is bound

to see it executed.* Is it executed in New Orleans, in Nashville, or in any place heretofore held by rebel forces, and now occupied by the forces of the United States?

The President is as much bound, we take it, by the will of the Nation, when expressed in law, as the meanest citizen, and he may be impeached as well for neglecting his duty in *not* executing the law as in actively doing what the law forbids. We make here a brief extract from the works of Alexander Hamilton, pp. 502, 506.

"The power to make laws is the power of pronouncing authoritatively the will of the Nation as to all persons and things over which it has jurisdiction, or it may be defined to be 'the power of prescribing rules binding upon all persons and things over which the Nation has jurisdiction.'

"The sixth article of the Constitution of the United States declares that 'the Constitution, and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof,' all treaties, &c., 'shall be the supreme law of the land.' The power to make laws is 'the power of pronouncing authoritatively the will of the Nation as to all persons and things over which it has jurisdiction,' or it may be defined to be the power of prescribing rules binding upon all persons and things over which the Nation has jurisdiction. 'A law of the land, till revoked or annulled by competent authority, is binding not less on each branch and department of the Government than on each individual of society. Each House of Congress collectively, as well as the members of it separately, are under a Constitutional obligation to observe the injunctions of a pre-existing law, and to give it effect; if they act otherwise, they infringe the Constitution, the theory of which knows in such case no discretion on their part. To resort to first principles for their justification in assuming such a discretion, is to go out of the Constitution for an authority they cannot find in it—it is to usurp the original character of the People themselves—it is in principle to prostrate the Government."

We have made Mr. Seward principally responsible for the policy the Administration has thus far pursued, because it is the policy to which he had attached his name before the President was inaugurated, and because, wherever we can trace him since, we find him identified with it. Undoubtedly, the President has accepted it, and is officially responsible for it, but Mr. Seward had artfully, we say, not with any sinister intention, prepared it for him, and it has been easy for him, has been precisely in his line, to keep up

such a political combination as would make the President regard it as the only practicable policy left him. The President has hardly been a free agent, or had an opportunity of exercising his own unbiassed judgment, since his inauguration. Mr. Seward knows how to manage him, without his suspecting it, and when it will not do for him to act in person, he knows enough to call in Mr. Thurlow Weed or some other friend in whom the President has confidence. On the Slavery question—a vital question in the present controversy—we regard Mr. Seward as the evil genius of this Administration. It was he who obtained the removal of Frémont from the command of the Department of the West—a measure, aside from the merits of that General, on which we pronounce no judgment, except to say that we have never been one of his partisans—that has proved disastrous in numerous ways, especially in dividing the National party, not the Republican party merely, but the National party, and in creating partisans for and against other generals. We know Mr. Seward has said that he was the last member of the Cabinet that gave his vote for Frémont's removal from his command, which we believe is literally true, in the sense that he was the last member of the Cabinet that voted, at the meeting when his removal was finally approved; but we are not aware that he has denied that he urged or dictated the dispatch, two days before, removing him. General Frémont, for good or bad reasons, has a firmer hold on the affections of the loyal people of the country than any other man in it, and his name excites a popular enthusiasm that no other name among us will or can, and, though we interfere not with military appointments, and ask not that he be given an active command, we tell the Administration that it cannot afford to alienate and discourage his friends any more than Mr. Seward can afford to dispense with the political support of General McClellan.

We have written plainly, more plainly than the times seem to warrant; but we know we have done so with a loyal heart and a loyal purpose. We want our Nation saved, and we care not who saves or has the glory of saving it, if saved it be. If Mr. Seward is that man, all honor to him; but we tell him, we tell the President, we tell the country, if his policy be any longer continued, we shall have no Nation to save. On all points he has been outwitted, out-generalled, and defeated, and the Nation stands disgraced at home and

abroad. For a moment he may succeed in diverting the indignation of the army, sacrificed to his expectant policy, from himself to the Secretary of War, or to the Abolitionists; but the truth will ere long be known, and his political juggling or his jaunty airs will fail to save him. For the President personally, we have great respect, and believe that, if he could rid his Administration of Mr. Seward, the "irrepressible conflict" man, and put a competent National man in his place, a man of ideas and of practical wisdom, not a mere politician, who understands nothing but rhetoric and the manipulation of party, he might yet succeed in carrying us safely through the National crisis. Perhaps all we ask will be done before what we write issues from the press, perhaps it will not, perhaps it is no longer practicable or possible.

Since writing the foregoing, a friend sends the following extract from a private letter, from a source entitled to full credit, which we are at liberty to publish, only suppressing the name of the writer. We hope the wish expressed by Mr. Seward may find its explanation in the fact that it was expressed at a dinner party, and near its close.

"July 21st, 1862.

"At a great diplomatic dinner on the 20th July, 1862, Seward first declared that he regrets not to have the power of Louis Napoleon, and to make a *coup d'état* against the Congress, which, by its confiscation bill has prevented a peace from being concluded with success; and further, that he for the first time understood the necessity for a Cromwell."

ART. IV.—*Athenäum*, DR. T. FROSCHAMMER. Munich: Lentner. 1862. Quarterly, 8vo.

THIS is the title of a philosophical and scientific Review that has recently made its appearance in Germany, under the editorship of Dr. T. Froschammer, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Munich. It first met our eye on a casual visit to Westermann & Co., well-known foreign Booksellers of this City, and we were at once struck with the author's clear comprehension of the problem of the Church in our age, How to restore science and genius to the position they once held in her bosom?—in other words, how to determine, on true and comprehensive principles, the re-

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lation of science to faith—of philosophy to theology? Indeed this problem may be regarded as the *intellectual* phase of the great question of nature and grace, just as the *moral* phase of the same question has been determined by defining the relation of free-will to grace. The world has marvelled at the vast amount of learning and science that has been brought to bear on this latter question before a true mean was struck between Pelagius and his adherents on the one hand, and Baius and Jansenius on the other. And it would seem that, in our day, a contest no less laborious is in preparation, before the dualism between the natural and supernatural in the matter of faith and science is brought into harmony without compromising the legitimate sphere of either.

Professor Kuhn of Tübingen, in his *Katholische Dogmatike*, published some few years ago, one of the ablest writers in our day, was the first we met with in Catholic Germany to assert and maintain the independence of science, or its right to be governed by its own laws. He was attacked in an elaborate pamphlet by Dr. Clemens, Professor of Philosophy at Münster, who in turn advocated the common traditional doctrine, that science is but the handmaid of theology, and as such, of course, should take its principles from faith, and be governed in its conclusions entirely by the dogmas of the Church. We read Professor Kuhn's rejoinder at the time, now some two years since; and until the present publication of Professor Froschammer fell into our hands, we had met with nothing superior in our German reading.

Dr. Froschammer sees clearly enough that it is the dearth of such philosophical studies as are based on the free legitimate use of our mental faculties that has brought the Church into antagonism with the science that is outside of her, and has hampered and emasculated whatever of science there is within her—and his task is, to labor to restore science to its independent position—to give back to it the vigor and legitimate sway it held in the Apologetic age of the Church, when Justin Martyr and his compeers came freighted with the spoils of Grecian Philosophy to aid in defending, in unfolding, and in consolidating her doctrine.

Of Professor Froschammer himself we have no knowledge except what we derive from his works—of these, *die Freiheit der Wissenschaft*, Freedom of Science, *die aufgabe der naturphilosophie und ihr verhältniss zur naturwissenschaft*, the Problem of Natural Philosophy and its relation to

natural science, and the one at the head of this article, are all that we have read. They, however, make it clear enough to us that he is one of the leading minds of Catholic Germany, and is destined by his extensive scientific and philosophical learning, by his logical strength and acuteness, and his bold, independent thought, to exercise no ordinary influence upon his country and his age. He has entered upon his work, fully aware of the number and power of the enemies he must encounter, and what is better still, fully armed for their assaults. Certainly if he can sustain himself against future opponents as ably as the *Athenäum* attests he has done with *Die Katholik*, one of the first to make an onslaught upon him, he will prove in the end a true benefactor to the Church and society,—such a one as she would have been glad to hail for these many generations. No one can read his scathing replies to the old time-worn objections of *The Catholic*—his complete riddling of the defences it relied upon as impregnable, without a feeling of joy that “a strong man, armed” has come to lift off the load of oppression that has kept science and reason manacled within the Church for so long a period, and that this emancipation comes from the hand of a priest (such the remark of his opponent would lead us to conjecture) makes it none the less welcome by reason of our own poor efforts in the same cause.

His work entitled *Freiheit der Wissenschaft*, or Freedom of Science, goes to show, in the first place, that science, especially Philosophy, must have freedom, that is, be free to follow its own laws; laws which are essential to its very existence; that these laws constitute therefore its *natural right*, without which science itself ceases, since only constraint and arbitrariness can rule in its place. Therefore even within the Catholic Church, this freedom of science must be granted so long as she admits and does not exclude and repudiate science itself. Without this freedom the Church must fall into contradiction with herself, for while on the one hand she would admit science to exist, and even seek to foster it, on the other, by depriving it of its natural rights or the very conditions of existence, she would render it impossible. In the second place, science must be free, must follow the law of its nature (which only herself can find out and determine), because the perfection of science could not otherwise be seriously sought and attained. On this ground also must the Catholic Church allow freedom

of science, otherwise that ideal of science could not be actualized on which she relies to show the accordance of science with Faith; since this ideal is not attainable by mere obedience, submission and belief, but is striven after and reached only by means purely scientific. Finally, in the third place, he shows that, apart from the pure standpoint of Science and of its interests, it lies in the interest of Christian Faith and of the Church herself, to possess and perfect a science which brings the facts of revelation—Faith, its contents and authority itself, to the test of a proof that is free and independant of Faith, and resting upon natural principles, in order to bring home Faith to the natural consciousness, to the reason of the unbeliever, to legitimate it, and to defend and vindicate it against the attacks of its enemies. He further goes on to show that such a Science has at all times been assumed in the Christian Church, and it is from these principles that Christian Science has taken its rise, and which, adapting itself to all the changes and necessities of the times, gives birth to that natural and Apologetic Science always fostered by the Fathers, and which has continually been perfecting itself, and which will and must become further perfected and remodelled, so long as it is deemed allowable, indeed, necessary, that natural power and activities should operate effectively in the preservation and advancement of Christianity. These points which we have briefly stated are developed, illustrated, and defended with great ability, learning, force of argument, acuteness, skill, and even wit, in the Second *Heft* of the *Athenäum*, containing 170 pages. We should be very glad, if it were in our power, to translate and publish the whole of this masterly exposition and defence, which is too compact to permit of extracts without more or less of injustice to the author. We, however, cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of giving a brief extract from the conclusion of a previous answer to his opponents, more especially to *The Catholic* published in his first *Heft*.

“*The third part of my dissertation upon Freedom of science, The Catholic judges to be written in a strain of ‘bitterness and resentment.’ I have heard very unprejudiced and impartial persons proclaim quite the contrary of this very portion. That The Catholic should view it in another light argues perhaps that it touches somewhat closely upon himself. If there is any bitterness it is to be found in the subject, not in the expression. When one has to*

unveil evil and describe it just as it is, the mildest language will seem bitter to those interested.

"What I have said with regard to adherence to the old opinions of the schools, which are defended with obstinacy and pass almost for dogmas, while at the same time they hamper every advance of science beyond the old traditional status, the critic declares to be all 'simply false.' That declaration is simple enough, but, mere denial is not refutation, be it ever so brief and convenient. When he asks: 'Does Dr. Froschammer really believe that the advocates of the scholastic tendency do not know how to distinguish what they should defend as dogma, and what not?' I answer: whether they know it or not, I cannot say, but so much the worse for them if knowing how to distinguish they have not been careful to do so.

"The brilliant portion however of the article of *The Catholic*, is that wherein he seeks to justify the procedure of the Congregation of the Index which I had censured. I had remarked that in the Congregation only the old schools and school opinions were represented, and for that reason they unfairly influenced the criticism, if not the condemnation, passed upon modern works, and the more so, as the referees and judges have for the most part pledged themselves to uphold Thomas Aquinas, &c. To this the critic remarks: 'It did not here occur to Dr. F. to give any place to the thought that perhaps just here a prejudice against his tendency could arise from the ecclesiastical standpoint, namely, that the Church authority appoints *such* men to the Congregation of the Index. In general, from the mass of accusation which Dr. F. has heaped upon the Congregation, one could not but infer that these men hold it to be absolutely impossible for them in any way to err—from such a thought they would fly as from fire.' One would think, that to write in such a style upon this subject, a person must have lost the natural sense of right and justice, must have become so blind to all history and experience as to think that in ecclesiastical administration what men call 'abuse' and 'abusive' are absolutely impossible elements; therefore never have occurred and never can; whatever happens, and however it may happen, each one must find to be good and excellent, and should appeal therefrom neither to natural law nor even to *positive ordinances*; and nevertheless the above is literally in *The Catholic*; and yet, a man must hold his peace, though he sees it to be a wrong that a court should exist, which at once is both party and judge, and when the party, moreover, contains the accusers; a court which cannot judge impartially on conscientious grounds because it has once sworn the oath to adhere to a definite tendency in matters of science, and in every way to defend and promote that tendency. And is no wrong possible where the fundamental principles of natural law and the ineradicable sentiments of justice are concerned, because forsooth we are ourselves liable to err? How absurd thus to have recourse for help to general human

infirmity, to man's liability to err, instead of producing something pertinent in defence or in justification of the usual procedure of this Congregation, which indeed would be impossible.

"If in such a matter, human liability to err is to withhold our judgment, nothing remains but to give ourselves over to rank skepticism, to question the veracity of human nature in its most immediate operations, and with that, to renounce at once knowledge and faith, reason and authority. The critic speaks of a mass of accusation—why did he not reply to it, and show it to be groundless?—why was he especially silent about the Constitution of Benedict XIV., which was designed to govern and moderate the action of the Congregation of the Index, and to guard in some way the honor and dignity of science and of authors, and which are no longer observed?—why did he not speak of these points instead of going off into empty phrases? My declaration that the scholastic tendency combats not alone with means purely scientific, but with weapons of ecclesiastical suspicion and denunciation, the critic characterizes a gross piece of insolence. It would have been far better for him to have given the proof that the fact was not as I stated it; instead of this, in the very attack upon my writings he has given the clearest proof of the truth of my statement, as is abundantly obvious from the whole discussion hitherto. One must be in bad straits, when his conduct is of such a complexion that to characterize it as it really is, is forthwith deemed by him a piece of insolence.

"To these expressions of the critic the editor makes some additional remarks, which I will not pass over in silence. He disavows being in any communication with the Congregation of the Index, and intending any denunciation whatever. As regards freedom of science and of speech, he will accord to others the same freedom he claims for himself. That, at all events, is worth hearing; though what he means by it is left somewhat ambiguous. 'Let others, therefore,' he continues, 'freely develop their theories; we claim for ourselves the liberty to combat them as false, if we perceive them to be so. Let others set forth their principles; we will be free to develop our own. Against this nothing could be objected from the standpoint of free science.' Certainly not. Now, however, he proceeds: 'We shall be answered, perhaps, We have nothing against your setting up theories and adducing your reasons therefor, but you should not charge us with heresy; should not bring authority down upon us; should not cast suspicion upon us, as if we were damaging orthodoxy. But does not any one see that, if in such and similar phrases there is in general some show of reason, it amounts to nothing more than that against a theory which it may please a man of learning to set up, we should oppose our subjective thought, and not measure it by the objective standard of the Church's doctrine? But that means nothing else than a demand

upon us to renounce our Catholic standpoint. If people will not find fault with us for being Catholic, who wish to remain Catholic themselves, they must not complain if to all things we apply the standard of Catholic truth.'—(p. 61.)

"Here, in my opinion, the concession of free investigation made above receives sufficient abatement, and is brought within pretty narrow limits. It seems then that *The Catholic* cannot comprehend that any but *subjective* thought is produced, when the doctrine of the Church cannot step in as objective standard and principle. But does not *The Catholic* see that by this *all science*, especially *all philosophy*, is abolished, and that positive theology is the only true science remaining? and that if, outside of the doctrine of the Church, there is nothing but subjective opinion, and not truths objectively certain, both as principles and as consequences deduced therefrom, there is in the main nothing left but Faith? a faith, too, without test, without secure rational judgment; since to have this there would be needed a firm objective-point outside of the domain of Faith, which, according to his doctrine, could not be furnished, because, with him, nothing exists external to faith but subjective opinion? Faith, itself, would come upon mankind only as chance or fate, and rest with its authority wholly upon an obscure foundation. Positive Theology, even, in such a state of things would not be possible, and all science would be alike suppressed. But if, besides the doctrine of the Church, there is, moreover, an objective natural truth and certainty, and not mere fluctuating opinion, then a ground is gained upon which actual science can and must base itself, in order to attain to knowledge, and not remain merely faith, forever turning in a circle, making Faith principle and result at the same time. This *The Catholic* does not see into; and his assertions above made, natural and obvious as they may appear at first sight, are, when closely examined, the very ruin of all true science. And, indeed, it is in the principles here enunciated and upheld that we have to seek the chief cause of the paltry progress, the barrenness, the emasculation of the higher science inside the Catholic Church. To impose the objective standard of the Church doctrine on science, and its results, is an affair of Church authority, not of science. Science, on the contrary, has but poorly fulfilled its task, if it knows nothing more than to forever trace whether a philosophic theory does or does not, in some way or other, come into disharmony with Faith, or whether it is not possible to misinterpret it into such disharmony, and, accordingly, whether it is not open to suspicion or charge of heresy. Thence flows a source of contention and rancor, of intrigue and discouragement, of self-satisfied content and mental debility. Science becomes an easy matter; and all the fervor and toil of its investigation are spared, when one is satisfied to measure things by the standard of Faith, and then either let the matter rest or decide it scientifically according to Faith. Scientific frivolity and conceit

get along well on that principle, but neither Science nor Faith gain any thing; rather, both lose and suffer damage: Science, because it is not seriously pursued, but rather impeded; Faith and its authority, because, when in matters of science one is forever appealing to Faith, every error, every narrowness, every folly of such scientific inquirers, will be placed to its account, and it will be made liable for them. No! with such principles *The Catholic* would end the task and toil of Science where properly it only begins. If Science itself is to gain any thing, and through Science, Faith, then it must be shown, upon scientific grounds, that the doctrines of Faith are truth, and why, and their contrary, false; for so long as this is not done, a doctrine of Faith is not scientifically proved, and the contrary of it is not scientifically refuted, for any one capable of judging,—and still that is properly the task of Science. If it proceeds always from Faith, and gets its support from it, it carries proof only for such as believe already, and offers an argument which has value for them only from the fact that they already believe, and just so long as they believe. For the unbeliever and for science, naturally such a mode of proof has no value.

“The business of science, even within the Church, is to examine with reference to their scientific characters, the decrees of faith and the views opposed to them, to know them according to the principles and laws of thought. The business of ecclesiastical authority on the other hand is, to attest the agreement or non-agreement with faith, of the results of science. When now a single scientific inquirer, or a combination of them, by means of a review, regard as their chief task the latter of these, they mistake the business of science as well as exercise an arrogance against other inquirers, by playing the rôle of Church authority against them—a procedure that can only engender mortification and bitterness. *The Catholic* has the less right to enact such a rôle, as, according to its principle asserted above, there exists outside of the objective truth of the Church, nothing but subjective opinion. If this be a conviction of *The Catholic*, then, not being itself the ecclesiastical authority, it has not a particle of right to thrust upon us his views and explanations of Church doctrine, as they are only subjective, since the individual who writes an essay or polemic is not himself the objective Christian truth.

“Science within the Church must also consider as its task to show *why* certain scientific theories or results are not in accordance with Catholic Doctrine, and why therefore they are not true. Hence it will rightfully have fulfilled its task, which the Church must appoint, when it shows that such theories and results *do not accord with the Church because they are not scientifically true*, and not vice versa, that they are not true because they do not accord with the Church; for to declare that, is simply a matter of authority and not of science. If science within the Church has in view to ex-

amine, judge, and if possible, refute anti-christian doctrine not by the standard of dogma, but by that of the idea of science, then will the measure of its own gain and perfection correspond to its true significance and advantage to Christianity. On the other hand, if dogma alone is always made a standard in scientific inquiry and knowledge, then, never will the true notion of science itself be realized, never will that ideal of science be realized, from which the Church hopes as a result the perfect accord of faith and knowledge. A science which must be guided by dogma as its governing rule will never attain this aim, for the accord will always be factitious, artful or forced, and not free, natural, and scientifically necessary, therefore, not such an accord as proceeds from the realization of the idea of science. Inasmuch as the Church holds on to the principle that true science and true faith have a necessary accord with each other, she must naturally have in her mind an ideal which she believes will itself show the accord when it is attained. Relying upon this, she must not simply allow, but should wish that this ideal be striven for and reached. The perfection of science, however, cannot be compassed by belief and subjection, which are not the characteristics of true science, but is only attained by purely scientific means, that is, when purely scientific principles and the laws of thought are applied to the object of knowledge by means of human reason cultivated to its highest perfection. Credence and subjection to faith and authority could certainly supply *real* truth to a science, never *formal* truth, that is the actual knowledge, in which precisely the essence of science consists. For, I repeat again it is not the possession of truth that science supplies, but the *knowledge* of truth is necessary in order to realize the ideal of science. Accordingly it does not belong to the truth and perfection of science to believe and to serve, but really to know according to scientific laws. So far as science is only believing and serving, it is not as yet truly knowing, consequently it is so far incomplete and removed from the ideal of science, in the attainment of which, the Church, as already remarked, looks for the perfect accord of knowledge with faith. But finally science must accord *knowing* and *believing*. If the Church therefore wishes that this ideal of science be gradually attained—and how should she not?—it must also be her intention to have purely scientific means at work to perfect it, and as a matter of course, that science must have freedom, that is to say, should follow its own legitimate course, since in any other way that ideal, and with it the perfect accord of faith and knowledge, will not be reached. *The Catholic* however, with its principles and its course, cannot on the one hand, either realize the idea or even offer any thing towards its realization, and on the other, it arrogates to itself in reference to other inquirers the function of the ecclesiastical teacher's authority. In either relation its tendency cannot be in the intention or interest of authority, and whilst being

unable itself to offer any thing important to Science, it seeks to place hindrances to the efforts of others.

"*The Catholic* further remarks: 'So much on Freedom, now a word more on Science. It is a strange way of combating to set one's self up as a defender of science and matters scientific, and from the outset to allot to his opponents the rôle of the unscientific, just as the great mass of Protestants have done to us Catholics.' Have I really done so in my writing? Truly this is to gasp in the air for accusation. In the dissertation in question, I begin with the first elements of science and scientific research; write a whole section upon the necessary conditions, qualities, characteristics of science, in order to show that it must of necessity claim for itself freedom—that is, have legitimate action, and only after having gone through a thorough discussion in these points, do I declare that whoever disallows or does not fulfil those requirements, does not proceed in a scientific manner and cannot attain to true science, and that, therefore, *The Catholic* itself, since he will not concede the freedom of science, is unscientific, in the measure in which he will not and does not concede it. All this is set forth in the most detailed manner, and to say the truth, I have made the way to this exposition showing *The Catholic* to be unscientific, neither short nor easy for myself, and yet he comes forward now, and asserts that from the outset I have allotted to him the rôle of unscientific procedure! Not so, in truth, but he himself has adopted this course from the beginning.

"'Our times,' he continues, 'are hard times for the Catholic Church, and seem but little suited for strife and controversy among Catholics themselves, which can only be a source of joy for our adversaries. Would that at this time we were united from our hearts. But misfortunes never come singly, and so not only have we the great conflict without, but must besides have contests within.' Here again there is manifested a total misconception of the whole matter. There is no question here of a conflict, but of purifying and ameliorating; there is no design to weaken the Church, but to strengthen her, by removing the elements and causes of her weakness; and if a conflict has arisen, it has been occasioned by the resistance of those elements of weakness, and by their effort to maintain themselves and become more wide-spread, especially in Germany. The very oppressed condition of the Church shows such a renovation and improvement to be needed. The Scholastic-Romanizing tendency of science, and the system of instruction it has given birth to for youth and for the people at large, are clearly not of a growth with the times and their relations, and have afforded the Church and its Supreme Pastor but little service, or rather bad service; at all events in the hour of trial, it has shown itself powerless in presence of the spirit of the age and its complications. It is a system unequal to the task of truly forming the mind, of guid-

ing and ennobling it, but rather fills it with indifference and neglect, or with vexation and contempt. Look at Italy. Everywhere there has this scholastic tendency held absolute sway, for itself and for its favorite mode of instructing youth; there the Jesuits were all powerful and influential, both in person and with their wide-spread *Civiltà Cattolica*. With all this, has there been achieved a truly noble Christian education, love for the Church, reverence for its Chief Pastor? Not at all, as is manifest; for, from one end of Italy to the other, how much illiterateness, how great an aversion to Christianity, to the Church, and to her visible Head, is revealed as to the result! Is not that clearly a sufficient sign that this scholastic tendency with its system of education no longer suits the age, that it is without vigor, and can afford but poor service to Christianity and the Church? Truly, they will not fail to reply that the fault is not theirs, but belongs to the upheavings of the time, to the spread of anti-christian principles, perhaps also to German philosophy! Be that as it may, it is clear, at all events, that the scholastic training is no longer a match for the intellectual struggles and dangers of our day, to which it so strikingly succumbs; and it is no less clear that the mental life of this people was far from sound, far from being suitable and vigorous, else this upheaving and these evil principles would not have found such sympathy there. Where the carcass is, there it is said, the ravens are gathered. Is it to be wondered at, that under these circumstances, we here in Germany should not suffer to be thrust unceremoniously upon us, and everywhere to prevail, a science and a mode of instruction clearly proved to be pernicious in itself, and which in Italy has shown itself so powerless and so much at variance with the age, and all this while German science and our own native efforts are treated with contempt, and, as far as is dared, are stigmatized and denounced to ecclesiastical censure? And will any one be offended at us for putting forth all our energies to create a different and a better science, one which will correspond more to the notion of science and better accord with the culture and needs of the age, and, therefore, be in a better position to do true and loyal service to Christianity? and is it not natural and proper to defend ourselves when attacked, and stand by our cause when suspicion is cast upon it? We seek no contest, but we do not want what is pernicious to science, and to the Church, and to our people, to be thrust upon us, and what is profitable and advantageous to be taken away.

"We have but one more citation to make from what remains of the strictures of *The Catholic*, and that refers to the course of the Congregation of the Index. 'That the Congregation of the Index,' says he, 'is capable of still greater perfection is *a priori* certain; but even as it is it has in our modern times shown its usefulness and ability, unbiassed and unbribed by the splendor of learning and of genius, given a death-blow to the dangerous, and in a meas-

ure insidious and illusive errors of Lamenaianism and Tradition-alism in France, and of Hermesianism and Guntherism in Germany, whose threatening diffusion had been in nowise impeded by the mere activity of science, and thus the Congregation has done great service to truth and science and to their true and prosperous advancement.' I hope and take for granted, that *The Catholic* has not been aware of or has not well considered what he really says in this passage; for, certainly he will not impose upon the Church the shame and degradation of seriously insinuating to her the principle that a procedure no matter how qualified, be it even against nature and law, is nevertheless allowable to the Church, *if only it prove useful and productive of good results!* No! not by utility, not by favorable results, is a procedure to be justified in the Church, if otherwise unfair and against law. The Church least of all can favor such principles, and she will surely prefer by far to have no advantage, indeed rather to suffer damage, than to gain what is useful and advantageous by means disallowed and unlawful. If then the course of the Congregation of the Index is unwarranted, inadequate, and even opposed to existing ordinances, no advantage, and no result it may procure, can justify it, and no damage it may avert should hinder a change. For the rest we may remark that it is altogether an incorrect view of things, to affirm that the Congregation of the Index had given the death-blow to the above-mentioned scientific tendencies and systems. The censure can prohibit and suppress books and systems, but to give the death-blow is only the province of scientific refutation.

"And now one word more in conclusion. The Editor of *The Catholic* is pleased to favor me with an admonition, seeing that 'I, as teacher in Munich of so many Catholic youth devoting themselves to the priesthood, have a great calling and a great responsibility.' 'It would,' continues he, 'be sad beyond measure were he to implant in the minds of his students who have given him their confidence, a false scientific and mental tendency—may he spare this grief to the Church, and pardon us this outspoken warning.' Such well-meant advice I will not leave without a reply, and on my part, I might counsel *The Catholic*, instead of always speaking in supreme judicial tone of the false course, and erroneous speculation into which I am said to have fallen, to get at once and earnestly a conception of his own course and tendency, and see if they are not wrong and in our day pernicious to science and the Church. Let him examine if in history a revivification, a regeneration, has ever been effected by means of repression, and not rather disorder and impotency been the result of such violent procedure. Let him once reflect that the only effect the Romanizing scholastic science and education can and will have, especially in Germany, is, the ever-wider estrangement from the Church of the cultivated German world, the ever-increasing chasm between the clergy and

the rest of educated persons, the ever-growing impossibility for the Church to act successfully upon the conscience of the age, and to maintain herself and her religion in a fitting status. How imperfect soever my performances may be, they will certainly never exercise an influence so detrimental to the Church as well as to science, nor one so injurious to the German nation, as the Romanizing scholastic tendency, which *The Catholic* believes should be so zealously defended in Germany, indeed I may say, than it has exercised and continues more and more to exercise, thereby giving reason for 'the times to be hard for the Church;' for the rest, I can give *The Catholic* the assurance that I also take no pleasure in such controversies, have not really sought them, and desire nothing so much as never again to be placed under the necessity of giving a reply to such accusations and attacks on his part."

ART. V.—*Essay on Catholicism, Liberalism, and Socialism, considered in their fundamental principles.* By DONOSO CORTES, MARQUIS DE VALDEGAMAS. Translated from the Spanish. Philadelphia: Lippincott & Co. 1862. 16mo. pp. —

WE do not insert the name of the accomplished and gifted translator of this remarkable essay by the late Donoso Cortes, for we do not know whether it is her intention to publish it with her name, or not, the work being not yet out, and we having before us only 160 pages of the advanced sheets. We, however, commend her for having sought consolation amidst the troubles of her country, and her own private griefs, in translating for her countrymen so valuable a work, and one so much needed at the present time to be read and studied, as the profound and eloquent essay on Catholicity, Liberalism, and Socialism, certainly one of the very few truly excellent works our age has produced, and, in the original, one of the most eloquent books to be found in Spanish, or in any other language that we are acquainted with, while its theme is the loftiest, the profoundest, the most comprehensive that can engage the thoughts of the philosopher, the statesman, the citizen, the Christian, or the man.

Donoso Cortes was a great man, a man of true genius, and deserves to rank in the first class of the really eminent men of our time. Like nearly all the men who in our day have

risen to eminence and been remarkable for the richness and firmness of their faith, and the sincerity and depth of their devotion, his youth, though he was born of Catholic parents and piously educated, was overcast with doubts and perplexities as to the Christian faith, and for a time marked, if not by absolute unbelief, yet by a lamentable religious indifference. At length, domestic afflictions brought him to reflection, and reflection restored him to faith; he became understandingly as well as lovingly a Christian, and one of the most fervent and influential Catholic laymen of Europe. With him faith was not a mere sentiment, religion a mere feeling, but a deep and profound conviction in which his whole nature as a man sympathized and took part. He was a Catholic from conviction, not from inheritance only, and understood and could give a reason for the faith that was in him. His genius was synthetic, and no man in modern times, if we except his illustrious contemporary, the much decried and calumniated Vincenzo Gioberti, has more clearly seen, or more firmly grasped the Christian synthesis, which embraces in one living whole God and creation, nature and grace, religion, the Church, society, family, and the state. His high position as a senator of Spain, and ambassador of the Spanish Government to various foreign courts, as well as his personal character, so true, so gentle, so energetic, so disinterested and self-sacrificing, gave weight to his words, while his rare eloquence charmed and to a great extent captivated for a few brief years his age, and gave a new impulse to Catholic thought. Too brief was his career, too soon he died for us, but, not too brief or too soon for himself, for he died in the Lord, and his works do follow him.

In early life, in the freshness of youth and opening manhood, Donoso Cortes was a Spanish Liberal, and though he subsequently despaired of liberty in the sense he had at first hoped to secure it, yet never did he cease to breathe a free spirit, or to labor for what he held to be true freedom. There are passages scattered through his works, which indicate his loss of confidence in constitutional guaranties, and so-called parliamentary governments, and that he was prepared to take refuge from the evils of his times in monarchy, unlimited save by moral and religious restraints; but no man ever lived who held despotism in greater detestation, or who was prepared to make greater sacrifices for genuine liberty. He saw or thought he saw, in the revolutions of 1848, in the prevailing social uneasiness and political convulsions of the

times, a breaking up of social order, and a return towards barbarism, and he felt the need of authority, of power, of a strong concentrated government able to compress the dissolving tendencies, and to hold society back from absolute ruin, till reason, religion, and Catholic instruction could resume their legitimate empire over the rebellious and licentious populations of Christian Europe. Notwithstanding what we see at this moment in our own country, notwithstanding the demand, as yet only whispered, for a dictatorship to save us from the weakness and vacillation of the administration, which threaten the existence of the nation, and create at home and abroad the impression that our experiment in behalf of free government has failed, because under its influence intelligence and virtue have declined; we, for ourselves, hold fast our old convictions, and retain our confidence in constitutional government, and think the Spanish statesman too easily desponded, and allowed himself to go too far in his advocacy of a strong government, and the centralization of power. If we were forced to choose between them, we would prefer to come under the federative order, contended for by the so-called Confederacy, to coming under the centralized despotism of Philip II., Louis XIV., or Napoleon III. Better Jefferson Davis than a dictator, whether that dictator be William H. Seward or George B. McClellan, or Abraham Lincoln; better state sovereignty with Republican organization than the maintenance of national sovereignty by means of a military or any other despotism. Yet it was not despotism the Marquis de Valdegamas loved, but it was liberty through republican and parliamentary systems he despaired of; and if he approved the assumption of supreme power by the French President, he saw that under Imperial centralism he had and could have no place; he withdrew from the public, sought occupation and consolation in his religious exercises, in visiting the sick, and in ministering to the poor and the afflicted, and soon died, clothed with the habit of a Jesuit; fitting end for a man who loves liberty, and despairs of obtaining it for the world through political action or combinations.

Donoso Cortes was a theologian formed by the study of the Holy Scriptures and the Fathers, not by the exclusive study of the later scholastics, and the compendiums of modern professors. Hence he was most vigorously attacked by French abbés, especially the Abbé Guizot, a man of more learning than knowledge, who undertook to prove him

retical, or at least unsound in the faith. But these French abbés, though clever, as all Frenchmen are, never understood, and could not understand the depth and reach of the Spaniard's thought, and therefore very naturally concluded that it must be unorthodox. Moreover, he had borrowed his terminology from the Scriptures and the Fathers, not the schools in which they had been educated, and therefore could not fail to fall under their suspicion. The fact is, that there has grown up among us in later times, a very rigid, but narrow and shallow theology, which a great many amongst us confound with Catholic faith itself, and whoever departs from it, in any direction, or fails to adopt its dry and frigid terminology, is at once assumed to be unsound in doctrine, disloyal to the Church, at least deserving to be censured as rash, bad sounding in his expressions, or offensive to pious ears. Under the rod of *temeraria, mal sonans*, offensive to pious ears, our pedantic abbés, our theological *petit maîtres*, attempt to lash almost every generous spirit, every really thinking student, who aspires to a free, living theology, into subjection to their hide-bound and cramping systems, which squeeze the very life out of them. Both faith and theology suffer from their pedantry and intolerance.

The system of theology which is the most generally adopted at present in Catholic schools, is that taught or patronized by the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, and there is a very wide feeling among honest and devout Catholics, that to depart from any thing approved by the Fathers of the Society, is to depart from what is approved by the Church herself. Yet we should do well to bear in mind, that, while Catholic faith is always and everywhere one and the same, embraced alike by all, there are among us various systems of theology, which often differ very widely one from another. Every Catholic is free, according to his own convictions, to follow any one of these systems or schools, or to differ from them all, so long as he does not contravene the Catholic faith, or Catholic dogma. A man may be a Molinist, a Thomist, or an Augustinian, defend the *scientia media*, or assert the *præmotio physica*, and yet be irreproachable as a Catholic believer. Theology is not faith, nor is any system of theology or philosophy a divine revelation. Every system of theology or philosophy is a human science, the production of the human faculties operating on divine things supernaturally revealed, or cognizable by the light of reason, and is subject to the fallibility common to all our faculties. No man, no

number of men, no school, no religious order or congregation has any right to set up its peculiar system of theology or philosophy as a test of orthodoxy, or to require conformity to it on pain of being decried as a disloyal or suspected Catholic. The early Fathers of the Society of Jesus were great men, and good men; they thought freely for themselves, and gave currency to a theology which, with various modifications, has since become that of the Society itself. It is permissible for the Society to hold and teach it, but it is not Catholic doctrine, to differ from which is heresy; it is only the Society's views of Catholic doctrine; its systematic and logical explanations of it, and deductions from it. Through various causes this system is very widely accepted, and most of our seminarians are trained in it, whether they are Jesuits or not. We complain not of this; we only complain of the attempt, unconsciously made perhaps, to impose this system upon us as authoritative, and to denounce as unsound in the faith those who do not see fit to accept it, or prefer to follow a different school.

For ourselves, we are not, in all things, a disciple of the Jesuits' school of theology. We regard their system as the weakest and the least philosophical of all the systems of Catholic theology that have been emitted. We do not accept the *scientia media*, for we know no medium between God and man but the creative act of God, and unless man has proper creative power, God is and must be the determining cause of all that is good and positive in the action of creatures, and therefore must know all things in knowing his own determinations. We, therefore, prefer the doctrine of the *præmotio-physica*, or that the determining cause of whatever is good and positive in creatures, is God himself; but a determining cause that in man determines him as a free second cause, not as bound by the law of fate or necessity. The Jesuit may differ from me, refute me by natural reason, or by what is called the *ratio theologica*, if he can, but he must not denounce me, or pretend that I am unsound in the faith, for my opinion is as free in the Church as his; nor is it permitted me to denounce or defame him, for his opinion is as free in the Church as mine. In regard to the *status naturæ puræ*, original sin, natural beatitude, &c., we go with the Augustinians, rather than with the Jesuits. We hold their system of theology to be philosophical, and more consonant with the attributes of God, and the unity and simplicity of the action in creation, than the Jesuits' system.

redemption, regeneration, and glorification than are the teachings of Molina and other Fathers of the Society. Under the influence of the Society, as we believe, theology has become a dead science, and the Catholic world has shrunk to very narrow dimensions, which are daily becoming narrower; while under the influence of the profounder and more comprehensive theologies of earlier times, the clergy conquered the world, and led the human race. In this fact we see the interpretation of that hostility which the Society incurs even from Catholics. Yet the Jesuits individually are learned men, able men, excellent, pious, devoted, self-sacrificing men, whom to know is to love and venerate; and the theology they teach is unquestionably permitted by the Church, who neither approves nor condemns formally any system of theology, unless the rights of dogma are in question.

Donoso Cortes had grand theological conceptions, which he always expressed with a living and energetic eloquence, but not always with what, in our times, is regarded as strict verbal accuracy. In a few instances, he is not fully master of his own thought, and fails to vindicate it to ordinary minds. He seeks the origin and type of creation, of family, of the state, of society, in God as the ever-blessed Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in which he is eminently philosophical, and eminently Catholic. God is the origin and type of all created existences, and in him are and must be the principles of all the relations which do or can subsist among them, since he is universal creator, origin, cause, exemplar, and end of all things. In the Trinity, we must seek the principle of generation, production, reproduction, perfection, completion, or consummation, and, consequently, not sex, as the heathen did, but the principle of sex, essential to production, or development in the natural order. In this principle is the origin and ground of natural human society, as in grace is the origin and ground of supernatural human society or the Church, whose ministers are rightly and felicitously called *fathers*, spiritual fathers, fathers of the spiritual life. But not having penetrated into the divine mystery of the Trinity as far as reason operating on revealed *data* can go, he presents this grand doctrine in a confused and imperfect form, which, under some points of view, may seem objectionable. We extract what he says on this point, and which the Abbé Gaduel considered as a denial of the Trinity itself.

"The same God, who is the author and governor of civil society, has also created and regulated domestic society. Placed in the most hidden, the highest, the purest, and the brightest of the celestial regions, is a tabernacle, which is inaccessible even to the choirs of the angels. In this unapproachable tabernacle is perpetually enacted the prodigy of prodigies, and the mystery of mysteries. There dwells the Catholic God, one and triune: one in essence, three in person. The Son is coeternal with and engendered by the Father; and the Holy Ghost is coeternal with and proceeds from the Father and the Son; and the Holy Ghost is God, and the Son is God, and the Father is God; and God has no plural, because there is only one God, three in person and one in substance. The Holy Ghost is God even as the Father is God, but He is not the Father: He is God even as the Son is God, but He is not the Son. The Son is God even as the Holy Ghost is God, but He is not the Holy Ghost; He is God even as the Father is God, but He is not the Father. The Father is God even as the Son is God, but He is not the Son; He is God even as the Holy Ghost is God, but He is not the Holy Ghost. The Father is omnipotence; the Son is wisdom; the Holy Ghost is love; and the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are infinite love, supreme power, and perfect wisdom. There unity, expanding perpetually, begets variety, and variety in self-condensation is perpetually resolved into unity. God is thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; and He is the supreme thesis, the perfect antithesis, the infinite synthesis. Because He is one, He is God; because He is God, He is perfect: because He is perfect, He is most fruitful; because He is most fruitful, He is diversity; because He is diversity, He is the family. In his essence exist, in an inexpressible and incomprehensible manner, the laws of creation, and the exemplars of all things. Every thing has been made in his image, and, therefore creation is one and many. He is the universal word, which implies unity and variety combined in one. Man was made by God, and in his image, and not only in his image, but also in his likeness; and for this reason man is one in essence, and represents a sort of trinity of persons. Eve proceeds from Adam, Abel is begotten by Adam and Eve, and Adam, Abel, and Eve are the same thing; they are man, they are human nature. Adam is man the father, Eve is man the woman, Abel is man the son. Eve is man as Adam, but she is not the father; she is man as Abel, but she is not the son. Adam is man as Abel without being the son, and as Eve without being the woman. Abel is man as Eve without being the woman, and as Adam without being the father.

"All these names are divine, even as the functions which they signify are divine. The idea of paternity, the foundation of the family, could not have had its origin in the human mind. No fundamental differences exist, in the relation between father and son,

of sufficient importance to constitute in themselves a right. Priority is simply a fact, and nothing more; and the same thing may be said of power; and both united cannot of themselves make the right of paternity, although they may originate another fact, that of servitude. This fact supposed, the proper name of father is *master*, as that of son is *slave*. This truth, which reason suggests to us, is confirmed by history. Among those nations who have forgotten the great biblical traditions, the title of paternity has ever been but the synonym for domestic tyranny. If there could have existed a nation forgetful, on the one hand, of those great traditions, and on the other neglecting the worship of material power, among this people the fathers and sons would have been, and would have called themselves, brothers. Paternity comes from God, and can alone exist through him, either in name or in reality. Had God permitted an entire oblivion of all paradisiacal traditions, mankind would have lost even the name of this institution.

"The family relation is divine in its institution and in its nature, and has everywhere shared the vicissitudes of Catholic civilization; and it is very certain that the purity or the corruption of the first is invariably an infallible symptom of a corresponding condition of the second; as the history of the various vicissitudes and changes of the latter becomes equally the history of similar alternations in the former.

"In Catholic ages, the family relation tends to the highest degree of excellence; its human element is spiritualized, and the cloister takes the place of the domestic circle. While in the domestic life children reverently submit to their father and mother, the inmates of cloisters, with a still greater reverence and submission, bathe with their tears the sacred feet of a better Father, and the holy habit of a more tender mother. When Catholic civilization is no longer in the ascendant and begins to decline, the family relation immediately becomes impaired, its constitution vitiated, its elements disunited, and all its ties enfeebled. The father and mother whom God had united in the bonds of affection, substitute for this sacred tie a severe formality; while the children lose that filial reverence enjoined upon them by God, and a sacrilegious familiarity usurps its place. The ties which unite the family are loosened, debased, and profaned. Finally, they become obliterated, the family disperses, and is lost in the circles of the clubs and places of amusement.

"The history of the family may be traced in a few words. The divine family is the exemplar and model of the human family, and all its persons are eternal. The spiritual human family, which most closely approaches the divine in perfection, exists through all time. Between the father and mother in the natural human family the tie lasts during life; and between them and their children it is prolonged many years. But in the human anti-Catholic family the

relation between the father and mother lasts only some years; between them and the children only some months; in the artificial family of clubs only a day; and in that place of amusement but for a moment.

"In this, as in many other things, duration is the measure of perfection. Between the divine family and the human family of the closter, we find the same proportion as between time and eternity. When we compare the spiritual family of the cloister, which is the most perfect human type, and the sensual life of the clubs, which is the most imperfect, we again find the same proportion, as between the brevity of a moment and the immensity of all time." pp. 36-40.

There are grave defects in this statement, and the human trinity presented as the copy of the Divine lacks exactness, and indicates that the author has not sufficiently grasped the principle of the interior, essential, and eternal progression of the Divine Being, by virtue of which he is inherently active, living being, or as the schoolmen say, most pure act, *actus purissimus*; but the thought itself is profoundly philosophical and truly Catholic, and it was only the lack of a more perfect mastery of the *prima theologia*, almost wholly neglected in our days, that could have made the good Abbé Gaduel suspect it of heterodoxy. The human trinity as presented may not correspond to the Divine in all its parts as the copy to the exemplar, but it is clear that the author accepts in good faith the doctrine of the Trinity, and founds every thing on it, as he should do. What has happened to Donoso Cortes has happened and will happen to others, to all who are borne by the order of their genius, the temperament of their minds, or the character of their studies, to leave the beaten track, and to labor to advance or elevate thought, or to gain a free and fuller comprehension of Divine things than that which generally obtains. God redeems the world by dying for it, and all who would serve humanity must imitate him. The world always crucifies its redeemers, and crucifies them between two thieves, not to indicate that it crucifies them as redeemers, but as criminals. Therefore, said our Lord, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." It is precisely in what we in these sentences have done that the misunderstanding begins. We have here given a general application to particular revealed facts, and the theological *petit maîtres* at once conclude, with their peculiar logic, that because we deduce general truths from the individual facts, that we

deny the facts themselves, or simply resolve them, after the manner of the rationalists, into general propositions or rational truths. Thus, if we speak of the Word as incarnated in the race, they at once conclude that we deny his Incarnation in the individual, as if the race could subsist without the individual, or that Christ was an individual man hypostatically united to the Divine person. So, if we deduce a universal truth from a miracle recorded in the Bible, they conclude that we deny the miracle as a fact, and are simply rationalists. They cannot understand that we are synthesists, not mere analysts.

Now, we accept the simple facts, the simple defined dogmas in all sincerity, and in precisely the literal, definite sense in which they are accepted by our pedantic and literalistic theologians and by the vulgar; but we take also, as they seem not to be able to do, the facts as symbols of ideas or universal truths, and the dogmas as universal principles. Because we believe more than they do, they suppose we believe less; because we see more in the facts and dogmas than they see, we are presumed to see in them nothing at all. Here is the source of the misunderstanding between them and us, and the reason why we find bishops and priests, as well as journalists, denouncing us as un-Catholic, or as evidently under the influence of an heretical tendency. Did not the high-priest say it was better that our Lord should die than that the whole nation should perish? Is it not better that we should be denounced and defamed than that the faith of the least of these little ones should be endangered? Certainly. If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more they of his household. But they are the wicked Jews, misbelieving heretics, or besotted pagans, never Catholics, who do these things! Yet what our Lord said, he said for all times, and the faults he rebuked in the Synagogue are faults in the Church, and are hardly less common in the New than they were in the Old. The fact is, we take it, as did the Fathers, the great facts recorded in the Bible are not only particular facts, individual facts, and to be accepted as such, but also facts symbolical of great ideas, and of the general laws of Divine Providence, and therefore, may and should teach us something beyond what the literalists see in them. The dogmas of the Church are all Catholic, and if Catholic, universal principles, and susceptible of a universal sense and application.

Here meet the men we call literalists, and the rationalists. The literalists see only the particular facts and isolated dogmas, and confine themselves as far as possible to the strict letter. So taken the facts and dogmas appear arbitrary, capricious, unmeaning, and remain unproductive. They are the dry bones, not the living body of truth. They have no soul, for their soul is in their union and relation with God, the living truth itself. Repelled by the literalists, the rationalists reject the letter altogether, and take only the general principles and truths which the facts and dogmas are supposed to symbolize. They thus render all religion subjective, abstract, without any concrete or objective reality or support. Either class is fatal to religion. What we aim at is the real and sincere acceptance of the letter with the literalists, but at the same time as significant of universal or Catholic truth. We wish to show that the individual facts are pregnant, that the dogmas of the Church are not arbitrary, capricious, and isolated assertions, but great and living principles subsisting and operating in this system of things of which we are a part. This is what we have aimed to do, and what has led to so much misunderstanding of our views by well-meaning and fervent Catholics, but who never look beyond the mere letter. It is what was attempted with perhaps greater success than by any other man in modern times by Gioberti in Italy. It is what, under certain aspects, was attempted by Balmes in Spain, what, under other aspects, is attempted by Montalambert, in France, by Kuhn and Froschammer, in Germany, by the editors of the *Home and Foreign Review* in England, and by every really living man, rising above routine, now in the Church. This was the great work of the lamented Donoso Cortes, of which the essay before us is a splendid, a most valuable, though not an absolutely faultless monument.

The translator could not in the actual state of theological controversy among us, have selected a better or a more opportune work. It must be received by all thinking men with gratitude, and be read with avidity. The school of Alexandria triumphed over that of St. Irenæus, and will continue to do so whatever opposition the literalists may offer. Donoso Cortes will give a new impulse to theological thought in this country, and elevate controversy to a higher and serener region than that in which it is now carried on. For her part, the translator has performed her task with taste and fidelity, and given us one of the very best trans-

lations to be found in our language. As far as we have compared the translation with the original, it is remarkably exact. It is also free, spirited, and elegant, and the author suffers very little from his English dress. The most eloquent book we ever read, it is hardly less eloquent in the translation than in the original. The most gifted and accomplished lady has evidently translated it as a labor of love, but we hope a discerning public will appreciate and reward her labor.

ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *End of the Nineteenth Volume.*

IN closing the Nineteenth Volume of the Review, we may be permitted to assure our friends that, though the opposition to it in various quarters, the difficulties and distractions of the times, and the defection of our London publishers, have in some measure affected its circulation, there is a fair prospect that the Review will weather the storm, and when passion has subsided, and misunderstandings cleared up, recover all the ground it may have momentarily lost with a portion of the Catholic public. Never did the Catholic public more need the Review, and never has it had a fairer chance of doing good service to the Catholic cause than at the present moment.

The circumstances of the country have done much to break down the barriers between Catholics and non-Catholics, and excite kindlier feelings in the bosom of each towards the other. The civil war is fast moulding us into one people, and without the sacrifice or compromise of any principle on the part of Catholics. Catholic blood and non-Catholic blood have been too profusely shed, and too frequently mingled in the same crimson current on too many a stricken field for us not to feel that we are countrymen and brothers. Catholics have sealed their nationality and their loyalty with their blood, and we have a right to feel that we are Americans, rooted in the national soil. We have won the hearts, and we have gained the respect of non-Catholics, and removed many of their prejudices against our Church. It depends on us to continue and deepen the good impression that has been made. The Review can aid not a little in this, and is in a position to exert a more favorable influence than it ever could before, and we cannot believe that its discontinuance now would serve either the cause of our country or of our religion.

The opposition of Catholics has arisen chiefly from misunderstanding frequently our expressions, and still more frequently our purposes. Time and thought will soon correct both, and it will be seen that though we have rubbed hard against many prejudices, and contradicted some fondly-cherished opinions, we have never shown a disloyal intention, have never contravened any thing really Catholic, and have committed no offence but that of laboring with all our might to elevate the views, the tone of feeling, the literature and science, the general education

and culture of Catholics at home and abroad. The time is not far distant when we shall receive for what we have aimed to do an honor as undeserved as is the censure now bestowed on us.

The real difference between us and our Catholic opponents grows out of the fact that they think mainly of preserving the faith in those who have it, and we think mainly of extending it to those who have it not, and hence they naturally rely on feeling and the force of habit, and we on intellectual freedom and activity. We understand, what they do not, that we can extend our faith only by breaking up the tyranny of habit, the associations of the past, and freeing the mind from all authority but that of truth. We therefore demand freedom of thought, freedom of science, freedom of worship, and the entire separation in the external order, or as politics, of Church and State. This demand, indispensable to successful propagandism, is regarded by some, who only study to keep Catholic those who are Catholic, as incompatible with the rights and interests of the Church. Here is the source of the misunderstanding between us and a portion of the Catholic community. This demand is taken as an evidence of our impatience of legitimate authority and of a disobedient spirit. Time will very soon prove this a gross mistake. We love our religion, we love our Church, and we would not explain away or compromise any thing really Catholic to gain to our ranks the whole non-Catholic world.

But while we claim to be a rigid, uncompromising Catholic, we do not consider it necessary to defend as Catholic every opinion or every practice we may find prevalent among Catholics; nor do we deem it compatible with our duty to our Church to pervert history so as to make it appear that in all things Catholics have been in all respects in the right, and non-Catholics in the wrong; and we are persuaded that it is poor policy to hush up, conceal, or disguise, what may not have been praiseworthy in our past history, instead of frankly exposing and explaining it. Ecclesiastical history should be studied and written with an eye single to the discovery and statement of strict historical truth, not with a view of serving any other purpose. We demand fair dealing from Protestants; we must, then, deal fairly with them—not as they too often do deal with us, but as we would have them deal with us. In this we only insist on one of the plainest and simplest dictates of Christian morality.

We do not, and it is not fitting, especially in these times, that we should, overlook the fact that we and non-Catholics are countrymen and fellow-citizens, and have many duties and interests in common. To neglect these would now be a crime in a Catholic publicist. It is of the last importance to us, as Catholics, to show that we really are aware of these, and approach them with earnestness, intelligence, and zeal. These common duties and common interests as men, freemen, and American citizens, are at this time the most pressing, the most urgent, and therefore the most religious of all our duties and interests. We devote, and as long as the civil war lasts, shall devote no inconsiderable portion of our Review to these duties and interests, and therefore to national and political subjects, in which the distinction between the orthodox and heterodox does not come into play. We think, on these matters we may say without arrogance or presumption, that we have gained the confidence and esteem of a large portion of our countrymen who have no special affection for our Church. But this

is no reproach to us as a Catholic, or injury to the Catholic cause, for we have compromised no Catholic principle and neglected no Catholic duty to gain it; we have only endeavored to discharge our duty as a man and a citizen.

We could not, if we would, in these times of national peril, when all, Catholics and non-Catholics, must unite, stand shoulder to shoulder in the serried ranks of the army to save the national life, against the armed hosts of rebellion, renew those long and sharp controversies with Protestants, in which we indulged in the earlier numbers of this Review. Such controversies would now be mistimed and misplaced, and could only damage the Catholic cause. We hold fast our faith, our love of truth, and our firm devotion to it; but we cannot throw his heresy into the face of the comrade who stands by our side to mingle his blood with ours in defence of our common country. When the war is over, and peace has returned, we may renew those controversies, if we live and occasion offers; but we cannot do it now. The words would not flow from our lips or from the point of our pen. The only controversy we can now encourage between Catholics and Protestants, is a generous emulation, in which shall best serve the country in this her hour of peril.

The Review will be none the less earnest and determined as a Catholic publication, because it leaves that controversy, by the way, a controversy which, in its old form, has no longer any special interest, and, in our judgment, any special utility. We think we can better serve our religion and Catholic civilization by devoting our pages to philosophical, political, national, scientific, and historical questions, which have only an indirect bearing on that special controversy, than we can by bringing it up now, when minds are in no mood to consider it. There is a higher and broader field of thought, and of truly Catholic thought, which, at present at least, the interests of religion, the evolution of truth, and the progress of society, require to be cultivated, and in cultivating which we may have the co-operation of the true scholars and scientific men of the whole civilized world. All we can gain in this field, be it more or less, will belong to Catholicity.

We say then, in answer to numerous inquiries, that the Review may be expected to appear next January as usual, the same old *Brownson's Quarterly Review*, which now closes the nineteenth year of existence, and will be sent, according to the terms printed on the cover, to all who order it.

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2. *Sacred Cosmogony, or Primitive Revelation demonstrated by the harmony of the facts of the Mosaic History with the principles of General Science.* Translated from the French of L'Abbé A. Sorignet. Saint Louis: Patrick Fox. 1862.

THE author of this work, unlike many who have written on the same subject, has studied, to some extent, the natural sciences. He has read a great deal in Geology, and understands much even of its details. He understands and recognizes the formation of the rocks of the earth, both sedimentary and igneous, by processes which are still going on in nature. He seems, too, quite familiar with the studies of the naturalist, both in the living and in the fossil world, and recognizes the

fossils as relics and representatives of real organic life, and entitled to a place in natural history, and here his agreement with geologists may be said to end. His attempted harmony is based on the supposition that they are fundamentally ignorant of the principles of their own science, in place of which he proposes a geology of his own upon new principles, and it is with this private science that he endeavors to "harmonize the facts of the Mosaic History." It is clear that this book can be of no practical value as a medium of harmony, since the geologists are required to yield the entire ground, and take lessons in their own science from this learned Abbé.

A fundamental principle of our author is that, in all the sciences, the starting-point should be taken from the first chapter of Genesis, which, moreover, he assumes is to be literally understood. "To it," he says, "the sciences must recur, to find their base and principle." And again, "When Moses received, through tradition, the cosmogony, and committed it to the guardianship of the chosen people, he laid the foundation of theology and of all human sciences."

We protest against this book, and against every similar attempt at defending the book of Genesis. All systematic science is undoubtedly human, and liable to error, the science of theology no less so than every other, since the human mind is not made infallible by being exercised upon divine things. Our faith is infallible, so far as it is really faith; but our reasonings upon faith are not, and nothing can be farther from infallibility than our private interpretations of a book so ancient as the Genesis. The supposition that naturalists, when they reason, are fools, and Biblical students sages, will never form a basis of reconciliation between revelation and natural science. This book stands in sad contrast with the writings of Dr. Wiseman on kindred subjects. Great advances certainly have been made by observers in every department of nature since the Cardinal wrote his treatises on "The connection of Science with Revealed Religion." Some of the particular theories of reconciliation which he proposed are no longer admissible; but the guiding spirit which directed his pen was a spirit of good sense and harmony, and marks the difference between a theologian of true liberal learning and the pedantic and pretentious Abbé, who puts forth this new apple of discord.

The author's meaning, we may add, is sometimes very obscure, arising we fear from the want of a clear conception of his own thought. The fault certainly cannot lie in the translation, which is in most excellent English, and evidently the work of a master hand.

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3. *The Home and Foreign Review*. London: Williams and Norgate. Quarterly. July, 1862. 8vo. pp. 288.

THE HOME AND FOREIGN REVIEW succeeds to the *Rambler*, or rather is the *Rambler* itself converted from a Monthly to a Quarterly. It is in the hands of Catholics, conducted by Catholics, and really in the interest of Catholicity, inasmuch as historical and scientific truth and taste and literature are always in its interest; but it is not specially a Theological Review, or in the technical sense a Catholic Review. It is intended to be read by the cultivated classes generally, whether Catho-

lic or non-Catholic, and to be for Catholics very much what the *London Quarterly* is for Church-of-England folk. It is a secular periodical, literary and scientific, designed mainly to give a higher tone and more activity to thought in the community generally, and in the Catholic community specially. Its appearance marks a new epoch in English Catholic literature. Hitherto English-speaking Catholics have had no general literature, or at best hardly enough to speak of. We have prayer-books, devotional books, ascetic books, controversial books, many of them really excellent; but we have hardly, if we except Lingard's History of England, a single work that is designed for general reading, and to contribute to the general culture and intelligence of the age. This is a damage, and has created an impression outside, that we Catholics are either incapable of competing successfully in general science and literature, or that we are prohibited by our religion from doing it.

Every Catholic bookseller knows that he is confined in the sale of his publications almost exclusively to the Catholic public, and that the Catholic public take up very slowly a purely literary or scientific work, not bearing on any point specially controverted between Catholics and Protestants. Hence the literature and science of the day are in the hands of the non-Catholic community, and the thought and intelligence of the age, aside from what is specially doctrinal or devotional, receive an anti-Catholic coloring even among Catholics themselves. We often complain of this, and charge the restriction of the sales of our own works to our own community to the prejudices or the bigotry of non-Catholics, who, we assume, will neither buy nor read a book written by a Catholic. This is a mistake. A good book, of high scientific and literary merit, of general interest, will find its way to the general public as readily if written by a Catholic as if written by a non-Catholic. No small amount of the bigotry and sectarianism we complain of are of our own creation. We live, speak, write, and act as if we were ourselves a sect relegated to some by-corner of the land, taking no interest in the affairs of the Nation or civilized society, any further than our special denominational interests are affected. We forget that our religion is catholic, and embraces all truth and all interests, and that there is an immense field which we hold and may cultivate in common even with the heterodox. The civilization of the modern world is after all Christian civilization, and accepts as well as demands Christian thought.

The editors of *The Home and Foreign Review* have had a good thought, and, if seconded by Catholics who understand their real interests, will do a good work. They will do much to bring us out of the narrow sectarianism in which we have been grovelling through the force of circumstances, and which is so repugnant to the genius of our religion, and to give Catholic scholarship a chance to live. They will do much to break down the barriers hitherto, in the English-speaking world, nearly impassable, between it and the general public, and we hope the rumor which reaches us, that Cardinal Wiseman has issued a pastoral against them is unfounded. The first number promises well, and is, with some slight exceptions, all we could wish it, and every way able to compete in the general public for favor with the very best of our English Reviews. We trust that no narrow-minded views or unmanly fears for orthodoxy, on the part of Catholics, will diminish its influence or impede its prosperity.

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